The question ‘For Spinoza, what body is identical with the human mind?’ deserves more attention than it has received. On first view it looks plausible enough simply to answer ‘the human body’, using the latter expression in its ordinary sense. Yet a second look, prompted by the question What then are we to make of the human brain?’, can easily create dissatisfaction and send us searching for firmer guidelines in Spinoza’s philosophy. I want to unearth such guidelines here. My investigation (...) will be undertaken mainly from the viewpoint of someone familiar with issues of current interest in philosophy of mind. It will therefore be helpful to begin the discussion with a brief attempt to classify his general position on mind and body from a contemporary point of view. (shrink)

EVEN IF ’MIRACLE’ MEANS A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE, A CASE CAN BE MADE FOR THINKING THAT MIRACLES ARE POSSIBLE, DETECTABLE, AND COMPATIBLE WITH SCIENCE. THE CASE WORKS BY DEFINING A LAW-VIOLATION AS AN EVENT OF A KIND THAT IS EPISTEMICALLY IMPOSSIBLE UNLESS THERE IS GOOD EVIDENCE OF A GOD’S PRODUCING AN INSTANCE. HUMAN AND NON-HUMAN OBJECTIONS ARE CONSIDERED AND ANSWERED.

Descartes' attempt to avoid the charge of circularity is unconvincing, And more recent efforts by scholars such as frankfurt and kenny to defend him on this point have not been entirely successful. The only way to remove the circle is to replace the search for perfect knowledge by a search for knowledge that is less than perfect, Yet not obviously attainable. Philosophers can then defend knowledge claims against metaphysical doubts without fear of having to beg the question, Indeed can even (...) adopt the cartesian principle that defending knowledge claims is impossible without engaging in this type of epistemology. (shrink)

Could John Locke defend his view that the knowledge we acquire in intuition and demonstration is infallible, and should he try to defend it? Peter Schouls thinks the project is unviable, and I think Schouls is right. But I also think Locke should not even bother trying. I shall elaborate on the argument that he could not defend the view, indicate why I think he should abandon infallibility, given his other views, and then investigate what he might usefully say about (...) knowledge and certainty if he were persuaded to abandon it. (shrink)

Robert richman tries to defend a justified-True-Belief analysis of knowledge by attacking the assumption that a justified belief can be false. But, Although 'p is justified but false' is incoherent if asserted about the way things actually are, It is not incoherent if asserted about a supposed situation. And critics of a justified-True-Belief analysis need only do the latter.

1. Introduction. Can Berkeleian idealism draw any support from the following argument?

The word ‘dualism’ can be used to pick out at least four different theories concerning the relationship between mind and body. A mind and a body are two different entities and each is “had” by a man. A man is thus a composite being with two components, one “inner”, the other “outer”. You, for example, are a man and your mind is “inner” in the sense that you alone can reflectively experience yourself thinking, or feeling pain, or seeing colours . (...) I can in a sense observe you thinking, but only by observing you use your body in certain ways—e.g. to make certain sounds, write certain things, look at the pages of an open book and frown. My “experience” of you thinking is thus not a reflective experience. Your body is “outer”, on the other hand, in the sense that you cannot experience it or its properties in any exclusive way. That is, in whatever sense you can be said to experience your body, someone else can equally be said to experience it. (shrink)

Some moral philosophers, Such as ross and moore, Think that, Whereas we can be sure of limited judgments concerning "prima facie" duties and intrinsic values, We cannot be sure of judgments of rightness or wrongness. Two arguments for this type of scepticism are examined. The first works only if we assume, With ross, That '"prima facie" duty' is a moral notion, Not an epistemic notion. The second works only if we assume that there is no difference between uncertainty about a (...) moral judgment and uncertainty about the evidence that bears on the judgment. Since neither assumption is sound, Neither argument works. (shrink)

Whether any beliefs are justified nonempirically is important in a debate with sceptics who deny empirical justification, if the parties involved in the debate claim that their position is justified. Sceptics must assume that their premises are justified nonempirically, to avoid begging the question. The main problem with advocating nonempirical justification is that accounts tend to be either too niggardly or too generous, implying either that nonempirical justification is impossible or that peer adversaries must be equally justified. The way to (...) solve this problem is to recognize that justification involves satisfying two conditions: having reason to hold a belief and having a ground for being confident about one's reason. The reason can be nonempirical even though the ground is almost always empirical. This distinction can be used to resolve a number of familiar concerns. (shrink)

Suppose that a jury in a murder trial brings in a verdict of guilty and one of the jurors still wonders whether the verdict is a good one, although he is not inclined to try to have it reversed. Is his attitude coherent?