Twenty essays by fifteen British and American writers representing some of the best anglo-american Platonic scholarship dating, chiefly, from the fifties but with essays by Cherniss, Ryle, Vlastos, and Hackforth dating from the thirties. The later dialogues are the focus with nine of the essays treating the Theory of Forms explicitly. Included are essays by Ryle and Runciman on the Parmenides, and also the Vlastos-Geach exchange on the Third Man Argument. The Timaeus is covered by Cherniss' "On the Relation of (...) the Timaeus to Plato's Later Dialogues," and also by Vlastos' "The Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus" and Morrow's "Necessity and Persuasion in Plato's Timaeus." In all, a welcome collection.—E. A. R. (shrink)
In terms of the details of Plato's life, the composition and order of the Dialogues and Epistles, and the political and scholastic climate of Plato's Athens and the broader Hellenic culture, this is a daringly imaginative book; critics may find it too imaginative. Ryle argues against the authenticity of all the Epistles, basing his conclusion on a bit of close detective work involving the date of Dionysius I's death and the date of Plato's invitation to Syracuse: Epistle (...) VII is all a bit of baseless Dionist propaganda. Ryle's conjecture that the majority of the Dialogues were designed for public dramatization and open competition, on the model of the Greek tragedies, at local and Olympic games is a distinct possibility. But will we be convinced by the many "straws" that support the hypothesis that the Apology-Crito-Phaedo sequence of Dialogues was written by Plato, not to justify Socrates, but to defend himself against a contemporary charge of defamation? that the Academy was founded in 371, not 387? that the Phaedrus was composed in 361-360, after the Laws? that the Republic was never published in Plato's lifetime? While Ryle vigorously supports all these contentions, inconsistencies or more plausible hypothesis remain. The book is unfortunately completely silent about any of the substantive issues in Plato's philosophy; but perhaps enough has been gained if Plato scholars are sent scurrying back to the ancillary Greek philosophies and histories, not to mention the stylometrists.—E. A. R. (shrink)
Hare and Vlastos write on Plato, Anscombe, Ackrill, MacKinnon, Owen, and Bambrough on Aristotle, while Ryle gives some of the history of "Dialectic in the Academy." All of the essays were written especially for this volume, and most show a disappointing lack of polish. Vlastos' "Degrees of Reality in Plato" is an exception, and his thesis is an interesting reworking of a familiar criticism. Bambrough has the best offering on Aristotle: an approving assessment of Aristotle's doctrine and method (...) of employment of equivocal terms, an employment which Bambrough praises as "A Paradigm of Philosophy," and compares favorably with the Wittgensteinian doctrine of family resemblances.—E. A. R. (shrink)
The basic theme is the development of the Platonic notion of Eros and its relation to the soul from the Platonic texts through the neo-Platonic and early Christian writers. Rist is concerned to modify Nygren's thesis that Eros is situated as a radically upward movement, while the downward movement of love is to be assigned exclusively to the Christian notion of Agape. He tries to show how Plato, and even more Plotinus, and finally Origen associated a downward movement with (...) Eros and attributed it to the Good, the One, or to God, as the case might be. Some other suggestive contributions are his criticism of J. Gould's attempt to apply the Rylean distinction between "knowing how" and "knowing that" to an interpretation of the Socratic dictum that "Virtue is knowledge"; and his pointing out of the hyperintellectualization of the notion of virtue beginning with Aristotle's sharp distinction between theoria and praxis, continuing into the neo-Platonic tradition, until its eventual disintegration, under the partial influence of Gnosticism, into anti-nominianism.—E. A. R. (shrink)
More than simply a distillation of Crombie's two volume work, this book takes as its theme the role of maieutic in the Platonic dialogues, and its general employment as the tool of philosophy when philosophy is construed along with Plato as the task of coming to "an explicit understanding of that which we understand implicitly all along." From this perspective Crombie is able to guide the Anamnêsis of the reader to a balanced understanding of such readily misconstrued doctrines as (...) the Theory of Forms and the role of images in the Platonic intellectual economy. The author is sympathetic to be sure, but unapologetically critical where necessary. In all, the area traversed and the skill in handling and presentation make the book an excellent introduction to the philosophical Plato.—E. A. R. (shrink)
There are no changes of note between this re-issue of Field's book and the previous edition. The book first appeared in 1930 and still remains a solid introduction to the background of Plato's philosophy. The first part gives a sober and balanced account of Plato's life and the form and chronology of the dialogues. The second and third parts detail the moral, political, literary, and philosophical setting of Plato's thought. Three appendices are added. The first defends the (...) authenticity of all but the first and second epistles; the second defends the general accuracy of Aristotle's account of the Platonic forms; the third is a lengthy and valuable summary, with texts, of the history of "Socrates and Plato in Post-Aristotelian Tradition." Field's particular virtue is the consistency with which he separates fact from conjecture in the account of Plato and his work. He is not himself above conjecturing in order to fill in some of the gaps in our knowledge, but his conjectures are clearly indicated and moderate in character.--E. A. R. (shrink)
Unlike most anthologies in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, the present selection does not try to collect representative extracts from the writings of most, or even many, important aestheticians throughout the ages. It aims for depth rather than width and tries to do as much justice as possible to those aestheticians which it does include, without bothering much about those left out. The result is really impressive. No less than 138 pages are devoted to Plato and Aristotle alone, (...) where the reader may find not only the usual passages from the Poetics and the Rhetoric but also relevant material from De Partibus Animalium and Politica. Such an anthology, so it seems, must be an opinionated one. Thus, while it contains some 70 pages of Dewey's Art as Experience, there is not a single line of Santayana in it. Although I disagree with the choice made in this case, I cannot but admire the courage it took to make it. Another surprise is the inclusion of the relatively obscure mediaeval thinker, Marsilio Ficino, in an anthology which excludes Baumgarten, Lessing, Burke, Schiller, Coleridge, Bosanquet and Alexander, to mention but few, and whose sole contemporary representative is Heidegger. The extracts from Ficino's commentary on Plato prove, however, to be highly interesting and relatively original, too. Thus, even if Ficino is not as great as some of the aestheticians not included in this volume, I, for one, would not regret this mark of personal, off-beat, taste. The last selection, Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art," appearing for the first time in English translation, comes as special bonus to the reader. The editors' introductions to each selection are generally concise, precise, and very helpful. Sometimes, however, one may find an exception: in their introduction to the Heidegger translation, the editors characterize the Kehre as a "reversal... from the stress on anxiety, nothingness... to a stress on more affirmative moods." This is, to say the least, a grossly misleading remark, which is likely to confuse the student of the later Heidegger rather than help him.—E. M. Z. (shrink)
Twenty-nine philosophers from Plato to William Luijpen are represented by selections varying from three to twenty-two pages in length. The selections and their proportions are simply too idiosyncratic. Why should Stephen Strasser get twenty-two pages while Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, and Hume manage only twenty-nine total pages among the four of them? Most of the classical philosophers are represented by mere snippets; Kant is high man with fifteen pages of text—and even these are broken up into seven sections. The (...) issue is not simply number of pages: after all, Leibniz' Monadology would have fit in less space than that accorded to John Peters. This is not to denigrate Peters, who was an exceptionally good philosopher; but the beginning student should be exposed to Leibniz, Hegel, and Marx before he is exposed to Peters. Or he should at least be exposed to Smart, Feigl, or some other contemporary naturalistic viewpoint along with Peters, Teilhard de Chardin, and Merleau-Ponty. How, for example, can one begin to appreciate the task Merleau-Ponty has set for himself in philosophical psychology unless one has become familiar with the behavioristic and reductionistic positions Merleau-Ponty is defining himself over and against? The bibliographies in the first part of the book are inadequate.—E. A. R. (shrink)
Start with descriptive sketches of the epistemologies and ontological underpinnings of the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, and Kant, as they form the point of departure for the modern reductionistic and mechanistic paradigm of scientific explanation—the thesis is modified in the case of Kant, a transitional figure, who did emphasize the notion of agency, but still as fitted into the Cartesian, dualistic framework—and as they provide the locus of return, with important modifications, to teleological, emergentistic, and holistic frameworks (...) of explanation. Add a pluralistic ontology of "comprehensive entities," which relies heavily on M. Polanyi's conceptions of "personal knowledge," "tacit knowing," and the "unexpected-range-of-possibilities" criterion for assessing degrees of reality of grades of being. Blend the former two ingredients with clear and cogent argumentation as well as a skillful handling of some of the recent sources in biology as they bear on the problem of deciding whether emergence and telism are irreducible features of even a rationally reconstructed framework of experience, and one has the makings of a challenging book by Marjorie Grene. Grene is anything but heavy-handed in her treatment of the devil of reductionism which she has located; but it is doubtful that she has given him his full due—insofar as she has concentrated her fire on an older style of behaviorism and mechanism that itself often has difficulty recognizing its rapidly matured and much more sophisticated progeny, scientific realism.—E. A. R. (shrink)
"From beginning to end, art is bent upon making; this book says nothing else." Fortunately, we need not take the author at his word. But if the reader sees this, maintains Gilson, he will see the errors in those philosophical approaches to art which mistake esthetics for the philosophy of art, and mistake what is a mode of being simply as production with what is a mode of being as knowledge. The foe is "noematism" and Gilson is tireless in exposing (...) its occurrence in all philosophical views of art since Plato—even in Aristotle, for whom he, otherwise, has a decided preference. Only with Nietzsche does art assert its independence of anthrôpos théôrétikos and ally itself with the Will to Power. Gilson does not approve of this extreme but he does recognize it as the inevitable result of trying to cast art in the role of the messenger of meaning, be that meaning the highest, as with the intuitionism of the Romantics, or the lowest, as in the "imitation of an imitation" notion propounded by Plato. Not that there is no meaning to be had from works of art; but concentration on the contemplation of a work of art—the province of esthetics—distracts from the recognition of the purpose of art itself, namely the activity of subordinating matter to form in the well-making of a sensible product whose being is "conceived in beauty." This latter is the proper function of the philosophy of art.—E. A. R. (shrink)
Arguing against Jaeger's contention that in his Academy days Aristotle was content to defer to the ontology of Plato, in particular the Theory of Forms, while at the same time developing the logic of the Categories which is at odds with the Theory, Owen shows that the formulation of the logical doctrine presupposed a criticism and rejection of the Platonic ontology; the more general point Owen makes is that logic and ontology were never distinct in Aristotle's mind, and his (...) development in both areas can be understood only through an appreciation of their interdependence in his intellectual Odyssey. Platonism there is in Aristotle, but it is most fruitfully traced in Aristotle's thought as a function of Aristotle's early rejection of another distinctive Platonic theme, i.e., Plato's conviction that Dialectic was a master science, and subsequent return to this theme in his later work where he installs metaphysics in the chair of first philosophy. That this return to Platonism represents an advance over Plato is due to the fact that it is conversion mediated through Aristotle's doctrine of equivocals.—E. A. R. (shrink)
In what is at the very least a tour de force, one of the most important contemporary Italian philosophers, Michele Sciacca, has given a critical exposition of literally hundreds of philosophical writers who share in common the tradition of Western philosophy from Kant and Hegel back through Descartes, on the one hand, and back through Augustine, Aristotle, and Plato, on the other. Treatment ranges from a paragraph or two to nineteen pages in the case of Kierkegaard. For those not (...) sharing Sciacca's preference for an integral Christian philosophy which can successfully incorporate all the positive values of humanism, his "criticisms" will frequently seem polemical and unsupported by the exposition he has provided. This is particularly the case in his treatment of scientifically oriented, analytical and linguistic philosophy which he discusses in a chapter with the somewhat unflattering title, "'Physicalism' and the New 'Scientific' Barbarity." But the book is obviously intended more as an act of philosophical reflection than as a history of contemporary philosophy, and is, in this respect, to be assessed more by the criterion of philosophical soundness used to judge, e.g., Aristotle's handling of his predecessors, and Hegel's reading of the history of philosophy, than by considerations of historical scholarship. And, as philosophy, Sciacca's Christian Spiritualism is imposing.—E. A. R. (shrink)
This book is the second part of the second volume of Ricœur's projected three volume work, La Philosophie de la Volonté. The first volume has already been translated as The Voluntary and the Involuntary and the first part of the second volume, which is titled generally Finitude et Culpabilité, has been translated as Fallible Man. The third part of the second volume has been projected as an Empirics of the Will, while the third volume has been broadcast as a Poetics (...) of the Will. The entire project moves from phenomenology to thought, in an attempt to give an account of man from the standpoint of Will, or more dramatically put, from the standpoint of human freedom and all the vicissitudes of existence that come with this freedom. Evil is one of the more portentous consequences of human freedom, and this book is concerned to explore it in a fashion which is initially phenomenological. But it moves toward the reflective thought that will emerge full blown in the Empirics. There Ricœur will offer a transcendental validation of the hermeneutic he has adopted to explain man through interpreting the way man presents himself to himself in his prereflective language and comportment with the world. In the first part of the book Ricœur picks up the leading symbols of evil, given through the phenomenon of confession, and follows them in their dialectical progression from evil as defilement, through evil as sin, to evil as guilt. His discussions of the Sumerian, Babylonian, and Hebrew writings, as they witness to these stages in the symbolization of evil, are exceptionally sensitive and thoroughly informed by the scholarship. Ricœur then turns his attention to the systematization of these symbols in the various archaic myths, giving first a typology of these myths and, finally, a dynamics of the myths. In the latter his Christian as well as his hermeneutical standpoints begin to assert themselves more explicitly. The preferred myth on evil, for Ricœur, is the Adamic myth, and he moves outward from there to the tragic myth, as expressed in the Greek dramatists, to the theogonic myth as expressed in Hesiod and the Sumerian and Babylonian literature, and finally to the orphic myth of the exiled soul. In addition to sustaining the development of the main thesis about the way in which a phenomenology of the symbols of evil gives rise to thought, Ricœur has many individual analyses and insights that are extremely exciting. His consideration of Plato's supposed dualism, which he interprets along the lines of Pauline dualism, which is to say, as not being an ontological dualism, is one of the more striking of these analyses. The combined rigor of argument and richness of material in this book signal a high place for it in the recent philosophical literature in general.--E. A. R. (shrink)
This is an historically oriented textbook including selected writings from such varied thinkers as Plato, Kant, Hegel, Taine, Croce, Fry, Camus, etc. Richter presents an introduction designed to acquaint the student with the diversity of perspectives and problems that will be encountered in the course of the text. Aesthetics is here construed as a broader field in the 20th century than in the past. It is no longer to be defined as the philosophy of the beautiful or of art; (...) it is in fact no longer limited to philosophic concerns but encompasses "all studies of the arts and related types of experience from a philosophic, scientific, or other theoretical standpoint, including those of psychology, sociology, anthropology, cultural history, art criticism, and education." The branching out of aesthetic concerns and methods is developed historically through the selections presented. Plato's discussions of aesthetics are seen to be subordinated to his political philosophy and doctrine of Ideas. Although they present a more complete aesthetic doctrine, the views of Schopenhauer and Hegel are also seen to be determined by their metaphysical systems. The romantic emphasis on the role of the artist by Tolstoy and Veron is represented, as well as the influence of positivism in the experimental approach of Taine. Each selection includes an introduction and discussion of the text along with study questions and suggested bibliography. The student is thus presented with most of the major theories of art, with art as imitation, as communication, as intuition, as experience, as rebellion; mimetic, empirical, and formalistic views on the nature of art are also confronted. Such discussions provide the basis for a recognition of interesting contrasts in views on aesthetic problems.—E. M. (shrink)
The excuse for publishing a new anthology of texts in ancient philosophy is that the effort is not a duplication of previous attempts, either in terms of the texts offered or the interpretations tendered. It is impossible to meet the first criterion for the pre-Socratics, since there is a concise and relatively agreed upon canon of material. What then of the interpretations offered in this volume? They are scant, unimaginative, and, in some cases, misleading. This is especially true in the (...) case of the sophists. Thus, Callicles' long speech from the Gorgias is quoted as representative of sophistical doctrine on the antithesis between nature and convention. The practice of quoting Plato on the sophists is hazardous at best. Why not, instead, print and analyze those intriguing fragments one and two of Antiphon's Περὶ ληθείας? Or if Plato is to be trusted in regard to the sophists, why not quote Protagoras' remarks in the Platonic dialogue of that same name? Or the excursion in the Theaetetus? These selections would present a much more complete picture of Protagoras' doctrines than the seven lines from the doxographical tradition that the editors supply. In addition, there appears to be little logic in the bibliographies. The only secondary source suggested for the sophists is Untersteiner's book. Havelock's The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics is equally controversial, but certainly more reliable. Or if J. H. Loenen's "Was Anaximander an Evolutionist?" could be dredged up from Mnemosyne, surely some material from the other journals could have been found for the sophists. After the pre-Socratics, the book offers about eighty-five pages of selections from Plato, one hundred pages from Aristotle, twenty-five pages from Hellenistic stoicism, Epicureanism, and skepticism and a concluding twenty pages from Plotinus. A novel and quite useful feature of the book is a thematic table which topically indexes the texts according to the editors' conception of the main branches of philosophy.--E. A. R. (shrink)
This interesting approach to literary analysis comprises articles by writers in philosophy, literature, and the classics. Authors treated include Shaw, Shakespeare, Plato, Ibsen, and Browning; among those faced with dilemmas are Faust, Billy Budd, Hamlet, and Job.--E. T.
The first six chapters of this book present and criticize six views of the nature of proper names, among which are theories that proper names have no meaning or connotation, that proper names have more meaning than other signs or that their meaning is infinite, that ordinary proper names should be analysed into "logically" proper names, etc. This part of the book is the best. One may find in these chapters several well-reasoned arguments which seem to totally demolish the theories (...) under investigation. Chapters seven to nine present the author's own solution to the problem. Sørensen holds that a proper name does have a meaning—otherwise it would not have been a part of language at all. The meaning of a linguistic sign, he argues, is a set of conditions to be satisfied by an extra-linguistic entity, such that this entity may be identified as denoted by the said sign. A proper name is an individual name, and its meaning is a series of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of the individual entity which this name is intended to denote. It is Sørensen's view that this series consists of a definite description of final length including space and time indicators. The definiens formula for proper names is thus 'P' = 'the x that... t... p....' The discussion of this proposal is, however, greatly impaired by Sørensen's utter disregard for the rich philosophical literature existing on the subject: no attempt is made to confront his view with the now standard arguments against theories of that type. Even many inner difficulties of the proposed solution are ignored. E.g., one may ask what values do 't' and 'p' take in the definition of 'Zeus'. Or take the following puzzle: are 'The x that taught Aristotle in p at t' and 'The x that studied with Socrates in p at t' both the meaning of 'Plato'? Sørensen's view that "A national register may be looked upon as a dictionary of proper names" suggests a positive answer, but surely R and S cannot be the same meaning. Many similar problems bother the reader of Sørensen's book, but, unfortunately, they are nowhere discussed.—E. M. Z. (shrink)
The author, a physicist as well as a philosopher, uses the thought of Werner Heisenberg as a focus for examining the epistemological foundations of quantum theory. Though Heisenberg's earliest original insights were stimulated by Plato's Timaeus he soon swung over to Bohr's empiricism in developing and supporting the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. His later philosophical reflections are markedly Kantian with irreducible physical invariants playing the role of Kant's necessary and universal laws. As Heelan sees it, an examination of (...) the intentionality-structure of the scientist supplies the critical basis for judging the reality of the objects known through science. Though Heisenberg rejected the naive "empirical objectivity" of pre-quantum interpretations of science, his reflective evaluation of his own achievements is inadequate in explaining the formal objectivity of the objects known. By distinguishing the criterion of reality, rational affirmation, from the meaning of "reality," whatever is defined by the object in its formal sense, Heelan is able to develop a critical realism that assigns an ontological status to fundamental particles. "Main-line" philosophers of science may feel ill at ease with Heelan's phenomenological terminology of "intentionality-structure," "noema," and "horizon" and may object to his treatment of "meaning" and "language." But if they "bracket" these reservations they will find this book an unusually well-informed and penetrating study of the philosophical implications of modern physics.—E. M. M. (shrink)
A dialectically rather than chronologically ordered survey: it moves first through the outright dualism of Descartes, to the primacy-of-soul position of Plato, and then to the extremes of Feuerbachian materialism and Berkeleyean immaterialism. Then, returning to pre-philosophical foundations in an attempt to recapture the lived phenomenon of body-soul unity that each of the above philosophers acknowledged, but lost in a welter of reductive abstractions, Van Peursen considers the non-dualistic and non-reductivist conceptions of primitive man, Homeric man, and Biblical man. (...) Coming back to the philosophers, this time to those of a more hylomorphic stamp, Van Peursen critically discusses Aristotle, and the corps vécu analyses of Gehlen, Plessner, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Finally, Van Peursen treats the variegated positions of Wittgenstein, Hampshire, and Ryle; the former two coming in for guarded endorsement while Ryle is set forth sympathetically, but attacked for his doctrine of the merely indexical "I." In the last chapter, Van Peursen's own phenomenological version of an "I" which is simultaneously embodied and transcendent—the latter owing to its structure as an "oriented" embodiment—is presented in a suggestive but sketchy fashion. The book is valuable as an introduction, and if, in the end, one is prepared to agree with the spirit, if not the letter, of Van Peursen's embodiment theory, then the metaphilosophical lesson he has tried to drum in throughout the book, namely, the danger inherent in philosophers hypostatizing philosophical or scientific abstractions to the detriment of the integral reality which is man, will make this something more than simply a sensitive survey.—E. A R. (shrink)
Adherence to a few basic principles of textbook reading compilation have made this one of the more worthwhile introductory philosophy texts. In the first place, the editors have given lengthy and frequently complete texts. Anselm's Proslogium, Descartes' Meditations, Plato's Phaedo, and Kant's Prolegomena are given complete or nearly complete; there is a ninety-one page extract from Locke's Essay, over fifty pages of James and nearly forty pages from Whitehead. This still leaves room for ample primary material by Leibniz, Hume, (...) and Schopenhauer. The plan of the book is to frame the important primary text with intellectually contemporaneous discussion of the problems treated in the primary text, and then to bracket each section with a prologue and epilogue drawn—except in the final section where Plato has the last word—from twentieth-century literature relevant to the issues under discussion in each section. The authors are thus able to provide an historical and thematic introduction to philosophy, which together cannot help but impress the beginning student with the unity of philosophical experience. Obviously no single textbook will ever escape the need for supplementation; this one in particular will require those who would like their students to be exposed to more phenomenology and existentialism, and, to a lesser degree, analytical philosophy, to introduce additional reading. But Epstein and Kennedy have provided the basic skeleton to which may be added as much flesh as the instructor desires.—E. A. R. (shrink)
It is a pleasure to see that there is an art to editing college, readings texts. Individual editors handle five more or less isolable schools of thought, and in the same stroke achieve a modest effort in the history of ethical thought. I. The "Classical" authors include Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas ; II. "Dialectical" thinkers include Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Engels ; III. "American Naturalistic Thought" contains selections from James, Dewey, Edel, Hook, Romanell, Dennes ; IV. "Analytic" selections are from (...) Moore, Schlick, Ayer, Stevenson, Toulmin, Nowell-Smith ; V. "Existentialist" material is from Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, Marcel, Camus, Teilhard de Chardin. The introductions to each section are well-done and genuinely informative, and include a glossary of key terms occurring throughout each particular section. Analytically designed questions are placed after each selection and each section contains a selected but annotated bibliography.—E. A. R. (shrink)
The editors of this book of readings have packed in a wealth of material in a way which evinces an imaginative conception of, as well as an ambitious program for a course in the philosophy of education. There are forty-three selections of varying completeness from thirty-six different authors; among the philosophers included are Kierkegaard, Schlick, Kant, Ayer, Blanshard, Scheffler, Stace, Moore, Feigl, Russell, Lewis, Dewey, James, Royce, and Peirce. Plato is the only pre-Kantian philosopher to make an appearance. Half (...) of the selections do not concern education or the philosophy of education directly. Rather, they consider one or more of the four main problem areas of philosophy which the editors have decided gear into problems in the philosophy of education most directly. These areas are the nature of philosophy, metaphysics or the nature of reality, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of value. The section on metaphysics is epistemologically slanted, as might be expected where the concern is for the relation of teaching and learning to the nature of reality. The statements of the philosophers on the general philosophical problems are given at the beginning of each of the sections and then followed by applications of the philosophical position by philosophers, once again, and educational theorists to the field of education. Since too often the philosophy of education is taught in the education rather than the philosophy department, the liberal dose of straight philosophy should prove extremely helpful to the student of education who is accustomed to receiving the philosophy appropriate to the philosophy of education in a highly diluted form.—E. A. R. (shrink)
This volume has benefited from the same care in preparation as its companion volume, Approaches to Morality, and duplicates the layout and apparatus of the former. I. The "Classical" authors remain Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas ; II. Selections from Hegel, Marx, Engels, and A. Schaff make up the section on "Dialectical" thinkers ; III. "American Pragmatic-Naturalist" material is from Peirce, James, Dewey, Santayana ; IV. "Analytic-Positivist" selections are from Hume, Carnap, Russell, Ayer, Ryle, Wittgenstein, Moore, Strawson, Hampshire ; V. "Existentialist (...) and Phenomenological Thought" includes material by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, A. Brunner, Marcel, Heidegger. It would be difficult to find a better book of readings for an undergraduate course in philosophical psychology which covers the same or a wider variety of perspectives while offering as much background information and editorial assistance.—E. A. R. (shrink)
This book is a collection of essays in honor of Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Rice University for forty years. Besides a tribute to Tsanoff written by J. S. Fulton, there are ten essays written by distinguished philosophers, each considering a topic in his field of interest. Virgil Aldrich discusses the importance of language in an essay entitled "Self-Consciousness." An examination of the new in art and an attempt to explicate its value and rationale is (...) presented by Van Meter Ames; illustrative material is drawn from such sources as contemporary film, pop art and chance music. In "Social Science and Social Norms" Clifford Barrett discusses the relevance of facts and norms in systematic considerations of social scientists. C. P. Snow's concept of two cultures is examined by A. Cornelius Benjamin in "Philosophy and the Cultures." Other essays presented are "Philosophy and Common Sense" by George Boas, "Conscience and Conscientiousness" by A. Campbell Garnett, "Criteria for Ideas of God" by C. Hartshorne, and "Sovereignty and the Idea of Republic" by C. W. Hendel. Charles Morris examines the common themes of the pragmatic movement, discussing such fields as epistemology, axiology and cosmology, and such philosophers as Peirce, Dewey, Mead and Lewis. In the concluding essay G. R. Morrow discusses Plato's views about a God and the many gods of the Greek pantheon. This book is a loose collection of papers, lacking any single theme or determinate relation between the essays presented; each essay, however, is competently handled and is interesting in its own right.—E. M. (shrink)
This volume can be considered a supplement to A. Plantinga's similar book on the Ontological argument, and includes classic texts and contemporary commentary on both the Cosmological and the Teleological arguments, though there is no extended consideration of the problem of evil as it bears particularly on the Teleological argument. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume and Kant give the classic arguments for and against the Cosmological argument. Geach, Edwards, Plantinga, and Penelhum provide the contemporary commentary. Paley, Hume, Mill, and Kant (...) state and criticize the classical Teleological argument, while A. E. Taylor, Ducasse, and Broad provide the contemporary rejoinder. A concluding postscript includes articles by Smart and Taylor, with a brief selection from Tillich. It is helpful to have as much of the material as is possible on the theistic arguments under one cover. It is unfortunate, however, that editorial limitations and imagination were not stretched or reapportioned to provide some contemporary commentary from outside the orbit of Anglo-American philosophy. In addition, the editor's introduction contains some serious misstatements about the classical Cosmological arguments. The classical argument did not maintain in any sense that God is a "self-causing cause" or that the "Prime Mover is not only the initial member in a temporal series..." ; God is not "the initial member in a temporal series" at all. Nor does the editor distinguish between natural theology and the philosophy of religion; something close to obfuscation is the consequence of this failure in his remark that linguistic analysis has "demonstrated that a definition of God is the starting point for the philosophy of religion."—E. A. R. (shrink)
This new edition brings together the English translation of the renowned Plato scholar and translator, Seth Benardete, with two illuminating commentaries on it: Benardete's "On Plato's Symposium" and Allan Bloom's provocative essay, "The ...
M. J. Levett's elegant translation of Plato's _Theaetetus_, first published in 1928, is here revised by Myles Burnyeat to reflect contemporary standards of accuracy while retaining the style, imagery, and idiomatic speech for which the Levett translation is unparalleled. Bernard William’s concise introduction, aimed at undergraduate students, illuminates the powerful argument of this complex dialogue, and illustrates its connections to contemporary metaphysical and epistemological concerns.
". . . one of the masterpieces of classical scholarship. . . . Contemporary work on the Timaeus will inevitably take Plato's Cosmology as its starting point." -- Charles H Kahn, University of Pennsylvania.
Se e in che modo il piacere abbia a che fare con il modello di vita preferibile è argomento centrale, sia nella cultura greca, sia nel dibattito filosofico antico. Questo articolo confronta le differenti soluzioni che Platone e Aristotele hanno dato alla questione del piacere, rispettivamente nel Filebo e nell’Etica Nicomachea, registrando una significativa divergenza nel metodo e nella concezione antropologica.Whether and in what way pleasure has to do with a desirable lifestyle is a main topic both in Greek culture (...) and in ancient philosophical debate. This article compares the different solutions that Plato and Aristotle gave to the question of pleasure, in Philebus and in Nicomachean Ethics respectively, pointing out an important divergence in method and anthropological conception. (shrink)
A appreciation and critical discussion of RE Allen's Plato's Parmenides. I argue that, contra Allen, the Parmenides is not an aporetic dialogue and that the eight hypotheses are not governed by the so-called "dilemma of participation." Rather, the apparent contradictions between and within the hypotheses function to elicit from the reader a distinction in kind between the sorts of one that forms, on the one hand, and their sensible participants, on the other, are and to illumine the 'relation' of (...) participation. (shrink)