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Profile: Elizabeth Schechter (Washington University in St. Louis)
  1. Two Unities of Consciousness.Elizabeth Schechter - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):197-218.
    : This paper argues for a distinction between possession of a unified consciousness and possession of a single stream of consciousness. Although the distinction has widespread applicability in discussions of the structure of consciousness and of pathologies of conscious experience, I will illustrate its importance primarily using the debate about consciousness in split-brain subjects, suggesting that those who have argued that split-brain subjects have two streams of consciousness apiece and those who have argued that they have a unified consciousness may (...)
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    The Subject in Neuropsychology: Individuating Minds in the Split‐Brain Case.Elizabeth Schechter - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):501-525.
    Many experimental findings with split-brain subjects intuitively suggest that each such subject has two minds. The conceptual and empirical basis of this duality intuition has never been fully articulated. This article fills that gap, by offering a reconstruction of early neuropsychological literature on the split-brain phenomenon. According to that work, the hemispheres operate independently of each other insofar as they interact via the mediation of effection and transduction—via behavior and sensation, essentially. This is how your mind and my mind interact (...)
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  3. Individuating Mental Tokens: The Split-Brain Case.Elizabeth Schechter - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):195-216.
    Some philosophers have argued that so long as two neural events, within a subject, are both of the same type and both carry the same content, then these events may jointly constitute a single mental token, regardless of the sort of causal relation to each other that they bear. These philosophers have used this claim—which I call the “singularity-through-redundancy” position—in order to argue that a split-brain subject normally has a single stream of consciousness, disjunctively realized across the two hemispheres. This (...)
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  4. Can Panpsychism Bridge the Explanatory Gap?Peter Carruthers & Elizabeth Schechter - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):32-39.
  5. The Unity of Consciousness: Subjects and Objectivity.Elizabeth Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):671-692.
    This paper concerns the role that reference to subjects of experience can play in individuating streams of consciousness, and the relationship between the subjective and the objective structure of consciousness. A critique of Tim Bayne’s recent book indicates certain crucial choices that works on the unity of consciousness must make. If one identifies the subject of experience with something whose consciousness is necessarily unified, then one cannot offer an account of the objective structure of consciousness. Alternatively, identifying the subject of (...)
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  6. The Switch Model of Split-Brain Consciousness.Elizabeth Schechter - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):203 - 226.
    The attempt to model the structure of consciousness in split-brain subjects is ongoing. This paper concerns the recently proposed ?switch model? of split-brain consciousness, according to which a split-brain subject possesses only a single stream of consciousness, unified at and across time, that shifts from one hemisphere to the other from moment to moment. The paper argues that while the central explanatory element of the switch model may account for some aspects of split-brain consciousness, the best general picture of split-brain (...)
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    Intentions and Unified Agency: Insights From the Split-Brain Phenomenon.Elizabeth Schechter - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (5):570-594.
    Under experimental conditions, behavior suggesting dual agency is easily elicited from split‐brain subjects who usually behave in an unremarkable fashion. This article presents a model of split‐brain agency that accounts for this apparent tension. Right and left hemisphere are associated with distinct agents, R and L, each of whose unity is grounded in the special inferential and experiential relations that its mental states bear to each other. These same relations do not hold interhemispherically; rather, unified behavior is largely the result (...)
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  8. Persons and Psychological Frameworks: A Critique of Tye.Elizabeth Schechter - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):141-163.
    This paper concerns the relationships between persons, brains, behaviour, and psychological explanation. Tye defines a ‘psychological framework’ (PF) as a set of token beliefs, desires, intentions, memories, streams of consciousness, higher-order mental states, etc., that ‘form a coherent whole’ and against which a creature’s ‘behavior can be explained’ (p. 141). A person is the subject of such a psychological framework. Each person has one PF, and with each new PF there is a new person. Meanwhile materialism tells us, according to (...)
     
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  9. Ripetizioni : Freud, Svevo E la Coscienza di Zeno.Elizabeth Schechter - 2008 - In Pierluigi Barrotta, Anna Laura Lepschy & Emma Bond (eds.), Freud and Italian Culture. Peter Lang.
     
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