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Elizabeth Schier [13]Elizabeth Cecilia Schier [2]
  1. Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science Since 1980.Elizabeth Schier & John Sutton - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. New York: Springer.
    If Australasian philosophers constitute the kind of group to which a collective identity or broadly shared self-image can plausibly be ascribed, the celebrated history of Australian materialism rightly lies close to its heart. Jack Smart’s chapter in this volume, along with an outstanding series of briefer essays in A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Forrest 2010; Gold 2010; Koksvik 2010; Lycan 2010; Matthews 2010; Nagasawa 2010; Opie 2010; Stoljar 2010a), effectively describe the naturalistic realism of Australian philosophy (...)
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  2. Why Are We Still Being Hornswoggled? Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):67-79.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett : 4–6, 1996, Cognition 79:221–237, 2001, J Conscious Stud 19:86, 2012) and Churchland :402–408, 1996, Brainwise: studies in neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness (...)
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  3.  76
    The Represented Object of Color Experience.Elizabeth Schier - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):1 – 27.
    Despite a wealth of data we still have no clear idea what color experiences represent. In fact, color experiences vary with so many factors that it has been claimed that they do not represent anything at all. The primary challenge for any representational account of color experience is to accommodate the various psychophysical results that demonstrate that color appearance depends not only on the spectral nature of the target but also on the spectral, spatial and figural nature of the surround. (...)
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  4.  7
    Introduction: The Hard Problem of Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):1-3.
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  5. Our Intuitions About Consciousness Are Inconsistent.Elizabeth Schier - unknown
     Introduce the intuitions  Accepting that there is no appearance/reality distinction for consciousness means we must deny that consciousness does causal work..
     
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  6. Scientific Representation, Materialism and New Facts.Elizabeth Schier - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2):189-94.
  7.  51
    The Knowledge Argument and the Inadequacy of Scientific Knowledge.Elizabeth Schier - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1):39-62.
    Recently a number of authors have responded to the knowl-edge argument by suggesting that Mary could learn about new physi-cal facts upon release (Flanagan, 1992; Mandik, 2001; Stoljar, 2001; Van Gulick, 1985). A key step in achieving this is a demonstration that there are facts that can be known via colour experience that cannot be learnt scientifically. In this paper I develop an account of scientific and visual knowledge on which there is a difference between the knowledge provided by science (...)
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  8. And the Inadequacy of Scientific Knowledge.Elizabeth Schier - unknown
    Recently a number of authors have responded to the knowledge argument by suggesting that Mary could learn about new physical facts upon release (Flanagan 1992; Mandik 2001; Stoljar 2001; Van Gulick 1985). A key step in achieving this is a demonstration that there are facts that can be known via color experience that cannot..
     
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  9. Making the Mind Higher-Level.Elizabeth Schier - unknown
    Kim (1998) has argued that a genuine robust physicalism does not leave any room for real, causally efficacious mental properties. Despite all of his concerns about the reality and causal efficacy of mental phenomena Kim does not eliminate all higher-level macro causation. Kim’s problem with the mental is that most current cognitive theories imply that the mind is not higher-level but higher-order. In this paper I argue that connectionism makes meaning higher-level and therefore by Kim’s own standards puts meaning on (...)
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  10.  3
    Subjectivity, Multiple Drafts and the Inconceivability of Zombies and the Inverted Spectrum in This World.Elizabeth Schier - forthcoming - Topoi:1-9.
    Proponents of the hard problem of consciousness argue that the zombie and inverted spectrum thought experiments demonstrate that consciousness cannot be physical. They present scenarios designed to demonstrate that it is conceivable that a physical replica of someone can have radically different or no conscious experiences, that such an experience-less replica is possible and therefore that materialism is false. I will argue that once one understands the limitations that the physics of this world puts on cognitive systems, zombies and the (...)
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  11.  17
    Identifying Phenomenal Consciousness.Elizabeth Schier - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):216-222.
    This paper examines the possibility of finding evidence that phenomenal consciousness is independent of access. The suggestion reviewed is that we should look for isomorphisms between phenomenal and neural activation spaces. It is argued that the fact that phenomenal spaces are mapped via verbal report is no problem for this methodology. The fact that activation and phenomenal space are mapped via different means does not mean that they cannot be identified. The paper finishes by examining how data addressing this theoretical (...)
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  12.  13
    The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism.Elizabeth Schier - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):689-690.
  13. The Explicable Emergence of the Mind.Elizabeth Schier - unknown
    The goal of the symposium 'Integrating Perspectives on the Relation between Mind and Brain' was to get people with different views and from different disciplines to open up a dialogue by focusing on answering a set of questions. In this paper I present a view of the relation between the mind and the brain that is informed by recent work in the philosophy of science. The basic idea is that the mind is more than the brain because mental states are (...)
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