Chapter INTRODUCTION Charles Sanders Peirce is quickly becoming the dominant figure in the history of American philosophy. The breadth and depth of his work ...

In this engaging book, Douglas Anderson begins with the assumption that philosophy—the Greek love of wisdom—is alive and well in American culture. At the same time, professional philosophy remains relatively invisible. Anderson traverses American life to find places in the wider culture where professional philosophy in the distinctively American tradition can strike up a conversation. How might American philosophers talk to us about our religious experience, or political engagement, or literature—or even, popular music? Anderson’s second aim is to find places (...) where philosophy happens in nonprofessional guises—cultural places such as country music, rock’n roll, and Beat literature. He not only enlarges the tradition of American philosophers such as John Dewey and William James by examining lesser-known figures such as Henry Bugbee and Thomas Davidson, but finds the theme and ideas of American philosophy in some unexpected places, such as the music of Hank Williams, Tammy Wynette, and Bruce Springsteen, and the writingsof Jack Kerouac.The idea of “philosophy Americana” trades on the emergent genre of “music Americana,” rooted in traditional themes and styles yet engaging our present experiences. The music is “popular” but not thoroughly driven by economic considerations, and Anderson seeks out an analogous role for philosophical practice, where philosophy and popular culture are co-adventurers in the life of ideas. Philosophy Americana takes seriously Emerson’s quest for the extraordinary in the ordinary and James’s belief that popular philosophy can still be philosophy. (shrink)

Each volume in the Purdue University Press Series in the History of Philosophy examines the fundamental ideas of a single philosopher, presenting one basic text by the thinker in question, and supplementing this by “a very thorough and up-to-date commentary.” The format is most successful when a reasonably short classic work containing the subject’s most important claims can be found. We might expect it to work much less well with a thinker like Peirce, serious study of whose work cannot avoid (...) taking seriously a large number of different papers and lectures: good reasons can be found for regarding any selection of a basic text unsatisfactory. It is thus a pleasure to report that Douglas Anderson met this challenge with considerable success. The commentary is of very high quality; and his choice of texts, although initially surprising, works very well. (shrink)

Peirce's cosmogony involves an apparent tension concerning the statusof initial ideas. They appear both dependent and independent. Peirce appears to resolve this tension, maintaining elements of both his realism and his idealism in his cosmogony, by asserting that God serves as a necessary condition for the reality of the initial ideas and by holding, through his agapasticism, that the ideas, as firsts, retain an element of spontaneity or freedom. From another angle, it is plausible to suggest that for Peirce God (...) functions as a continuum of other continua. Such a view allows Peirce to understand evolutionas a developmental teleology in which both order and spontaneity playsignificant roles. (shrink)

In his "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of Goc" (1908), Charles Peirce argued for two dimensions of belief in God's reality. On the one side, he maintained that this belief would be useful for guiding the conduct of life; on the other side, he maintained that the belief could function as the first stage in a scientific inquiry. My suggestion in this paper is that we examine the last of Peirce's 1903 lectures on pragmatism at Harvard to see how (...) the possibility of this dual function arises out of his late theory of cognition in which the functional certainty of perception is brought to close quarters with the provisionality of hypotheses. The upshot is that for Peirce a healthful religious belief should internally "marry" science and religion —theory and practice — by allowing provisional and vague conceptions of God to carry on the work of guiding conduct. /// No texto "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908), Charles Peirce defende que há duas dimensões de crença na realidade de Deus. Afirma, por um lado, que esta crença poderia ser útil para orientar o comportamento (conduct of life); por outro, que ela poderia ser como que o primeiro escalão numa investigação científica. A minha sugestão neste artigo é que, examinámos as últimas conferências de Peirce de 1903 sobre o pragmatismo em Harvard para ver como a possibilidade desta dupla função surge da sua última teoria de conhecimento (cognition) em que a certeza funcional de percepção é usada para aproximar o aspecto provisório das hipóteses. A consequência disso é que para Peirce uma saudável crença religiosa deve "juntar" internamente ciência e religião - teoria e prática - permitindo as concepções provisórias e vagas de Deus para continuar a tarefa de orientar o comportamento. /// Dans ce texte "Un argument négligé pour la réalité de Dieu" (1908), Charles Peirce soutient qu'il y a deux dimensions de croyance en la réalité de Dieu. Il afflrme, d'un côté, que cette croyance pourrait être utile pour orienter le comportement (conduct of life) et, par ailleurs, qu'elle pourrait être pour ainsi dire le premier niveau dans une recherche scientifique. Ma suggestion dans le présent article est que nous examinions les dernières conférences de Peirce en 1903 sur le pragmatisme à Harvard pour voir comment Ia possibilite de cette double fonction surgit de sa dernière théorie de la connaissance dans laquelle la certitude fonctionnelle de perception est utilisée pour aborder l'aspect provisoire des hypothèses. La conséquence en est que pour Peirce une saine croyance religieuse doit "unir" intrinsèquement science et religion - théorie et pratique - en permettant les conceptions provisoires et vagues de Dieu. (shrink)

This article borrows from the american tradition of emerson, james, and peirce to argue that religious belief may properly originate in feeling, willing, or reasoning. i also maintain that such belief is not consummated until all three aspects of one's being--feeling, willing, and thinking--have been addressed. this approach both democratizes the possibility of religious belief and requires of full belief that it be applicable to all aspects of one's life.

Under the influence of rationalism and various forms of absolute idealism in the nineteenth century, teleology took on the nature of fixity; the universe was held to be fulfilling a definite telos. Such teleology defined a closed universe. In the latter half of the same century the American pragmatists, under the influence of Bergson and Renouvier, began to develop their notion of an open universe: one whose possibilities were not predetermined but were evolving creatively. This necessarily involved a change in (...) the understanding of teleology as reflected, for example, in C. S. Peirce’s 1892 account of “developmental teleology.” These changes in turn led to the “open universe” views of Whitehead, Hartshorne, and process theology in general. Within this historical framework one view which deserves some recognition for its role in this transition is often overlooked, that is, the personalism of Borden Parker Bowne. Bowne’s personalism suggests both the need for redefining teleology and two possible avenues for accomplishing such redefinition. (shrink)

The essays in this book have grown out of conversations between the authors and their colleagues and students over the last decade and a half.

This little book is an interesting collection, though one that may not appeal to those who conceive “philosophy” narrowly. The essays are drawn from a conference celebrating the 300th anniversary of Berkeley’s birth, and are both historical and philosophical in nature. Throughout the book the scholarship seems to be of high order, and the writing and argument are clear.

This little book is an interesting collection, though one that may not appeal to those who conceive “philosophy” narrowly. The essays are drawn from a conference celebrating the 300th anniversary of Berkeley’s birth, and are both historical and philosophical in nature. Throughout the book the scholarship seems to be of high order, and the writing and argument are clear.

In 1905 William James wrote an essay in McClure's Magazine recalling the importance to his own work of the Scottish-born philosopher Thomas Davidson. In the essay, James states that Davidson was "essentially a teacher." What is interesting when one looks at Davidson's life and work is that, for Davidson, teaching does seem to be an essential feature of what it means to be a philosopher. Here, I develop how Davidson construes this linking of philosophy and teaching with a concluding emphasis (...) on the two schools he established: Glenmore, a summer philosophy program in the Adirondacks and the "Breadwinners' College," an open school he began for working persons in New York City. I offer this as a discussion paper so that James's recollection of Davidson's importance to his own work may provoke us to consider how we presently understand the linking of teaching and philosophy. This seems especially appropriate for an academic culture such as ours in which much of our time is spent teaching and in which we are often primarily evaluated by a separate category of professional "research." The American tradition has "lost" any number of its important.. (shrink)

Possibility of the Aesthetic Experience, edited by Michael H. Mitias, is an interesting and diverse collection of essays. It is difficult to know where to begin to evaluate such a collection; the styles move from the quasi-phenomenological of Arnold Berleant’s “Experience and Theory in Aesthetics,” to the historical and technical analyses of Carla Cordua’s “A Critique of Aesthetics” and Bohdan Dziemidok’s “Controversy About Aesthetic Attitude.” In this brief review, therefore, I shall address the book in a way that I would (...) use it—as a supporting text in an advanced undergraduate aesthetics course. (shrink)

The title of this book, Thought and Nature, despite its common sound, is entirely appropriate. Arthur Collins pursues various strands of rationalist philosophy and does so through a series of themes held together by a general interest. This interest is the intertwining of epistemology and ontology, the relation of thought and nature. This loose focus enhances the book’s readability since it holds together what are otherwise independent essays and at the same time does not overwork a single theme by merely (...) playing it out in different settings. Moreover, as an exercise in the history of philosophy this approach has the benefit of not oversimplifying the evolution of ideas, a tendency some contemporary historians of philosophy have with respect to the development and demise of rationalism. The issue here is significant, for, as Collins maintains: “When we come to consider philosophy after Descartes, the stark contrast and opposition between rationalism and empiricism withers away”. (shrink)

The title of this book, Thought and Nature, despite its common sound, is entirely appropriate. Arthur Collins pursues various strands of rationalist philosophy and does so through a series of themes held together by a general interest. This interest is the intertwining of epistemology and ontology, the relation of thought and nature. This loose focus enhances the book’s readability since it holds together what are otherwise independent essays and at the same time does not overwork a single theme by merely (...) playing it out in different settings. Moreover, as an exercise in the history of philosophy this approach has the benefit of not oversimplifying the evolution of ideas, a tendency some contemporary historians of philosophy have with respect to the development and demise of rationalism. The issue here is significant, for, as Collins maintains: “When we come to consider philosophy after Descartes, the stark contrast and opposition between rationalism and empiricism withers away”. (shrink)

In The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal, Victor Kestenbaum swims against the current of Dewey scholarship. He declares for and gives close articulation to the importance of transcendence in the philosophy of John Dewey. The guiding thread of the book is "the proposal that Dewey never outgrew his idealistic period. His philosophical achievement is not to be located in his naturalism but in the frontiers along which the natural and the transcendental touch" (137). Kestenbaum does not argue that (...) Dewey defends a supernatural sense of transcendence; instead, he documents the modes of transcendence that, for Dewey, reveal themselves within the flow of experience. This is a learned and carefully developed book, one that will provoke pragmatists to think carefully about how growth, self-revision, and... (shrink)

Library of Living Philosophers volume on Hilary Putnam with critical essays, Putnam's autobiography and his replies.

This collection of essays aims to mark a place for American philosophy as it moves into the twenty-first century. Taking their cue from the work of Peirce, James, Santayana, Dewey, Mead, Buchler, and others, the contributors assess and employ philosophy as an activity taking place within experience and culture. Within the broad background of the American tradition, the essays reveal a variety of approaches to the transition in which American philosophy is currently engaged. Some of the pieces argue from an (...) historical dialogue with the tradition, some are more polemically involved with American philosophy’s current status among the contemporary philosophical "schools," and still others seek to reveal the possibilities for the future of American philosophy. In thus addressing past, present, and future, the pieces, taken together, outline a trajectory for American philosophy that reinvents its importance from a new angle of vision. (shrink)

To read any book by Paul Weiss is to enter into an ongoing philosophical discussion. Emphatics is no exception. Here Weiss takes up some issues from previous work but from a new angle of vision. Much of what he says also moves beyond the content of earlier writings, which is as it should be. "A creative, systematic philosopher," Weiss says, "is somewhat like a poet rewriting a long poem, preserving some parts of earlier versions in later ones. What has been (...) done is not invalidated, but moved beyond" (37). Another characteristic Weissian feature marks Emphatics: it is difficult to read. The ideas themselves are difficult, and Weiss doesn't go out of his way to coddle his reader. Serving as... (shrink)