Descartes deems wonder the first among the passions. Pride and generosity originate from it. To maintain that generosity originates from wonder, Descartes has to deal with serious and hard theoretical issues. Descartes, I shall argue, tackles these issues to endow generosity with a role in the monitoring passions. I back this conjecture examining Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s theories of passions.
In his remarks on L’Homme, La Forge aims at a rigid separation of the functions of the body from the activity of the soul. This project looks authentically Cartesian, but some critical issues reveal how difficult it is taking away any activity of the soul in sensitive experience. In the Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, La Forge explicitly limits the cognitive capability of the memory without the active presence of the mind.
Descartes deems wonder the first among the passions. Pride and generosity originate from it. To maintain that generosity originates from wonder, Descartes has to deal with serious and hard theoretical issues. Descartes, I shall argue, tackles these issues to endow generosity with a role in the monitoring passions. I back this conjecture examining Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s theories of passions.
The physician Louis de La Forge built his entire work upon the promotion, defensce, and completion of Descartes’ thought. In the course of this endeavor, he sought to refute the notion that knowledge of the mechanisms of the living body is the necessary condition for producing such mechanisms. Around the same time, Arnold Geulincx formulated the principle Quod nescis quomodo fiat id non facis, according to which an effect can only be produced only by someone who knows how it is (...) produced. Geulincx developed this principle within a Cartesian framework, and it soon became a cornerstone of arguments supporting oOccasionalism from a Cartesian perspective. La Forge instead upheld the opposite thesis, yet still on the basis of ideas drawn from Cartesian philosophy. In doing so, La Forge intended to defend Descartes’ physiology against a form of vitalism which was fueling the opposition to Cartesian science in Parisian philosophical and scientific circles, and which found a prominent champion in the physician Cureau de La Chambre. (shrink)
Hobbes refers to a state of "mere nature" to describe the condition of man without political organisation. The origin of this notion is identified in the theory of pure nature discussed by Suarez and its implications are shown.
The Cartesian dualism requires a type of knowledge appropriate to a mind separate from the body. This type of knowledge is present in angelic knowledge as opposed to beatific knowledge in the works of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. The beatific knowledge is the type of knowledge chosed by Malebranche and Spinoza.
In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes intends to prove that material things exist. His proof, which centers on the origin of the ideas of material things, has frequently been judged weak. But there is...
Leibniz's polemical aim against those who claim that God could have created a better world is not Malebranche but Suarez. In fact, Leibniz and Malebranche are united in traveling the road of the commensurability of the finite world with God, in opposition to the Thomist theology.
In the essay Spinoza Dies, the Author imagines Spinoza's reflections in the hours preceding his death and uses them to present the philosopher's theories on life, death, suicide and eternity of the mind. These theories require a concept of identity able to answer questions on the essence of life and death, the identity of the dying and of the surviving individual. While some interpreters deny that the eternal mind can be a personal one, the Author argues in complete contrast that (...) the mind truly achieves a personal identity only in the dimension of eternity. (shrink)
Malebranche's proof of the existence of God "by mere sight" is opposed to Descartes' a priori proof. Its origin as the origin of vision in God is in the theory of beatific vision developed by Aquinas.
As definições do bem e do mal que abrem a Parte iv da Ética parecem posicionar decididamente Espinosa entre os filósofos que consideraram poder defini-los por meio de proposições suscetíveis de verdade e falsidade, reconduzindo, portanto, à razão a origem destas noções. Por outro lado, a proposição 8 da mesma parte afirma de modo inequívoco que o conhecimento dos valores morais é inteiramente redutível a um estado emocional. Dado este aparente paradoxo, trata-se, então, de analisar se e como podem ser (...) conciliadas as definições de bem e de mal e a proposição 8 da Parte IV. O artigo mostra que a filosofia de Espinosa busca produzir uma mutação dos conhecimentos e, portanto, dos desejos; em última instância, uma mutação da natureza do agente, da qual irá derivar, necessariamente, uma mutação na especificação dos bens e nas ações, porque, mudando a natureza da mente, serão diferentes as coisas que provocam alegria e que serão, desse modo, desejadas. Não por acaso, o supremo bem, o conhecimento de Deus, comporta um componente afetivo: a alegria. Trata-se de mostrar que o componente afetivo é intrínseco ao juízo de valor e, ao mesmo tempo, exprime a natureza do sujeito e motiva a sua ação. Por isso, o homem que usa a razão não poderá senão desejar o que lhe é verdadeiramente útil. (shrink)
Mersenne presented Descartes with a series of objections to the Meditations. A careful analysis of these objections can throw light on the theological context in which those criticisms were grounded. Mersenne’s objections reproduce theses already advanced in the Quaestiones celeberrimae in Genesim. In this work, in which he intended to refute Vanini, Mersenne used some proofs of the existence of God derived from the Jesuit Lessius, and already used by Vanini himself. These same proofs, together with others developed by Mersenne, (...) were then taken up by the free thinker Pierre Petit. A reconstruction of the origin of the arguments used by Mersenne can provide important elements to evaluate the interweaving of apologetic and heterodox literature in the first half of the 17seventeenth century and to discuss Leo Strauss’s proposal to “read between the lines.”. (shrink)