Advanced medical imaging, such as CT, fMRI and PET, has undergone enormous progress in recent years, both in accuracy and utilization. Such techniques often bring with them an illusion of immediacy, the idea that the body and its diseases can be directly inspected. In this paper we target this illusion and address the issue of the reliability of advanced imaging tests as knowledge procedures, taking positron emission tomography in oncology as paradigmatic case study. After individuating a suitable notion of reliability, (...) we argue that PET is a highly theory-laden and non-immediate knowledge procedure, in spite of the photographic-like quality of the images it delivers; the diagnostic conclusions based on the interpretation of PET images are population-dependent; PET images require interpretation, which is inherently observer-dependent and therefore variable. We conclude with a three-step methodological proposal for enhancing the reliability of advanced medical imaging. (shrink)
Health care systems can positively influence our personal decision-making and health-related behavior only if we trust them. I propose a conceptual analysis of the trust relation between the public and a healthcare system, drawing from healthcare studies and philosophical proposals. In my account, the trust relation is based on an epistemic component, epistemic authority, and on a value component, the benevolence of the healthcare system. I argue that it is also modified by the vulnerability of the public on healthcare matters, (...) and by the system’s credibility. I apply my proposed analysis of public trust in health care systems to the phenomenon of vaccine hesitancy, a tendency to question vaccine policies, and to seek alternative vaccine schedules or to refuse vaccination. Understanding the role of trust and its components can be key to understanding the phenomenon. (shrink)
This article aims to provide a critical map of toleration as it is displayed in contemporary democracy. It does so by presenting three conceptions of toleration to which current practices of toleration can be traced, and, precisely, these are the standard notion, the political conception based on the neutrality principle, and toleration as recognition. The author argues that the latter is the appropriate conception to address the politically relevant issues of toleration arising in pluralistic democracy, while the first is adequate (...) only for social relations. In order to illustrate this argument, she presents a case of a contested and never solved request for a place of worship by the Muslims of Vercelli which represents an example of a very restricted and minimal interpretation of the standard notion, labeled ‘disrespectful tolerance’. The case is meant to show that unacceptable forms of toleration are still practised, and that the standard notion, here interpreted in the most minimal and negative way, is inappropriate for democratic politics. (shrink)
In this paper I focus on the emergence of the concept of the “historical a priori” at the origin of Foucault’s archeology. I emphasize the methodological function of this concept within Foucault’s archaeology, and I maintain that despite the different thesis it entails as compared to its philosophical sources, it pertains to one of the main issues of phenomenology, that is, the problematization of the relation between reality as it appears in its historicity, and transcendentality. I start from the interest (...) of the young Foucault in existential psychiatry, and I focus on the French philosophical context in which Foucault’s Introduction to Ludwig Binswanger’s “Dream and Existence” (1954) was conceived. My aim is to show that the first “phenomenological” phase of Foucault’s work is coherent, from a methodological point of view, with the development of archaeology intended as “historical epistemology.” I conclude by arguing that Foucault’s archaeology is methodologically linked to Canguilhem’s epistemology, in that the latter presents itself as an important attempt at linking together historicity and transcendentality. (shrink)
RésuméCet article examine la manière dont Michel Foucault se rapporte à la psychologie et à la psychopathologie phénoménologiques dans les années 1950, à la lumière des nouvelles sources documentaires que nous avons aujourd’hui à notre disposition. Notre contribution se concentre en particulier sur le manuscrit inédit de l’un des cours donnés par Foucault à l’université de Lille entre 1952 et 1954 : le cours sur « Binswanger et la phénoménologie ». L’analyse de ce cours, conçu par Foucault dans le contexte (...) d’une réflexion philosophique sur le problème anthropologique de la psychopathologie, nous permettra enfin de restituer à Foucault la place qui lui revient dans le domaine de la « philosophie de la psychiatrie ». (shrink)
As libraries begin to embrace Web 2.0 technologies to serve patrons—ushering in the era of Library 2.0—unique dilemmas arise in the realm of information ethics, especially regarding patron privacy. The norms of Web 2.0 promote the open sharing of information—often personal information—and the design of many Library 2.0 services capitalize on access to patron information and might require additional tracking, collection, and aggregation of patron activities. Thus, embracing Library 2.0 potentially threatens the traditional ethics of librarianship, where (...) protecting patron privacy and intellectual freedom has been held paramount. The question is not whether libraries will move toward Library 2.0, but how they will do it, and whether they can preserve the contextual integrity of patron privacy and maintain their professional librarian ethic, while also providing enhanced services to their patrons. This article will provide an ethical examination of the emergence of new Library 2.0 tools and technologies in relation to existing ethical norms of information flow within the library context. By doing so, librarians and information professionals will be better situated to avoid—or at least renegotiate—the impending Faustian bargain regarding patron privacy in the "2.0" era. (shrink)
We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal external- ism is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up in the debate, we see (...) no reason to relinquish an idea that seems intuitive and appeals to many cognitive sci- entists: that phenomenology is narrow, i.e., that phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of our experiences. This idea grounds the opposite philosophical position, phenomenal internalism. (shrink)
Written at a time of crisis in the project of social and political modernity, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s 1864 novel Notes from Underground offers an intriguing parallel for the twenty-first century lone-wolf; it portrays an abject, outcast, spiteful unnamed anti-hero boiling with rage, bitter with resentment and on the verge of radicalisation. A Girardian reading of the poetic truths contained in Dostoevsky’s work is able to provide important keys to explain the contemporary transformation from ‘fourth-wave’ religious terrorism to ‘fifth-wave’ lone-wolf terrorism. Such (...) a reading argues that it is mimetic rivalry – rather than much-trumpeted forms of religious violence or cultural differences – that fuels the triangular relation between governments, terrorists and civilian victims at heart of terrorist acts. This approach is further able to blend social inquiry with an account of the individual, in fact anthropological, conditions of lone-wolf terrorism by tracing the globalisation of resentment and the individualisation of violence to the hyper-mimeticism characterising the globalisation of late modernity. Finally, a mimetic reading of ‘fifth-wave’ terrorism accounts for the turbulence of a global politics in which victimhood and scapegoating no longer have the ability to stabilise social order and warns against a future where violence proliferates and escalates unchecked. (shrink)
This paper focuses on one of the original moments of the development of the “phenomenological” current of psychiatry, namely, the psychopathological research of Ludwig Binswanger. By means of the clinical and conceptual problem of schizophrenia as it was conceived and developed at the beginning of the twentieth century, I will try to outline and analyze Binswanger’s perspective from a both historical and epistemological point of view. Binswanger’s own way means of approaching and conceiving schizophrenia within the scientific, medical, and psychiatric (...) context of that time will lead us to grasp the epistemological stakes at the origins of his project of reforming psychiatry by means of phenomenology. I will finally attempt to upgrade and update Binswanger’s project in light of the current reappraisal of phenomenology within the ongoing debate on psychopathology engaged by studies in the field of science and philosophy of mind. (shrink)
Italy is in the forefront of forensic neuroscience practice among European nations. In recent years, the country presented two major criminal cases, the Trieste Case in 2009 and the Como Case in 2011, which were the first cases employing neurogenetic and functional neuroimaging methods in European courts. In this paper we will discuss the consequences that an understanding of the neural and genetic determinants of human (mis)behavior will have on law, especially on the Italian legal context. Some claim that such (...) consequences will actually be revolutionary, while others argue that legal doctrine assumptions won’t be undermined by neuroscientific findings. In the first section of the paper, we introduce the general debate and follow with a section devoted to the two Italian cases. In the third and final section, we discuss epistemological and ethical issues regarding Italian neurolaw. We defend a position which diverges from those prevailing in the debate. While negative outcomes and concerns were usually evidenced, we focus on positive changes coming with the new paradigm of interaction between neuroscience and the law. Our view is that these cases are clearly pioneering ones, anticipating what will happen in the courtrooms of the European Union in the whole, in the near future. (shrink)
In this paper, we first want to defend the idea that reference intentionality is the relation of constitution holding between an intentional state, a thought, and the object it is about, its intentional object. As such, reference intentionality is for a thought an essential property, whose predication to that thought is true in virtue of the nature of such a thought. We will take this to be one of the main lessons of serious externalism, according to which the intentional object (...) occurs in the individuation conditions of the thought about it. Moreover, we want to draw some consequences of this idea. First, in conformity with serious externalism we will claim that an objectual thought is nothing but its intentional object in a cogitative modality, which is nothing but a certain motivational role for that object to play with respect to a subject. Second, we will claim that one such thought, both as a type and as a token, is an abstract particular, respectively a kind and a relational trope. (shrink)
The current science publishing system is in need of a positive transformation for the good of scientists and society as a whole. Herein, we propose features that, in our view, will distinguish the science publishing system of the future.
The general concept of mental disorder specified in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is definitional in character: a mental disorder might be identified with a harmful dysfunction. The manual also contains the explicit claim that each individual mental disorder should meet the requirements posed by the definition. The aim of this article is two-fold. First, we shall analyze the definition of the superordinate concept of mental disorder to better understand what necessary criteria actually (...) characterize such a concept. Second, we shall consider the concepts of some individual mental disorders and show that they are in tension with the definition of the superordinate concept, taking pyromania and narcissistic personality disorder as case studies. Our main point is that an unexplained and not-operationalized dysfunction requirement that is included in the general definition, while being systematically violated by the diagnostic criteria of specific mental disorders, is a logical error. Then, either we unpack and operationalize the dysfunction requirement, and include explicit diagnostic criteria that can actually meet it, or we simply drop it. (shrink)
This article aims at introducing René Girard’s mimetic theory in the field of International Studies, identifying some of the areas of research that it might usefully open up. First, the article explores mimetic theory and some of its basic concepts—mimetic desire, mimetic rivalry, the scapegoat mechanism, and the sacrificial crisis—in order to highlight the strong heuristic and analytical potential of Girard’s work. Second, the article considers Girard’s contribution in light of contemporary theories of International Relations to demonstrate its added value. (...) Third, the article serves as a critical introduction to the various sections and contributions of the Special Issue. (shrink)
Rainer Forst's Toleration in Conflict is a significant contribution to the important topic of toleration. Its critical survey of various arguments for and around toleration is thorough and rigorous. However, although Forst's argument for the respect concept of toleration is persuasive, the claim that this is a tolerant theory of toleration located at a higher level than other arguments is perhaps less so.
Along with a well-honoured tradition, we will accept that intentionality is at least a property a thought holds necessarily, i.e., in all possible worlds that contain it; more specifically, a necessary relation, namely the relation of existential dependence of the thought on its intentional object. Yet we will first of all try to show that intentionality is more than that. For we will claim that intentionality is an essential property of the thought, namely a property whose predication to the thought (...) is true in virtue of the identity, or nature, of such a thought. More particularly, for us intentionality will again be a relation, yet a relation of ontological dependence of the thought on its intentional object; specifically, the relation for the thought of being constituted by its object. Moreover, we will try to show that if intentionality is such a constitutive relation for the thought that has it, certain metaphysical consequences ensue. First, an objectual thought, a thought whose content basically consists in its intentional object, is nothing but that object in a certain cogitative modality, or, which is the same, as playing a certain motivational role for the subject entertaining the thought itself (at a certain time). Second, if an objectual thought is nothing but an intentional object in a cogitative modality, such a thought, not only as a type, but also as a token, is an abstract entity. More specifically, an objectual thought-type, an abstract object par excellence, is indeed instantiated by objectual thought-tokens which are again abstract particulars, yet of a specific kind: namely, tropes of a relational sort depending for their existence on their bearers (and possibly also on their temporal location). (shrink)
In this paper, I analyse the image creation of Zen Buddhism as emerges from films produced in Europe and North America. In particular, I explore Marc Rosenbush's Zen Noir, Zen & Zero by Michael Ginthör, and Erleuchtung Garantiert by Doris Dörrie. Comparatively, I examine a recent Japanese production on the life and teachings of the Sōtō Zen master Dōgen titled Zen and directed by Takahashi Banmei. The aim of this analysis is to explore if and how depictions of Zen in (...) western movies mirror representations of this religious tradition made ad hoc for the ‘West’ and, conversely, what is the image of Zen Buddhism as appears in Japanese productions. This will be considered in a comparative perspective in order to identify differences, possible common patterns and mutual influences which may have shaped the cinematic perception of this form of Japanese Buddhism in Europe and North America. (shrink)
This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery.
A preliminary overview of Husserl reading Kant shows that both thinkers represent two essentially different types of philosophies in their methods and reach. The judgement made by Husserl about Kant allows to state that we are facing two different privileged intuitions. Nevertheless, it also allows to state a “family resemblance”–if not in their styles and methodology– in certain ground convictions regarding philosophy and reason’s finite nature. This paper approaches, from a Husserlian perspective, the relationship between “experience and judgment” –proper to (...) a “Transcendental Theory of Elements”– and in that between “science and philosophy” –corresponding to a “Transcendental Theory of Method”. Furthermore, it will approach the distinction between natural and transcendental-phenomenological attitudes that allow Husserl to introduce two levels of philosophical interrogation and two types of philosophical anthropologies, corresponding to the splitting of the ego – a pure constitutive ego and a constituted one. This last will lead to the genetic problem of the ego’s self-constitution from the deepest strata of passive instinctive life (unconscious and irrational) towards rational life in a teleological ascending movement that enacts the Kantian problem of reason’s finitude. Despite of the incorporation that Husserl makes of a teleology of Leibnizian type that resolves the Kantian hiatus between sensible and intelligible world, the Kant connoisseurs will recognize his tracks in the configuration of the Husserlian trascendental phenomenology. (shrink)
Are concepts stable entities, unchanged from context to context? Or rather are they context-dependent structures, created on the fly? We argue that this does not constitute a genuine dilemma. Our main thesis is that the more a pattern of features is general and shared, the more it qualifies as a concept. Contextualists have not shown that conceptual structures lack a stable, general core, acting as an attractor on idiosyncratic information. What they have done instead is to give a contribution to (...) the comprehension of how conceptual structure organized around such a stable core can produce contextually appropriate representations on demand. (shrink)
I argue that a concept is applied correctly when it is applied to the kind of things it is the concept of. Correctness as successful kind-tracking is fulfilling an externally and naturalistically individuated standard. And the normative aspect of concept-application so characterized depends on the relational (non-individualistic) feature of conceptual content. I defend this view against two objections. The first is that norms should provide justifications for action, and the second involves a version of the thesis of indeterminacy of reference.
English The article considers the normative dimension of female gender stereotypes, underscoring the prescriptive and self-prescriptive power they contain. Particularly highlighted, from the social psychological point of view, is the recurring reproduction of expectations of an intra-gender homogeneity based on a traditional female role. Emphasis is put on how this tendency to refuse to recognize intra-gender differences - often evident in job contexts - may contribute to conserving the power imbalances existing between men and women, and to sustaining women's systematic (...) relegation to 'second place' in the workplace. As an example, the article contains some free quotations relating to the qualitative analysis made of women's discursive productions collected in a wider research project on the relation between gender and science. These aspects of stereotypic self- and other-perception - and the social expectations deriving from them - are also discussed in the light of the sociological approach to gender identity, and in their relations to practices and to ongoing social changes. French Cette contribution reprend la dimension normative des stéréotypes de genre féminin en soulignant le pouvoir normatif et auto-normatif qu'ils contiennent. D'un point de vue psychosocial, la reproduction constante d'attentes, même féminines, vers une homogénéité au sein des femmes, déclinée sur un rôle féminin traditionnel, est particulièrement mise en évidence. Il est souligné que cette tendance à méconnaître les différences au sein des femmes, souvent criante dans le contexte professionnel, peut contribuer à la conservation des déséquilibres de pouvoir existant entre hommes et femmes au travail en favorisant le classement continu des femmes à la 'deuxième place' dans les organisations. Quelques extraits de l'analyse qualitative effectuée sur les discours féminins relevés dans un projet de recherche plus ample sur la relation entre genre et science sont cités à titre d'exemple. Ces aspects d'auto- et hétéro-perception stéréotypique - et les attentes sociales qui en dérivent - sont également discutés à la lumière de l'approche sociologique de l'identité de genre, dans leur relation avec les pratiques et face aux changements sociaux en cours. (shrink)
The general definition of mental disorder stated in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders seems to identify a mental disorder with a harmful dysfunction. However, the presence of distress or disability, which may be bracketed as the presence of harm, is taken to be merely usual, and thus not a necessary requirement: a mental disorder can be diagnosed as such even if there is no harm at all. In this paper, we focus on the (...) harm requirement. First, we clarify what it means to say that the harm requirement is not necessary for defining the general concept of mental disorder. In this respect, we briefly examine the two components of harm, distress and disability, and then trace a distinction between mental disorder tokens and mental disorder types. Second, we argue that the decision not to regard the harm requirement as a necessary criterion for mental disorder is tenable for a number of practical and theoretical reasons, some pertaining to conceptual issues surrounding the two components of harm and others pertaining to the problem of false negatives and the status of psychiatry vis-à-vis somatic medicine. However, we believe that the harm requirement can be maintained among the specific diagnostic criteria of certain individual mental disorders. More precisely, we argue that insofar as the harm requirement is needed among the specific diagnostic criteria of certain individual mental disorders, it should be unpacked and clarified. (shrink)
In this essay, I reconstruct tolerance as a moral virtue, by critically analysing its definition, circumstances, justification and limits. I argues that, despite its paradoxical appearance, tolerance qualifies as a virtue, by means of a restriction of its proper object to differences that are chosen. Since this excludes the most important and divisive differences of contemporary pluralism from the scope of the virtue of tolerance, the moral model of toleration cannot constitute the micro-foundation of the corresponding political practice. However, if (...) the political ideal of toleration must be founded on independent political reasons of justice, the moral model can bridge the gap between private morality and public reason, providing citizens with moral motives to supplement the political obligation to neutrality. (shrink)
We administered suggestions to see a gray-scale pattern as colored and a colored pattern in shades of gray to 30 high suggestible and eight low suggestible students. The suggestions were administered twice, once following the induction of hypnosis and once without an induction. Besides rating the degree of color they saw in the stimuli differently, participants also rated their states of consciousness as normal, relaxed, hypnotized, or deeply hypnotized. Reports of being hypnotized were limited to highly suggestible participants and only (...) after the hypnotic induction had been administered. Reports of altered color perception were also limited to high suggestibles, but were roughly comparable regardless of whether hypnosis had been induced. These data indicate that suggestible individuals do not slip into a hypnotic state when given imaginative suggestions without the induction of hypnosis, but nevertheless report experiencing difficult suggestions for profound perceptual alterations that are pheonomenologically similar to what they report in hypnosis. (shrink)
Les pratiques du commerce équitable, décrites dans cet article, montrent comment a pu se développer, tout au long de ses quarante années d'existence, un mouvement capable de relier autour des mêmes préoccupations, des citoyens du nord et du sud du monde. De ce fait, on peut affirmer que, en dépit des clivages et des divergences, le commerce équitable participe à la définition d'un espace public d'envergure internationale autour des questions de la consommation et des modes d'organisation du commerce international. La (...) première partie a pour but de clarifier la démarche technique et les valeurs qui animent le mouvement. La deuxième partie pose la question de savoir dans quelle mesure les impacts générés à la fois sur le marché conventionnel et sur le développement du sud du monde ont du sens pour l'avenir.The practices of fair trade described in this article show how this movement has been able to create links between citizens with shared concerns in the southern and northern hemispheres in the 40 years it has existed. In this way, we are able to affirm that despite certain differences and divisions, fair trade has contributed towards the definition of international public discussion on question such as consumption and the organization of international trade. The first part of this article aims to clarify the technical process and the values underpinning this civic movement through a description of its practices. The second part aims to assess the extent to which the impact fair trade has had on conventional trade and on local development in the southern hemisphere indicates a direction for the future. (shrink)
P.T. Geach has maintained (see, e.g., Geach (1967/1968)) that identity (as well as dissimilarity) is always relative to a general term. According to him, the notion of absolute identity has to be abandoned and replaced by a multiplicity of relative identity relations for which Leibniz's Law - which says that if two objects are identical they have the same properties - does not hold. For Geach relative identity is at least as good as Frege's cardinality thesis which he takes to (...) be strictly connected with relative identity - according to which an ascription of cardinality is always relative to a concept which specifies what, in any particular case, counts as a unit. The idea that there is a close connection between relative identity and Frege's cardinality thesis has been issued again quite recently by Alston and Bennett in (1984). In their opinion, Frege's cardinality thesis is not only similar to relative identity - as Geach maintains - but it implies it. Moreover, they agree with Geach in claiming that a commitment to Frege's cardinality thesis forces a parallel commitment to relative identity. Against Geach, Alston and Bennett we will claim that (Tl): "Frege's cardinality thesis is similar to relative identity" is false and that therefore (T2) "Frege's cardinality thesis implies relative identity" is false as well. (shrink)
Entre los múltiples temas de la fenomenología, el de la intencionalidad es un concepto clave que permite tentar una interpretación del significado del pensamiento husserliano respecto de su difícil relación con la modernidad y de su puesto en la filosofía contemporánea. La presente contribución sigue las huellas de ese concepto en la obra temprana de Edmund Husserl. Paralelamente, aborda la posición de Husserl respecto de la equívoca noción de "conciencia" o "subjetividad" la que, siguiendo ciertas concepciones de la modernidad, se (...) venía entendiendo hacia fines del siglo XlX como "inmanencia" o "presencia a sí". Algunos textos tempranos de Husserl son puestos en relación con la primera edición de su "Quinta Investigación Lógica" (1901), por ser éste el "lugar" en el que se halla expuesta, de modo quizás privilegiado, la tensión husserliana entre la "tradición" y la "cosa misma". (shrink)
The paper questions the view that the alleged lack of autonomy displayed by certain practices and cultural behavior may constitute a sound justification for limiting toleration of those practices. Not only is the concept of autonomy open to endless controversy, but it also entails a conflict with liberal public morality and often nurtures double standards. To this end, the paper first examines the assumptions and basis of the lack-of-autonomy approach; this analysis perforce leads the author to unravel the notion of (...) autonomy and its rival conceptions. Second, it will be argued that liberal and democratic politics, though indebted to the value of personal autonomy in a fashion, requires only a purely political principle of autonomy. It is also contended that if comprehensive notions of autonomy are used instead of a purely political conception, unacceptable consequences for the public morality of liberal democracy may follow. Finally, the point will be illustrated with some examples drawn from multicultural politics. (shrink)
Riassunto: In questo contributo analizzeremo il criterio del danno, presente nella definizione generale di disturbo mentale del DSM. La questione ha rilevanza sia da un punto di vista filosofico, perché il danno è una componente normativa e valoriale, non oggettiva, sia da un punto di vista clinico, perché chi ha difeso il criterio del danno ha spesso sostenuto che in sua assenza avremmo troppi falsi positivi. Infine, ha importanza dal punto di vista socio-sanitario in relazione al rapporto tra la psichiatria (...) e la medicina non psichiatrica, nello specifico tra il DSM e l’ICD. Sosterremo che ci sono buone ragioni per non mantenere il danno come criterio necessario nella definizione generale del disturbo mentale. Dopo una breve introduzione, forniremo una panoramica storica sul ruolo del criterio del danno nelle varie edizioni del DSM. Successivamente si illustrerà la principale obiezione contro l’inclusione del criterio del danno nella definizione generale di disturbo mentale, ossia il problema dei falsi negativi, per poi presentare e discutere ulteriori ragioni – medico-pratiche e concettuali – che depongono a sfavore dell’attribuzione di un forte peso al criterio del danno. In sede conclusiva ribadiamo come la decisione presa dalla task force del DSM-5 di escludere il criterio del danno dalla definizione generale di disturbo mentale debba essere sostenuta. Parole chiave: Danno; Disabilità; Disagio; Disturbo mentale; DSM “Harm” as Criterion for the Definition of Mental Disease in DSM. Some Epistemological Reflections: In this paper, we analyse the harm requirement in the general definition of mental disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders. This issue has both philosophical and clinical relevance: on the one hand the harm requirement is a normative, value-laden, non-objective component in the definition of mental disorder; on the other hand, the harm requirement has often been defended on the grounds that it prevents an increase in false positives. The issue is also important in assessing the relationship between psychiatry and somatic medicine, more precisely, between the DSM and the International Classification of Diseases. We argue that there are good reasons not to maintain the harm requirement in the general definition of mental disorder. After a brief introduction, we overview the history of the harm requirement across the various editions of the DSM. Then, we examine the main objection to the inclusion of the harm requirement in the general definition of mental disorder, that is, the problem of false negatives, and also present several other points – both practical and conceptual – that help demonstrate why the harm requirement is inadequate as a definiens of mental disorder. To conclude, we stress that the decision of the DSM-5 task force not to regard the harm requirement as a necessary component of mental disorder should be endorsed. Keywords: Harm; Disability, Distress; Mental Disorder; DSM. (shrink)
El estudio parte de la discusión de De anima, III, 11, 434a7-10: a diferencia de las interpretaciones más difundidas del pasaje, que dependen considerablemente del comentario de Filopón, aquí se busca reconstruir la actividad de medición, planteada en relación de analogía con la “imaginación deliberativa”, a la luz de procedimientos de descomposición y recomposición de figuras geométricas, muy difundidos en los siglos V-IV a.C., de los cuales se presentan también ilustraciones numismáticas. En la misma línea se puede situar tanto la (...) referencia de Ética Nicomáquea, III, 5, 1112b20-21 al “análisis” de las figuras, como el de Ética Nicomáquea, VI, 9, 1142a23-29 al triángulo como “extremo”. A este modelo metrético-espacial de la phantasia bouleutikē se añade uno de tipo logístico-temporal, que es mencionado en De anima, III, 7, 431b7-8 y en De memoria, 2, 453a15-16, con una interesante confirmación en Tucídides, I, 138, 3, donde Temístocles es comparado con un “habilísimo gnōmōn”. En ambos casos, los modelos matemáticos en los que se inspira el hombre que imagina mientras trata de comprender qué es obrar bien, aquí y ahora, no son productos refinados de ciencia teórica, sino que pertenecen a aquellas “matemáticas de los mercaderes”, que Platón desaconsejaba practicar para alcanzar la visión del verdadero bien.The paper begins with the discussion of De anima, III, 11, 434a7-10:unlike the best known interpretations of the passage, which considerably depend on Philoponus’ commentary, here we try to reconstruct the measurement activity, presented in a relationship of analogy with the “deliberative imagination”, in the light of procedures of decomposition and recomposition of geometrical figures, which were widely spread in the V-IV centuries B.C., of which numismatic illustrations are also offered. It is possible to understand in the same line the reference both to the “analysis” of figures in Nichomachean Ethics, III, 5, 1112b20-21, and to the triangle as an “extreme” in Nichomachean Ethics, VI, 9, 1142a23. To this spatial-metretic model of the phantasia bouleutikē, a logistic-temporal one is added, mentioned in De anima, III, 7, 431b7-8 and Dememoria, 2, 453a15-16, with an interesting confirmation in Thucydides, I, 138,3, where Themistocles is compared to a “skillfull gnōmōn”. In both cases, themathematical models that serve as inspiration to the man that imagines whiletrying to understand what is to act well, here and now, are not refined productsof theoretical sciences, but part of those “merchants’ mathematics” which Platoadvised not to practice in order to gain the vision of the true good. (shrink)
Baccarini and Malatesti (2017) defend the idea that we must use coercively biomedical means to enhance the morality of a specific group of individuals: psychopaths, diagnosed through the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) standards (Hare, 2003). Their argument is theoretical, thus it goes independently from the actual effectiveness of existent treatments, and it is based on a logical reasoning. Moral bioenhancement (MB) means include psychotropic drugs, brain stimulations, neurosurgeries, genetic editing, etc. -/- In short, the authors apply Gerald Gaus' account of open (...) justification (Gaus, 1996, 2011), according to which “a prescription addressed to an agent is a reasoning that includes premises that consider the system of reasons (such as beliefs, preferences, etc.) of that agent” (Baccarini and Malatesti, 2017, p. 1). In their view, coercive MB of psychopaths is morally sound and deducible by reasons within the psychopath's cognitive-affective system—even if the psychopath needs not to be able to consciously or sincerely endorse them. We believe that this argument is flawed. In sum, we argue that the psychopath's cognitive-affective system would consistently justify reasons against mandatory MB to herself, even if she wishes differently for others, and that the prescription cannot be extended. (shrink)
The mathematical scenario in Italy during the Late Middle Ages and the Renaissance is mainly dominated by the treatises on the abacus, which developed together with the abacus schools. In that context, between approximately the last thirty years of the fourteenth century and the first twenty years of the sixteenth century, the manuscript and printed tradition tell us of queries and challenges, barely known or totally unknown, in which the protagonists were abacus masters. We report in this work on the (...) most significant examples and draw out interesting cues for thoughts and remarks of a scientific, historical and biographical nature. Five treatises, written in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, have been the main source of inspiration for this article: the Trattato di praticha d’arismetricha and the Tractato di praticha di geometria included in the codices Palat. 573 and Palat. 577 kept in the Biblioteca Nazionale of Florence and written by an anonymous Florentine disciple of the abacist Domenico di Agostino Vaiaio; another Trattato di praticha d’arismetrica written by Benedetto di Antonio da Firenze in 1463 and included in the codex L.IV.21 kept in the Biblioteca Comunale of Siena; the Tractatus mathematicus ad discipulos perusinos written by Luca Pacioli between 1477 and 1480, manuscript Vat. Lat. 3129 of the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana; and Francesco Galigai’s Summa de arithmetica, published in Florence in 1521. (shrink)