Beliefs and desires are linked with one another by an obvious kind of duality. Everyone assumes that a person's beliefs may be, to some extent, ascertained by seeing how he acts: for we suppose that he will do the things which he believes will fulfil his wishes, and avoid doing what he thinks will frustrate them. Similarly, his desires may, to some extent, be ascertained by seeing how he acts; for if we know what he thinks about the results of (...) his actions, we suppose that the expected results are desired or not disliked and those believed unlikely are disliked or undesired. We have three variables, conduct, desire, and belief; and we suppose that there is some equation by which the first in conjunction with one of the others implies a determinate value of the third. In principle, it should be equally possible to deduce conduct from belief and desire. But that seems of less metaphysical interest, because we think of actions as open to observation in a straightforward way, whereas we are more dubious about beliefs and desires. (shrink)

In “Intrinsic value: some comments on the work of G. E. Moore” , I argued that Moore implies that intrinsic value is measurable, but has never suggested any method of measuring it. In this note I shall outline a method which is derived, but not exactly copied, from some of the analyses which economic theorists have given of “cardinal utility”. A survey of some of the economic discussions is given by S. A. Ozga in “Measurable utility and probability”.

Nowadays the word “ conscience ” has an old-fashioned, obsolete air. I shall try to guess at the reasons, and then I shall consider whether they are good reasons.

The object of this paper is to review and examine some of the things which G. E. Moore says about the nature of intrinsic value, about the sort of objects which possess it, and about the method of ascertaining the intrinsic values of things. Most of the discussion will be based on Principia Ethica : for in that work Moore stated the substance of his ethical theories once and for all. He explicitly changed his mind later on a few specific (...) issues, which will be noted when they arerelevant: and I shall argue in my fourth section that he also changed his mind in one matter without acknowledging that he was doing so. With those exceptions, it seems to me that his later writings differ from Principia chiefly by their style of presentation and by the introduction of some new distinctions, and I shall think myself justified, on most points, in treating them as an aid to amplifying or refining the position which Moore adopted in Principia.The other works to be referred to are Ethics ; “The conception of intrinsic value”, written about 40 years ago and published in Philosophical Studies; “Is goodness a quality?” in Arist. Soc. Sup. Vol. 1932; and “A reply to my critics” in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, edited by Schilpp. The last work will be cited as Reply. (shrink)

Austin E. Duncan-Jones; Definition of Identity of Structure, Analysis, Volume 2, Issue 1-2, 1 October 1934, Pages 14–18, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/2.1-2.14.

Austin Duncan-Jones; I—Notional Choice: The Presidential Address, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 61, Issue 1, 1 June 1961, Pages 1–18, https://.