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Profile: E. J. Green (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
  1.  17
    On the Perception of Structure.E. J. Green - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Many of the objects that we perceive have an important characteristic: When they move, they change shape. For instance, when you watch a person walk across a room, her body constantly deforms. I suggest that we exercise a type of perceptual constancy in response to changes of this sort, which I call structure constancy. In this paper I offer an account of structure constancy. I introduce the notion of compositional structure, and propose that structure constancy involves perceptually representing an object (...)
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  2. A Layered View of Shape Perception.E. J. Green - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2).
    This article develops a view of shape representation both in visual experience and in subpersonal visual processing. The view is that, in both cases, shape is represented in a ‘layered’ manner: an object is represented as having multiple shape properties, and these properties have varying degrees of abstraction. I argue that this view is supported both by the facts about visual phenomenology and by a large collection of evidence in perceptual psychology. Such evidence is provided by studies of shape discriminability, (...)
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  3.  69
    The Sources of Intentionality, by Uriah Kriegel.E. J. Green - 2015 - Mind 124 (493):366-370.
  4.  8
    Attentive Visual Reference.E. J. Green - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):3-38.
    Many have held that when a person visually attends to an object, her visual system deploys a representation that designates the object. Call the referential link between such representations and the objects they designate attentive visual reference. In this article I offer an account of attentive visual reference. I argue that the object representations deployed in visual attention—which I call attentive visual object representations —refer directly, and are akin to indexicals. Then I turn to the issue of how the reference (...)
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  5.  4
    Representationalism and Perceptual Organization.E. J. Green - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):121-148.
    Some philosophers have suggested that certain shifts in perceptual organization are counterexamples to representationalism about phenomenal character. Representationalism about phenomenal character is, roughly, the view that there can be no difference in the phenomenal character of experience without a difference in the representational content of experience. In this paper, I examine three of these alleged counterexamples: the dot array, the intersecting lines, and the 3 X 3 grid. I identify the two features of their phenomenology that call for explanation: grouping (...)
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