224 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Duncan Pritchard [225]Duncan H. Pritchard [1]
See also
Duncan Pritchard
University of Edinburgh
  1. Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   206 citations  
  2. The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge? -- Achievement without (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   79 citations  
  3. Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
  4. Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):440-453.
    Reductive intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  5.  65
    Epistemological Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Epistemological disjunctivism in outline -- Favouring versus discriminating epistemic support -- Radical scepticsim.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   31 citations  
  6. Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
    In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti- luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck. Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti- luck epistemology can be developed in new directions.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   83 citations  
  7. Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):133 - 151.
    This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current thinking about (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   56 citations  
  8.  90
    The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.
    This essay offers a rearticulation and defence of the modal account of luck that the author developed in earlier work . In particular, the proposal is situated within a certain methodology, a component of which is paying due attention to the cognitive science literature on luck ascriptions. It is shown that with the modal account of luck properly articulated it can adequately deal with some of the problems that have recently been offered against it, and that the view has a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  9. Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth.Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):335-357.
    A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue-theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  10. Williamson on Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Eighteen leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, scepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's central claim that knowledge is a mental state.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  11. Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):181-199.
    According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge-how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  12. Varieties of Externalism.J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):63-109.
    Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we then examine first (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  13.  89
    Epistemic Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (11):550-571.
    The goal of this paper is to mark the transition from an anti-luck epistemology to an anti-risk epistemology, and to explain in the process how the latter has advantages over the former. We begin with an account of anti-luck epistemology and the modal account of luck that underpins it. Then we consider the close inter-relationships between luck and risk, and in the process set out the modal account of risk that is a natural extension of the modal account of luck. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  14.  63
    Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):70-90.
    Support is canvassed for a novel solution to the sceptical problem regarding our knowledge of the external world. Key to this solution is the claim that what initially looks like a single problem is in fact two logically distinct problems. In particular, there are two putative sceptical paradoxes in play here, which each trade on distinctive epistemological theses. It is argued that the ideal solution to radical scepticism would thus be a biscopic proposal—viz., a two-pronged, integrated, undercutting treatment of both (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  15. Recent Work on Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):85 - 110.
    Recent discussion in epistemology has seen a huge growth in interest in the topic of epistemic value. In this paper I describe the background to this new movement in epistemology and critically survey the contemporary literature on this topic.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   42 citations  
  16. Safety-Based Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:33-45.
    This paper explores the prospects for safety-based theories of knowledge in the light of some recent objections.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   34 citations  
  17.  84
    Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.
    A certain construal of the Gettier problem is offered, according to which this problem concerns the task of identifying the anti-luck condition on knowledge. A methodology for approaching this construal of the Gettier problem—anti-luck epistemology—is set out, and the utility of such a methodology is demonstrated. It is argued that a range of superficially distinct cases which are meant to pose problems for anti-luck epistemology are in fact related in significant ways. It is claimed that with these cases properly understood, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  18. Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:19-43.
    It is argued that a popular way of accounting for the distinctive value of knowledge by appeal to the distinctive value of cognitive achievements fails because it is a mistake to identify knowledge with cognitive achievements. Nevertheless, it is claimed that understanding, properly conceived, is a type of cognitive achievement, and thus that the distinctive value of cognitive achievements can explain why understanding is of special value.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  19.  90
    Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism.Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):84-103.
    According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where this means that the agent's cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. We build on this critique to argue that insofar as agents epistemically (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  20. Recent Work on Radical Skepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):215-257.
    This discussion surveys recent developments in the treatment of the epistemological problem of skepticism. These are arguments which attack our knowledge of certain truths rather than, say, our belief in the existence of certain entities. In particular, this article focuses on the radical versions of these skeptical arguments, arguments which purport to show that knowledge is, for the most part, impossible, rather than just that we lack knowledge in a particular discourse. Although most of the key recent developments in this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   37 citations  
  21. Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):255-272.
    In his final notebooks, published as On Certainty , Wittgenstein offers a distinctive conception of the nature of reasons. Central to this conception is the idea that at the heart of our rational practices are essentially arational commitments. This proposal marks a powerful challenge to the standard picture of the structure of reasons. In particular, it has been thought that this account might offer us a resolution of the traditional scepticism/anti-scepticism debate. It is argued, however, that some standard ways of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  22.  26
    Legal Risk, Legal Evidence and the Arithmetic of Criminal Justice.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Jurisprudence 9 (1):108-119.
    It is argued that the standard way that the criminal justice debate regarding the permissible extent of wrongful convictions is cast is fundamentally flawed. In particular, it is claimed that there is an inherent danger in focussing our attention in this debate on different ways of measuring the probabilistic likelihood of wrongful conviction and then evaluating whether these probabilities are unacceptably high. This is because such probabilistic measures are clumsy ways of capturing the level of risk involved, to the extent (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  23. The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    A common epistemological assumption in contemporary bioethics held b y both proponents and critics of non-traditional forms of cognitive enhancement is that cognitive enhancement aims at the facilitation of the accumulation of human knowledge. This paper does three central things. First, drawing from recent work in epistemology, a rival account of cognitive enhancement, framed in terms of the notion of cognitive achievement rather than knowledge, is proposed. Second, we outline and respond to an axiological objection to our proposal that draws (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  24. Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.
    G. E. Moore famously offered a strikingly straightforward response to the radical sceptic which simply consisted of the claim that one could know, on the basis of one's knowledge that one has hands, that there exists an external world. In general, the Moorean response to scepticism maintains that we can know the denials of sceptical hypotheses on the basis of our knowledge of everyday propositions. In the recent literature two proposals have been put forward to try to accommodate, to varying (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   42 citations  
  25. Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  26.  77
    Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (3):436-461.
    In this article it is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Two applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti-risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal anti-luck condition. Second, to legal (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  27. McDowell and the New Evil Genius.Ram Neta & Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):381–396.
    (NEG) is widely accepted both by internalist and by externalists. In fact, there have been very few opponents of (NEG). Timothy Williamson (e.g., 2000) rejects (NEG), for reasons that have by now received a great deal of scrutiny.2 John McDowell also rejects (NEG), but his reasons have not received the scrutiny they deserve. This is in large part because those reasons have not been well understood. We believe that McDowell’s challenge to (NEG) is important, worthy of fair assessment, and maybe (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   26 citations  
  28. The Structure of Sceptical Arguments.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):37 - 52.
    It is nowadays taken for granted that the core radical sceptical arguments all pivot upon the principle that the epistemic operator in question is 'closed' under known entailments. Accordingly, the standard anti-sceptical project now involves either denying closure or retaining closure by amending how one understands other elements of the sceptical argument. However, there are epistemic principles available to the sceptic which are logically weaker than closure but achieve the same result. Accordingly the contemporary debate fails to engage with the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   29 citations  
  29. Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology.Spyrion Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard - 2013 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (8):105-120.
    The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of individualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds that social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be given priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific aim of radically transforming the latter to fit the results and (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  30.  74
    Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education.Duncan Pritchard - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):236-247.
    A certain conception of the relevance of virtue epistemology to the philosophy of education is set out. On this conception, while the epistemic goal of education might initially be promoting the pupil's cognitive success, it should ultimately move on to the development of the pupil's cognitive agency. A continuum of cognitive agency is described, on which it is ultimately cognitive achievement, and thus understanding, which is the epistemic goal of education. This is contrasted with a view on which knowledge is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  31.  52
    Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  32. What is the Swamping Problem?Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  33. Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    This paper surveys attempts in the recent literature to offer a modal condition on knowledge as a way of resolving the problem of scepticism. In particular, safety-based and sensitivity-based theories of knowledge are considered in detail, along with the anti-sceptical prospects of an explicitly anti-luck epistemology.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  34. Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):245-268.
    This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so-called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recognise an important distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  35. Review: Apt Performance and Epistemic Value. [REVIEW]Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):407 - 416.
  36. McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):273-294.
    At the very least, externalists about content will accept something like the following claim.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  37. Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.
    The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call “veritic” epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I call (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   21 citations  
  38. Contrastivism, Evidence, and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):305 – 323.
    I offer a critical treatment of the contrastivist response to the problem of radical scepticism. In particular, I argue that if contrastivism is understood along externalist lines then it is unnecessary, while if it is understood along internalist lines then it is intellectually dissatisfying. Moreover, I claim that a closer examination of the conditions under which it is appropriate to claim knowledge reveals that we can accommodate many of the intuitions appealed to by contrastivists without having to opt for this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  39.  51
    Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):437–447.
    I discuss John Greco's paper 'What's Wrong with Contextualism?', in which he outlines a theory of knowledge which is virtue-theoretic while also being allied to a form of attributor contextualism about 'knows'.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  40. Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):325-339.
    This paper principally argues for two controversial theses: that understanding, unlike knowledge, is distinctively valuable, and that understanding is the proper goal of inquiry.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  41.  73
    The Value of Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - The Philosophers' Magazine 16 (26):54-55.
    The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  42. What is This Thing Called Knowledge?Duncan Pritchard - 2006 - Routledge.
    What is Knowledge? Where does it come from? Can we know anything at all? This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epistemology including recent developments such as virtue epistemology and contextualism. Duncan Pritchard discusses traditional issues and contemporary ideas in thirteen easily digestible sections, including: the value of knowledge the structure of knowledge virtues and faculties perception testimony and memory induction scepticism. _What (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  43. Wittgenstein on Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - In Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press.
    An overview of Wittgenstein’s remarks on scepticism in On Certainty is offered, especially with regard to the notion of a “hinge proposition”. Several possible interpretations of the anti-sceptical import of this text are then critically assessed, with each view situated within the contemporary literature on scepticism.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  44. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):434-455.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  45. Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
    A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best thought of not as (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  46.  67
    Seeing It for Oneself: Perceptual Knowledge, Understanding, and Intellectual Autonomy.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):29-42.
    The idea of is explored. It is claimed that there is something epistemically important about acquiring one's knowledge first-hand via active perception rather than second-hand via testimony. Moreover, it is claimed that this kind of active perceptual seeing it for oneself is importantly related to the kind of understanding that is acquired when one possesses a correct and appropriately detailed explanation of how cause and effect are related. In both cases we have a kind of seeing it for oneself which (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  47. The Epistemology of Testimony.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):326–348.
    Let us focus on what I take it is the paradigm case of testimony—the intentional transfer of a belief from one agent to another, whether in the usual way via a verbal assertion made by the one agent to the other, or by some other means, such as through a note.1 So, for example, John says to Mary that the house is on fire (or, if you like, ‘texts’ her this message on her phone), and Mary, upon hearing this, forms (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  48. Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):969-990.
    A very natural view about perceptual knowledge is articulated, one on which perceptual knowledge is closely related to perceptual discrimination, and which fits well with a relevant alternatives account of knowledge. It is shown that this kind of proposal faces a problem, and various options for resolving this difficulty are explored. In light of this discussion, a two-tiered relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge is offered which avoids the closure problem. It is further shown how this proposal can: accommodate our (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  49. How to Be a Neo-Moorean.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 68--99.
    Much of the recent debate regarding scepticism has focussed on a certain template sceptical argument and a rather restricted set of proposals concerning how one might deal with that argument. Throughout this debate the ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism is often cited as a paradigm example of how one should not respond to the sceptical argument, so conceived. As I argue in this paper, however, there are ways of resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic. In particular, I consider the prospects (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  50.  98
    The Value of Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1):86-103.
    The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
1 — 50 / 224