En el libro V de la República Platón intenta distinguir a los verdaderos filósofos de un grupo de personajes que son solo parecidos a los filósofos, pero que en realidad no lo son. Platón utiliza diferentes términos para referirse a estos pseudo-filósofos pero el más recurrente es el de philotheámones (φιλοθεάμονες). Los estudiosos de Platón han tenido muy diversas interpretaciones sobre la identidad de estos personajes. En este trabajo defiendo que dentro del grupo en cuestión están los sofistas, una interpretación (...) cuya intuición principal fue defendida por Vegetti (2000) pero criticada recientemente por Meinwald (2017). Aquí ofrezco tanto razones textuales como filosóficas y contextuales a favor de esta interpretación. (shrink)

En este artículo examino el tratamiento escéptico que Quine hace de la necesidad proposicional (de dicto) y no-proposicional (de re) a través de su teoría de tres grados de compromiso modal. Argumento que, a pesar de poseer diversos aspectos valiosos, sufre de varias limitaciones importantes que lo ..

Some philosophers think that anti-realism about de re necessity entails anti-realism about the individuation and identity of objects. In this paper I address one argument for this view, due to Sidelle, according to which the only way in which a de re modal conventionalist can avoid being refuted by a well-known argument based on the contingency of conventions is by also accepting conventionalism about objects. I show that Sidelle’s argument is not successful and, in this way, I also show that (...) the combination of de re modal anti-realism and realism about objects is at least not threatened from this direction. (shrink)

We outline a theory of the cognitive role of belief in absolute necessity that is normative and intended to be metaphysically neutral. We take this theory to be unique in scope since it addresses simultaneously the questions of how such belief is (properly) acquired and of how it is (properly) manifest. The acquisition and manifestation conditions for belief in absolute necessity are given univocally, in terms of complex higher-order attitudes involving two distinct kinds of supposition (A-supposing and C-supposing). It is (...) subsequently argued that the proposed acquisition and manifestation conditions are rationally interdependent, and that such harmony affords explanations of connections between different facets of belief in necessity that otherwise remain mysterious. (shrink)

Under what conditions would it be paradoxical to consider the possibility of false judgment? Here we claim that in the initial puzzle of Theaetetus 187e5–188c9, where Plato investigates the question of what could psychologically cause a false judgment, the paradoxical nature of this question derives from certain constraints and restrictions about causal explanation, in particular, from the metaphysical principle that opposites cannot cause opposites. Contrary to all previous interpretations, this metaphysical approach does not attribute to Plato any controversial epistemological assumptions (...) and fits better with the text and its role within the dialectic of the dialogue. (shrink)

I discuss Aristotle’s opening argument against Platonic Forms in _Metaphysics_ A.9, ‘the Razor’, which criticizes the introduction of Forms on the basis of an analogy with a hypothetical case of counting things. I argue for a new interpretation of this argument, and show that it involves two interesting objections against the introduction of Forms as formal causes: one concerns the completeness and the other the adequacy of such an explanatory project.

Aristóteles parece negar el estatuto ontológico de los artefactos que no serían sustancias. Se analizan los textos básicos al respecto y sus principales interpretaciones. Se discute la opinión de R. Katayama, para mostrar que acierta en remarcar la importancia de la separabilidad de los compuestos, pero se equivoca en la noción de separación. Se sostiene que las formas no son separables de sus compuestos tanto naturales como artefactos, pero los primeros poseen un tipo de separación de otras formas o especies (...) que no poseen los segundos y, por ello, son substancias. Aristotle seems to deny the ontological status of artifacts which are not substances. In this paper I discuss the basic regarding this topic and its main intepretations. I discuss R. Katayama's opinion to show that he is right to underline the importance of the trait of separation, but he is wrong regarding the the notion of separation. My thesis is that neither the forms of natural things nor those of artifacts are separable from the composites, but the former possess a different kind of separation from other forms or species, which the latter do not possess. Hence, the former are substances. (shrink)

Republic 596a introduces a One over Many principle that has traditionally been considered as an argument for the existence of Forms, according to which, one Form should be posited for each like-named plurality. This interpretation was challenged by (Smith, J. A. 1917. “General Relative Clauses in Greek.” Classical Review 31: 69–71.), who interpreted it rather as a statement that each Form is unique and correlated to a plurality of things that have the same name as it. (Sedley, D. 2013. “Plato (...) and the One-over-Many Principle”, in Chiaradonna & Galluzzo 2013, 113–37.) has offered a forceful defence of Smith’s interpretation. I argue that Sedley’s defence fails and that the traditional interpretation should be preferred. (shrink)

In the first argument of Metaphysics Μ.2 against the Platonist introduction of separate mathematical objects, Aristotle purports to show that positing separate geometrical objects to explain geometrical facts generates an ‘absurd accumulation’ of geometrical objects. Interpretations of the argument have varied widely. I distinguish between two types of interpretation, corrective and non-corrective interpretations. Here I defend a new, and more systematic, non-corrective interpretation that takes the argument as a serious and very interesting challenge to the Platonist.

En Metafísica M.2 Aristóteles desarrolla diversas objeciones en contra de la introducción platónica de objetos matemáticos como substancias no-sensibles, separadas de las sensibles. Su primera objeción es de carácter doble. En primer lugar, Aristóteles argumenta que la postulación de objetos geométricos separados produce una acumulación absurda. En segundo lugar, sugiere que este argumento geométrico se puede extender al caso de las unidades y los números. En este trabajo me ocupo de explicar esta extensión aritmética. Los especialistas han interpretado esta extensión (...) de una manera que denomino “maximalista”. Aquí defiendo una interpretación distinta, “minimalista”. (shrink)

Aristotle formulates in _Metaphysics_ M.9 an aporia about Forms, according to which, those who introduce Forms make them universal substances and, at the same time, separate entities and, hence, particulars. But, he claims, it is not possible that both attributes, being a universal and being a particular, inhere in the same thing. The interpretation that scholars have offered of this objection is external, in that they hold that it derives from Aristotle’s own conception of separation: only what is particular is (...) separate. Here I defend an internal interpretation which claims that the objection derives from an assumption about the explanatory role of Forms that Aristotle attributes to the Platonists. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Crispin Wright's modal anti-realism as based on the availability of a certain attitude of Caution towards judgements of necessity. I think that Wright's account should be attractive in several ways for modal theorists with an anti-realist bend. However, the attitude of Caution to which it appeals has attracted some controversy. Wright himself has later come to doubt whether Caution is ultimately coherent. Here I first address Wright's worries concerning the coherence of Caution and show that (...) they are unfounded. But then I argue that although the attitude of Caution is coherent, it cannot provide a suitable basis for a non-eliminativist account of necessity. I offer two different objections against Caution. I argue that Wright's appeal to Caution, if successful, would show not only that modal judgement is non-objective but also that it is dispensable. Thus, I claim that appeal to Caution would seem to serve more as a threat against a non-eliminativist account of necessity, rather than as a potential adequate basis for it. However, I argue that Wright's appeal to Caution is unsuccessful, for there is no genuine Caution: Caution is a mere verbal attitude. (shrink)

En este trabajo realizo un examen crítico del reciente libro de Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo sobre la crítica de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de las Ideas. El libro de Di Camillo es un trabajo muy serio cuya lectura recomiendo ampliamente. Sin embargo, considero que cuatro de las principales tesis que la autora defiende tienen varias dificultades y mi objetivo aquí es presentar argumentos detallados en contra de ellas: la interpretación de la distinción entre argumentos más y menos rigurosos del (...) tratado Sobre las Ideas; la tesis de que la separación es el blanco esencial de las críticas aristotélicas a las Ideas; la interpretación de las opciones que Platón tiene para responder al argumento del tercer hombre, y la tesis de que la separación de las Ideas debe entenderse como homonimia. In this paper I examine Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo's recent book on Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's theory of Ideas. Di Camillo's book is a very serious work that I highly recommend. Nevertheless, I consider that four of the main theses that the author defends face several difficulties and my aim here is to offer detailed arguments against them: the interpretation of the distinction between more and less accurate arguments of the treatise On Ideas; the thesis that separation is the essential target of Aristotle's criticisms against Plato's Ideas; the interpretation of the options available to Plato to reply to the third man argument; and the thesis that the separation of Ideas should be understood as homonymy. (shrink)

Aristotle formulates in _Metaphysics_ M.9 an aporia about Forms, according to which, those who introduce Forms make them universal substances and, at the same time, separate entities and, hence, particulars. But, he claims, it is not possible that both attributes, being a universal and being a particular, inhere in the same thing. The interpretation that scholars have offered of this objection is external, in that they hold that it derives from Aristotle’s own conception of separation: only what is particular is (...) separate. Here I defend an internal interpretation which claims that the objection derives from an assumption about the explanatory role of Forms that Aristotle attributes to the Platonists. (shrink)

En este trabajo examino la “elección imposible” que Sócrates le plantea a Teeteto y que parece consistir en elegir entre: aceptar (a) que el juicio falso es imposible, o (b) que es posible conocer y no conocer el mismo objeto (Teeteto 196c7-d2). De acuerdo con la interpretación tradicional de esta elección, Sócrates afirma que es necesario aceptar una de las dos opciones: (b). En consecuencia, Sócrates desarrollaría el Aviario como un modelo de explicación del error en el que es posible (...) conocer y no conocer lo mismo. Aquí argumento en contra de esta lectura. Según mi interpretación, lo que dice Sócrates es que se deben rechazar los dos términos de la “elección imposible”, (a) y (b), y, por ende, el Aviario presenta un modelo en el que el juicio falso es posible sin tener que aceptar que es posible conocer y no conocer lo mismo. (shrink)

El consumo de energía y el crecimiento económico han llevado a la degradación del medio ambiente. Las centrales eléctricas son una de las principales fuentes de contaminación. Existe una necesidad de utilizar energías renovables para reducir el impacto ambiental. Sin embargo, en los países en desarrollo, la falta de recursos económicos limita la adopción de energías limpias. Las energías limpias, como la solar, eólica, hidroeléctrica y geotérmica, son fuentes sostenibles de energía. La energía hidroeléctrica puede ser controvertida debido a sus (...) impactos ambientales y sociales. La biomasa y el biogás también son fuentes de energía renovable. La eficiencia energética es otra área importante para reducir la dependencia de los recursos no renovables. El artículo discute la importancia de las energías limpias y el desarrollo sostenible en el Perú. Se menciona el potencial de la energía de las olas marinas, el bioetanol y el biodiesel como fuentes de energía renovable. También se abordan los impactos ambientales de los "negocios sucios" y las implicaciones socioeconómicas de las energías limpias. Se discuten los conflictos de interés y la regulación normativa en el país, así como las perspectivas futuras y la necesidad de un desarrollo energético estable y sostenible. Palabras clave: Energías limpias, negocios sucios, impacto ambiental, sostenibilidad. (shrink)

La educación tradicional concebida en compartimientos estancos que coquetean en torno al árbol de la ciencia, ha formado a un individuo descontextualizado, sin capacidad de respuesta para enfrentar la complejidad del mundo actual. La Multiversidad Mundo Real “Edgar Morin” asume la misión de una enseñanza educativa basada en los postulados del Pensamiento Complejo de Edgar Morin; pero aún quedan pendientes nuevas definiciones que rompan con los esquemas de la educación basada en el paradigma simplificador. La meta es emprender (...) el gran viraje que haga posible que la reforma paradigmática implique también una reforma de las mentes y del lenguaje, porque nombrar lo nuevo con la palabra vieja dificulta a nivel inconsciente detonar el cambio. Superar los bloqueos propios y los adquiridos por la educación que nos ha conducido a ser individuos desarticulados del contexto, ese es el gran reto de la Multiversidad. (shrink)

Uriah Kriegel has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the phenomenal realm. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertai...

The presence of the past is of prime importance in today's Mexican society. According to José Fuentes Mares, among the “peoples of the world the Mexican is the one who lives history the most”. With regard to the unsatisfactory relations between Mexico and North America, the journalist Alan Riding asks himself: “How can a people who relish the past to the point of intoxication understand another that looks constantly to the future?” In the Republic of Mexico, according to him, “the (...) entire past of the country throws a dense shadow over the present”. Conforming to a universal custom, every country divides its present past into four groups (survival, residues, memories and history), but in few nations are the four groups as copious as in this one. Although Mexico is rapidly shedding many old customs and is selling residual objects to foreign collectors on the sly, its historical treasure is still enormous, perhaps the largest in the world. (shrink)

Alan Turing is often portrayed as a materialist in secondary literature. In the present article, I suggest that Turing was instead an idealist, inspired by Cambridge scholars, Arthur Eddington, Ernest Hobson, James Jeans and John McTaggart. I outline Turing’s developing thoughts and his legacy in the USA to date. Specifically, I contrast Turing’s two notions of computability (both from 1936) and distinguish between Turing’s “machine intelligence” in the UK and the more well-known “artificial intelligence” in the USA. According to my (...) proposed historical interpretation, Turing did not view computations in the real world to be exhaustively and deterministically characterized by his automatic machines from 1936. (shrink)

Philosophical Perspective on Cinema addresses the relationship between human existence and sensual reality. Applying metaphysical/existential reflection to cinema, the author explores the philosophical clarity that cinema can offer reflective persons about the human experience.

Despite growing interest in workplace democracy, the question whether nonworker stakeholders, like suppliers and local communities, warrant inclusion in the governance of democratic companies, as workers do, has been largely neglected. We inspect this question by leaning on the boundary problem in democratic theory. We first argue that the question of who warrants inclusion in democratic workplaces is best addressed by examining why workplace democracy is warranted in the first place, and offer a twofold normative benchmark—addressing objectionable corporate power and (...) upholding efficiency—to assess the principles of democratic inclusion on offer. Against this benchmark, we next argue that the All-Affected Principle is unfit due to its over- and underinclusive extensional results, and that the All-Subjected Principle, whose variants we examine alongside their extensional results, holds more promise when coupled with independent considerations of justice or a constrained variant of the All-Affected Principle. These combinations need not entirely preclude, but speak against, nonworker stakeholder inclusion. (shrink)

Seen from the point of view of evaluation conditions, a usual way to obtain a connexive logic is to take a well-known negation, for example, Boolean negation or de Morgan negation, and then assign special properties to the conditional to validate Aristotle’s and Boethius’ Theses. Nonetheless, another theoretical possibility is to have the extensional or the material conditional and then assign special properties to the negation to validate the theses. In this paper we examine that possibility, not sufficiently explored in (...) the connexive literature yet.We offer a characterization of connexive negation disentangled from the cancellation account of negation, a previous attempt to define connexivity on top of a distinctive negation. We also discuss an ancient view on connexive logics, according to which a valid implication is one where the negation of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent, and discuss the role of our idea of connexive negation for this kind of view. (shrink)

This book offers intriguing philosophical inquiries into biotechnological art and the life sciences, addressing their convergences as well as their epistemic and functional divergences. Rooted on a thorough understanding of the history of philosophy, this work builds on critical and ontological thought to interpret the concept of life that underscores first-hand dealings with matter and experimentation. The book breaks new ground on the issue of animality and delivers fresh posthumanist perspectives on the topics addressed. The authors embark on a deep (...) ontological probe of the concept of medium as communication-bridging and life-bearing. They also take on the concept of performativity as biotechnological art. The book includes concrete, well-documented case studies and shows how certain narratives and practices directly impact ideas surrounding science and technologies. It will interest philosophers in art and technology, aesthetics, ontology, and the life sciences. It will also engage art practitioners in art and science, curators and researchers. (shrink)

The literary and scientific renaissance that struck Germany around 1800 is usually taken to be the cradle of contemporary humanism. Posthumanism in the Age of Humanism shows how figures like Immanuel Kant and Johann Wolfgang Goethe as well as scientists specializing in the emerging modern life and cognitive sciences not only established but also transgressed the boundaries of the “human.” This period so broadly painted as humanist by proponents and detractors alike also grappled with ways of challenging some of humanism's (...) most cherished assumptions: the dualisms, for example, between freedom and nature, science and art, matter and spirit, mind and body, and thereby also between the human and the nonhuman. Posthumanism is older than we think, and the so-called “humanists” of the late Enlightenment have much to offer our contemporary re-thinking of the human. (shrink)

This book is a volume in the Penn Press Anniversary Collection. To mark its 125th anniversary in 2015, the University of Pennsylvania Press rereleased more than 1,100 titles from Penn Press's distinguished backlist from 1899-1999 that had fallen out of print. Spanning an entire century, the Anniversary Collection offers peer-reviewed scholarship in a wide range of subject areas.

This book focuses on a key issue today: the role of values in technology, with special emphasis on ethical values. This topic involves the analysis of internal values in technology (as they affect objectives, processes, and outcomes) and the study of external values in technology (social, cultural, economic, ecological, et cetera). These values - internal and external - are crucial to the decision making of engineers. In addition, they have increasing relevance for citizens concerned with the present and future state (...) of technology, which gives society a leading position in technological issues. The book follows three main lines of research: 1) new perspectives on technology, values, and ethics; 2) rationality and responsibility in technology; and 3) technology and risks. This volume analyzes the two main sides involved here: the theoretical basis for the role of values in technology and a practical discussion on how to implement them in our society. Thus, the book is of interest for philosophers, engineers, academics of different fields, and policy-makers. The style used lends itself to broad audience. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Note.

La mort est ce qui identifie l'homme à l'animal et ce qui l'en différencie. Comme tout être vivant, l'homme subit la mort. A la différence de tout être vivant, il nie la mort dans ses croyances en un au-delà. Edgar Morin dégage les attitudes fondamentales des hommes et des cultures à l'égard de la mort. Il examine l'horreur de la mort, le risque de mort, le meurtre, et les deux grands mythes originaires de la mort : celui de la (...) survie et celui de la renaissance. Il dégage les croyances concernant la mort dans les grandes civilisations historiques pour en arriver à la crise contemporaine de la mort et aux nouvelles conceptions biologiques sur les relations entre vie et mort. (shrink)