In this “Letter from Chile” I describe and comment the main features of philosophical activity in Chile. My perspective is related to my own academic experience: that of a Chilean academic, who earned his doctorate at the Free University of Berlin, worked in that same university for six years as an Assistant Professor, and has been an Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile in Santiago for the last eleven years. The first part (...) of the text offers a review of the historical development of philosophy in Chile. Afterwards, I refer to the current situation of our academic philosophy, analyzing various aspects: issues, currents, institutions, publications, research system, among others. Finally, I outline, from the above, some assessments and a general diagnosis of the present situation of philosophy in my country. (shrink)

“On Why in Philosophy Examples Matter”. The purpose of the article is to show the need of using examples in philosophy, associating to them four functions: to illustrate, explain, argue and show. Among other assertions, we attempt to justify the following: a) Examples are, as well as illustrations, evidences; such that what may be seen as an act of didactic generosity may be considered properly as the response to an always possible demand. b) The introduction of philosophical concepts requires frequently (...) a mutual cooperation between definition and example; the need of the latter in conceptual explanation is condoned by a reflection on the following of rules. c) A certain overrating of the counterexample and underrating of the example are tokens of a notion of philosophy put here into question. d) In Wittgenstein and other authors, a little heeded function of some examples is detected: of showing an alternative way of viewing the matter, of re-describing ancient philosophical themes. Towards the end, the issue of the example is assumed –this time– as an example of a more general issue: that of the relation between rhetoric and philosophy. (shrink)

El objetivo del artículo es describir rasgos estructurales de la comprensión de metáforas mediante una comparación con la comprensión de otras culturas, tal como ésta ha sido comentada por Wittgenstein y Geertz. El fenómeno de estudio es la comprensión enfática de metáforas fuertes. La comparación entre ambos tipos de comprensión sirve para plantear y dar respuesta a tres preguntas desatendidas en la profusa literatura sobre la metáfora: 1) ¿En qué sentido nos sorprenden las metáforas fuertes? 2) ¿En qué sentido pueden (...) ser profundas? 3) ¿En qué sentido hablamos de la riqueza de este fenómeno lingüístico? /// This paper sets out to describe the structural features of metaphor comprehension through a comparison with the process of understanding other cultures construed along the lines proposed by Wittgenstein and Geertz. The phenomenon under analysis is the emphatic understanding of strong metaphors. The comparison between understanding metaphors and cultures serves to raise and answer three questions that have been neglected in the vast literature on metaphors: 1) In which sense do strong metaphors surprise us? 2) In which sense can a metaphor be profound? 3) In which sense do we speak of the richness of this linguistic phenomenon? (shrink)

Desarrollo en este artículo tres planteamientos en torno a la cuestión del sentido de la vida, cada uno de ellos asociado a las nociones que figuran en su título: ambigüedad, disolución y latencia. 1) La expresión “sentido de la vida” posee al menos cuatro significados y de ello se siguen consecuencias no menores. 2) En su acepción habitual, la pregunta por el sentido puede disolverse o dejar de plantearse, cuando es sustituida por la pregunta práctica por la vida buena. 3) (...) Ello no significa que la pregunta por el sentido desaparezca del todo: ella continua latente. Pero cuando vuelve a tornarse manifiesta, ya no demanda de nosotros una respuesta. Es esa la experiencia del asombro, a la que me refiero hacia el final del texto. (shrink)

The present text follows three general objectives, which, at the same time, build its structure. Firstly, I would like to present and question Bernard Williams’ description of the virtue of accuracy. Secondly, I´ll try to complement Williams’ description by analyzing two dimensions of accuracy: care, on one side, and what I call “proximity to the problem”, on the other side. Related to that last issue, I add an excursus about writing. The third and last part of this article is an (...) attempt to relate the discussion about the so called virtues of truth —sincerity as well as accuracy— with the issue of self-deception. Specifically, I try to a) support Mele´s deflationary account of self-deception as motivationally biased belief, b) make an adjustment to this conception, and c) complement it with another aspect which has not received enough consideration in the discussion about self-deception, namely some beliefs we don´t generate or that manifest a high lack of accuracy. (shrink)

The title and subtitle entail the main claims of this article. In the face of the present debate on the question whether Wittgenstein was a foundationalist, a coherentist, or both things, I suggest that, at least in a certain important sense, he didn’t adopt either of these positions. The point concerns the status of propositions that I characterize as “unheard-of propositions” and that constitute the most important subclass of so called “Moore-type propositions”. Unheard-of propositions (and the corresponding beliefs) are neither (...) doubted nor justified, they are not said and not even thought. We simply count on them or we take them for granted. In calling our attention on these primitive, spontaneous and instinctive certainties Wittgenstein is trying to correct an intellectualist bias in traditional conceptions of human being. This reading is confirmed through an analysis of the origin of our basic certainties: we have some of them naturally or instinctively, we acquire others by training, but in neither case there are rational processes at stake (nor irrational ones, of course). The debate between foundationalism and coherentism conceals precisely what Wittgenstein is trying to uncover: a stratum of certainties that, being objective, precede the order of knowledge and justification. (shrink)

Resumen Según la tesis principal de este artículo, para articular el alcance e interés del tema wittgensteineano de los parecidos de familia se requiere ver en él, no una respuesta a la pregunta por lo que sea un concepto en general, sino una propuesta de carácter metodológico. Dos preguntas orientan la parte central del texto: (1) ¿Qué significa “conceptos de parecidos de familia”? (2) ¿Cuáles serían los conceptos en cuestión? Con respecto a (1), intento mostrar que el término no es (...) unívoco: un primer sentido dice relación con el dictum de los “parecidos que se superponen y entrecruzan” (IF 67) y se diferencia de un segundo sentido asociado al tema de los “bordes borrosos” (IF 71). Con apoyo en esta distinción ofrezco una respuesta a (2): en el primer sentido del término, no existe ningún concepto de familia, mientras que de acuerdo con el segundo todos los conceptos lo son. En la parte final propongo reinterpretar el tema en clave metodológica. Afirmar que conceptos como los de lenguaje, comprender, pensar, etc., son conceptos de familia significa que la reflexión filosófica sobre ellos no pasa fundamentalmente por buscar definiciones; que tanto o más importante es la cuidada descripción de ejemplos paradigmáticos, como “centros de variación” (EPB 190). Abstract According to the main thesis of this article, in order to articulate the scope and interest of Wittgenstein’s family resemblances topic, we should see into it not an answer to the question what concepts in general are, but a methodological proposal. Two questions guide the central part of the text: (1) What does “family-resemblances concepts” mean? (2) What concepts fall within the corresponding class? Regarding (1) I try to show that “family-resemblances concepts” is not an unequivocal term: a first sense has to do with the dictum of “similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (IF 67) and is to be distinguished from a second sense associated with the topic of “blurred edges” (IF 71). This distinction lies behind the answer I offer to (2): in the first sense of the term, there is no family concept at all, while according to the second sense all concepts are of this kind. In the final part I propose a reinterpretation of the issue from a methodological perspective. To say that concepts like language, understanding, thinking, etc. are family concepts means that the philosophical reflection on them should not centre on the praxis of looking for definitions. As important ―maybe more important― as that it’s the careful description of paradigmatic examples, as “centers of variation” (EPB 190). (shrink)

This article focuses on two largely ignored aspects of the understanding of strong metaphors: the visual dimension and the emotional factors. Particularly, I intend to offer answers to the following questions: 1) What does it mean to understand a visual metaphor? 2) Can Wittgenstein’s ideas about the vision of aspects help to better understand this understanding? 3) In what sense does his notion of secondary sense enrich the philosophical reflection on the understanding of metaphors? 4) In what sense may emotions (...) be an important factor in the understanding of certain metaphors? The article is framed in a methodological proposal: I defend a phenomenology of the metaphor, that is, an accurate description of our experiences with metaphors, and in this case, its understanding. (shrink)

Davidson's thesis that the notion of a rule is dispensable in regard to a theoretical explanation of linguistic communication is here critically investigated. First I put Davidson's into question and thereby arrive at the conclusion that instances of communication in two languages pose no threat and that Davidson invokes a dubious concept of a rule in his treatment of so called malapropisms. Then I investigate his My thesis is that Davidson does not succeed-in taking into account appropriately the, as he (...) himself concedes, important distinction between "using words correctly" and "believing that one uses words correctly". Finally I try to formulate of the later Davidson in such a manner that they do not fall prey to his rule-criticism. (shrink)

Resumen Dada la renovada vigencia que la antigua pregunta socrática: ¿cómo se debería vivir? goza en nuestros días -en particular, en el ámbito anglosajón y alemán-, no extraña que los diferentes enfoques vengan acompañados a menudo por con sideraciones de índole metodológica. ¿Cómo abordar hoy la proverbial pregunta? ¿Con qué criterios de corrección debería cumplir una teoría de la vida buena? ¿Es siquiera posible una tal teoría? El propósito de la presente reflexión es contribuir al esclarecimiento de estas cuestiones mediante (...) lo que propongo llamar una apro ximación indirecta a la cuestión de la vida buena. En el texto se describen y justifican los rasgos centrales de dicha aproximación, la que se distancia del debate actual entre teorías de la vida buena, al no asumir una serie de pretensiones metodológicas características de dicho debate.Given the renewed interest that the old Socratic question “How should we live?” has taken in the present day -in particular, in the Anglo-Saxon and in the Germán world- it is not surprising that the different approaches are often accompanied by methodological considerations. How to deal with the old question today? What correction criteria should a theory of the good life meet? Is such a theory even possible? The aim of this essay is to contribute to the clarification of these issues through what I propose to call “an indirect approach” to the question of the good life. The paper describes and justifies the central features of this approach, which distances itself from the current debate between good life theories, by not assuming a series of methodological claims characteristic of this debate. (shrink)