We argue that the mandatory moral bioenhancement of psychopaths is justified as a prescription of social morality. Moral bioenhancement is legitimate when it is justified on the basis of the reasons of the recipients. Psychopaths expect and prefer that the agents with whom they interact do not have certain psychopathic traits. Particularly, they have reasons to require the moral bioenhancement of psychopaths with whom they must cooperate. By adopting a public reason and a Kantian argument, we conclude that we can (...) justify to a psychopath being the recipient of mandatory moral bioenhancement because he has a reason to require the application of this prescription to other psychopaths. (shrink)

In this chapter, we investigate whether psychopathy is a mental disorder. We argue that addressing this question requires engaging, at least, with three principal issues that have conceptual, empirical, and normative dimensions. First, it must be established whether current measures of psychopathy individuate a unitary class of individuals. By this we mean that persons classifed as psychopaths should share some relevant similarities that support explanation, prediction, and treatment. Second, it must be proven that psychopathy harms the person who has it. (...) Third, it must be established that the harm associated with psychopathy is relevant for the ascription of disorder status. Regarding this latter issue, we argue that psychopathy should be considered a disorder if its harmfulness derives from certain incapacities or limited capacities. These incapacities should affect basic competences that are justifably required for conducting a preferable type of life. Within this framework, we tentatively advance the hypothesis that some normatively justifed conclusions and empirical evidence about psychopathy, that needs nonetheless to be further investigated, might support the claim that people with psychopathy have a mental disorder. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper, Gaus’ ground for the ideal of persons as free and equal is described. Doubts are raised about the appropriateness of the use of his account of this ideal as endogenous to our moral practice. Th e worries are related to the use of the concept of having a reason that Gaus makes in his book, as well as to the aptness of his account of our moral practice from the viewpoint of our moral (...) phenomenology. Some doubts are raised in relation to the pertinence of Gaus’ concept of having a reason from the perspective of the motivation of the public reason project. In the second part of the paper, a summary is off ered of Gaus’ model of public justification and some of its consequences are discussed. Th e primary intention here is to show that, contrary to Gaus’ view, egalitarian liberalism, and not classical liberalism, is the most appropriate result of such a model of justification. (shrink)

In the article, we consider the objections of the capability approach to Rawls’s theory of public justification. The objection is that Rawls’s theory is considered with an exclusive focus on reason and rationality as essential properties of justice, excluding from the domain of justice people who do not possess these properties (such as people with severe cognitive impairments). We point out the shortcomings of the alternative proposal to the capability theory, which is based on the dignity of the species, because (...) we claim that no valid normative conclusions can be derived from the concept of the species. We conclude by adopting a model of public justification according to which duties and rights are determined by reasonable people (ideal legislators). Reasonable people impartially judge the principles of justice even for those who do not participate in the process of justification but deserve the recognition of rights by universalizing these rights. Through universalization, they justified these rights for themselves and for those they represented by presenting adequate representatives in the process of justifying the principles of justice for those who do not have the capability to be reasonable and rational. (shrink)

L’objet du présent article est le suivant : comment développer une justification publique en matière de justice qui respecte à la fois le pluralisme entre des citoyens libres et égaux, la qualité épistémique des décisions et la responsabilité épistémique? Pour aborder ce problème, j’envisage le modèle de justification publique proposé par John Rawls, en particulier sa conception de la légitimité et de la justification des décisions publiques présentes dans sa théorie de la raison publique. J’insiste sur les éléments épistémiques de (...) la doctrine de Rawls concernant la justification publique, en particulier le rapport à la science dans le cadre de la raison publique. Je propose toutefois d’amender la description rawlsienne des raisons scientifiques publiques afin d’inclure un ensemble de raisons plus ancrées dans les besoins du monde réel, à savoir de considérer la légitimité d’un ensemble de conclusions scientifiques raisonnables, en tant que raisons justificatives publiques valides, sans se limiter à des conclusions hors de toute controverse. J’indique le problème que constitue l’attribution de légitimité au pluralisme raisonnable des raisons scientifiques pour une détermination probante des politiques. Ma solution consiste à considérer comme légitimes — parce que raisonnables — des décisions sélectionnées selon une procédure démocratique équitable. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel method for identifying the public evaluative standards that contribute to the classification of certain conditions as mental disabilities. Public evaluative standards could contribute to ascertaining disabilities by outlining characteristics whose presence beyond a threshold is fundamentally important for the life of a person and whose absence or reduced occurrence constitutes a disability. Additionally, they can participate in determining disabilities by delineating particularly grave difficulties, impairments, or incapacities. Our method relies on a model of public justification (...) of evaluative standards that is inspired by Gerald Gaus’s theory of public reason. Thus, our approach recommends the justification of evaluative standards through sound deliberative routes from reasons accessible to all persons who participate in the process of justification and the convergence of what is justified in this way to each of them. We deem that disabilities could be caused both by problems in the internal characteristics of a person as well as by unfairness or a lack of hospitality in external circumstances. This is why the method of justification is applied to the assessment of those circumstances as well. If social or environmental circumstances cannot be justified through the convergence of reasons accessible to all persons involved in the process of justification, we have reasons to exclude the presence of a disability and ascertain the presence of inadequate external conditions. (shrink)

This paper is about the notions of the artistic, aesthetic, cognitive and moral value of art and their interconnectedness. The main concern is to try to advocate the cognitivist claim about the artistic value of artworks’ contribution to the advance of knowledge, as well as for the relevance of the moral dimension for artistic value. This is a discussion of the intersection of the debate about moral and aesthetic value. The central part of the paper is focused on a debate (...) with Peter Lamarque. The problem of immoral art-works and their cognitive value is discussed at the end of this paper in order to show that they are counterexamples of the thesis of artistic relevance of the moral dimension. (shrink)

Ovaj je zbornik nastao kao rezultat istraživanja provedenog unutar istoimenoga znanstveno-istraživačkoga projekta na kojemu su urednici istovremeno bili i glavni istraživači, a ostali autori članovi istraživačke skupine. Kao svjedoci različitih vrsta otklona od prevladavajućeg, uobičajenoga, normalnoga, pozitivnog ili ponašanja koje se karakterizira kao asocijalno, zapitali smo se – što postojeće čini normom, treba li odstupanje od norme nužno smatrati devijacijom i kakvi su poželjni društveni odgovori na odstupanja od normi. Često se smatra ispravnim upravo ono što je prevladavajuće, a ono (...) što predstavlja otklon označava se kao devijacija u negativnome značenju onoga što nije ispravno, nije posve ispravno, ili čak onoga što treba sankcionirati. Naš je početni stav bio da ono što prevladava ne smije biti neupitna norma, kao što ni ono što je otklon nije po automatizmu devijacija. Međutim, ne smatramo ni da prevladavajuću normu, samom tom činjenicom što je prevladavajuća, nužno treba kritizirati te da je svaki otklon po sebi poželjan. Cilj našeg istraživanja bio je istražiti različite oblike deficita i devijacijau u domeni formiranja vjerovanja individualnih, grupnih, kolektivnih i institucijskih epistemičkih aktera (socijalna epistemologija) i u domeni društvenog i institucijskoga djelovanja (filozofija politike i filozofija psihijatrije). Nastavno na to, pokušali smo identificirati vrijednosti postojećih normi, koliko odgovaraju poželjnim vrijednostima te koji su poželjni društveni odgovori na otklone od normi. (shrink)

The discussion regards moral epistemology as the research of a proper methodology in moral thinking. Coherentism is proposed as the appropriate methodology in the individual context of moral thinking (because of the fact that all the alternatives to coherentism, at least understood as a regulatory ideal, are opposed to rationality), while a qualified form of consensualism is proposed as the appropriate methodology in the context of communitarian or public justification of beliefs.

Empirical methods interact with moral philosophy in several ways. In this paper I remark the role of experience, as well as formative experience, in moral epistemology. I defend the thesis that abstract reasoning is not sufficient in morality. Experiences are needed for refined moral judgments. In particular, I focus on experience and formative experience through engagement with artworks. I endorse a form of art cognitivism, the thesis that we can learn through experiences of artworks, but here I remain neutral toward (...) whether the cognitive value of artworks contributes to their artistic value. In my view, learning from artworks is not detached from abstract reasoning, but complementary to it. This is needed in order to reply to an objection directed at art cognitivism, one which appeals to the fact that the properties of artworks can improve our moral cognitive capacities, as well as reduce them. I reply to this objection by saying that although art is one resource of moral learning, it is not the only resource. This is why we must not passively endorse insights that are derived from experiences of artworks. We must critically analyse these by comparing them with other beliefs and experiences. Experiences of artworks are a source of moral learning, but insights that are derived from them must be reflective and critically examined. The model is a kind of reflective equilibrium, where various sources of learning interact and support, as well as check, each other for moral learning. (shrink)

This paper extends Alan John Simmons?s conceptual distinction between Lockean and Kantian conceptions of legitimacy that he applied to the question of the legitimacy of states, to the issue of legitimacy of public decisions. I criticise the consent conception of legitimacy defended by Simmons, and I defend the Rawlsian version of the justificatory conception of legitimacy from his objection. The approach of this paper is distinctive because the two conceptions are assessed by investigating, using the method of reflective equilibrium, their (...) respective prescriptions concerning the treatment of antisocial personality disorder and epidemiologic measures. I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium does not support the consent conception. Considering the issues of treatment of APD and of epidemiologic measures, I argue that the consent conception of legitimacy is not well-equipped for the evaluation of norms that are not strictly self-regarding. This causes a deficit of prescriptions for relevant social responses. Further, by considering the case of responses to epidemics, I argue that such a conception can avoid harmful consequences only by recurring to additional, and independent, premises. This does not cause incoherence but reduces the coherence of a normative system. Finally, the consent conception is not equipped to support social cooperation in an optimal way, which has proved to be necessary in critical conditions, like a pandemic. On the other hand, I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium supports the Rawlsian version of justificatory conception of legitimacy, because of its advantages in handling the indicated issues. In addition, I maintain that this justificatory conception is respectful of freedom and equality of agents as moral self-legislators, and, thus, it is not vulnerable to Simmons?s main criticism. (shrink)

Auf die bloße Ankündigung der Möglichkeit menschlichen Klonens formulierten die Moralisten kritische Argumente gegen die Zulässigkeit der Einführung dieser Praxis. Ein kritischer Blick auf diese Argumente zeigt jedoch, dass sie nicht wohl fundiert sind, d.h. dass sie nicht als legitime Argumente in der Debatte um das in einem Staat öffentlich zulässige zu verwenden sind, denn sie stützen sich auf falsche Prämissen oder sie sind unvereinbar mit Erlaubnissen im Hinblick auf andere Formen der menschlichen Reproduktion. Jedes Argument zugunsten des Verbotes menschlichen (...) Klonens wird mindestens anhand eines der folgenden Mittel analysiert: Steht es im Einklang mit den Grundprinzipien zeitgenössischer Demokratien ; stützt es sich auf wohl fundierte und weitgehend akzeptierte Ergebnisse wissenschaftlicher Forschungen; ist es kohärent mit den üblichen und allgemein anerkannten moralischen Vorstellungen, die mit anderen Formen menschlicher Reproduktion verbunden sind. Das Hauptargument, das als gute Grundlage zum Verbot menschlichen Klonens angesehen wird, ist die moralische Pflicht, künftigen Personen keinen Schaden zuzufügen. Das Ergebnis des Verwerfens traditioneller moralischer Argumente gegen das menschliche Klonen bedeutet keine allgemeine Rechtfertigung menschlichen Klonens, es zeigt nur, dass neue oder präziser ausgeklügelte Argumente zu erbringen sind, wenn menschliches Klonen verboten werden soll. (shrink)

Der Artikel beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob die Verlängerung der L ebenszeit zu den in der Verfassung einer gut eingerichteten Gesellschaft verankerten Grundfragen gehört, sei es als schutzwürdiges Recht oder aber als Verbot. Der letztere Fall bezieht sich auf die Frage, ob es Umstände gebe, die von gesetzgebenden gesellschaftlichen Grundeinrichtungen ins Feld geführt werden könnten, um ein Verbot von Forschungen oder bestimmten technologischen Praktiken, die das Ziel einer wesentlichen L ebenszeitverlängerung verfolgen, durchzusetzen. Es mag als offenkundig erscheinen, dass entsprechende (...) Verbote auf unmittelbarem Wege bewirkt werden, wenn eine positive Antwort auf die gestellte Frage ausbleibt. Dies ist jedoch nicht der Fall. Selbst wenn auf verfassungsrechtlicher Ebene kein Verbot erreicht werden kann, ist es immer noch möglich, entsprechende gesetzliche Regelungen auf tieferer Ebene festzulegen. In der Folge ergibt sich ein neues Problem: Ist es möglich, unter anderen in der Verfassung zu verankernden Grundfragen, ein Recht auf die Entwicklung wissenschaftlicher Forschung zu bestimmen , ferner ein Recht auf die Nutzung technologischer Ressourcen mit dem Ziel, die L ebensdauer des Menschen wesentlich zu verlängern? Es werden zwei Arten von Argumenten analysiert. Die erste Argumentationsweise besagt, dass die Verlängerung der L ebenszeit schädlich sei, da sie die Natur des Menschen gefährde. L aut zweiter Argumentationsweise ist eine Verlängerung der menschlichen L ebenszeit nutzlos, da sie in Sinnlosigkeit und Langweile führe. (shrink)

Must liberalism, in dealing with issues of basic rights and primary goods, take into account national belonging as a particularly important form of cultural belonging? The paper first discusses liberalism which is frequently defined as difference-blind and which considers citizens solely on the basis of some of their abstract and common features. The alternative position is liberal nationalism, according to which individuals and their primary goods stand at the center of considerations of justice, but which also finds it impossible to (...) ignore cultural belonging when discussing primary goods and basic rights of individuals. In discussing the strategy which affirms national cultural belonging as a precondition for autonomy, an attempt is made to show that this is not a sufficient basis for the role of a special national cultural belonging in the definition of primary goods, because even if a national cultural belonging is needed for practicing autonomy, specific national cultural belonging isn’t. (shrink)

This paper revisits John Stuart Mill’s famous proposal for plural voting, according to which universal suffrage is conjoined with the possibility for some to claim and utilise multiple votes if they meet a particular set of qualifications. We observe the proposal in the light of Mill’s own historical context, but we also evaluate it with respect to the changing social and political conditions that ensued. Surely, the proposal faces criticisms in both contexts taken separately, but some of the previously prominent (...) objections retain their force, while others recede in contemporary circumstances. Accordingly, for instance, the paper recognises the force of the objection that the educated experts who are to hold multiple votes are difficult to identify with the ideal of quality decision-making and the common good in mind, but rejects dated assumptions such as that of the overwhelming strength of class bias or the predominantly class-based motivations for social grouping. Most importantly, although the paper ultimately rejects Mill’s plural voting proposal, it supports his attempt to incorporate experts into quality democratic decision-making, and investigates the practical forms of their inclusion. First, we outline the plural voting proposal in the context in which it initially arose. Second, we introduce the first objections to plural voting according to which such a mechanism undermines the educative role that Mill sets for democracy. Third, we discuss the problem of who the handlers of multiple votes – the “educated” – are supposed to be, their class background, the expertise required, and the strength of underlying class biases. Fourth, we look at the different stages of the political decision-making process, in search of possible remedies for the problems brought about by plural voting. Fifth, we assess some of the assumptions underlying Mill’s proposal in light of contemporary society. In summary, we argue for the rejection of the plural voting scheme, but we discuss alternative ways of including experts in the decision-making process. (shrink)

Two issues in Cowley’s book Medical Ethics, Ordinary Concepts and Ordinary Lives are discussed. The first is methodological and it concerns the relation between the personal and the impersonal perspectives. An apparent problem is represented by some uncertainties in the interpretation of their relation in Cowley’s proposal. In some cases presented by Cowley, although the agents do not give up the requirements of the personal perspective, their actions correspond to the requirements of the impersonal perspective. The question is how did (...) the agent make the decision? The other issue is that the personal perspective, as described in some cases, seems to be concerned only by reasons relevant to the subject herself. The question is whether such a perspective may be properly called moral, or it rather deserves to be qualified as prudential, egocentric or egoistic.The second issue regards organ donation, where Cowley contrasts the cultural discourse endorsed by people personally involved because of their links to the dead person, and the bioethicists’ discourse. Some empirical data seem to challenge this distinction. (shrink)

The research started with a definition of the general ethical background to be applied in bioethical discussions, particularly regarding aspects of morality that have to be enforced by the community. Only those moral beliefs that can be accepted by consensus in a free discussion can be enforced. It follows that the basic principle of a well ordered society is the equality (and possible upwards extension) of the basic liberties. Therefore, whenever it is possible to respect the principle of autonomy in (...) matters of bioethics (here including questions of abortion, assisted procreation, genetics, organ transplantation and euthanasia) this must be done. On the other hand, there are some common values that can be defended in a free dialogue, values that are needed in order to guarantee stable cooperation in a political society. These values include the respect for human life, which implies the respect for human life in all its forms. This leads to the conclusion that people who are able to be part of the system of cooperation in a political society have rights which are dominant in moral considerations. In all cases where there is no conflict between these rights and the value of life as manifested in human individuals who are not able participate in social cooperation, considerations of the value of the life of the latter must be an important moral consideration. This implies that embryo experimentation should be permitted in order to develop scientific advances needed to save human life, but embryos must not be used for trivial reasons or for the cosmetic industry. (shrink)

The method of reflective equilibrium implies that moral principles received from philosophical reasoning and considered moral judgments received intuitively are finally justified if they cohere with each other. This idea is combined with the proposal of rational consensus (Lehrer), which shows the way in which divergences of judgements could be made to converge. This second method is used to the end of rendering more plausible the intuitions used in reflective equilibrium, and, so, to show the appropriateness of the coherentist method (...) in ethics. (shrink)

Abstract In The Rational and the Social James Brown argues against the use of the method of reflective equilibrium in attempting to justify methodological norms. For, according to Brown, this would involve a circularity for that method presupposes an account of good scientific practice. In this paper it is argued that the method can be sustained without such a presupposition using either conherentism, reliabilism or defeasible foundationalism. That being so there is no circularity in applying it within normative methodology of (...) science. (shrink)

Cremaschi’s book presents a critical exposition of the development of contemporary moral philosophy. A virtue of the book rarely found in other philosophical survays is the parallel representation of the themes discussed both in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and in the continental one. The final part of the book is devoted to recent developments in applied ethics.

James Allan’s book A Sceptical Theory of Morality and Law is an interesting and first–rate attempt of using a humean theory as a model for a contemporary sceptical view in ethics and philosophy of law. In presenting Hume’s theory, Allan explicitly declares that he is not interested in an exegeses of Hume’s theory, but he intends to use it as a critical tool for contemporary moral discussions. Allan’s books surely represents a major contribution to contemporary moral discussions, and some of (...) his topics deserves a further discussion, as his discussion of Thomas Nagel, his criticism to moral intuitionism, the fact of whether his naturalistic reduction leads to scepticism or to naturalistic realism. (shrink)

Review on Timothy Chappell , Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006.

Cohen-Almagor's book represents a remarkable contribution to the discussion of the right to die with dignity. It offers the discussion of a wide range of topics. They include: the terminology respectful of human dignity ; the question of autonomy; the sanctity-of life – quality of life debate; criticism of some extreme quality-of-life position; criticism of Ronald Dworkin's distinction between critical and experiential interests and the consequences this author draws from it; active and passive euthanasia; the Dutch experience and the Oregon (...) Death with Dignity Act; and many others. The book is discussed from a basically sympathetic view, where some details are focused on as meriting some further examination. Some remarks are offered to indicate the complexity of the definition of autonomy; a defense of Dworkin's argument is offered; an insistence on the necessity to rely on moral conferring features is remarked. (shrink)

Rawlsian public reason requires public decisions to be justified through reasons that each citizen can accept as reasonable, free and equal. It has been objected that this model of public justification puts unfair burdens on marginalized groups. A possible version of the criticism is that the alleged unfairness is constituted by what Miranda Fricker and other authors call epistemic injustice. This form of injustice obtains when some agents are unjustly treated as not reliable, or when they are deprived of epistemic (...) resources to utter their claims or burdened when they need to express demands. I show that the Rawlsian model can stand the objection. Restricting justificatory reasons, at least when basic issues of human rights, liberties and opportunities are at stake, is needed in order to warrant a stable society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens. (shrink)

In contemporary debates on euthanasia, physician assisted suicide and withholding and withdrawing life prolonging treatments, besides commonly used reasons, which are based on presumption of freedom and avoidance of pain, there is also an idea of a duty to die. Given that individuals are also members of society, and that they have families and loved ones, it is necessary to discuss cases when illness causes severe burdens for lives of loved ones. We consider that patient’s just assessment of duty to (...) die can be legitimate candidate for justification of procedure of acceleration of death, taken care of necessary conditions of justified social support for patients and necessary aliment from family and society. In this paper we examine main features of duty to die thesis, extract objections, and offer guidelines for continued discussion. We also want to express the importance of establishing social circumstances and preconditions for protecting the individuals.U suvremenim raspravama o eutanaziji i liječnički potpomognutom samoubojstvu, te odustajanju od tretmana, osim uobičajenih razloga koji se temelje na slobodi i izbjegavanju patnje osobe koja traži ubrzavanje smrti, postoji i teza o dužnosti umiranja. S obzirom na to da je pojedinac ujedno i član zajednice, odnosno da ima obitelj i voljene, nužno je raspraviti o slučajevima kada bolest izaziva značajne teškoće za život njegovih bližnjih. Smatramo kako i pacijentova pravedna prosudba o dužnosti umiranja može biti legitiman kandidat za opravdanje postupaka ubrzavanja smrti, uz nužne preduvjete pravedne društvene podrške pacijentu i dužne skrbi od strane obitelji i društva. U ovom tekstu razlažemo osnovne značajke teze o dužnosti umiranja, izdvajamo prigovore i dajemo smjernice za nastavak rasprave te izražavamo važnost ustanovljavanja društvenih okolnosti i preduvjete za zaštitu pojedinaca. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous souhaitons étudier les différents avantages épistémologiques qu’on tire de certains ouvrages artistiques, en nous focalisant sur les arts narratifs. Nous affirmons que, dans un certain sens, les arts narratifs peuvent ressembler au témoignage, dans la mesure où ils fournissent des informations susceptibles d’être épistémologiquement précieuses aux acteurs cognitifs que nous sommes. Nous distinguons au moins deux catégories larges de ces avantages épistémologiques. La première comprend « l’énoncé des faits » et dans ce sens représente le pendant (...) du cas paradigmatique de témoignage où, ce que le témoin dit, peut être source de connaissance pour le public qui de cette manière reçoit simplement les faits . Cependant, cette sorte d’avantage épistémologique n’est pas la plus originale ou la plus pertinente qu’on puisse tirer de l’art. L’autre catégorie concerne l’accroissement de la conscience ou l’approfondissement de la compréhension de certains phénomènes, soit en rapportant les faits d’une façon spécifique, puissante et engageante , soit en présentant la position, l’attitude ou l’opinion de l’artiste, qui puissent nous être révélateurs ou provocateurs. (shrink)