A critical analysis of Kelsen’s theory leads to a broad concept of custom, which covers diverse types of customary norms, where the always required conviction of legal bindingness depends on different types of factual and normative reasons. In it we should include a strict concept of custom or legal usage, derogating custom, custom of general international law, custom that establishes an unwritten constitution, custom that establishes a new written constitution, judicial custom which creates a rule of precedent and custom newly (...) expressed in the judicial application of customary rules. The basic norm could be formulated as a constitutive norm: ‘If the norms created through the first historical constitution are effective, then the first historical constitution are valid.’ It is thus a customary constitutive rule that recognizes the first historical constitution as valid law. Norms which establish sources of law are constitutive rules, they can be customary norms or legislated norms, but if they are legislated, they have their validity recognized by, directly or indirectly, a constitutive customary norm. By using a broad concept of custom as a conventional practice, Hart implies that general recognition of a customary rule, together with the practice that accompanies it, are sufficient conditions of validity. A doctrine of recognition that is arrived at by means of criticism and a rational reconstruction of the doctrines of Kelsen and Hart regains the essential theses of the traditional recognition theory of Bierling and Engisch. (shrink)

A critical analysis of Kelsen’s theory leads to a broad concept of custom, which covers diverse types of customary norms, where the always required conviction of legal bindingness depends on different types of factual and normative reasons. In it we should include a strict concept of custom or legal usage, derogating custom, custom of general international law, custom that establishes an unwritten constitution, custom that establishes a new written constitution, judicial custom which creates a rule of precedent and custom newly (...) expressed in the judicial application of customary rules. The basic norm could be formulated as a constitutive norm: ‘If the norms created through the first historical constitution are effective, then the first historical constitution are valid.’ It is thus a customary constitutive rule that recognizes the first historical constitution as valid law. Norms which establish sources of law are constitutive rules, they can be customary norms or legislated norms, but if they are legislated, they have their validity recognized by, directly or indirectly, a constitutive customary norm. By using a broad concept of custom as a conventional practice, Hart implies that general recognition of a customary rule, together with the practice that accompanies it, are sufficient conditions of validity. A doctrine of recognition that is arrived at by means of criticism and a rational reconstruction of the doctrines of Kelsen and Hart regains the essential theses of the traditional recognition theory of Bierling and Engisch. (shrink)

Rawls says that public reason is the reason of the citizens of a democratic state and takes the Supreme Court in the USA as the exemplar of public reason. It differs from non public reason, which is used e.g., in universities and academic institutions. Rawls contrasts with Kant, which opposes the public reason of the scholar—or the philosopher—, who speaks before the world, to the private reason of state or church officials. The later, once they accept an authority, cannot think (...) by themselves (selbst denken). A closer examination shows that Rawls is not so far from Kant as it seems, because he takes the constitutional judges not as they are, but as they should be. However Rawls still apparently refuses Kant’s unity of reason. Further investigation of the relations between ethical reason, democratic reason and legal reason is needed. Democratic reason is tantamount both to public reason and to legal reason in a modern constitutional state. It is a requirement of ethics but still not identical with ethical reason, since it is possible to accept democratic reason and to argue against it from an ethical point of view. There is just one good way of reasoning, in spite of the constraints that the sources of law and the rules of procedure impose on legal reasoning, compared with ethics. Such constraints are based on the democratic principle, which is again based on ethical reason, which at last both grounds and limits the constraints that law imposes on reason. (shrink)

O que pretendo defender neste texto é que uma posição empirista na moral é compatível com uma pretensão de validade intersubjetiva de juízos morais. Essa pretensão deve, nesse caso, estar calcada na naturalização dos fundamentos da moralidade, mas tem de conviver com limites acerca da justificação de enunciados de valor. Para defender esse ponto, sirvo-me da filosofia moral de Hume, como ele a expôs no seu texto Uma investigação sobre os princípios da moral. No que diz respeito à filosofia de (...) Hume, o objetivo deste texto é explicitar o caráter empírico seja de seu método de investigação da moral, seja do princípio que para ela ele encontra. (shrink)

La « philosophie chrétienne » a-t-elle encore un avenir, ou connaît-elle aujourd’hui sa fin ? Le présent article cherche à répondre de manière nuancée à cette question, après avoir évoqué la naissance du problème et le contexte culturel, rappelé l’essentiel de la fameuse querelle des années 1930, et examiné plusieurs tentatives ultérieures d’articuler la rencontre de la philosophie autonome et de l’expérience chrétienne.

Zaratustra e o fracasso pedagógico 1 Resumo: O presente texto toma o Prólogo da obra Assim Falou Zaratustra, precisamente, aquilo que se pode chamar de fracasso pedagógico. O argumento é que Zaratustra não fracassa ao dialogar com o povo na praça do mercado, mas faz desse encontro o seu primeiro ato fundamental de formação e aprendizado. Palavras-chave: Zaratustra; Formação; Fracasso Pedagógico. Zaratustra y el fracaso pegagogico 1 Resumen: El presente texto toma el prólogo de la obra Así habló Zaratustra, precisamente, (...) lo que podría llamarse el fracaso pedagogico. El argumento es que Zaratustra no fracasa deja de diálogo con las personas en la plaza del mercado, pero este encuentro su primer acto fundamental de la formación y el aprendizaje. Palabras clave: Zaratustra; Formación; El fracaso pedagógico. Zarathustra and the pedagogical failure 1: The following text takes the prologue of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, precisely, that which may be called a pedagogical failure. The argument herein is that Zarathustra does not fail when he dialogues with people in the market square; instead he turns this encounter into his first fundamental act of formation and learning. Keywords : Zarathustra; Formation; Pedagogical Failure Data de registro: 30/01/2020 Data de aceite: 27/05/2020 [1] 'Pedagógico é relativo à pedagogia, que tem como etimologia gr. Paidagõgía, direção ou educação da criança. Do lat. Paedagõga, lei que serve de guia'. Contudo, gostaria de enfatizar que o termo "pedagógico" não será entendido neste trabalho como um conjunto de métodos, de direção, de técnicas de ensino e de condução. A sua utilização demanda, neste estudo, sentidos de criação, tornar-se, superar-se, ou seja, constituir-se. Dessa maneira, inspira uma perspectiva formativa. É assim que este termo pode ser lido neste texto, ou seja, toma uma leitura diferenciada do que seja a sua própria etimologia. (shrink)

O presente artigo tenciona promover um debate entre Gadamer e Habermas, respectivamente partindo das obras La herencia de Europa e A inclusão do outro: estudos de teoria política, no que tange ao problema do multiculturalismo nas sociedades democráticas contemporâneas, uma vez que a partir da globalização econômica e homogeneização cultural surgem graves riscos de autoalienação por parte de certas comunidades e o desrespeito para com as diferenças culturais das minorias inatas. Os pensadores aqui estudados têm como proposta uma racionalidade alternativa (...) voltada ao diálogo solidário, bem como ao respeito intersubjetivo que deve ser constantemente motivado a partir da formação educacional dos sujeitos pertencentes às mais diferentes culturas e nacionalidades. (shrink)

Este trabalho é um estudo introdutório e didático da concepção humeana do entendimento humano.Na primeira parte apresento a concepção empirista em que Hume se inscreve, na segunda são sumariados os principais aspectos de sua teoria acerca do entendimento humano e na última parte teço algumas considerações a propósito do papel da linguagem e do juízo nesta teoria. .

Segundo Levinas em Husserl encontra-se o paradigma do pensar da tradição filosófica que concebe a consciência como intentional, activa e teórica, determinando o objecto perante o qual se encontra, dando-lhe sentido. Para Levinas, ao contrário, o eu perante o Outro revela-se como sendo essencialmente passividade, subordinado a ele a quem tem de responder e recebendo dele sentido. Apesar desta oposição Levinas considera-se seguidor do espfrito e da letra da fenomenologia. /// Selon Levinas, on trouve chez Husserl le paradigme du penser (...) de la tradition philosophique qui conçoit la conscience comme intentionelle, active et théorique, déterminant l'objet face auquel elle se trouve et lui donnant sens. Pour Levinas, au contraire, le moi devant l'Autre se révèle comme etant essentiellement passivité; il est subordonné à l'Autre, dont il doit répondre et il reçoit sens de lui. Malgré cette opposition, Levinas se considere comme adhérant à l'esprit et à lettre de la phénoménologie. /// According to Levinas, Husserls thought exemplifies the paradigm on the philosophical tradition's tendency to conceive the conscience as intentional, active, and theoretical; the conscience determines the object that it encounters before it by giving the object a sense. For Levinas, on the contrary, the "I" that encounters the "Other" is essentialy passive, for the "I" is in a relation of subordination to the "Other" and receives his sense from this very relation. But, in spite this opposition Husserl's position, Levinas considers himself a follower of the spirit and letter of phenomenology. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza los intentos llevados a cabo por Jeremy Bentham y John Stuart Mill para hacer converger algunos de los principales modelos de fundamentación moral: las éticas de la felicidad, como la aristotélica, o la propia ética utilitarista, las éticas del deber de raíz kantiana y las éticas de los derechos.Si conseguimos “reducir”, en primer lugar, las éticas de los derechos al modelo de la ética del deber, podremos simplificar mucho la cuestión y limitarnos a contrastar este último modelo (...) con las éticas de la felicidad, que a su vez deberían converger en la propia ética de la utilidad. No obstante, y aun reconociendo su gran interés, una convergencia completa entre modelos alternativos se revela como imposible. A pesar de los esfuerzos, sobre todo de John Stuart Mill, no es posible una unificación completa de los planteamientos utilitaristas con los de Aristóteles y Kant. La continuación de la empresa utilitarista de lucha por la unificación teórica en el ámbito del problema de la fundamentación moral encuentra un buen ejemplo actual en la obra de Esperanza Guisán. (shrink)

Does Duncan Kennedy successfully cannibalize jurisprudence? He attempts to do it by demonstrating the inexistence of rightness in legal argumentation. If there is no right legal argument, then there is no right answer in adjudication, adjudication is not a rational enterprise and legal doctrine cannot be said to be a science. It can be shown that skepticism is self-defeating. Duncan Kennedy can avoid self defeat only because he actually believes in a lot of legal arguments. His thesis that judges decide (...) questions of policy without any methodology that distinguishes them from legislators does not hold. Judicial reasoning is subject to constraints that do not affect legislators. It must be based on the sources of law and is limited by rules of procedure. Even when the judges have ‘interstitial’ legislative powers they are, unlike the legislator, bound to fit the system and their decisions are considered in procedure from the perspective of the right answer doctrine. The only work that can convincingly refute the skeptic argument against legal science is the reconstruction of jurisprudence as a scientific enterprise. Such work is beyond the scope of any single paper. The article aims to give some inspirations for such a task. (shrink)

Le présent article considère l’apport, mais aussi certaines limites, des développements dans lesquels B. Welte s’efforce d’élaborer la différence phénoménologique entre l’Absolu philosophique et Dieu, et de montrer que le Mystère infini se présente comme Dieu en prenant figure dans des événements de révélation.

Les neuf ouvrages de cette chronique ont été répartis en quatre groupes. Le premier réunit deux livres qui relèvent, en grande partie du moins, de la christologie philosophique. Le second regroupe deux études qui se penchent sur la christologie thomiste. Le troisième recense un ouvrage de M. Fédou sur la christologie qui s’est élaborée en Asie depuis les années 60. Le quatrième rend compte de la réédition de l’esquisse classique de W. Pannenberg et présente deux essais récents: l’un sur l’incarnation (...) et l’autre sur la résurrection. (shrink)

Le présent article étudie les vues de Fichte sur la filiation divine de Jésus, sa conscience, ses miracles, et son identification avec le Christ. Bien qu’elle reconnaisse que Jésus a eu conscience d’être Fils de Dieu, l’approche fichtéenne esquive l’Incarnation comme telle et se réduit ainsi à une simple jésuslogie. Tout en admettant que le Christ est devenu réalité historique en Jésus, et que le rôle de Jésus – le vrai et grand miracle – demeure unique du point de vue (...) historique, elle estime que le dogme christologique a eu tort de rendre métaphysique l’historique. (shrink)

En se centrant sur la façon dont l’ouvrage que Blondel a consacré à l’Esprit chrétien articule le rapport de la philosophie et du christianisme, le présent article s’efforce d’expliciter les traits «classique» de la méthode employée, tout en reconnaissant les limites de sa mise en œuvre.

Dans son Traité d’athéologie, M. Onfray, sans souci de rigueur, se contente de mélanger les poncifs les plus usés de la polémique antireligieuse. À la différence de celui de Nietzsche, son athéisme se rend la tâche trop facile, en ne prenant jamais l’adversaire au sérieux.

Within a sequence of studies on slavery in Brazil in 50 years, we have the original study on the political dimension of this slavery from original documentation (Annals and Archives) carried forward by Tamis Parron. In the nineteenth century occurred, according to the author, a politicization of slaveholding issues rather than the development of a policy of slavery. The smuggling of slaves and the defense of slavery are too significant to be set aside by historiography events. To Parron, external aspects (...) such as change in American policy slavery and the position of England clearly interfered in the internal politics of Brazil. However, to the author, what existed was not only the defense of slavery with the clear involvement of the state, but also political game scenes by those who had different opinions. Some indirect events such as the Land Law and the domestic slave trade were part of a politicization of the issue of slavery and consequently, the maintenance of the slave society. (shrink)

La conception fichtéenne de l’Université n’accueille que les parties exégétique et historique de la théologie, et en exclut tout le reste, soit en le renvoyant dans un autre établissement, soit en l’éliminant purement et simplement. En supprimant ainsi l’unité et la méthode herméneutique de la théologie, Fichte ne rapporte cette discipline à la forme philosophique que comme simple « matière ».