This book is based on two new nominalistic theses: first, that material things (houses, cats, people, symphonies, and also hair, milk, red, and love) are ...

I defend a slightly modified version of geach's rule r, I.E., That although both a and b are g, It is possible for a to be the same f as b and a different h than b, Provided that the question whether a and b are the same g is undecidable. Answering those who object to relative identity I claim that they tacitly adhere to a false fregean view, I.E., That one cannot use a singular term to denote an entity (...) x if it is not true that for every y, X=y or not x=y. I show, However, That such terms are, And must be, Used by every empirically oriented language with finite or infinite predicative arsenal, And hence relative identity is more handy than absolute identity. Finally I give a version of leibniz's law for relative identity. (shrink)

It has been persuasively argued that music refers. For example, a passage that resembles the demeanour of people under the sway of emotion E is seen as itself being E and, thus, as referring to E. Yet what is the purpose of such reference? Serious music, I say, works as a proof. A passage that refers to E is cast as a well-formed formula in a calculus. That formula is then creatively developed in accordance with the rules of that calculus (...) (e.g. harmony and counterpoint in classical music). As in scientific proofs, intermediary generated formulae need not have external meaning over and above the character they have due to their role in the formal sequence. Yet finally a formula is derived that does have external meaning; for example, it refers to emotion F. The composer has thus fictionally proved that E is equal to F, e.g. that hope is futile or that love conquers all. (shrink)

Like frege, I claim that any singular term (a name, A definite description, Or an indexical) has a sense, And it refers to what satisfies that sense. Unlike frege, I say that this referent is the real world entity that satisfies the said sense in some belief world, Usually, The utterer's. Reference is a function from senses to transworld heirlines. Thus, My token of 'plato' may have a different sense than your token of 'plato', Yet both may refer to plato. (...) My token of 'the f' may have the same sense as your token of 'the f', Yet they may have different referents. My semantics constitutes, I believe, A new argument for the tenability of metaphysical realism. (shrink)

In both "individuals" and "the bounds of sense" p f strawson has argued that the no-Ownership theory of mental states is incoherent. He has argued for example, That the no-Ownership theorist must use, In stating his theory, A concept the validity of which the theory attempts to deny (i.E., That experiences are necessarily owned). I show that this argument is based on a confusion of modalities, Mistaking "de dicto" for "de re" necessity. I further show that the very claim that (...) sets of experiences are identifiable only through reference to their "havers" is mistaken. Mental events are individuated and grouped together exactly as physical events are. I therefore conclude that a person "consists" of, "inter alia", Mental particulars; his thoughts are his in the same sense that his legs are his own. Siding with hume against kant, Strawson, And shoemaker, I argue that there are criteria for ascription of experience to persons and a person must use those criteria in ascribing experiences, Even current ones, To himself. Hence, A person who misapplies those criteria may be mistaken in believing of a certain experience that it is (or is not) his own. (shrink)

Relativists try to reduce the realistic notion of truth or make do without it. Rorty, e.g., regards 'true' as an indexical, or as a commendatory term; both construals result in contradictions. Dummett replaces truth by assertability, but that results in a vicious regress, making it impossible, first, to state the theory, and second, that nonomniscients know anything. Quine, rejecting meaning and reference altogether, ends with a picture of language that is a mere pattern of (e.g., vocal) interactions; by its own (...) light, that theory is incomprehensible and unjustifiable. Truth as correspondence to reality is therefore an irreducible notion. (shrink)

IntroductionEddy M. Zemach was born in Jerusalem in 1935. His mother, Helena, was a dentist as well as a poet, and his father, Shimon, was a dentist as well as a political figure. Eddy completed B.A. and M.A. degrees in both Hebrew literature and philosophy at the Hebrew university of Jerusalem. He studied for a doctoral degree in philosophy at Yale University. In 1965 he completed his dissertation on the boundaries of the aesthetic, supervised by Paul Weiss. Another of his (...) teachers at Yale was Wilfrid Sellars, who influenced his philosophical views on mind and language. Aesthetics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language formed the center of his philosophical interest, though this interest was extended to other philosophical areas, such as metaphysics and epistemology.Eddy published extensively in both philosophy and Hebrew literature, and also wrote many short stories . He wrote some two hundred papers, and twelve scholarly books .. (shrink)

Contemporary thinkers either hold that meanings cannot be mental states, or that they are patterns of brain functions. But patterns of social, or brain, interactions cannot be that which we understand. Wittgenstein had another answer (not the one attributed to him by writers who ignore his work in psychology): understanding, he said, is seeing an item as embodying a type Q, thus constraining what items will be seen as the same. Those who cannot see things under an aspect are meaning-blind.That (...) idea is expanded in this article. Its ontology consists of types only: entities that recur in space, time, and possible worlds. Types (Socrates, Man, Red, On, etc.) overlap; Socrates = Bald at some index and not in another. The logic used is thus that of contingent identity. Now some possible worlds are mentally represented; the entities that occur in them are meanings. But such entities may also recur in the real world. Thus the entities we experience, the phenomena, which serve as our meanings, may be identical in the real world with real things. A correspondence theory of truth is thus developed: a sentence is true iff its meaning constitutes, in a specified way, a real situation. (shrink)