Kant's Critique of Judgment accounts for the sharing of a common world, experienced affectively, by a diverse human plurality. In order to appreciate Kant's project, Judging Appearances retrieves the connection between appearance and judgment in the Critique of Judgment. Kleist emphasizes the important but neglected idea of a sensus communis, which provides the indeterminate criterion for judgments regarding appearance. Judging Appearances examines the themes of appearance and judgment against the background of Kant's debt to Leibniz and Shaftesbury. Drawing upon treatments (...) by Husserl, Sartre, Ricoeur and Arendt, Kleist delineates the proto-phenomenological method through which Kant uncovers the idea of a sensus communis. Kleist shows that taste is a discipline of opening oneself to appearance, requiring a subject who dwells in a common world of appearances among a diverse human plurality. This volume will prove valuable for anyone interested in a fresh approach to themes at the heart of Kant's aesthetics. (shrink)

A problem arises in Schopenhauer’s claim that each individual person’s will, or intelligible character, is timeless. The principium individuationis depends upon spatio-temporal determinations governing the world as representation. As individual, one’s individual character would seem to depend upon spatio-temporalconditions. Yet, Schopenhauer adopts the Kantian distinction between empirical character and intelligible character, with the individual’s intelligible characterremaining the timeless Ding-an-sich, or will. In response to this problem, I proceed in four stages. First, I examine why Schopenhauer appropriated the Kantiandistinction between intelligible (...) and empirical character. Secondly, I argue in favor of the solution which indicates that, for Schopenhauer, each individual’s intelligible character is related to the Platonic Idea unique to that individual. In the third stage, I determine how the teleological claims in Schopenhauer’s doctrineof Ideas bear on the problem. In the fourth stage, I suggest how Schopenhauer’s account presents a phenomenology of the unity of consciousness. (shrink)

The Critique of Judgment aims to account for the affective sharing of a common world of appearance. To accomplish this project, Kant retrieves a connection between contemplation and judgment which had lain dormant in the philosophical tradition since the time of Plato. Kant rescues the theme of contemplatio or $\theta\varepsilon\omega\rho\acute\iota\alpha$ from the Neo-platonist tradition culminating in Leibniz and Shaftesbury. This tradition took beauty as the motivation for an intuitive assimilation to the order of ideas, which are understood as principles for (...) the determination of natural form. Discovering imagination as a power through which human beings may escape the tyranny of determinate objectivity, Kant insists that taste demands an openness towards appearance, outside of cognitive and conative determination. The attitude of disinterestedness suspends objectivity and looks toward the idea of a sensus communis, which implies a human plurality. In the first two Critiques, Kant subjectivizes the Leibnizian principle of determining ground. In the third Critique he suspends this principle, while retrieving and retaining the significance of humanitas latent in the idea of sensus communis which forms the indeterminate ground for aesthetic judgments. ;The first two chapters develop a phenomenological interpretation of Kantian aesthetics. Operating with an unthematized method of phenomenological reduction, Kant uncovers features indicating the primacy of appearance over determining ground within aesthetic contemplation. The third chapter traces Kant's response to Leibniz from the pre-critical period up to the Critique of Judgment. Kant's rehabilitation of appearance emerges in opposition of the Leibnizian principle of determining ground. The fourth chapter resumes the phenomenological interpretation, now directed to illuminating Kant's apology for sensibility and his advance beyond Shaftesbury's Platonist aesthetics. Sensibility compels think to relinquish its power to determine objectivity. ;A tension emerges between the subject's powers of determination and the freedom within sensibility which escapes determination. Despite its indeterminancy, the regulative idea of a sensus communis orients a disciplined sensitivity to appearance. Beauty testifies to a fractured human subject who cannot determine its own ground and must dwell in a world of appearance among a plurality in the sharing of perspectivally situated voices. (shrink)

Hume remarked on how our moral value-commitments set limits for what we are willing to imagine. Moral values also guide imagination when we envision variant scenarios and options for action. How do values reveal themselves through imagining? What does the manner through which values appear tell us about the nature of values? Imagination furnishes a non-perceptual manner of arriving at moral determinations anchored to the irreducibly first-person experience of moral approval and disapproval. The commitment to one’s values, surviving through every (...) willingly imagined alteration of perspective, indicates a subjective necessity to values. At the same time, the values leaving their trace in what we imagine, direct imagination to furnish reasons which necessitate belief and action. This subjective necessity generates an ideal of affective moral consistency and a criterion of suitability for proposed action. (shrink)

Kant’s attempts to formulate a conception of the harmony of nature and freedom have two logical presuppositions. The first presupposition is separation of ought and is, which provides a logical formulation of the separation of freedom and nature. Kant might well have settled on the view that the separation between nature and freedom cannot be bridged. Why did Kant attempt to overcome said separation? The second presupposition of Kant’s project to bridge nature and freedom involves an ought→can inference, stating that (...) moral obligation implies the possibility of its fulfillment. There are at least two ways this inference can be understood. There is a weak sense of the inference, stating that no one is obliged to do the impossible. There is also a very strong sense of the inference, stating that if a moral obligation is found to obtain, it must then be possible to fulfill it. Kant interprets the ought→can inference in this strong as well as in the weak sense. Nature, the law-governed totality of what exists, must be understood as able to provide a suitable field for moral realization. The isomorphism between the lawfulness of nature and that of moral freedom animate Kant’s account of moral judgment, and will provide the main focus of the current investigation. Kant conceives of nature and freedom as twin kingdoms, thus providing a theoretical model validating this ought→can inference. The weaker sense of this ought→can inference does justice to moral judgment without requiring the awesome task of bridging nature and freedom. Why, then, should we maintain the strong ought→can inference in our post-Kantian situation? I suggest that Kant’s insistence on the strong ought→can inference may yield an ethical approach to the ever more powerful ways in which human beings technologically transform nature, including human nature itself. (shrink)