This paper details the experience of planning, orchestrating, teaching, and participating in a writing-intensive, team-taught, introductory philosophy class designed to expand the diversity of voices included in philosophical study. Accordingly, this article includes the various perspectives of faculty, TAs, and students in the class. Faculty authors discuss the administrative side of the course, including its planning and goals, its texts and structure, its working definition of “philosophy,” its balance of canonical and non-canonical texts, the significant resistance met in getting the (...) course approved, the complex pedagogical difficulties that attend teaching non-canonical texts, the motivation and execution of the course’s writing-intensive dimension, and a summary of student evaluations of the course. The TA authors reflect on the high level of student engagement and interest compared to other introductory philosophy courses, the perception that students found the material highly relevant to their own lives, and the capacity of the material to bring about philosophical insight for the instructors in the class. The student author offers a favorable account of the class and remarks on how the structure of the course aided the accessibility and relevance of the texts. (shrink)

Naturalism pervades Spinoza’s doctrines of The Ethics, but the contours of it often bewilder us. In this light, I consider the account of falsity, or having a false idea, as presented by Spinoza in Proposition thirty_five of the Second Part, its demonstration, and the subsequent note. Based on my interpretation I argue for the claim that his account has coherence and makes sense. Further, I examine the significance of what Spinoza says about falsity for comprehension of his philosophy overall, especially (...) as regards its contrasts with the philosophy of Descartes. (shrink)

In John Locke’s “Two Treatises of Government”, Locke defends a doctrine of universal rights along with a principle of liberty that rejects hereditary chattel slavery. While rejecting the practice of slavery at a theoretical level, Locke was nevertheless involved in ventures that show a commitment to the practice of slavery, e.g. his role in writing the “Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina”, a document sanctioning African slavery in Carolina. In contrast to recent interpreters who claim to reconcile Locke’s stance on universal rights (...) with his commitment to slavery, this paper argues that Locke’s view on slavery was, in fact, incongruous with his practical commitments outside of philosophy. While such a view raises a number of pedagogical problems, this paper argues that these can be attended to by giving greater attention to Locke’s view about the guidance that philosophy offers daily life. (shrink)

This paper exposits and defends the ideas of Marie de Gournay (1565-1645), a Parisian essayist and literary critic. Reading her as an early feminist, the author argues that Gournay’s work merits far more attention than it has received, especially her arguments which track the social formation of sex, her conscious opposition to male defamation of and mistreatment of women, and her appreciation of how male misogyny reflects the social privilege of the men who advance it. Gournay’s true genius, however, lies (...) in her argumentative method. Her goal is to get women to break the habit of deferring to men’s opinions about women and women’s experience. To do this, however, Gournay must first authorize her own arguments within a misogynist context and thus deploys the argumentative strategy of first appealing to socially sanctioned authorities to argue her points. Having framed Gournay’s work in these terms, the author considers several of Gournay’s interpretations of canonical figures, replies to contemporary critics of Gournay, and concludes by discussing the inclusion of Gournay’s work in an early modern Western philosophy course. (shrink)

I think there are no quality individuals which, in the way required, have the characteristics they ascribe to them. Without these features quality individuals will not serve the purpose for which Matthews and Cohen introduce them. So quite apart from the difficulties there are in Plato's account of predication, not only is Aristotle's account unacceptable as it stands, but also Matthews and Cohen's alteration offers no improvement. Indeed, it seems to me that no account of predication can be constructed which (...) will avoid a distinction between individuals and qualities which are not individuals, which some philosophers seem to find so distasteful. Matthews and Cohen's introduction of quality individuals is just one further attempt to avoid this distinction. In order to bring out what is wrong with the notion of quality individual I shall describe the context in which it is introduced and then discuss the mistakes I find in it. (shrink)

Many philosophers have maintained that secondary qualities are private mental entities. In this paper I use the discussions of H. A. Prichard, Berkeley and G. E. Moore on the status of secondary qualities to bring out the assumptions that underlie this view. One of these is that secondary qualities are particular. I show that Prichard holds these assumptions and then I attempt to diagnose why he holds them. In the course of this diagnosis I explore several senses of 'dependent' which (...) play a role in this view. Finally, I show that a causal dependence of secondary qualities upon the perceiver will not lead to the conclusion that secondary qualities are private unless the philosophical thesis that they are particular is already assumed. (shrink)