7 found
Ephraim Glick [6]Ephraim N. Glick [1]
See also
  1. Practical Modes of Presentation.Ephraim Glick - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):538-559.
    The Intellectualist thesis that know-how is a kind of propositional knowledge faces a simple problem: For any proposition p, it seems that one could know p without knowing how to do the activity in question. For example, it seems that one could know that w is a way to swim even if one didn't know how to swim oneself. In this paper I argue that this “sufficiency problem” cannot be adequately addressed by appealing to practical modes of presentation.
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  2. Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism.Ephraim Glick - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):398-434.
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  3. Abilities and Know-How Attributions.Ephraim Glick - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
    Anti-Intellectualists about know-how , following Ryle, hold that knowing how to do something is simply having the ability to do it. With qualifications, I defend this traditional view. The central motivation is drawn from observations about what is involved in learning to do something. Two sorts of ability are distinguished and the thesis is defended against putative counterexamples.
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  4. What is a Singular Proposition?Ephraim N. Glick - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1027-1067.
    An account of the distinction between singular and general propositions should reflect the core ideas that have motivated the distinction. Those core ideas can be appreciated independently of many commitments regarding the metaphysics of propositions, but theorists with differing views on the latter have given quite different explanations of what it is for a proposition to be singular or general. Many of those explanations turn out not to reflect the core ideas adequately after all, either by misclassifying certain propositions or (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  5. A Modal Approach to Intentional Identity.Ephraim Glick - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):386-399.
  6. Context, Content, and Epistemic Transparency.Mahrad Almotahari & Ephraim Glick - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):1067-1086.
    We motivate the idea that presupposition is a transparent attitude. We then explain why epistemic opacity is not a serious problem for Robert Stalnaker's theory of content and conversation. We conclude with critical remarks about John Hawthorne and Ofra Magidor's alternative theory.
    Direct download (10 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  7.  64
    The Argument for Propositions from Modal Validity.Ephraim Glick - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):359-370.
    © The Authors 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] of the central goals of Propositions is to argue that propositions exist. My plan for the following is to explore the options for Merricks’s opponents. I’m not sure whether, in the end, they have any entirely satisfactory strategy, but the discussion will still be of some interest. At least I hope to achieve some clarification of the initial (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation