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Emmett L. Holman [17]Emmett Holman [3]Emmett Lou Holman [1]
  1. Panpsychism, physicalism, neutral monism and the Russellian theory of mind.Emmett Holman - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):48-67.
    As some see it, an impasse has been reached on the mind- body problem between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism. So lately another view has been gaining popularity, a view that might be called the 'Russellian theory of mind' (RTM) since it is inspired by some ideas once put forth by Bertrand Russell. Most versions of RTM are panpsychist, but there is at least one version that rejects panpsychism and styles itself as physicalism, and neutral monism is also a possibility. (...)
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  2. Color Eliminativism and Color Experience.Emmett L. Holman - 2002 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):38-56.
    Anyone who is a color eliminativist‐i.e., believes that the physical world is colorless‐must explain how our sense experience of color can be so systematically illusory. As it turns out, it is difficult to do this without committing oneself to dualism. In this paper I explore the options available to the color eliminativist in this regard, and argue that his/her prospects are more promising, though still far from certain, if s/he adopts the position that sense experience is strictly intentional.
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  3.  40
    Panpsychism and the mind-body problem in contemporary analytic philosophy.Emmett L. Holman - 2024 - Intellectual History Review 34 (1):251-269.
    Not so long ago, the idea that analytic philosophers would be taking panpsychism seriously would have been hard to believe. That is because in its early, logical positivist, stage, the analytic movement earned the reputation of being militantly anti-metaphysical. But analytic philosophy has come a long way since the heyday of logical positivism; and, in fact, the dialectic of recent debates on the mind–body problem among analytic philosophers has pushed many of them in the direction of panpsychism. In this paper, (...)
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  4. Phenomenal concepts as bare recognitional concepts: harder to debunk than you thought, …but still possible.Emmett L. Holman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827.
    A popular defense of physicalist theories of consciousness against anti-physicalist arguments invokes the existence of ‘phenomenal concepts’. These are concepts that designate conscious experiences from a first person perspective, and hence differ from physicalistic concepts; but not in a way that precludes co-referentiality with them. On one version of this strategy phenomenal concepts are seen as (1) type demonstratives that have (2) no mode of presentation. However, 2 is possible without 1-call this the ‘bare recognitional concept’ view-and I will argue (...)
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  5. Dualism and secondary quality eliminativism.Emmett L. Holman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately "secondary quality eliminativism"- the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated.
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  6.  79
    Continuity and the metaphysics of dualism.Emmett L. Holman - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (March):197-204.
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  7.  22
    Intension, identity, and the colourless physical world: A revision and further discussion.Emmett L. Holman - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):203 – 205.
    (1981). Intension, identity, and the Colourless Physical World: A revision and further discussion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 203-205.
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  8.  51
    Is the physical world colourless?Emmett L. Holman - 1979 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):295-304.
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  9. Maxwell and materialism.Emmett L. Holman - 1986 - Synthese 66 (March):505-14.
    In a recent article, Grover Maxwell presents a case for a kind of mind-brain identity theory which he claims precludes materialism. His case is based on some views about meaning which I find plausible. However, I will argue that, by adopting certain assumptions about the nature of sensory experience, and extending some of Maxwell's views about meaning in a plausible way, the issue of a materialistic identity theory is reopened. Ultimately, I will agree that such a theory is not true, (...)
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  10.  59
    Qualia, Kripkean arguments, and subjectivity.Emmett L. Holman - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-29.
    The subjectivity of consciousness is widely regarded as a major stumbling block for materialist theories of mind. In this paper I show how Kripkean arguments against identity theories , and in particular a Kripkean argument against qualia-material property identity developed by Frank Jackson are a way of highlighting this problem. As such, Kripkean arguments are akin to recent discussions of subjectivity by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson . I then consider some recent attempts to refute Kripkean arguments or otherwise show (...)
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  11.  19
    Qualia, Kripkean Arguments, and Subjectivity.Emmett L. Holman - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-429.
    The subjectivity of consciousness is widely regarded as a major stumbling block for materialist theories of mind. In this paper I show how Kripkean arguments against identity theories (Kripke, 1972), and in particular a Kripkean argument against qualia-material property identity developed by Frank Jackson (1980) are a way of highlighting this problem. (And such arguments are not the quasi-historical curiosities they are sometimes pictured as being, because problems confronting functionalism have led to a modest revival of identity theory.) As such, (...)
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  12.  8
    Qualia, Kripkean Arguments, and Subjectivity.Emmett L. Holman - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-429.
    The subjectivity of consciousness is widely regarded as a major stumbling block for materialist theories of mind. In this paper I show how Kripkean arguments against identity theories (Kripke, 1972), and in particular a Kripkean argument against qualia-material property identity developed by Frank Jackson (1980) are a way of highlighting this problem. (And such arguments are not the quasi-historical curiosities they are sometimes pictured as being, because problems confronting functionalism have led to a modest revival of identity theory.) As such, (...)
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  13.  26
    Russellianism and the Quotational Model of Phenomenal Concepts.Emmett L. Holman - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:41-61.
    A popular defense of physicalist theories of consciousness against anti-physicalist arguments is the “phenomenal concept strategy”. According to PCS there are phenomenal concepts that designate phenomenal properties, and whose use requires adopting the first person perspective with respect to those properties, thus allowing an epistemic gap between the phenomenal and the physical without requiring a metaphysical gap. One version of PCS is the quotational version, according to which phenomenal concepts are in part constituted by the very properties they designate. The (...)
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  14.  78
    Sensory experience, epistemic evaluation and perceptual knowledge.Emmett L. Holman - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (September):173-187.
  15.  36
    Sense experience, intentionality, and modularity.Emmett Holman - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:143-57.
  16.  7
    Sense Experience, Intentionality, and Modularity.Emmett Holman - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:243-258.
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  17.  43
    Sensory experience, perceptual evidence and conceptual frameworks.Emmett L. Holman - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):99-108.
  18.  54
    The problem of theory-Laden perception.Emmett L. Holman - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (1):91 - 99.
  19.  25
    Empirical Knowledge. [REVIEW]Emmett L. Holman - 1989 - Review of Metaphysics 42 (4):832-834.
    This is an enormously ambitious book. The author not only develops a theory of empirical knowledge, but also develops a theory of reference, argues for both metaphysical and scientific realism, and deals with numerous subsidiary issues. He is extremely thorough in considering and critically discussing alternative views, and very careful and meticulous in the presentation and defense of his own. The book is also rich in interesting and occasionally ingenious ideas. It will make rewarding reading for anyone interested in these (...)
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  20.  22
    Language and Truth. [REVIEW]Emmett L. Holman - 1988 - Review of Metaphysics 42 (2):383-385.
    This is a work in the ordinary language tradition that develops what the author regards as a neo-Wittgensteinian account of truth. While conceding to P. F. Strawson that the term 'true' is sometimes used non-descriptively, Hallett is more interested in elucidating its descriptive use. His centerpiece for doing this, arrived at about midway through the book, is his "principle of relative similarity" : "for a statement of fact, or informative utterance, to be true it suffices that its use of terms (...)
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