Order:
See also
Dylan Black
Xi'an Jiao Tong University
  1.  64
    A Non‐Normative Account of Assertion.Dylan Black - 2019 - Ratio 32:53-62.
    Many contemporary philosophers argue that assertion is governed by an epistemic norm. In particular, many defend the knowledge account of assertion, which says that one should assert only what one knows. Here, I defend a non‐normative alternative to the knowledge account that I call the repK account of assertion. According to the repK account, assertion represents knowledge, but it is not governed by a constitutive epistemic rule. I show that the repK account offers a more straightforward interpretation of the conversational (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2.  78
    The Concept of Consciousness and the Bogeyman of Conflation.Dylan Black - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (7-8):28-50.
    Many philosophers of mind believe that the term 'consciousness' is ambiguous and charge that theoretical work on consciousness is often guilty of conflating distinct concepts of consciousness. I criticize the best arguments for this view -- what I call the multiple concepts view -- and I offer some preliminary support for a new brand of univocalism according to which the concept of consciousness is a cluster concept. In particular I address three lines of evidence for the multiple concepts view: (1) (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  16
    Analyzing the Etiological Functions of Consciousness.Dylan Black - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1:1-26.
    Scientists disagree about which capacities a functional analysis of consciousness should target. To address this disagreement, I propose that a good functional analysis should target the etiological functions of consciousness. The trouble is that most hypotheses about the etiological origins of consciousness presuppose particular functional analyses. In recent years, however, a small number of scientists have begun to offer evolutionary hypotheses that are relatively theory neutral. I argue that their hypotheses can serve an independent standard for evaluating among theories of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  10
    Analyzing the etiological functions of consciousness.Dylan Black - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):191-216.
    Scientists disagree about which capacities a functional analysis of consciousness should target. To address this disagreement, I propose that a good functional analysis should target the etiological functions of consciousness. The trouble is that most hypotheses about the etiological origins of consciousness presuppose particular functional analyses. In recent years, however, a small number of scientists have begun to offer evolutionary hypotheses that are relatively theory neutral. I argue that their hypotheses can serve an independent standard for evaluating among theories of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  9
    Out of the Sludge: How Vertebrates Came to Have Subjective Experience. [REVIEW]Dylan Black & Colin Allen - 2017 - BioScience 67:1004-1007.
  6. The Global Workspace Theory, the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, and the Distribution of Consciousness.Dylan Black - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 84:102992.
    Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption of the argument is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark