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  1.  64
    The Objects of Respect.Elizabeth Foreman - 2015 - Environmental Ethics 37 (1):57-73.
    Although it is widely held that we do not owe basic respect to nonhuman animals, a close examination of why we owe this respect to human beings leads to the conclusion that we owe it to nonhuman animals as well. While Kant’s basic notion of respect for persons is intuitively plausible, Kant’s two arguments for why respect is owed to human beings ultimately fail, and a reconsideration of which feature of human beings actually grounds the respect that humans are owed (...)
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  2. Good Eats.Elizabeth Foreman - 2014 - Between the Species 17 (1):53-73.
    If one believes that vegetarianism is morally obligatory, there are numerous ways to argue for that conclusion. In this paper, classic utilitarian and rights-based attempts to ground this obligation are considered, as well as Cora Diamond’s reframing of the debate in terms of the proper way to view other animals. After discussion of these three ways to ground the obligation and their problems, an attitude-based approach inspired by Diamond’s view is advanced. It is argued that such a view, by focusing (...)
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  3.  55
    An Agent-Centered Account of Rightness: The Importance of a Good Attitude.Elizabeth Foreman - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):941-954.
    This paper provides a sketch of an agent-centered way of understanding and answering the question, “What’s wrong with that?” On this view, what lies at the bottom of judgments of wrongness is a bad attitude; when someone does something wrong, she does something that expresses a bad, or inappropriate, attitude . In order to motivate this account, a general Kantian agent-centered ethics is discussed, as well as Michael Slote’s agent-based ethics, in light of analysis of the grounding role of attitudes (...)
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  4.  34
    Focusing Respect on Creatures.Elizabeth Foreman - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):593-609.
    Obligations of respect tend to be grounded in the moral relevance of features of creatures rather than in the creatures themselves. This is troubling for two reasons: (1) There is a difference between what we take the attitude of respect to be, and the way in which our theories structure our obligations, and (2) If the presence of a feature is what generates our obligations, then the creatures to whom we are obligated lose their claim on us if they lose (...)
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  5.  25
    Dogs and tigers and fish, oh my! Sporting captivity.Elizabeth Foreman & Pam R. Sailors - 2023 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 17 (4):477-487.
    In contemporary society, humans interact with nonhuman animals in a number of ways, many of which involve the captivity of the nonhuman animals involved. Nonhuman animals trained for sport (sled dogs, horses trained for dressage, etc.), nonhuman animals confined for human entertainment (zoos, aquariums, circuses, etc.), and companion animals are all held captive by the human beings who interact with them. However, the moral acceptability of these forms of captivity seems to vary widely; this variance isn’t only a function of (...)
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  6.  98
    Brain-Damaged Babies and Brain-Damaged Kittens: A Reexamination of the Argument From Marginal Cases.Elizabeth Foreman - 2014 - Journal of Animal Ethics 4 (1):58-73,.
    Given the existence of “marginal human cases”, it is often argued that we must either acknowledge that some human beings have less moral status than some non-human animals, or commit to the idea that moral status is held by humans qua human. In this paper, the moves available on both sides are shown to be unsatisfactory, and an argument for moral status that avoids both of the standard positions is suggested. Ultimately, it is argued that the discussion of moral status (...)
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  7. Doing Without Moral Rights.Elizabeth Foreman - 2014 - In Elisa Aaltola & John Hadley (eds.), Animal Ethics and Philosophy: Questioning the Orthodoxy. New York: Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 133-147.
  8.  76
    Ethical Theory: An Anthology, 2nd edition, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau. [REVIEW]Elizabeth Foreman - 2016 - Teaching Philosophy 39 (2):233-235.
  9.  73
    Review of Jens Timmermann (ed.), Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide[REVIEW]Elizabeth Foreman - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (8).
  10.  39
    Review of Patricia Marino’s Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World. [REVIEW]Elizabeth Foreman - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2016.
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