Data gathered by investigators are used to test the validity of a specific scientific hypothesis. When the hypothesis relates to the biology of a disease or its treatment, then data sets may contain specific and identifiable medical information. Since the information in a clinical data set was gathered to test a specific hypothesis and there is usually a sponsor interested in the outcome, the issue of who owns the data is a critical one. In my opinion, data from both publicly (...) and privately funded research should be made available, in a format that protects confidentiality and intellectual property rights, to interested and responsible parties within a reasonable period of time after publication. (shrink)

At the heart of Drazen Prelec’s chapter is the distinction between outcome utility and diagnostic utility. There is a particular distinction in the literature on causal networks (Pearl 2000), namely the distinction between observing and intervening, that maps onto Prelec’s distinction between diagnostic and outcome utility. I will explore the connection between both frameworks.

Autor razmatra i kritizira dva argumenta iz višesmislice: S. Pinkerov argument iz višesmislice za hipotezu takozvanoga ‘jezika misli’ i argument iz višesmislice protiv davidsonovske ‘semantike istinosnih uvjeta’ što ga je predložila K. P. Parsons. Oslanjajući se uglavnom na G. Harmana i D. Davidsona, on nastoji pokazati da Pinker/Parsons argumenti dijele jednu zajedničku strategiju i također impliciraju i/ilisugeriraju jedan, po njegovu sudu neprihvatljiv, pojam višesmislice. Raspravljajući o Pinkerovu argumentu, on nastoji objasniti na koji su način razlike u tumačenju višesmislice reflektirane u (...) promjenama javnih i svima dostupnih aspekata uporabe jezika. U diskusiji pak o argumentu protiv ‘semantike istinosnih uvjeta’ on, contra Parsons,nastoji objasniti u kojem je smislu moguće govoriti o istinosnim uvjetima za višesmislice, a da to ne znači prijetnju Davidsonovom pristupu teoriji značenja. Autor, na koncu, brani teoriju višesmislice kao jednoga vida neznanja/neodlučivosti i tvrdi da ta teorija predstavlja i plauzibilniju i realističniju teorijsku opciju od one nakojoj su Pinker i Parsons temeljili svoje argumente, a koju nalazimo i kod Aristotela , K. Bacha ili W. Lycana.The author explores and criticises two arguments from ambiguity: S.Pinker’s argument from ambiguity in support of the ‘Language of Thought’ hypothesis, and the argument from ambiguity proposed by K. P. Parsons against Davidsonian ‘semantics of truth-conditions’. Leaning primarily on G. Harman and D. Davidson he aims to demonstrate that the Pinker/Parsons arguments share a common strategy, on the one hand, and imply and/or suggest, as he claims, an implausible view of ambiguity, on the other. Discussing Pinker’s argument he further attempts to elucidate the ways in which the modifications of public and inter-subjectively accessible aspectsof the use of language reflect the differences in interpretations of an ambiguity. His exploration of the argument against ‘semantics of truth-conditions’ then aims to explain, contra Parsons, the sense in which talk about the truth conditions for ambiguity does not implicate a threat to Davidson’s perspective on the theory of meaning. Finally, the author argues for the view of ambiguity as a kind of ignorance/undecidability that, as he contends, represents both more realistic and more plausible theoretical option than the one on which both Pinker and Parsons found their arguments and which also comes out in Aristotle , K. Bach and W. Lycan. (shrink)