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  1.  14
    The Divine Method and the Disunity of Pleasure in the Philebus.Emily Fletcher - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):179-208.
    the philebus is a puzzling dialogue, both for the substantive views it puts forward,1 and for the unexpected twists and turns of the discussion. Commentators frequently complain about the dialogue's lack of unity, due to its many apparently unnecessary digressions and interruptions.2 The discussion of the so-called 'divine method' seems to be one of the worst offenders on this score, for it is described and exemplified at length, only to be set aside as unnecessary shortly afterwards.I argue that the divine (...)
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  2.  48
    Plato on Pure Pleasure and the Best Life.Emily Fletcher - 2014 - Phronesis 59 (2):113-142.
    In the Philebus, Socrates maintains two theses about the relationship between pleasure and the good life: the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is better than the unmixed life of intelligence, and: the unmixed life of intelligence is the most divine. Taken together, these two claims lead to the paradoxical conclusion that the best human life is better than the life of a god. A popular strategy for avoiding this conclusion is to distinguish human from divine goods; on such a (...)
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    Aisthēsis, Reason and Appetite in the Timaeus.Emily Fletcher - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (4):397-434.
  4.  6
    Plato's Moral Psychology: Intellectualism, the Divided Soul, and the Desire for Good by Rachana Kamtekar.Emily Fletcher - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):643-646.
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    Plato on Incorrect and Deceptive Pleasures.Emily Fletcher - 2018 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100 (4):379-410.
    In the Philebus, Socrates argues that pleasure, like judgment, can be “false”. Most scholars who discuss this claim restrict their interpretation to Socrates’ first argument that pleasure can be “false”, where Socrates uses pseudēs as a synonym of “incorrect”. As a result, scholars have failed to recognize that in the next argument Socrates uses pseudēs to pick out a different problem with pleasure: in certain circumstances, a pleasure can deceptively appear to a subject to be larger or smaller than it (...)
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