6 found
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Ekaterina Kubyshkina
Università degli Studi di Milano
Ekaterina Kubyshkina
Università degli Studi di Milano
Ekaterina Kubyshkina
University of Campinas
  1. A logic for factive ignorance.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5917-5928.
    In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of φ, then φ is true. In the present article, we first (...)
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    Logics of Ignorance and Being Wrong.David Gilbert, Ekaterina Kubyshkina, Mattia Petrolo & Giorgio Venturi - 2022 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 30 (5):870-885.
    This article investigates the connections between the logics of being wrong, introduced in Steinsvold (2011, Notre Dame J. Form. Log., 52, 245–253), and factive ignorance, presented in Kubyshkina and Petrolo (2021, Synthese, 198, 5917–5928). The first part of the paper provides a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic of factive ignorance that corrects errors in Kubyshkina and Petrolo (2021, Synthese, 198, 5917–5928) and resolves questions about the expressivity of the language. In the second half, it is shown that the (...)
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    Rational Agency from a Truth-Functional Perspective.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Dmitry V. Zaitsev - 2016 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 25 (4):499-520.
    The aim of the present paper is to introduce a system, where the epistemic state of an agent is represented truth-functionally. In order to obtain this system, we propose a four-valued logic, that we call the logic of rational agent, where the fact of knowing something is formalized at the level of valuations, without the explicit use of epistemic knowledge operator. On the basis of this semantics, a sound and complete system with two distinct truth-functional negations is provided. These negations (...)
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  4.  33
    Conservative translations of four-valued logics in modal logic.Ekaterina Kubyshkina - 2019 - Synthese 198 (S22):5555-5571.
    Following a proposal by Kooi and Tamminga, we introduce a conservative translation manual for every four-valued truth-functional propositional logic into a modal logic. However, the application of this translation does not preserve the intuitive reading of the truth-values for every four-valued logic. In order to solve this problem, we modify the translation manual and prove its conservativity by exploiting the method of generalized truth-values.
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    Revising the Elenchus via Belief Revision.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - 2023 - Logica Universalis 17 (2):231-258.
    Vlastos’ famous characterization of the Socratic elenchus focuses on two main aspects of this method: its epistemic roots and its dialogical nature. Our aim is to lay the groundwork to formally capture this characterization. To do so, first, we outline an epistemic framework in which the elenchus can be inscribed. More precisely, we focus our analysis on the passage from unconscious ignorance to conscious (or Socratic) ignorance and provide new insights about the epistemic outcome of an elenctic argument. Secondly, from (...)
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    What ignorance could not be.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (2).
    In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance. The Standard View defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the New View defines it as the absence of true belief. We argue that both views provide necessary, but not sufficient conditions for ignorance, and thus do not constitute satisfactory definitions for such a notion.
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