We present an experimental test of the validity of the Pauli Exclusion Principle for electrons based on the concept put forward a few years ago by Ramberg and Snow. In this experiment we perform a very accurate search of X-rays from the Pauli-forbidden atomic transitions of electrons in the already filled 1S shells of copper atoms. Although the experiment has a simple structure, it poses deep conceptual and interpretational problems. Here we describe the experimental method and recent experimental results, which (...) we interpret as an upper limit for the probability to violate the Pauli Exclusion Principle. We present also future plans to upgrade the experimental apparatus using Silicon Drift Detectors. (shrink)
In this paper we describe an experimental test of the validity of the Pauli Exclusion Principle (for electrons) which is based on a straightforward idea put forward a few years ago by Ramberg and Snow (Phys. Lett. B 238:438, 1990). We perform a very accurate search of X-rays from the Pauli-forbidden atomic transitions of electrons in the already filled 1S shells of copper atoms. Although the experiment has a very simple structure, it poses deep conceptual and interpretational problems. Here we (...) describe the experimental method and recent experimental results, which we interpret in the framework of quon theory. We also present future plans to upgrade the experimental apparatus using Silicon Drift Detectors. (shrink)
G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an External World (...) In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)
Dieser Artikel ist die Übersetzung des zuerst in 1950 veröffentlichten Schlüsseltextes “Humanisme og kristendom” des dänischen Philosophen und Theologen Knud E. Løgstrup. In diesem Text legt Løgstrup seine Konzeption der Debatte zwischen Humanismus und Christentum dar. Er argumentiert dafür, dass die beiden Positionen nicht als einander entgegengesetzt zu betrachten sind, da beide die Interdependenz und Verletzlichkeit des Menschseins als Grundlage für eine “stumme” Forderung nach Umsorge erkennen – auch wenn der Humanismus in dieser Forderung lediglich die Leistung sozialer Normen sehen (...) und das Christentum sie mit Lehren der Kirche verwechseln kann. So betrachtet, greift der Text als erster Entwurf jenen Ideen vor, die Løgstrup in seinem späteren Hauptwerk Den etiske fordring entwickeln sollte. (shrink)
Resumo: Este estudo objetiva retomar o diálogo efetuado entre a tradição da ontologia hermenêutica heideggeriana e a psicanálise freudiana, a fim de discutir se ele ainda tem lugar na atualidade e, em caso positivo, problematizar como ele tem sido construído. Apesar de existirem muitos argumentos que questionam a possibilidade de articulação entre esses dois campos, eles não encerram consensualmente essa discussão e exigem ser atualizados. No cenário mais recente, algumas pesquisas têm acenado para o estabelecimento de pontos de conexões entre (...) elas, sem, contudo, desconsiderarem a especificidade dos campos teóricos em questão. Essa forma de interlocução parece o grande desafio aos pesquisadores na atualidade.: This study aims to retake the dialogue made between the tradition of the heideggerian hermeneutic ontology and freudian psychoanalysis, in order to discuss whether it still has a place in the actuality and, if so, to problematize how it has been constructed. Despite having a lot of arguments which question the possibility of articulation between both fields, they don't enclose consensually this debate and require an updating. In the last scenario, some researches go towards the establishment of connection points among them, without, however, disregarding the specificity of the theoretical fields in question. This way of interlocution seems the great challenge of the researchers nowadays. (shrink)
Is God's foreknowledge compatible with human freedom? One of the most attractive attempts to reconcile the two is the Ockhamistic view, which subscribes not only to human freedom and divine omniscience, but retains our most fundamental intuitions concerning God and time: that the past is immutable, that God exists and acts in time, and that there is no backward causation. In order to achieve all that, Ockhamists distinguish ‘hard facts’ about the past which cannot possibly be altered from ‘soft facts’ (...) about the past which are alterable, and argue that God's prior beliefs about human actions are soft facts about the past. (shrink)
O presente trabalho examina uma perspectiva hermenêutica do político presente no pensamento de Chantal Mouffe, cujo empreendimento se dá com o seu postulado em torno do que denomina por democracia radical e plural e da resultante desse postulado dentro de uma ordem cosmopolita da política e o reflexo do empreendimento dos direitos nesse sentido. A chave de leitura que orienta esta perspectiva advém da concepção do político realizada pela autora, em que o antagonismo é nuclear na formação da identidade plural (...) como forma de radicalização do político no contexto das diferenças entre o Eu e o Outro no plano político global. Aqui, os direitos devem ser considerados não do ponto de vista universal, mas das relações que são e devem ser sempre ressignificadas. Neste sentido, o político assume um caráter plural, inerente a condição mesma do social e se contrapõe ao projeto liberal de caráter universalista, racionalista e individualista, que não alcança as diferenças e com isso impossibilita uma leitura aberta do social enquanto modo de ressignificação do político. Por conseguinte, a possibilidade de sua ressignificação quanto à reinterpretação do social e também dos direitos, a partir das novas posições de sujeitos, está sempre aberta. Esse propósito tem o sentido de refletir o debate democrático em torno da relação entre o sujeito político do ponto de vista da universalidade dos direitos e a importância das diferenças nesta perspectiva. Tem-se em vista a proposta do projeto multipolar de Mouffe na construção das posições de sujeitos no âmbito cosmopolita, que não pode ser encarado de modo universal, mas da compreensão quanto a importância do antagonismo constitutivo das novas identidades. (shrink)
An important contribution to the foundations of probability theory, statistics and statistical physics has been made by E. T. Jaynes. The recent publication of his collected works provides an appropriate opportunity to attempt an assessment of this contribution.
Neste trabalho eu pretendo oferecer um breve esboço de uma das fontes do utilitarismo. A teoria do direito natural de Richard Cumberland. Embora o autor se insira na tradição do jus naturae, há elementos suficientes em seu texto que apontam para a preparação de noções importantes ao utilitarismo, noções de raciocínio consequencialista. Sem fazer anacronismos, eu pretenso esboçar aqui o papel assumido por Cumberland na história dessa corrente do pensamento ético.
Precision testing of the quantum electrodynamics (QED) and the standard model provides some of the most secure knowledge in the history of physics. These tests can also be used to constrain and search for new physics going beyond the standard model. We examine the evidential structure of relationships between theoretical predictions from QED, precision measurements of these phenomena, and the indirect determination of the fine structure constant. We argue that "pure QED" is no longer sufficient to predict the electron's anomalous (...) magnetic moment, and that standard model effects are needed. The details relevant to low-energy QED are robust against future theory change. (shrink)
What is a natural kind ? As we shall see, the concept of a natural kind has a long history. Many of the interesting doctrines can be detected in Aristotle, were revived by Locke and Leibniz, and have again become fashionable in recent years. Equally there has been agreement about certain paradigm examples: the kinds oak, stickleback and gold are natural kinds, and the kinds table, nation and banknote are not. Sadly agreement does not extend much further. It is impossible (...) to discover a single consistent doctrine in the literature, and different discussions focus on different doctrines without writers or readers being aware of the fact. In this paper I shall attempt to find a defensible distinction between natural and non-natural kinds. (shrink)
O texto partilha dos encontros vitais que mobilizaram no corpo de um biólogo-artista, exercícios fabulatórios de experimentação - com a imagem, a escrita, a memória, as águas de um igarapé, a terra, as vidas que atravessaram moradores atingidos por uma barragem - aglutinados pelas seguintes questões: como um biólogo pode experimentar a biologia, a arte, a natureza para além do já posto? Como a arte e a biologia se cruzam com/na natureza e que educações se compõem nesses vazamentos? O texto (...) vem com o desejo de instaurar um caos problemático nas concepções demasiadamente rígidas que enredam as biologias e seus atravessamentos na/com educação, tomando como inspiração conceitual a filosofia de Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari. (shrink)
How could the self be a substance? There are various ways in which it could be, some familiar from the history of philosophy. I shall be rejecting these more familiar substantivalist approaches, but also the non-substantival theories traditionally opposed to them. I believe that the self is indeed a substance—in fact, that it is a simple or noncomposite substance—and, perhaps more remarkably still, that selves are, in a sense, self-creating substances. Of course, if one thinks of the notion of substance (...) as an outmoded relic of prescientific metaphysics—as the notion of some kind of basic and perhaps ineffable stuff —then the suggestion that the self is a substance may appear derisory. Even what we ordinarily call ‘stuffs’—gold and water and butter and the like—are, it seems, more properly conceived of as aggregates of molecules or atoms, while the latter are not appropriately to be thought of as being ‘made’ of any kind of ‘stuff’ at all. But this only goes to show that we need to think in terms of a more sophisticated notion of substance—one which may ultimately be traced back to Aristotle's conception of a ‘primary substance’ in the Categories , and whose heir in modern times is W. E. Johnson's notion of the ‘continuant’. It is the notion, that is, of a concrete individual capable of persisting identically through qualitative change, a subject of alterable predicates that is not itself predicable of any further subject. (shrink)
The strong weak truth table (sw) reducibility was suggested by Downey, Hirschfeldt, and LaForte as a measure of relative randomness, alternative to the Solovay reducibility. It also occurs naturally in proofs in classical computability theory as well as in the recent work of Soare, Nabutovsky, and Weinberger on applications of computability to differential geometry. We study the sw-degrees of c.e. reals and construct a c.e. real which has no random c.e. real (i.e., Ω number) sw-above it.
O presente texto procura acompanhar alguns aspectos da reconstrução sartreana das relações entre indivíduo e história, tentando mostrar que a fenomenologia e o materialismo dialético comparecem nessa proposta de conhecimento e que é a convergência das duas perspectivas que permite, contemplando adequadamente a universalidade e a singularidade, descrever e compreender dialeticamente o modo histórico de produção da identidade individual.
What happens during a near-death experience? In an accessible style, this text reviews recent research about unbelievable events, creating an account of activity at the boundaries of science. It also examines research concerns, current theories, methodological issues and clinical implications.
Why does the problem of free will seem so intractable? I surmise that in large measure it does so because the free will debate, at least in its modern form, is conducted in terms of a mistaken approach to causality in general. At the heart of this approach is the assumption that all causation is fundamentally event causation. Of course, it is well-known that some philosophers of action want to invoke in addition an irreducible notion of agent causation, applicable only (...) in the sphere of intelligent agency. But such a view is generally dismissed as incompatible with the naturalism that has now become orthodoxy amongst mainstream analytical philosophers of mind. What I want to argue is that substances, not events, are the primary relata of causal relations and that agent causation should properly be conceived of as a species of substance causation. I shall try to show that by thus reconceiving the nature of causation and of agency, the problem of free will can be made more tractable. I shall also argue for a contention that may seem even less plausible at first sight, namely, that such a view of agency is perfectly compatible with a volitionist theory of action. (shrink)
Animal ethicists have recently debated the ethical questions raised by disenhancing animals to improve their welfare. Here, we focus on the particular case of breeding hens for commercial egg-laying systems to become blind, in order to benefit their welfare. Many people find breeding blind hens intuitively repellent, yet ‘welfare-only’ positions appear to be committed to endorsing this possibility if it produces welfare gains. We call this the ‘Blind Hens’ Challenge’. In this paper, we argue that there are both empirical and (...) theoretical reasons why even those adopting ‘welfare-only’ views should be concerned about breeding blind hens. But we also argue that alternative views, which (for example) claim that it is important to respect the telos or rights of an animal, do not offer a more convincing solution to questions raised by the possibility of disenhancing animals for their own benefit. (shrink)
In this book an introduction to the grammatical view of the scalar implicature phenomenon is presented. A detailed overview is offered concerning the embeddability of the exhaustivity operator, and the contextual dependance of the alternatives generation process. The theoretical implications of the grammatical view with respect to the abductive character of the scalar implicature are also discussed. A pragmatic account of the assertive content is proposed in correlation with a blindness-based account of the semantic content carried by scalar sentences, in (...) order to ensure that the information globally conveyed by the latter is sometimes different from the semantic content automatically generated. -/- . (shrink)
In this paper I shall venture into an area with which I am not very familiar and in which I feel far from confident; namely into phenomenology. My main motive is not to get away from standard, boring, methodological questions like those of induction and demarcation; but the conviction that a phenomenological account of the empirical basis forms a necessary complement to Popper's falsificationism. According to the latter, a scientific theory is a synthetic and universal, hence unverifiable proposition. In fact, (...) in order to be technologically useful, a scientific hypothesis must refer to future states-of-affairs; it ought therefore to remain unverified. But in order to be empirical, a theory must bear some kind of relation to factual statements. According to Popper, such a relation can only be one of potential conflict. Thus a theory T will be termed scientific if and only if T is logically incompatible with a so-called basic statement b, where b is both empirically verifiable and empirically falsifiable. In other words: T is scientific if it entails ¬b; where b, hence also ¬b, is an empirically decidable proposition. (shrink)
Este trabalho apresenta desdobramentos da história da Educação Salesiana no Colégio Salesiano de Santa Teresa, localizado em Corumbá-MS. Elegemos como recorte temporal os anos de 1972 a 1987, período que vigorou o convênio que deu origem a Escola Estadual Santa Teresa que funcionou simultaneamente ao CSST até 1982, passando a existir, a partir daí, somente a Escola Estadual. É nossa intenção mostrar como o currículo da Educação Salesiana, entendido como construção social, ganhou significado localmente, por meio da imprensa sul-mato-grossense, ao (...) narrar notícias, acontecimentos e jogos de poder, expondo o confronto entre grupos sociais, pois como sabemos, a imprensa é um importante instrumento político. Na análise dos dados, salienta-se conflitos entre formação de governantes e a defesa de acesso à escola pública; salienta-se, ainda, a invisibilidade das mulheres. (shrink)
E-Z Reader 7 is a processing model of eye-movement control. One constraint imposed on the model is that high-level cognitive processes do not influence eye movements unless normal reading processes are disturbed. I suggest that this constraint is unnecessary, and that the model provides a sensible architecture for explaining how both low- and high-level processes influence eye movements.
In this paper I develop and present a unified account of information, misinformation, and disinformation and their interconnections. The unified account is rooted in Paul Grice’s notions of natural and non-natural meaning Studies in the way of words. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 213–223, 1957) and a corresponding distinction between natural and non-natural information :313–330, 2010). I argue that we can specify at least three specific kinds of non-natural information. Thus, as varieties of non-natural information there is intentionally non-misleading information, (...) unintentionally misleading information—i.e. misinformation—and intentionally misleading information—i.e. disinformation. By shifting the focus from the truth-values of content to the intention/intentionality and misleadingness/non-misleadingness of that content I obtain a unified account that makes room for the potential misleadingness of true content, the potential non-misleadingness of false content, and everything in between. (shrink)
Are there those who confuse an automobile with its driver? We laugh at such a question. Are there those who cannot distinguish the “known” from the act of their “knowing”? Our laughter quickly fades. For our answer, we do not have to go directly to the jungles and the caves; our enumeration could begin with famous names of science. People who wield the surgical instruments of their discipline with the subtlest precision start to beat about with primitive conceptual clubs as (...) soon as discussion hits upon questions concerning consciousness and its accurate investigation. (shrink)
If one is an egalitarian, what should one want to equalize? Opportunities or outcomes? Resources or welfare? These positions are usually conceived to be very different. I argue in this paper that the distinction is misconceived: the only coherent conception of resource equality implies welfare equality, in an appropriately abstract description of the problem. In this section, I motivate the program which the rest of the paper carries out.
Hume's famous discussion of miracles in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding is curious both on account of the arguments he does deploy and on account of the arguments he does not deploy, but might have been expected to. The first and second parts of this paper will be devoted to examining, respectively, these two objects of curiosity. The second part I regard as the more important, because I shall there try to show that the fact that Hume does not deploy (...) an argument that he might have been expected to deploy in fact reflects a weakness in the view of natural laws that has come to be associated with Hume's name. I shall argue, in fact, that it is a symptom of the defectiveness of the ‘Humean’ view of natural laws that on that view it is only too easy to rule out the possibility of a miracle ever occurring. In the third part of the paper, I shall show how another view of laws can overcome this problem. (shrink)
A hipótese deste artigo tem o objetivo de mostrar que Samuel Pufendorf utiliza e elabora a distinção efetuada por Hugo Grotius entre direitos perfeitos e imperfeitos. De certo modo Pufendorf vai mais adiante do que Grotius e não apenas aceita a sua distinção, como também a esclarece: os direitos em geral são poderes morais obtidos pela lei que apresentam ao mesmo tempo dois tipos de poder moral e de direitos. No caso dos direitos perfeitos, o homem está por definição autorizado (...) a usar a força para proteger seu exercício do poder. Dentro da sociedade política isso significa que ele pode ir ao tribunal, entre as nações permite a justificativa da guerra. No caso dos direitos imperfeitos, porém, o seu detentor não tem a permissão de exigir seu cumprimento pela força, embora deva ser admitido que obstruir erroneamente seu exercício é algo desumano. O jurista alemão está mais interessado, portanto, em explicar o significado da função da própria distinção. Ele oferece sua explicação em dois estágios: o primeiro explica por que os direitos perfeitos têm de ser cumpridos. Entre as leis da natureza, algumas devem ser observadas simplesmente para que a sociedade possa existir, enquanto outras conduzem a uma existência melhorada. Os direitos perfeitos extraem seu caráter do primeiro tipo de lei, os imperfeitos, do segundo. O segundo estágio da explicação mostra como os direitos imperfeitos e perfeitos suplementam um ao outro.: The article presents some important ideas of the rights discourse of Samuel Pufendorf. The definitions of natural law, the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights. Keywords: Sociability; Natural Law; Rights; State. (shrink)
In The City of God , XI, 10, St Augustine claims that the divine nature is simple because ‘it is what it has’ . We may take this as a slogan for the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity , a doctrine which finds its way into orthodox medieval Christian theological speculation. Like the doctrine of God's timeless eternality, the DDS has seemed obvious and pious to many, and incoherent, misguided, and repugnant to others. Unlike the doctrine of God's timeless eternality, the (...) DDS has received very little critical attention. The DDS did not originate with Augustine, but I am not primarily concerned with its pedigree. Nor am I concerned to ask how the doctrine interacts with trinitarian speculation. I will have my hands full as it is. In Section I of this paper I shall provide a rough characterization of the DDS, indicate its complexity, and focus on a particular aspect of the doctrine which will exercise us in the remainder of the paper, namely, the thesis that the divine attributes are all identical with each other and with God. In section n I shall discuss Alvin Plantinga's recent objections to Aquinas' version of the DDS. I shall then offer a more detailed presentation of what I take to be Aquinas' version , and recast it in terms of a theory of attributes which is significantly different from Plantinga's . Although the recasting of the doctrine will enable me to rebut Plantinga's objections , it by no means solves all the problems of the DDS. In section vi I shall discuss the chief lingering problem facing a defender of the DDS. (shrink)
In a famous passage in her book, Intention , Professor G. E. M. Anscombe argues that we can only render intelligible the idea of someone wanting a thing if we know under what aspect the person sees the thing as desirable. The wanted thing must be characterized by the wanter as desirable in some respect. ‘[What] is required for our concept of “wanting”’, she says, ‘is that a man should see what he wants under the aspect of some good’ . (...) And furthermore, ‘the good conceived by the agent to characterize the thing must really be one of the many forms of good’ . Thus, while the object of desire need only be conceived as good by the wanter, and need not be really good, this can only be because the object does not have the desirable character the wanter believes it to have, not because the character supposed to be desirable is not really so. Desire cannot but be for one of the real forms of good. (shrink)
É bem conhecida a oposição estabelecida por Kant entre experiência possível e dialética, na medida em que esta última é caracterizada como a lógica da ilusão. Ao mesmo tempo, o modo de pensar metafísico, que ocorre dialeticamente, em sentido kantiano, é uma tendência inevitável da razão, expressa na exigência formal de completude das categorias. Como o pensar, enquanto exercício livre da razão, é em si mesmo mais amplo do que a atividade de conhecer, própria do entendimento, o pensar contém o (...) conhecimento, embora este se qualifique pelas regras e pelos limites determinantes da objetividade. A pergunta que tentaremos formular é se essa relação continente-conteúdo não poderia configurar também uma dependência da experiência em relação ao raciocínio dialético, que estaria de algum modo indicada na função reguladora das idéias da razão. Nesse caso, a oposição formal entre conhecer e pensar seria inseparável da inclusão estrutural (dependência) da experiência no âmbito da razão. Na raiz do problema estaria talvez a tensão (dialética) entre a aspiração subjetiva de totalidade e as exigências objetivas de limitação e segmentação da experiência e a forma da experiência teria de ser finalmente concebida a partir de um fundo de inteligibilidade problemática. Dialectics and experienceThe separation of possible experience as objective knowledge and dialetics as a non-objective or non-theoretical knowledge is one of the most important aspects of kantian critical philosophy. But Kant also says that the activity of reason, as a pure thinking, has more amplitude than understanding knowledge. So we could say that theoric knowledge would depend on rational ( and non-theoretical) knowledge, as something contained in it. If we accept that, the consequence would be a relation of dependence between the form of objective knowledge and the background of a problematic even doubtful inteligible knowledge. (shrink)
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