15 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Emer O'Hagan [15]Emer Mary O'hagan [1]
See also
Profile: Emer O'Hagan (University of Saskatchewan)
  1.  50
    Shmagents, Realism and Constitutivism About Rational Norms.Emer O'Hagan - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):17-31.
    I defend constitutivism against two prominent objections and argue that agential constitutivism has the resources to take normative and ethical deliberation seriously. I first consider David Enoch’s shmagency challenge and argue that it does not form a coherent objection. I counter Enoch’s view that the phenomenology of first-person deliberation pragmatically justifies belief in irreducibly realist normative truths, claiming that constitutivism can respect the practice of moral deliberation without appeal to robustly realist truths. Secondly, I argue that the error theoretic worry (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  2.  4
    Non-Self and Ethics: Kantian and Buddhist Themes.Emer O'Hagan - forthcoming - In Gordon Davis (ed.), Ethics without Self, Dharma without Atman: Western and Buddhist Philosophical Traditions in Dialogue. Springer.
    After distinguishing between a metaphysical and a contemplative strategy interpretation of the no-self doctrine, I argue that the latter allows for the illumination of significant and under-discussed Kantian affinities with Buddhist views of the self and moral psychology. Unlike its metaphysical counterpart, the contemplative strategy interpretation, understands the doctrine of no-self as a technique of perception, undertaken from the practical standpoint of action. I argue that if we think of the contemplative strategy version of the no-self doctrine as a process (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  5
    Self-Knowledge and the Development of Virtue.Emer O'Hagan - 2017 - In Noell Birondo & S. Stewart Braun (eds.), Virtue's Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons. New York: Routledge. pp. 107-125.
    Persons interested in developing virtue will find attending to, and attempting to act on, the right reason for action a rich resource for developing virtue. In this paper I consider the role of self-knowledge in intentional moral development. I begin by making a general case that because improving one’s moral character requires intimate knowledge of its components and their relation to right reason, the aim of developing virtue typically requires the development of self-knowledge. I next turn to Kant’s ethics for (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  47
    Practical Identity and the Constitution of Agency.Emer O'Hagan - 2004 - Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (1):49-59.
    In this paper I argue that Christine Korsgaard’s account of the normativity of practical reasons cannot meet her own justificatory criteria, specifically the demand that an answer to the normative question be successfully addressed in the first person. On this point her position is crucially ambiguous. I argue that Korsgaard’s demand that the authority of norms be justified by appeal to an agent’s practical identity leads her to conflate psychological facts about agents with the norms that establish the authority of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5.  60
    Belief, Normativity and the Constitution of Agency.Emer O'Hagan - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):39-52.
    In this paper I advance a constitutive argument for the authority of rational norms. Because accountability to reasons is constitutive of rational agency and rational norms are implicit in reasons for action and belief, the justification of rational norms is of a piece with the practice of reasoning. Peter Railton has objected that the constitutive view fails to defend the categorical authority of reason over agents. I respond to his objections, arguing that they presuppose a foundationalist conception of justification that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  43
    Self-Knowledge and Moral Stupidity.Emer O'Hagan - 2012 - Ratio 25 (3):291-306.
    Most commonplace moral failure is not conditioned by evil intentions or the conscious desire to harm or humiliate others. It is more banal and ubiquitous – a form of moral stupidity that gives rise to rationalization, self-deception, failures of due moral consideration, and the evasion of responsibility. A kind of crude, perception-distorting self-absorption, moral stupidity is the cause of many moral missteps; moral development demands the development of self-knowledge as a way out of moral stupidity. Only once aware of the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  17
    Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency Michael Bratman Cambridge Studies in Philosophy New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Xiii + 288 Pp., $59.95, $18.95 Paper. [REVIEW]Emer O'Hagan - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (02):393-.
  8.  11
    Review of Stephen R. Brown, Moral Virtue and Nature: A Defense of Ethical Naturalism[REVIEW]Emer O'Hagan - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (1).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  1
    Self‐Knowledge and Moral Stupidity.Emer O'hagan - 2012 - Ratio 25 (3):291-306.
    Most commonplace moral failure is not conditioned by evil intentions or the conscious desire to harm or humiliate others. It is more banal and ubiquitous – a form of moral stupidity that gives rise to rationalization, self‐deception, failures of due moral consideration, and the evasion of responsibility. A kind of crude, perception‐distorting self‐absorption, moral stupidity is the cause of many moral missteps; moral development demands the development of self‐knowledge as a way out of moral stupidity. Only once aware of the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  7
    Welfare and Rational Care Stephen Darwall Princeton Monographs in Philosophy Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, Xi + 135 Pp., $24.95. [REVIEW]Emer O'Hagan - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (3):620.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  8
    The Reasons of Love Harry G. Frankfurt Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, 100 Pp., $19.95 Paper. [REVIEW]Emer O'Hagan - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (2):398.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Elijah Millgram, Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation of Moral Theory Reviewed By.Emer O'Hagan - 2006 - Philosophy in Review 26 (4):273-275.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  1
    "Welfare and Rational Care by Stephen Darwall". [REVIEW]Emer O'hagan - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (3):620-622.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Generosity And Mechanism In Descartes's Passions.Emer O'hagan - 2005 - Minerva 9:236-260.
    Descartes’s mechanistic account of the passions is sometimes dismissed as one which lacks the resources toadequately explain the cognitive aspect of emotion. By some, he is taken to be “feeling theorist”, reducing thepassions to a mere awareness of the physiological state of the soul-body union. If this reading of Descartes’spassions is correct, his theory fails not only because it cannot account for the intentional nature of the passions,but also because the passions cannot play the role in Descartes’s moral theory they (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. "The Reasons of Love by Harry Frankfurt". [REVIEW]Emer O'hagan - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (2):398-400.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography