The problem of the time of a killing is often cited as providing grounds for rejecting the action identification thesis favoured by Anscombe and Davidson. In this paper I make three claims. First, I claim that this problem is a threat to the action identification thesis because of two assumptions the thesis makes: since the thesis takes actions to be a kind of doings, it has to assume that agents’ doings last as long as their actions and vice versa. Second, (...) I claim that not making both of these assumptions necessarily leads to another problem, the problem of the acting dead. This means that any theory of action has to choose its poison and face either one of these unresolved problems. Third, I claim that the solution to the problem of the time of a killing can be found by heeding linguistic arguments that ‘kill’ cannot mean ‘cause to die,’ as is commonly assumed, but instead has to have a more complex meaning. I discuss an alternative, more complex proposal and show how it allows us to keep the action identification thesis, fits colloquial usage of ‘kill’ and deals with the problem of the time of a killing. (shrink)
Dialogic Teaching is effective in fostering student learning; yet, it is hard to implement. Little research focused on secondary teachers’ learning of DT and on the link between teachers’ understanding and practices, although these two are usually strongly intertwined. Using a wide range of evidence, this case study systematically investigated and compared two secondary teachers’ understanding and practice of DT during their participation in a continuing professional development programme. The CPDP appeared effective to some extent. The History teacher’s understanding of (...) DT, i.e. being a co-learner, appeared highly effective in implementing DT, whereas the Mathematics teacher’s understanding of DT, i.e. creating a democratic learning environment, seemed only effective to some extent. Focusing on both teachers’ understanding and practice when developing DT seemed fruitful in explaining differences in practice. Future research could further explore to what extent understanding DT as being a co-learner facilitates professional development. (shrink)
Stakeholder involvement in design is desirable from both a practical and an ethical point of view. It is difficult to do well, however, and some problems recur again and again, both of a practical nature, e.g. stakeholders acting strategically rather than openly, and of an ethical nature, e.g. power imbalances unduly affecting the outcome of the process. Hidden Design has been proposed as a method to deal with the practical problems of stakeholder involvement. It aims to do so by taking (...) the observation of stakeholder actions, rather than the outcomes of a deliberative process, as its input. Furthermore, it hides from stakeholders the fact that a design process is taking place so that they will not behave differently than they otherwise would. Both aspects of Hidden Design have raised ethical worries. In this paper I make an ethical analysis of what it means for a design process to leave participants uninformed or deceived rather than acquiring their informed consent beforehand, and to use observation of actions rather than deliberation as input for design, using Hidden Design as a case study. This analysis is based on two sets of normative guidelines: the ethical guidelines for psychological research involving deception or uninformed participants from two professional psychological organisations, and Habermasian norms for a fair and just process. It supports the conclusion that stakeholder involvement in design organised in this way can be ethically acceptable, though under a number of conditions and constraints. (shrink)
Obedience: a simple term. Stanley Milgram, the famous experimental social psychologist, shocked the world with theory about it. Another man, Pol Pot, the infamous leader of the Khmer Rouge, showed how far the desire for obedience could go in human societies. Milgram conducted his experiments in the controlled environment of the US psychology laboratory of the 1960s. Pol Pot experimented with Utopia in the totalitarian Kampuchea of the 1970s. In this article, we discuss the process through which the Khmer Rouge (...) regime created an army of unquestioningly obedient soldiers – including child soldiers. Based on these two cases, we advance a framework on how obedience can be grown or countered. (shrink)
The eukaryotic helicase is an 11-subunit machine containing an Mcm2-7 motor ring that encircles DNA, Cdc45 and the GINS tetramer, referred to as CMG. CMG is “built” on DNA at origins in two steps. First, two Mcm2-7 rings are assembled around duplex DNA at origins in G1 phase, forming the Mcm2-7 “double hexamer.” In a second step, in S phase Cdc45 and GINS are assembled onto each Mcm2-7 ring, hence producing two CMGs that ultimately form two replication forks that travel (...) in opposite directions. Here, we review recent findings about CMG structure and function. The CMG unwinds the parental duplex and is also the organizing center of the replisome: it binds DNA polymerases and other factors. EM studies reveal a 20-subunit core replisome with the leading Pol ϵ and lagging Pol α-primase on opposite faces of CMG, forming a fundamentally asymmetric architecture. Structural studies of CMG at a replication fork reveal unexpected details of how CMG engages the DNA fork. The structures of CMG and the Mcm2-7 double hexamer on DNA suggest a completely unanticipated process for formation of bidirectional replication forks at origins. Here, we review the structure and function of CMG, the 11 subunit helicase for eukaryotic DNA replication. Two CMGs are assembled at origins starting from two Mcm2-7 hexamers oriented N-to-N. The orientation of CMG at a forked DNA implies that the two CMGs at an origin pass one another. (shrink)
Obedience: a simple term. Stanley Milgram, the famous experimental social psychologist, shocked the world with theory about it. Another man, Pol Pot, the infamous leader of the Khmer Rouge, showed how far the desire for obedience could go in human societies. Milgram conducted his experiments in the controlled environment of the US psychology laboratory of the 1960s. Pol Pot experimented with Utopia in the totalitarian Kampuchea of the 1970s. In this article, we discuss the process through which the Khmer Rouge (...) regime created an army of unquestioningly obedient soldiers — including child soldiers. Based on these two cases, we advance a framework on how obedience can be grown or countered. (shrink)
In anticipation of updating annotated bibliographies on Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics for Oxford Bibliography Online, I have sought to keep a running tabulation of all books, edited collections, translations, and journal articles which are primarily devoted to Aristotle’s ethical and political writings (including their historical reception but excluding neo–Aristotelian virtue ethics). In general, criteria for inclusion in this bibliography are that the work be: (1) publication in a peer–reviewed or academic/university press between 2011–2020; (2) “substantially” devoted to one of Aristotle’s (...) ethical or political works (e.g., Pol, EN, EE, MM, Athenian Constitution, Protrepticus); and/or (3) devoted to ethical or political concepts examined elsewhere in Aristotle’s corpus (e.g., Rhetoric, Poetics, zoological treatises, etc.). I encourage scholars to alert me about published works that I have omitted or listed incorrectly. (shrink)
Edward Pols is no stranger to these pages; indeed, his three most recent articles in The Review of Metaphysics are all versions of chapters in this, his fourth book. Those of us who have followed his philosophical development closely will recognize that The Acts of our Being elaborates and clarifies--but does not presuppose knowledge of--Meditation on a Prisoner. His general aim with regard to human agency and human action is to show that, yes, things really are as they seem, i.e., (...) that our common sense view that we ourselves originate our actions and are responsible for them, a view which more often than not is found to be contrary to scientific dogma, is in fact the correct view. His general strategy is to blaze a via media between the immediate prejudice which favors prima facie rational agency and the authoritative physiology which pretends to dispense with the concept of "agent." Realizing his task to be a tough one, Pols shrewdly substitutes the term "ontic responsibility," i.e., the state of being of such an ontological nature that accountability is appropriate and seemly, for the old bugaboo of a term "free will," thus perhaps facilitating a serious encounter with his more scientifically inclined readers. While acknowledging that reductionist science has been largely successful in shifting the everyday perception of human nature away from the ancient common sense view toward physicalist explanations and toward a broad faith in the eventual accomplishment of an exhaustive "perfected physiology," he takes great pains to demonstrate that it is not this newly popular scientific view, but the prima facie view, which is the philosophical ground of the entire legal structure, and hence, by extension, of social organization and civilization in general. Addressing the intelligent layperson rather than his professional colleague, Pols claims fundamentally that science's current project is to prove to us that we are actually something other than what we seem to ourselves to be. But science ought, instead of cancelling our prima facie knowledge of ourselves, to contribute to a fuller understanding of this prima facie knowledge. (shrink)
Misunderstanding of the dynamical behavior of the ventilatory system, especially under assisted ventilation, may explain the problems encountered in ventilatory support monitoring. Proportional assist ventilation (PAV) that theoretically gives a breath by breath assistance presents instability with high levels of assistance. We have constructed a mathematical model of interactions between three objects: the central respiratory pattern generator modelled by a modified Van der Pol oscillator, the mechanical respiratory system which is the passive part of the system and a controlled ventilator (...) that follows its own law. The dynamical study of our model shows the existence of two crucial behaviors, i.e. oscillations and damping, depending on only two parameters, namely the time constant of the mechanical respiratory system and a cumulative interaction index. The same result is observed in simulations of spontaneous breathing as well as of PAV. In this last case, increasing assistance leads first to an increase of the tidal volume (VT), a further increase in assistance inducing a decrease in VT, ending in damping of the whole system to an attractive fixed point. We conclude that instabilities observed in PAV may be explained by the different possible dynamical behaviors of the system rather than changes in mechanical characteristics of the respiratory system. (shrink)
The symbolism introduced earlier provides a convenient vehicle for examining the status and consistency of Aristotle's three diverse justifications and for explaining how he means to avoid Protagorean relativism without embracing Platonic absolutism. When the variables ‘ x ’ and ‘ y ’ are allowed to range over the groups of free men in a given polis as well as over individual free men, the formula for the Aristotelian conception of justice expresses the major premiss of Aristotle's three justifications: (1) (...) (∀ x )(∀ y ) (P(x)·W(x)/P(y)·W(y)=V(T(x))/V(T(y)))Democracy is justified by adding a minor premiss to the effect that as a group the many ( m ) are superior (>) in virtue and wealth to the few best men ( f ): 85 (2 d ) (P(m) · W(m)) > (P(f) · W(f)) (3 d ) V(T(m))>V(T(f))Absolute kingship is justified when a godlike man ( g ) appears in a polis who is incommensurably superior (≫) in virtue and wealth to all the remaining free men ( r ): (2 k ) (P(g) · W(g)) ≫ (P(r) · W(r)) (3 k ) V(T(g)) ≫ V(T(r))True aristocracy requires a more complex justification, which was symbolized in Section 4. These justifications are compatible with each other since they apply to different situations. The polises where democracy and true aristocracy are justified contain no godlike men, and the polis in which democracy is justified differs from that in which true aristocracy is justified in containing a large group of free men who individually have little virtue ( Pol. III.11.1281b23-25, 1282a25-26). Each of the justifications is a valid deductive argument. Aristotle affirms the major premiss they share on the basis of a twofold appeal to nature. The principle of distributive justice, the concept as distinguished from the various conceptions of distributive justice, is itself according to nature ( Pol. VII.3.1325b7-10) and so too is one particular standard of worth, the standard of the best polis. Consequently, the question of the status of these three justifications, whether they are purely hypothetical or not, is a question about the minor premiss or premisses of each. In the case of the democratic premiss Aristotle's answer is straightforward: it is sometimes but not always true ( Pol. III.11.1281bl5-21). Hence the justification of democracy is not purely hypothetical. Nor is the justification of absolute kingship. The man who is “like a god among men” ( Pol. III.13.1284a10-11) would be a man of heroic virtue (see VII.14.1332bl6-27); and such a man, Aristotle says, is “rare” ( σπávιoη ) (not nonexistent) ( E.N. VII.1.1145a27-28). The minor premisses of the aristocratic argument describe a situation where all of the free men in a given polis have sufficient wealth for the exercise of the moral and intellectual virtues and where all of the older free men of the polis are men of practical wisdom. In the Politics Aristotle makes only the modest claim that such a situation is possible: It is not possible for the best constitution to come into being without appropriate equipment [that is, the appropriate quality and quantity of territory and of citizens and noncitizens]. Hence one must presuppose many things as one would wish them to be, though none of them must be impossible ( Pol. VII.4.1325b37-38; see also II.6.1265al7-18). But Aristotle appears to subscribe to the principle that every possibility is realized at some moment of time ( Top. 11.11.115bl7-18, Met. Θ.4.1047b3-6, N.2.1088b23-25). This principle together with the claim that the situation described is possible entails that the situation sometimes occurs. Thus even Aristotle's justification of true aristocracy is not purely hypothetical. The final question is Aristotle's way of avoiding Protagorean relativism without embracing Platonic absolutism. The relativist, along with everyone else ( E.N. V.3.1131a13-14, Pol. III.12.1282bl8), can accept the principle of distributive justice: Q(x)/Q(y) = V(T(x))/V(T(y)) And he can concede that particular instances of this principle, particular conceptions of justice, accurately describe the modes of distributing political authority that appear just to particular polises and to particular philosophers. What he denies is that there is any basis for ranking these various conceptions of justice or for singling one out as the best (Plato, Theaet. 172A-B). Aristotle, following in Plato's track ( Laws X.888D7-890D8), maintains against the relativist that nature provides such a basis. But he departs from Plato in his conception of nature. For Plato “the just by nature” ( τó ρυσει δίκ↑oν }) ( Rep. VI.501B2) is the Form of justice, an incorporeal entity ( Phdo. 65D4-5, Soph. 246B8) that exists beyond time and space ( Tim. 37C6-38C3, 51E6-52B2), whereas for Aristotle the sensible world is the realm of nature ( Met. A.1.1069a30-b2). Thus in appealing to nature Aristotle does not appeal to a transcendent standard. Nor does he appeal to his main criterion of the natural, namely, happening always or for the most part. Aristotle's theory of justice is anchored to nature by means of the polis described in Politics VII and VIII, and he regards this polis as natural because it fosters the true end of human life and because its social and political structure reflects the natural hierarchy of human beings and the natural stages of life. Thus the nature that Aristotle's theory of justice is ultimately founded on is human nature. (shrink)
Estudio y an lisis del pensamiento e influencia de Thomas Hobbes en la pol tica contempor nea, consider ndolo el creador de la primera teor a del estado moderno. el reconocimiento de Hobbes son sus teor as sobre el materialismo en filosof a, el utilitarismo en moral y el despotismo en pol tica. Textos y ensayos referentes al iusnaturalismo, las sociedades parciales y la ley natural y civil en la filosof a de Hobbes.
In this in ter view, the pres ti gious an thro - pol o gist, his to rian and T.V. anaouncer, Alan Macfarlane com ments on some of the is sues that have been ad dressed in his writ ings. His main the o ret i cal con cern has been to study the pe cu - liar con di tions that gave rise to the mod e..
Mediteran je prostor susreta. Susretanje s jedne strane znači komunikaciju, aktivnost, otvorenost, prožimanje, dok s druge strane znači i sukob, često i rat, uništenje, istrebljenje. Susretanje je, dakle, istodobno opasnost i šansa, prijetnja i prigoda, mogućnost iščeznuća i predložak za novi kvalitet, što se na Mediteranu jasno ogleda. Neprestani napon, odnosi harmonije i suprotnosti, sličnosti i različitosti, pokazuju Mediteran u bitnom upravo kao prostor posredovanja, a posredovanje kao uvjet mogućnosti nečeg takovog kao što je Mediteran.Jedno od temeljnih posredovanja, iz kojeg (...) proizlaze ostala, jest odnos čovjeka i čovjeka, što bi se, govoreći jezikom pitanja, moglo drukčije odrediti kao pitanje mogućnosti i svrhe ljudske zajednice, odnosno bîti političkog. Na Mediteranu je, između ostalog, izvorište dva, mogli bismo reći oprečna, ali određujuća pristupa ovom pitanju: tzv. tradicionalni pristup politici – antičkogrčko shvaćanje politike kao djelovanja slobodnih i jednakih građana, koji u državi kao političkoj zajednici ozbiljuju bitne svrhe ljudskoga dobroga i pravednog života te čiji najreljefniji izraz nalazimo kod Aristotela , dok je s druge strane ono što nazivamo novovjekovnim pristupom politici, koji predstavlja nasuprotni pol antičkogrčkom određenju odnosa. Radikalni obrat nastupa upravo s Machiavellijem, a raščlambom njegova djela razabiru se i utjecaji na suvremenost.The Mediterranean is a meeting point. On the one hand, meeting points imply communication, activity, openness and interlacement, while on the other, conflict, frequently even war, destruction and extermination. Meetings, therefore, represent both danger and opportunity, threat and occasion, the possibility of annihilation and a model of a new quality, which the Mediterranean clearly mirrors. Its endless tension, the relations between harmony and opposition, its similarities and differences reveal the Mediterranean, in its essence, as a zone of mediation, and mediation itself as the very prerequisite of the existence of something like the Mediterranean.One of the most fundamental mediations, out of which all the others derive, is the relationship between man and man. Once translated into the language of questions, this could be reformulated as the question of the possibility and purpose of human society, i.e. the essence of the political. The Mediterranean is, amongst other things, the source of two, one could say diametrically opposed yet determinative approaches to this issue: one is the so-called traditional approach to politics – the Ancient Greek understanding of politics as a set of actions by free and equal citizens, who fulfil the purposes of a good and virtuous life in a state as a political community, the most outstanding example of which is formulated by Aristotle – while the other is the so-called modern approach to politics, which is the polar opposite of the Ancient Greek definition of the relationship at hand. With Machiavelli a radical shift takes place, and the analyses of his work disclose his influence on contemporaneity. (shrink)
It is argued (a) that laws are assurances of protections of rights and (b) that governments are protectors of rights. Lest those assurances be empty and thus not really be assurances at all, laws must be enforced and governments must therefore have the power to coerce. For this reason, the government of a given region tends to have, as Max Weber put it, a "monopoly on power" in that region. And because governments are power-monopolizers, it is tempting to think that (...) the concepts of government and law are to be understood in terms of the concept of power. In actuality, the first two concepts are to be understood primarily in terms of the concept of morality--of rights-protection, to be specific--and only secondarily in terms of the concept of power. Contentions (a) and (b) appear to be inconsistent with obvious facts (e.g. the fact that Pol Pot's regime violated the rights of those over whom it had power). But (a) and (b) are compatible with those facts. This is a consequence of two principles. First, moral requirements have a "dimension of weight," as Dworkin put it, meaning that one moral imperative can be outweighed, without being obliterated, by another moral imperative. Second, sentential operators can have different degrees of scope. "It is hereby assured that" is such an operator. Linguistic surface structure may obfuscate the degree of scope that it has in a given sentence. That fact compatibilizes our analysis with the fact that there are evil laws and evil governments. (shrink)
Ce texte se propose de nuancer la dichotomie stricte entre les concepts d?histoire et de justice, qui est courante dans l?interpr?tation de la pens?e hobbesienne. L?attitude critique de Hobbes envers l?histoire s?explique par sa pol?mique contre l?h?ritage de l?antiquit? classique, qui d?coule de son projet d?une science rigoureuse de la morale et de la politique. Cependant la conception hobbesienne de la justice ne se laisse pas d?velopper sans faire appel? certains?l?ments factuels et empiriques; elle ne se r?duit donc pas? une (...) construction purement rationnelle. Ces?l?ments ouvrent la pens?e hobbesienne? la probl?matique de l?histoire r?elle; pour Hobbes, le repr?sentant le plus important de ce genre d?histoire est Thucydide. Enfin la dimension historique de la pens?e de Hobbes nous permet d?entrevoir chez lui un concept de justice plus large, qui franchit les limites de la justice contractuelle. Ovaj tekst nastoji da nijansira dihotomiju izmedju pojmova istorije i pravde koja je uobicajena u interpretaciji Hobzovog misljenja. Hobzov kriticki stav prema istoriji objasnjava se njegovom polemikom protiv nasledja klasicne antike, koja stoji u vezi s njegovim projektom stroge nauke o moralu i politici. Medjutim, Hobzovo shvatanje pravde ne moze se zasnovati bez izvesnih faktickih, empirijskih elemenata; ono se ne svodi na neku cisto racionalnu konstrukciju. Ovi elementi otvaraju Hobzovo misljenje prema problematici stvarne istorije; za Hobza, najvazniji predstavnici takve vrste istorije su Tukidid i Tacit. Konacno, istorijska dimenzija Hobzovog misljenja dopusta nam da kod njega prepoznamo i jedan siri pojam pravde, koji probija granice pravde koja proizlazi iz ugovora. (shrink)
Pese a la estricta contextualización de lomágico como demoníaco en el tejido dela narrativa de El asno dorado de Apuleyo,una corriente que se ha descuidado enla academia moderna explora su legadopagano –r et i ene el al cance par a unahi pót esi s fact i bl e en l a forma de unacoalición paradigmática entre su progeniei nevi tabl e, l as bruj as desesperadas aligual que una comunidad distinguida detaumaturgos, los teúrgos, cuya identidaden el discurso intelectual proporciona elejemplo (...) más fino de las formas politeistasde adivinación. En Sobre los misterios deJamblico, se clarifica la representación deotra tipología de magia, la natural, queavala un notable paralelo en una premisacompartida –los niveles de motivación.Deseo proponer, que en tanto arroja luzsobre una clasificación dual de la magiac omo demoní ac a y nat ur al , t ambi énrefleja de manera fascinante los grados deunidad entre las brujas desesperadas ylos teúrgos en cuestión –las operacionesde l os pri meros a menudo sust ent ans us pl a n t e a mi e n t o s pa r a o c ul t a r e lconocimiento y su potencial no es inferiora l as preocupaci ones el evadas de l ossegundos.Despite the strict contextualization ofmagic as demonic within the fabric ofnar r at i ve i n Aput ei us ’ Go l de n As s , aneglected current in modern academia itspagan legacy - retains scope for a feasiblehypothesis in the form of a paradigmaticcoalition between its inevitable progeny,desperate witches as well as a distinguishedc o mmu n i t y o f t h a u ma t a u r g o i , t h etheurgist, whose identity in intellectualdi scour se, chi ef l y t he f i nest possi bl ee x e mpl um of pol yt he i s t i c f or ms ofdi vi nat i on I ambl i chus’ De Myst eri es,clarify their representation of anothertypology of magic, natural, endorsinga striking parallel in a shared premise -levels of motivation. I wish to propose,that in as much as it throws light on twofold classification of magic as demonic andnatural it also fascinatingly reflects degreesof unity, though not without reserve insome areas, between the desperate witchesand theurgists in question - the formerwhose operations often underpin theirclaims to occult knowledge and whosepotential is no less inferior to the elevatedconcerns of the latter. (shrink)
Limit cycles, because they are constituted of a periodic succession of states (discrete or continuous) constitute a good manner to store information. From any points of the state space reached after a perturbation or stimulation of the cognitive system storing this information, one can aim to join through a more or less long return trajectory a precise neighbourhood of the asymptotic trajectory at a specific moment (or a specific place) on the limit cycle, i.e. where the information of interest stands. (...) We propose that the isochronal fibration, initially imagined and described by A. T. Winfree may be an excellent way to connect directly those two locations. Each isochron is indeed the set of points in temporal phase with one single point of the attractor. The characterisation of the isochronal fibration of various dynamical systems is not easy and until now has principally only been done numerically but not analytically. By integrating the homogeneous solutions of the dynamical system we can solve this fibration in the case of the well known anharmonic pendulum. Other isochronal fibration on classical examples such as the van der Pol system and the non-symmetrical PFK limit cycle are obtained numerically and we also provide the first numerical study on 3-dimentional systems like the anharmonic pendulum with a linear relaxation on its third variable and the Lorenz attractor. The empirical approach seems us useful for dealing with the isochronal fibration which could constitute a powerful tool for understanding and controlling the dynamics of biological or biological-inspired systems. (shrink)
Table des matières: Présentation par Natalie DEPRAZ et Marc RICHIR. I. La «première phénoménologie» de Eugen Fink. Laszlo TENGELYI: La «fenêtre sur l'absolu» selon Fink. Marc RICHIR: Temps, espace et monde chez le jeune Fink. François-David SEBBAH: A propos des notions de re-présentation et d'imagination dans «Re-présentation et image» d'E. Fink. II. Autour de la Sixième Méditation cartésienne. Bernhard WAL-DENFELS: L'auto-référence de la phénomenologie. Guy VAN KERCKHOVEN: Le phénomène phénoménologique et la question de l'être. Réflexions sur la Sixième Méditation Cartésienne. (...) Ronald BRUZINA: Phénoménologie et critique chez Fink et Husserl. Natalie DEPRAZ: Le spectateur phénoménologisant: au seuil du non-agir et du non-être. Jean-Marc MOUILLIE: Spectateur phénoménologisant et réflexion pure . Bernard BESNIER: Le spectateur dés-intéressé et la question des voies vers la réduction. Ashraf NOOR: La question du langage dans la Sixième Méditation cartésienne. Javier SAN MARTIN: La philosophie de l'histoire chez Husserl et Fink. III. L'après-guerre. Pol VANDEVELDE: Coexistence et com-munication. Un point de vue phénomélogique. Walter BIEMEL: L'analytique existentiale et l'anthropologie de Fink. Serge MEITINGER: Eugen Fink: du jeu et de l'origine ou le prime-saut. Ernesto LEIBOVICH: Logos, keraunos et semainein. A propos du Séminaire «Héraclite». Hans Rainer SEPP: Nouvelle détermination de l'idéal. Françoise DASTUR: Eugen Fink: mondanétié et mortalité. Mario RUGGENINI: Etre, monde, finitude. Phénoménologie et ontologie dans la pensée de Fink. (shrink)
G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an External World (...) In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)
This paper describes the approach of empirical ethics, a form of ethics that integrates non-positivist ethnographic empirical research and philosophy. Empirical ethics as it is discussed here builds on the ‘empirical turn’ in epistemology. It radicalizes the relational approach that care ethics introduced to think about care between people by drawing in relations between people and technologies as things people relate to. Empirical ethics studies care practices by analysing their intra-normativity, or the ways of living together the actors within these (...) practices strive for or bring about as good practices. Different from care ethics, what care is and if it is good is not defined beforehand. A care practice may be contested by comparing it to alternative practices with different notions of good care. By contrasting practices as different ways of living together that are normatively oriented, suggestions for the best possible care may be argued for. Whether these suggestions will actually be put to practice is, however, again a relational question; new actors need to re-localize suggestions, to make them work in new practices and fit them in with local intra-normativities with their particular routines, material infrastructures, know-how and strivings. (shrink)
In EN V.3, Aristotle offers an abstract definition of distributive justice that is agreed to by all, namely that it should be governed by geometrical proportionality: ‘equals should be treated equally, unequals should be treated in proportion to their inequalities’. At the same time, he acknowledges that we need a more substantive definition of the currency of equality, i.e. to tell us who are equal and who unequal at each distribution, since this would be the only way to avoid each (...) group of people to identify its own conception with the universal concept of justice. In Pol. III.12 (1282b18-23) Aristotle is arguing that it is the task of the political philosopher to define what kinds of equality or inequality are relevant in distribution of political power. In order to do so, Aristotle has to answer the question who is a citizen, that is, who should share in the constitution (Pol. III.1 1274b40-41). First he clears away the false conceptions and claims about citizenship and then he offers two criteria for political distribution—political capacity and contribution to the polis—which prima facie seem inconsistent. This paper explores the relation of the two criteria and the fundamental role of political capacity within the context of political distribution; I intend to argue that they are actually two stages in the process of political distribution, where political capacity is indexical prior to the contribution to the polis. It is also suggested that the Aristotelian model is egalitarian, in the sense that all politically capable individuals, regardless of the degree of political capacity they possess, are awarded citizenship. (shrink)
Many scholars have suggested that Aristotle’s famous aphorism ‘treat equals equally, unequals unequally’ is a formal, and thus impractical, theory of equality. This dissertation aims to criticise the popular view that Aristotle’s theory of equality is purely formal and to develop and defend an interpretation which will pay attention to the substantive elements. The first chapter argues that Aristotle provides us with a spectrum from formal to substantive equality. At the formal end, we have the abstract principles of formal fairness (...) and proportionality, while at the substantive end we can find information for the designation of the appropriate variable of comparison between people or treatments in various domains of social interaction. The second chapter argues for an account of commensurability based on Ph. VII.4. I claim that, in any comparison, the term ‘equal’ should be predicated synonymously of the people or treatment compared, while at the same time they should not admit to difference in species; such an account, I suggest, is also compatible with Aristotle’s theory of economic value in EN V.5. The third chapter presents the Aristotelian account of equality in distributions. I focus on Aristotle’s theory of political distribution in Pol. III, where he puts forward two distinct criteria: political capacity and contribution to the polis. I also examine Aristotle’s moderate suggestion for equalisation of property by the means of public property and taxation. The fourth chapter criticises the popular line that Aristotle holds an inconsistent theory of corrective justice, because in EN V.4 he suggests that people should be treated as equal before the law, while in the first lines of EN V.5 he allows for hierarchical considerations. I eliminate this apparent inconsistency by claiming that the former deals with the compensatory, while the latter with the punitive element of corrective justice. The fifth chapter explores the role of equality within the private domain, mainly in the household and in various types of friendship. I propose that Aristotle offers two types of superiority, one based on actuality and a second based on function, which are not mutually exclusive. To summarise, by examining Aristotle’s responses to various problems about equality and hierarchy I conclude that although he possesses the theoretical tools to argue for ‘inalienable’ metaphysical equality of human beings which will make equality an individual entitlement or right, based on his principle of individuation in Metaph. Z.8, he prefers not to utilise this thesis for political purposes. Instead, he reduces equality to justice (inequality is unjust, since it violates principle of formal fairness which is fundamental for justice) and a set of pragmatical considerations (e.g. concord and the optimal outcome for the polis). He prefers to argue that equality or hierarchy of people or treatments is related to, and defined by, the particular institution that we examine. (shrink)
This paper articulates dignity as relational engagement in concrete care situations. Dignity is often understood as an abstract principle that represents inherent worth of all human beings. In actual care practices, this principle has to be substantiated in order to gain meaning and inform care activities. We describe three exemplary substantiations of the principle of dignity in care: as a state or characteristic of a situation; as a way to differentiate between socio-cultural positions; or as personal meaning. We continue our (...) analysis by presenting cases on dignity in care related to us in focus groups with medical professionals. Our empirical ethical lens is in this paper is to analyse, not the meaning of dignity, but the way in which it emerges in practices where it is pursued, within relationships between people, technologies, places, regulations, and the values cherished by or embedded in them. We show that professional caregivers recognize in the dignity of the person they care for their own dignity; giving up on the one implies no less than giving up on the other. This ‘mirrored experience’ of dignity expresses itself in professional’s engagement with the situation. The value of this engagement, we argue, lies not primarily in realizing the particular content of the values at stake. We point to the importance of engagement itself, even if the values engaged with cannot be realized to the full, and even if competing versions of dignity are at stake simultaneously. In this way the caregivers provide us with interesting examples of moral actorship in situations of conflicting values. (shrink)
Is God's foreknowledge compatible with human freedom? One of the most attractive attempts to reconcile the two is the Ockhamistic view, which subscribes not only to human freedom and divine omniscience, but retains our most fundamental intuitions concerning God and time: that the past is immutable, that God exists and acts in time, and that there is no backward causation. In order to achieve all that, Ockhamists distinguish ‘hard facts’ about the past which cannot possibly be altered from ‘soft facts’ (...) about the past which are alterable, and argue that God's prior beliefs about human actions are soft facts about the past. (shrink)
An important contribution to the foundations of probability theory, statistics and statistical physics has been made by E. T. Jaynes. The recent publication of his collected works provides an appropriate opportunity to attempt an assessment of this contribution.
There are roughly two meanings attached to the concept of dignity: humanitas and dignitas. Humanitas refers to ethical and juridical notions of equality, autonomy and freedom. Much less understood is the meaning of dignitas, which this paper develops as peoples’ engagement with aesthetic values and genres, and hence with differences between people. Departing from a critical reading of Georgio Agamben’s notion of ‘bare life’, I will analyze a case where aesthetics are quite literally at stake: women who lost their hair (...) due to cancer treatment. The analysis shows a complicated interplay between varying evaluations of female baldness by the self and others, mediated by (often strongly negative) cultural imaginaries, and aesthetic genres depicting conventional ways of ‘looking good’. The paper concludes by arguing for a reconnection of the two notions of dignity, and for a rehabilitation of aesthetics in daily life and care as fundamental values for organizing our societies. (shrink)
What is a natural kind ? As we shall see, the concept of a natural kind has a long history. Many of the interesting doctrines can be detected in Aristotle, were revived by Locke and Leibniz, and have again become fashionable in recent years. Equally there has been agreement about certain paradigm examples: the kinds oak, stickleback and gold are natural kinds, and the kinds table, nation and banknote are not. Sadly agreement does not extend much further. It is impossible (...) to discover a single consistent doctrine in the literature, and different discussions focus on different doctrines without writers or readers being aware of the fact. In this paper I shall attempt to find a defensible distinction between natural and non-natural kinds. (shrink)
Dignity is a fundamental concept, but its meaning is not clear. This paper attempts to clarify the term by analysing and reconnecting two meanings of dignity: humanitas and dignitas. Humanitas refers to citizen values that protect individuals as equal to one another. Dignitas refers to aesthetic values embedded in genres of sociality that relate to differences between people. The paper explores these values by way of an empirical ethical analysis of practices of washing psychiatric patients in nursing care. Nurses legitimate (...) the washing of reluctant patients with reference to dignity. The analysis shows the intertwinement of humanitas and dignitas that gives dignity its fundamental meaning. (shrink)
How could the self be a substance? There are various ways in which it could be, some familiar from the history of philosophy. I shall be rejecting these more familiar substantivalist approaches, but also the non-substantival theories traditionally opposed to them. I believe that the self is indeed a substance—in fact, that it is a simple or noncomposite substance—and, perhaps more remarkably still, that selves are, in a sense, self-creating substances. Of course, if one thinks of the notion of substance (...) as an outmoded relic of prescientific metaphysics—as the notion of some kind of basic and perhaps ineffable stuff —then the suggestion that the self is a substance may appear derisory. Even what we ordinarily call ‘stuffs’—gold and water and butter and the like—are, it seems, more properly conceived of as aggregates of molecules or atoms, while the latter are not appropriately to be thought of as being ‘made’ of any kind of ‘stuff’ at all. But this only goes to show that we need to think in terms of a more sophisticated notion of substance—one which may ultimately be traced back to Aristotle's conception of a ‘primary substance’ in the Categories , and whose heir in modern times is W. E. Johnson's notion of the ‘continuant’. It is the notion, that is, of a concrete individual capable of persisting identically through qualitative change, a subject of alterable predicates that is not itself predicable of any further subject. (shrink)
The strong weak truth table (sw) reducibility was suggested by Downey, Hirschfeldt, and LaForte as a measure of relative randomness, alternative to the Solovay reducibility. It also occurs naturally in proofs in classical computability theory as well as in the recent work of Soare, Nabutovsky, and Weinberger on applications of computability to differential geometry. We study the sw-degrees of c.e. reals and construct a c.e. real which has no random c.e. real (i.e., Ω number) sw-above it.
Science and technology studies concerned with the study of lay influence on the sciences usually analyze either the political or the normative epistemological consequences of lay interference. Here I frame the relation between patients, knowledge, and the sciences by opening up the question: How can we articulate the knowledge that patients develop and use in their daily lives and make it transferable and useful to others, or, `turn it into science’? Elsewhere, patient knowledge is analyzed either as essentially different from (...) or similar to medical knowledge. The category of experiential knowledge is vague and is used to encompass many types of experience, whereas the knowledge of the `expert patient’ may be assumed to have the shape of up-to-date medical information. This paper shows through a case study of people with severe lung disease that patient knowledge can be understood as a form of practical knowledge that patients use to translate medical and technical knowledge into something useful to their daily life with disease. Patients coordinate this with homegrown know-how and advice from fellow patients, weighing different values - of which `taking good care of one’s body’ is but one - that may conflict in a specific situation. These practices result in sets of techniques that may be made useful to others. The paper argues for two alternatives to state-of-the-art medical research to turn patient knowledge into science: ethnographies of knowledge practices and the collection and making accessible of techniques. (shrink)
The “patient perspective” serves as an analytical tool to present patients as knowing subjects in research, rather than as objects known by medicine. This paper analyses problems encountered with the concept of the patient perspective as applied to long-term mental health care. One problem is that “having a perspective” requires a perception of oneself as an individual and the ability to represent one’s individual situation in language; this excludes from research patients who do not express themselves verbally. Another problem is (...) that the idea of “talk” as a representation of the world ignores the fact that talk is also performative in the world: it requires, at least, the ability to deal with an interview situation. To think up alternative ways of including patients as subjects in research, I develop an approach that takes this performativity as a starting point. Analysing practical situations and activities, I argue that patients enact appreciations, making known what they like or dislike by verbal or non-verbal means in a given material environment, in situations that are co-produced by others. Thus, subjectivity is linked to situations and interactions, rather than just to individual characteristics; to “patient positions,” rather than “patient perspectives.”. (shrink)
O presente texto procura acompanhar alguns aspectos da reconstrução sartreana das relações entre indivíduo e história, tentando mostrar que a fenomenologia e o materialismo dialético comparecem nessa proposta de conhecimento e que é a convergência das duas perspectivas que permite, contemplando adequadamente a universalidade e a singularidade, descrever e compreender dialeticamente o modo histórico de produção da identidade individual.
In this paper I shall venture into an area with which I am not very familiar and in which I feel far from confident; namely into phenomenology. My main motive is not to get away from standard, boring, methodological questions like those of induction and demarcation; but the conviction that a phenomenological account of the empirical basis forms a necessary complement to Popper's falsificationism. According to the latter, a scientific theory is a synthetic and universal, hence unverifiable proposition. In fact, (...) in order to be technologically useful, a scientific hypothesis must refer to future states-of-affairs; it ought therefore to remain unverified. But in order to be empirical, a theory must bear some kind of relation to factual statements. According to Popper, such a relation can only be one of potential conflict. Thus a theory T will be termed scientific if and only if T is logically incompatible with a so-called basic statement b, where b is both empirically verifiable and empirically falsifiable. In other words: T is scientific if it entails ¬b; where b, hence also ¬b, is an empirically decidable proposition. (shrink)