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  1.  77
    Cardinality and Identity.Massimiliano Carrara & Elisabetta Sacchi - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):539-556.
    P.T. Geach has maintained (see, e.g., Geach (1967/1968)) that identity (as well as dissimilarity) is always relative to a general term. According to him, the notion of absolute identity has to be abandoned and replaced by a multiplicity of relative identity relations for which Leibniz's Law - which says that if two objects are identical they have the same properties - does not hold. For Geach relative identity is at least as good as Frege's cardinality thesis which he takes to (...)
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  2. To Think is to Have Something in One’s Thought.Alberto Voltolini & Elisabetta Sacchi - 2012 - Quaestio 12:395-422.
    Along with a well-honoured tradition, we will accept that intentionality is at least a property a thought holds necessarily, i.e., in all possible worlds that contain it; more specifically, a necessary relation, namely the relation of existential dependence of the thought on its intentional object. Yet we will first of all try to show that intentionality is more than that. For we will claim that intentionality is an essential property of the thought, namely a property whose predication to the thought (...)
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  3.  10
    Against Phenomenal Externalism.Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 49 (145):25-48.
    We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal external- ism is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up in the debate, we see (...)
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  4.  12
    To Think Is to Literally Have Something in One’s Thought.Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - Quaestio 12:395-422.
    In this paper, we first want to defend the idea that reference intentionality is the relation of constitution holding between an intentional state, a thought, and the object it is about, its intentional object. As such, reference intentionality is for a thought an essential property, whose predication to that thought is true in virtue of the nature of such a thought. We will take this to be one of the main lessons of serious externalism, according to which the intentional object (...)
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  5.  13
    Another Argument for Cognitive Phenomenology.Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):256-263.
    __: In this paper, we want to support Kriegel’s argument in favor of the thesis that there is a cognitive form of phenomenology that is both irreducible to and independent of any sensory form of phenomenology by providing another argument in favor of the same thesis. Indeed, this new argument is also intended to show that the thought experiment Kriegel’s argument relies on does describe a genuine metaphysical possibility. In our view, Kriegel has not entirely succeeded in showing that his (...)
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  6. Fregean Propositions and Their Graspability.Elisabetta Sacchi - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):73-94.
    According to Frege a proposition—or, in his terms, a thought—is an abstract structured entity constituted by senses which satisfies, at least, the three following properties: it can be semantically assessed as true or as false, it is the object of so called propositional attitudes and it can be grasped. What Frege meant by 'grasping' is the peculiar way in which we can have epistemic access to propositions. The possibility for propositions to be grasped is put by Frege as a warrant (...)
     
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  7. Propositions. An Introduction.Massimiliano Carrara & Elisabetta Sacchi - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):1-27.
     
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  8.  1
    Il contributo di Frege all’attuale dibattito sul naturalismo.Elisabetta Sacchi - 2010 - Rivista di Estetica 44:135-155.
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  9.  11
    Propositions: Semantic and Ontological Issues.Massimiliano Carrara & Elisabetta Sacchi (eds.) - 2006 - Rodopi.
    This special issue of GPS collects 11 papers , by leading philosophers and young researchers, which tackle more or less from close the topic of propositions by trying to provide the reader with a cross-section of the ongoing debate in this area. The raised issues range over the semantics, the ontology, the epistemology, and the philosophy of mathematics and stimulate the reader to reflect on crucial problems such as the following: are propositions objects? In the positive case, what kind of (...)
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  10. I pensieri e il regno di mezzo.Elisabetta Sacchi - 2004 - Rivista di Estetica 44 (26):239-255.
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  11. Pensieri E Rappresentazioni: Frege E Il Cognitivismo Contemporaneo.Elisabetta Sacchi - 2005 - Carocci.
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  12. The Contribution of Frege to the Current Debate on Naturalism.Elisabetta Sacchi - 2010 - Rivista di Estetica 44:135-155.
     
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