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Profile: Ellen Fridland (King's College London)
  1. They've Lost Control: Reflections on Skill.Ellen Fridland - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2729-2750.
    In this paper, I submit that it is the controlled part of skilled action, that is, that part of an action that accounts for the exact, nuanced ways in which a skilled performer modifies, adjusts and guides her performance for which an adequate, philosophical theory of skill must account. I will argue that neither Jason Stanley nor Hubert Dreyfus have an adequate account of control. Further, and perhaps surprisingly, I will argue that both Stanley and Dreyfus relinquish an account of (...)
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  2.  90
    Problems with Intellectualism.Ellen Fridland - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):879-891.
    In his most recent book, Stanley (2011b) defends his Intellectualist account of knowledge how. In Know How, Stanley produces the details of a propositionalist theory of intelligent action and also responds to several objections that have been forwarded to this account in the last decade. In this paper, I will focus specifically on one claim that Stanley makes in chapter one of his book: I will focus on Stanley’s claim that automatic mechanisms can be used by the intellectualist in order (...)
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  3.  81
    Automatically Minded.Ellen Fridland - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11).
    It is not rare in philosophy and psychology to see theorists fall into dichotomous thinking about mental phenomena. On one side of the dichotomy there are processes that I will label “unintelligent.” These processes are thought to be unconscious, implicit, automatic, unintentional, involuntary, procedural, and non-cognitive. On the other side, there are “intelligent” processes that are conscious, explicit, controlled, intentional, voluntary, declarative, and cognitive. Often, if a process or behavior is characterized by one of the features from either of the (...)
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  4.  11
    Skill and Motor Control: Intelligence All the Way Down.Ellen Fridland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    When reflecting on the nature of skilled action, it is easy to fall into familiar dichotomies such that one construes the flexibility and intelligence of skill at the level of intentional states while characterizing the automatic motor processes that constitute motor skill execution as learned but fixed, invariant, bottom-up, brute-causal responses. In this essay, I will argue that this picture of skilled, automatic, motor processes is overly simplistic. Specifically, I will argue that an adequate account of the learned motor routines (...)
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  5.  6
    Skill and Motor Control: Intelligence All the Way Down.Ellen Fridland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1539-1560.
    When reflecting on the nature of skilled action, it is easy to fall into familiar dichotomies such that one construes the flexibility and intelligence of skill at the level of intentional states while characterizing the automatic motor processes that constitute motor skill execution as learned but fixed, invariant, bottom-up, brute-causal responses. In this essay, I will argue that this picture of skilled, automatic, motor processes is overly simplistic. Specifically, I will argue that an adequate account of the learned motor routines (...)
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  6.  90
    Knowing‐How: Problems and Considerations.Ellen Fridland - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):703-727.
    In recent years, a debate concerning the nature of knowing-how has emerged between intellectualists who claim that knowledge-how is reducible to knowledge-that and anti-intellectualists who claim that knowledge-how comprises a unique and irreducible knowledge category. The arguments between these two camps have clustered largely around two issues: intellectualists object to Gilbert Ryle's assertion that knowing-how is a kind of ability, and anti-intellectualists take issue with Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's positive, intellectualist account of knowing-how. Like most anti-intellectualists, in this paper (...)
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  7.  42
    Imitation Reconsidered.Ellen Fridland & Richard Moore - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):856-880.
    In the past 20 years or so, the psychological research on imitation has flourished. However, our working definition of imitation has not adequately adapted in order to reflect this research. The closest that we've come to a revamped conception of imitation comes from the work of Michael Tomasello. Despite its numerous virtues, Tomasello's definition is in need of at least two significant amendments, if it is to reflect the current state of knowledge. Accordingly, it is our goal in this paper (...)
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  8.  10
    6 Skill Learning and Conceptual Thought.Ellen Fridland - 2013 - In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. pp. 13--77.
  9. Perception and Skill: Theoretical Foundations for a Science of Perception.Ellen Fridland - 2010 - Dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center
  10. The Case for Proprioception.Ellen Fridland - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):521-540.
    In formulating a theory of perception that does justice to the embodied and enactive nature of perceptual experience, proprioception can play a valuable role. Since proprioception is necessarily embodied, and since proprioceptive experience is particularly integrated with one’s bodily actions, it seems clear that proprioception, in addition to, e.g., vision or audition, can provide us with valuable insights into the role of an agent’s corporal skills and capacities in constituting or structuring perceptual experience. However, if we are going to have (...)
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  11.  7
    What is Cognition? Angsty Monism, Permissive Pluralism, and the Future of Cognitive Science.Cameron Buckner & Ellen Fridland - 2017 - Synthese (11):4191-4195.
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  12.  37
    Imitation, Skill Learning, and Conceptual Thought: An Embodied, Developmental Approach.Ellen Fridland - 2013 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. pp. 203--224.
  13.  29
    Skill, Nonpropositional Thought, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Ellen Fridland - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):105-120.
    In the current literature, discussions of cognitive penetrability focus largely either on interpreting empirical evidence in ways that is relevant to the question of modularity :343–391, 1999; Wu Philos Stud 165:647–669, 2012; Macpherson Philos Phenomenol Res, 84:24–62, 2012) or in offering epistemological considerations regarding which properties are represented in perception :519–540, 2009, Noûs 46:201–222, 2011; Prinz Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 434–460, 2006). In contrast to these debates, in this paper, I explore conceptual issues regarding how we ought (...)
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  14.  43
    Skill Learning and Conceptual Thought: Making Our Way Through the Wilderness.Ellen Fridland - 2014 - In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications. Routledge.
  15.  56
    Review of Christopher Hill's Consciousness. [REVIEW]Ellen Fridland - 2011 - Philosophical Inquiry 35 (3-4):112-114.
  16.  59
    Reviewing the Logic of Self-Deception.Ellen Fridland - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):22-23.
    I argue that framing the issue of motivated belief formation and its subsequent social gains in the language of self-deception raises logical difficulties. Two such difficulties are that (1) in trying to provide an evolutionary motive for viewing self-deception as a mechanism to facilitate other-deception, the ease and ubiquity of self-deception are undermined, and (2) because after one has successfully deceived oneself, what one communicates to others, though untrue, is not deceptive, we cannot say that self-deception evolved in order to (...)
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    Addiction and Embodiment.Ellen Fridland & Corinde E. Wiers - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-28.
    Recent experiments have shown that when individuals with a substance use disorder are confronted with drug-related cues, they exhibit an automatically activated tendency to approach these cues. The strength of the drug approach bias has been associated with clinically relevant measures, such as increased drug craving and relapse, and activations in brain reward areas. Retraining the approach bias by means of cognitive bias modification has been demonstrated to decrease relapse rates in patients with an alcohol use disorder and to reduce (...)
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  18.  45
    Philosophy of Learning.Ellen Fridland & Anna Strasser - 2012 - Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning.
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  19.  2
    Motor Skill and Moral Virtue.Ellen Fridland - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:139-170.
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  20.  25
    Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary, and Finn Spencer (Eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and the Two Visual Systems.Ellen Fridland - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):899-906.
  21. Jackie O; or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love My Chanel.Ellen Fridland & Andrew Porter - 2010 - In Brian Sietz & Ron Scapp (eds.), Fashion Statements: On Style, Appearance, and Reality. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  22. Empirical Consciousness.Patricia Kitcher & Ellen Fridland - 2009 - In Georg Mohr, Jürgen Stolzenburg & Marcus Willaschek (eds.), Kant-Lexikon. De Gruyter.