1. The concept of truth and the semantics of the truth predicate.Kirk Ludwig & Emil Badici - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):622-638.
    We sketch an account according to which the semantic concepts themselves are not pathological and the pathologies that attend the semantic predicates arise because of the intention to impose on them a role they cannot fulfill, that of expressing semantic concepts for a language that includes them. We provide a simplified model of the account and argue in its light that (i) a consequence is that our meaning intentions are unsuccessful, and such semantic predicates fail to express any concept, and (...)
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  2. The liar paradox and the inclosure schema.Emil Badici - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):583 – 596.
    In Beyond the Limits of Thought [2002], Graham Priest argues that logical and semantic paradoxes have the same underlying structure (which he calls the Inclosure Schema ). He also argues that, in conjunction with the Principle of Uniform Solution (same kind of paradox, same kind of solution), this is sufficient to 'sink virtually all orthodox solutions to the paradoxes', because the orthodox solutions to the paradoxes are not uniform. I argue that Priest fails to provide a non-question-begging method to 'sink (...)
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  3. On the Compatibility between Euclidean Geometry and Hume's Denial of Infinite Divisibility.Emil Badici - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (2):231-244.
    It has been argued that Hume's denial of infinite divisibility entails the falsity of most of the familiar theorems of Euclidean geometry, including the Pythagorean theorem and the bisection theorem. I argue that Hume's thesis that there are indivisibles is not incompatible with the Pythagorean theorem and other central theorems of Euclidean geometry, but only with those theorems that deal with matters of minuteness. The key to understanding Hume's view of geometry is the distinction he draws between a precise and (...)
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    Prisoner’s Dilemma and Newcomb’s Problem: Two Problems or One?Emil Badici - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (5):2543-2557.
    David Lewis argued that Newcomb’s Problem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma are “one and the same problem” or, to be more precise, that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is nothing else than “two Newcomb problems side by side” (Lewis Philosophy and Public Affairs 8:235–240, 1979 : 235). It has been objected that his argument fails to take into account certain epistemic asymmetries which undermine the one-problem thesis. Sobel ( 1985 ) acknowledges that many tokens satisfy the structural requirements of both problems, while questioning (...)
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    Standards of equality and Hume's view of geometry.Emil Badici - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):448-467.
    It has been argued that there is a genuine conflict between the views of geometry defended by Hume in the Treatise and in the Enquiry: while the former work attributes to geometry a different status from that of arithmetic and algebra, the latter attempts to restore its status as an exact and certain science. A closer reading of Hume shows that, in fact, there is no conflict between the two works with respect to geometry. The key to understanding Hume's view (...)
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    Iterated Mixed Strategies and Pascal’s Wager.Emil Badici - 2019 - Logica Universalis 13 (4):487-494.
    Mixed strategies have been used to show that Pascal’s Wager fails to offer sufficient pragmatic reasons for believing in God. Their proponents have argued that, in addition to outright belief in God, rational agents can follow alternatives strategies whose expected utility is infinite as well. One objection that has been raised against this way of blocking Pascal’s Wager is that applying a mixed strategy in Pascal’s case is tantamount to applying an iterated mixed strategy which, properly understood, collapses into the (...)
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