Conversational contextualism in epistemology is characterized by four main theses: 1. the indexicality of knowledge claims thesis; 2. the attributor contextualism thesis; 3. the conversational contextualism thesis, and 4. the main thesis of contextualism according to which a knowledge claim can be true in one context and false in another context in which more stringent standards for knowledge are operant. It is argued that these theses taken together generate problems for contextualism. In particular, it is shown that there is no (...) context in which the contextualist can truthfully claim to know her theory is true. Since these results were obtained only with principles the contextualist cannot give up—like the principle of epistemic closure and the principle that knowledge implies truth—it seems that contextualism is in need of a thoroughgoing revision if it is to become a successful epistemic theory. (shrink)

It is argued that neither contextualism nor relativism can provide a satisfying semantics of knowledge ascriptions. According to contextualism, the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions of the form “S knows that p” vary with the epistemic standards operative in the contexts of utterance. These epistemic standards are determined, in particular, by the speaker’s stakes with regard to p or the consideration of error-possibilities. It is shown that the absolute concept of utterance truth together with a knowledge rule of assertion lead (...) to certain unassertable truths in contextualism and to counterintuitive results with regard to certain cross-context knowledge ascriptions. Although utterance truth is relativized to contexts of assessment in relativist accounts of knowledge, relativism still makes inadequate semantic predictions. In particular, relativism runs into problems in cases where the context of assessment is lower than the context of utterance. It is finally argued that invariantist accounts, according to which the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions do neither vary with the context of utterance nor the context of assessment, but are determined by objective features given in the situation in which the knowledge claim is made, are better suited for modelling the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. Besides the fact that stakes or the consideration of error-possibilities can have an influence on the belief in a proposition, they have no further bearing on the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions. (shrink)

I begin with an explication of "thought experiment". I then clarify the role that intuitions play in thought experiments by addressing two important issues: (1) the informativeness of thought experiments and (2) the legitimacy of the method of thought experiments in philosophy and the natural sciences. I defend a naturalistic account of intuitions that provides a plausible explanation of the informativeness of thought experiments, which, in turn, allows thought experiments to be reconstructed as arguments. I also specify criteria for distinguishing (...) bad "intuition pumps" from legitimate thought experiments. These criteria help us to avoid being seduced by the dangerous suggestive power of misleading intuitions. (shrink)

A satisfactory theory of knowledge in which the shortcomings of a pure externalist account are avoided and in which the Gettier problem is solved should consist in a combination of externalist and internalist components. The internalist component should guarantee that the epistemic subject has cognitive access to the justifying grounds of her belief. And the externalist component should guarantee that the justification of her belief does not depend on any false statement. Keith Lehrer's coherence theory of knowledge as undefeated justification (...) is an example of such an internalist-externalist analysis of knowledge. But nevertheless, Lehrer's account leads to unintended results. Therefore, it is argued that a satisfactory coherence theory of knowledge must also be based on a gradual notion of systematic coherence. (shrink)

In this paper we survey some main arguments for and against epistemological contextualism. We distinguish and discuss various kinds of contextualism, such as attributer contextualism (the most influential version of which is semantic, conversational, or radical contextualism); indexicalism; proto-contextualism; Wittgensteinian contextualism; subject, inferential, or issue contextualism; epistemic contextualism; and virtue contextualism. Starting with a sketch of Dretske's Relevant Alternatives Theory and Nozick's Tracking Account of Knowledge, we reconstruct the history of various forms of contextualism and the ways contextualists try to (...) handle some notorious epistemological quandaries, especially skepticism and the lottery paradox. Then we outline the most important problems that contextualist theories face, and give overviews of their criticisms and defenses as developed in this issue. (shrink)

Contextualism has become one of the leading paradigms in contemporary epistemology. According to this view, there is no context-independent standard of knowledge, and as a result, all knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive. Contextualists contend that their account of this analysis allows us to resolve some major epistemological problems such as skeptical paradoxes and the lottery paradox, and that it helps us explain various other linguistic data about knowledge ascriptions. The apparent ease with which contextualism seems to solve numerous epistemological quandaries has (...) inspired the burgeoning interest in it. This comprehensive anthology collects twenty original essays and critical commentaries on different aspects of contextualism, written by leading philosophers on the topic. The editors’ introduction sketches the historical development of the contextualist movement and provides a survey and analysis of its arguments and major positions. (shrink)

Since universal language systems are confronted with serious paradoxical consequences, a semantic approach is developed in whichpartial worlds form the ontological basis. This approach shares withsituation semantics the basic idea that statements always refer to certain partial worlds, and it agrees with the extensional and model-theoretic character ofpossible worlds semantics. Within the framework of the partial worlds conception a satisfactory solution to theLiar paradox can be formulated. In particular, one advantage of this approach over those theories that are based on (...) the totality of possible worlds semantics can be found in the fact that the so-called Strengthened Liar problem is avoided. (shrink)

The paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses of arguments of proper self-reference, arguments of self-application and arguments of iterative application. A formalization of the underlying logical structure of these arguments helps to identify the implicit premises on which these arguments rest. If the premises are plausible, the conclusions reached by these arguments must be taken seriously. In particular, all the types of argument discussed, when sound, show that certain theories that purport to be universally applicable are not tenable. The argumentative (...) power of such arguments then depends on how devastating it is for the theories in question to give up their claim of universal applicability. (shrink)

Goldman's project of a veritistic social epistemology is based on a descriptive-success account of truth and a weak notion of knowledge as mere true belief. It is argued that, contrary to Goldman's opinion, pragmatism and social constructivism are not necessarily ruled out by the descriptive-success account of truth. Furthermore, it is shown that it appears to be questionable whether Goldman has succeeded to show that there is a weak notion of knowledge. But even if such a weak notion of knowledge (...) can be defended, this notion can result in a complete separation of knowledge from epistemic value, which does not seem to be in accordance with Goldman's concept of societal knowledge. (shrink)

I begin with an explication of “thought experiment”. I then clarify the role that intuitions play in thought experiments by addressing two important issues: the informativeness of thought experiments and the legitimacy of the method of thought experiments in philosophy and the natural sciences. I defend a naturalistic account of intuitions that provides a plausible explanation of the informativeness of thought experiments, which, in turn, allows thought experiments to be reconstructed as arguments. I also specify criteria for distinguishing bad “intuition (...) pumps” from legitimate thought experiments. These criteria help us to avoid being seduced by the dangerous suggestive power of misleading intuitions. (shrink)

C.Z. Elgins Argumente zur Unbrauchbarkeit des Wissensbegriffes für epistemologische Untersuchungen und die damit begründete Ersetzung des Wissensdurch den Verstehensbegriff werden anhand einer Analyse der Funktion von Begriffsexplikationen zur Bildung wahrer gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen zurückgewiesen. Die Verwendung grober Begriffskategorien, die mit einer Reduktion der Irrtumsmöglichkeit und somit einer leichten Bildung vieler gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen einhergeht, erweist sich nur vordergründig als epistemischer Vorteil für die Laien, da die so gewonnenen Uberzeugungen kognitiv weniger gehaltvoll sind, Experten aber neben den feineren gewöhnlich auch über die groben (...) Begriffskategorien verfügen, und selbst bei eingestandener Irrtumsmöglichkeit und dem Verzicht auf definitive Überzeugungen der Art „Dieses x ist F" erheblich mehr und Gehaltvolleres wissen als Laien, da auch ,,x ist definitiv kein F" oder ,,x ist höchstwahrscheinlich F" Wissen ausdrücken. (shrink)

As a result of his studies in metalogicEssler became convincedthat an absolute fixed totality of alltruths and a final metalanguage doesnot exist. Taking this result into account,it is shown that the usualabsolute concept of omniscience isuntenable. From this it can be concludedthat definitions of knowledge whichappeal to such a concept of omnisciencelead to serious problems.

C.Z. Elgins Argumente zur Unbrauchbarkeit des Wissensbegriffes für epistemologische Untersuchungen und die damit begründete Ersetzung des Wissensdurch den Verstehensbegriff werden anhand einer Analyse der Funktion von Begriffsexplikationen zur Bildung wahrer gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen zurückgewiesen. Die Verwendung grober Begriffskategorien, die mit einer Reduktion der Irrtumsmöglichkeit und somit einer leichten Bildung vieler gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen einhergeht, erweist sich nur vordergründig als epistemischer Vorteil für die Laien, da die so gewonnenen Uberzeugungen kognitiv weniger gehaltvoll sind, Experten aber neben den feineren gewöhnlich auch über die groben (...) Begriffskategorien verfügen, und selbst bei eingestandener Irrtumsmöglichkeit und dem Verzicht auf definitive Überzeugungen der Art „Dieses x ist F" erheblich mehr und Gehaltvolleres wissen als Laien, da auch ,,x ist definitiv kein F" oder ,,x ist höchstwahrscheinlich F" Wissen ausdrücken. (shrink)

C.Z. Elgins Argumente zur Unbrauchbarkeit des Wissensbegriffes für epistemologische Untersuchungen und die damit begründete Ersetzung des Wissensdurch den Verstehensbegriff werden anhand einer Analyse der Funktion von Begriffsexplikationen zur Bildung wahrer gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen zurückgewiesen. Die Verwendung grober Begriffskategorien, die mit einer Reduktion der Irrtumsmöglichkeit und somit einer leichten Bildung vieler gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen einhergeht, erweist sich nur vordergründig als epistemischer Vorteil für die Laien, da die so gewonnenen Uberzeugungen kognitiv weniger gehaltvoll sind, Experten aber neben den feineren gewöhnlich auch über die groben (...) Begriffskategorien verfügen, und selbst bei eingestandener Irrtumsmöglichkeit und dem Verzicht auf definitive Überzeugungen der Art „Dieses x ist F" erheblich mehr und Gehaltvolleres wissen als Laien, da auch,,x ist definitiv kein F" oder,,x ist höchstwahrscheinlich F" Wissen ausdrücken. (shrink)