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  1. Paradoxes of Intensionality.Dustin Tucker & Richmond H. Thomason - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411.
    We identify a class of paradoxes that is neither set-theoretical nor semantical, but that seems to depend on intensionality. In particular, these paradoxes arise out of plausible properties of propositional attitudes and their objects. We try to explain why logicians have neglected these paradoxes, and to show that, like the Russell Paradox and the direct discourse Liar Paradox, these intensional paradoxes are recalcitrant and challenge logical analysis. Indeed, when we take these paradoxes seriously, we may need to rethink the commonly (...)
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    Intensionality and Paradoxes in Ramsey’s ‘the Foundations of Mathematics’.Dustin Tucker - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (1):1-25.
    In , Frank Ramsey separates paradoxes into two groups, now taken to be the logical and the semantical. But he also revises the logical system developed in Whitehead and Russellthe intensional paradoxess interest in these problems seriously, then the intensional paradoxes deserve more widespread attention than they have historically received.
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    Paradoxes and Restricted Quantification: A Non‐Hierarchical Approach.Dustin Tucker - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):190-199.
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    Paradoxes and the Limits of Theorizing About Propositional Attitudes.Dustin Tucker - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    Propositions are central to at least most theorizing about the connection between our mental lives and the world: we use them in our theories of an array of attitudes including belief, desire, hope, fear, knowledge, and understanding. Unfortunately, when we press on these theories, we encounter a relatively neglected family of paradoxes first studied by Arthur Prior. I argue that these paradoxes present a fatal problem for most familiar resolutions of paradoxes. In particular, I argue that truth-value gap, contextualist, situation (...)
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    Variable Priorities and Exclusionary Reasons in Input/Output Logic.Dustin Tucker - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (6):947-964.
    Jörg Hansen, John Horty, and Xavier Parent and Leendert van der Torre have all recently described some sort of nonmonotonic logic to model reasons and their interactions. Horty’s framework is broader in scope than the other two, encompassing both reasoning about the relative strengths of reasons and reasoning about which reasons to consider in the first place. Hansen discusses a plethora of approaches and examples, including Horty’s, arguing that his preferred system best captures our intuitions. And Parent and van der (...)
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    Montagovian Paradoxes and Hyperintensional Content.Dustin Tucker - 2017 - Studia Logica 105 (1):153-171.
    A number of authors have taken a family of paradoxes, whose members trace back to theorems due either in whole or in part to Richard Montague, to pose a serious, possibly fatal challenge to theories of fine-grained, hyperintensional content. These paradoxes all assume that we can represent attitudes such as knowledge and belief with sentential predicates, and this assumption is at the heart of the purported challenge: the thought is that we must reject such predicates to avoid the paradoxes, and (...)
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    Education for Thinking.Dustin Tucker - 2010 - Teaching Philosophy 33 (4):428-432.