17 found
Order:
See also
Profile: Edward Hinchman (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee)
  1. Telling as Inviting to Trust.Edward Hinchman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):562–587.
    How can I give you a reason to believe what I tell you? I can influence the evidence available to you. Or I can simply invite your trust. These two ways of giving reasons work very differently. When a speaker tells her hearer that p, I argue, she intends that he gain access to a prima facie reason to believe that p that derives not from evidence but from his mere understanding of her act. Unlike mere assertions, acts of telling (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   48 citations  
  2. Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
    On one conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of avoiding incoherent combinations of attitudes. This conception construes the norms of rationality as codified by rational requirements, and one plausible rational requirement is that you not be akratic: that you not judge, all things considered, that you ought to ϕ while failing to choose or intend to ϕ. On another conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of thinking or acting in a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3. Trust and Diachronic Agency.Edward Hinchman - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):25–51.
    Some philosophers worry that it can never be reasonable to act simply on the basis of trust, yet you act on the basis of self-trust whenever you merely follow through on one of your own intentions. It is no more reasonable to follow through on an intention formed by an untrustworthy earlier self of yours than it is to act on the advice of an untrustworthy interlocutor. But reasonable mistrust equally presupposes untrustworthiness in the mistrusted, or evidence thereof. The concept (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  4. Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge.Edward Hinchman - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):613-646.
    The oddities in lottery cases and Moore’s paradox appear to support the knowledge account of assertion, according to which one should assert only what one knows. This paper preserves an emphasis on epistemic norms but presents grounds for an alternative explanation. The alternative divides the explanandum, explaining the error in lottery and Moorean assertions with one move and their deeper incoherence with another. The error derives from a respect in which the assertions are uninformative: the speaker is not being appropriately (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. Advising as Inviting to Trust.Edward Hinchman - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):355-386.
    How can you give your interlocutor a reason to act? One way is by manipulating his deliberative context through threats, flattery, or other incentives. Another is by addressing him in the way distinctive of reasoning with him. I aim to account for the possibility of this non-manipulative form of address by showing how it is realized through the performance of a specific illocutionary act, that of advising as inviting to trust. I argue that exercise of a capacity for reasonable trust (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  6. Assurance and Warrant.Edward Hinchman - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14 (17):1-58.
    Previous assurance-theoretic treatments of testimony have not adequately explained how the transmission of warrant depends specifically on the speaker’s mode of address – making it natural to suspect that the interpersonal element is not epistemic but merely psychological or action-theoretic. I aim to fill that explanatory gap: to specify exactly how a testifier’s assurance can create genuine epistemic warrant. In doing so I explain (a) how the illocutionary norm governing the speech act proscribes not lies but a species of bullshit, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7. Narrative and the Stability of Intention.Edward Hinchman - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):111-140.
    This paper addresses a problem concerning the rational stability of intention. When you form an intention to φ at some future time t, you thereby make it subjectively rational for you to follow through and φ at t, even if—hypothetically—you would abandon the intention were you to redeliberate at t. It is hard to understand how this is possible. Shouldn't the perspective of your acting self be what determines what is then subjectively rational for you? I aim to solve this (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8. Conspiracy, Commitment, and the Self.Edward Hinchman - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):526-556.
    Practical commitment is Janus-faced, looking outward toward the expectations it creates and inward toward their basis in the agent’s will. This paper criticizes Kantian attempts to link these facets and proposes an alternative. Contra David Velleman, the availability of a conspiratorial perspective (not yours, not your interlocutor’s) is what allows you to understand yourself as making a lying promise – as committing yourself ‘outwardly’ with the deceptive reasoning that Velleman argues cannot provide a basis for self-understanding. Moreover, the intrapersonal availability (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. Can Trust Itself Ground a Reason to Believe the Trusted?Edward Hinchman - 2012 - Abstracta Special Issues 6 (Special Issue VI):47-83.
    Can a reason to believe testimony derive from the addressee’s trust itself or only from reliability in the speaker that the trust perhaps causes? I aim to cast suspicion on the former view, defended by Faulkner, in favor of the latter – despite agreeing with Faulkner’s emphasis on the second-personal normativity of testimonial assurance. Beyond my narrow disagreement with Faulkner lie two broader issues. I argue that Faulkner misappropriates Bernard Williams’s genealogy of testimony when he makes use of Williams’s genealogical (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Reflection, Disagreement, and Context.Edward Hinchman - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):95.
    How far, if at all, do our intrapersonal and our interpersonal epistemic obligations run in parallel? This paper treats the question as addressing the stability of doxastic commitment in the two dimensions. In the background lies an analogy between doxastic and practical commitment. We’ll pursue the question of doxastic stability by coining a doxastic analogue of Gregory Kavka’s much-discussed toxin case. In this new case, you foresee that you will rationally abandon a doxastic commitment by undergoing a shift in the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  62
    Receptivity and the Will.Edward Hinchman - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):395-427.
    This paper defends an internalist view of agency. The challenge for an internalist view of agency is to explain how an agent’s all-things-considered judgment has necessary implications for action, a challenge that lies specifically in the possibility of two species of akratic break: between judgment and intention, and between intention and action. I argue that the two breaks are not importantly different: in each case akrasia manifests a single species of irrational self-mistrust. I aim to vindicate internalism by showing how (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Review of McMyler Testimony, Trust, and Authority. [REVIEW]Edward Hinchman - 2012 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3 (10).
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. “On the Risks of Resting Assured: An Assurance Theory of Trust”.Edward Hinchman - forthcoming - In Paul Faulkner Tom Simpson (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Trust. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    An assurance theory of trust begins from the act of assurance – whether testimonial, advisorial or promissory – and explains trust as a cognate stance of resting assured. My version emphasizes the risks and rewards of trust. On trust’s rewards, I show how an assurance can give a reason to the addressee through a twofold exercise of ‘normative powers’: (i) the speaker thereby incurs an obligation to be sincere; (ii) if the speaker is trustworthy, she thereby gives her addressee the (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Testimony and Assertion.Edward Hinchman - forthcoming - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  15. Trust and Reason.Edward Hinchman - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Entering into a trust relation enables you to do things you couldn't otherwise do. As trusted, you can help others do or believe what they have reason to do or believe. As trusting, you can get such help when more private resources run out. ;I begin by contrasting the way you address someone when you intend him to trust your testimony or advice with the way you might address him if you wanted merely to give him evidence that what you (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Trust and Will.Edward Hinchman - forthcoming - In Judith Simon (ed.), Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. “‘What on Earth Was I Thinking?’ How Anticipating Plan’s End Places an Intention in Time”.Edward Hinchman - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler Michael J. Sigrist (ed.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York: Routledge. pp. 87-107.
    How must you think about time when you form an intention? Obviously, you must think about the time of action. Must you frame the action in any broader prospect or retrospect? In this essay I argue that you must: you thereby commit yourself to a specific prospect of a future retrospect – a retrospect, indeed, on that very prospect. In forming an intention you project a future from which you will not ask regretfully, referring back to your follow-through on that (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography