In this article, we propose the Fair Priority Model for COVID-19 vaccine distribution, and emphasize three fundamental values we believe should be considered when distributing a COVID-19 vaccine among countries: Benefiting people and limiting harm, prioritizing the disadvantaged, and equal moral concern for all individuals. The Priority Model addresses these values by focusing on mitigating three types of harms caused by COVID-19: death and permanent organ damage, indirect health consequences, such as health care system strain and stress, as well as (...) economic destruction. It proposes proceeding in three phases: the first addresses premature death, the second long-term health issues and economic harms, and the third aims to contain viral transmission fully and restore pre-pandemic activity. -/- To those who may deem an ethical framework irrelevant because of the belief that many countries will pursue "vaccine nationalism," we argue such a framework still has broad relevance. Reasonable national partiality would permit countries to focus on vaccine distribution within their borders up until the rate of transmission is below 1, at which point there would not be sufficient vaccine-preventable harm to justify retaining a vaccine. When a government reaches the limit of national partiality, it should release vaccines for other countries. -/- We also argue against two other recent proposals. Distributing a vaccine proportional to a country's population mistakenly assumes that equality requires treating differently situated countries identically. Prioritizing countries according to the number of front-line health care workers, the proportion of the population over 65, and the number of people with comorbidities within each country may exacerbate disadvantage and end up giving the vaccine in large part to wealthy nations. (shrink)

When it comes to communication of pain, Anna Wierzbicka (2012) takes issue with the scientific definition of pain and turns to natural semantic metalanguage (NSM). However, “pain” is not one of the 64 semantic primes in NSM, and therefore Wierzbicka suggests words such as “body,” “bad,” and “don’t want.” This blurs the boundaries between pain and other aversive sensations and it also challenges certain clinical features of the pain experience.

The model provided by the organismic point of view is quite different. Without having recourse to any transcendent vital force or immanent teleology, it nevertheless rejects the basic ideas of mechanism. More specifically, it replaces the analytical- summative conception by the idea of biological organisms as wholes or systems which have unique system-properties and obey irreducible system-laws. The machine-theoretical conception is replaced by a dynamic interpretation of living things, wherein organic structures are due to a continuous flow of processes combining (...) to produce patterns of immense intricacy. The reaction-theoretical conception is jettisoned in favour of the view that the organism is primarily a center of activity which is autonomous and not a mere response to external stimuli. Finally, the organismic model considers that biological systems are stratified, so that, e.g., viruses, genes, chromosomes, cells, multicellular individuals, supra-individual aggregates, etc., form a hierarchy of "levels" exhibiting an increasing degree of complexity. The whole of nature, indeed, contains "a tremendous architecture, in which subordinate systems are united at successive levels into ever higher and larger systems.". (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Constructing Constructivism” by Hugh Gash. Upshot: Radical constructivism is explicitly discussed in Gash’s target article outlining “stages” or types of constructivism. The stages contextualize radical constructivism in a series of research phases involving a number of domains using a variety of approaches. The target article begs the query: “just how radical are many constructivist approaches in teaching and learning?”.

Abū al-Ḥajj¿j Yūsuf b. Muḥammad Ibn Ṭumlūs (Alhagiag Bin Thalmus, d. 620/1223) was a philosopher, physician and direct disciple of Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 595/1198), who lived and practiced rational sciences in Alzira and Marrakesh, a quarter of a century after the demise of his teacher. Ibn Ṭumlūs was not Ibn Rushd's only student who engaged in work on logic, but one of dozens of disciples, suggesting that the supposed simultaneous death of the latter's philosophy is "grossly exaggerated". As a (...) valuable window into the practice of logic in 13th century al-Andalus and the Maghreb, Ibn Ṭumlūs' Compendium on Logic (Al-Mukhtaṣar fī al-manṭiq) covers all the parts of "the expanded Organon", as it was known since al-F¿r¿bī (d. 339/951). The present volume offers a complete critical Arabic edition of this work, with an English and Arabic introduction, notes and indices. (shrink)

Commentary on Tarkasaṅgraha of Annambhaṭṭa, active 17th century, treatise on the fundamentals of Nyaya philosophy.

Some say that only 30 were seized, and that the Curiae were named after them, but Valerius Antias [fr. 3P] says there were 527, Juba [FGrH275F23] that there were 683. They were virgins, which was Romulus' main justification: no married women were taken – except one, Hersilia, by mistake - since it was not in wanton violence or injustice that they resorted to rape, but with the intention of bringing the two peoples together and uniting them with the strongest ties. (...) As for Hersilia, some say she was married to Hostilius, a very distinguished Roman, others that she was married to Romulus himself and even bore him children: one daughter, Prima, so called from the order of birth, and a single son, whom Romulus named Aollios after the crowd of citizens under his rule, though he was subsequently called Abillios [i.e. Avillius]. Many authors, however, contradict this account, which is given by Zenodotus of Troezen [FGrH 821F2]. (shrink)

En sus Escolios, Nicolás Gómez Dávila hace manifiesta la relación existente entre las antiguas nociones gnósticas y las pretensiones ilustradas de la modernidad. Al determinar los fundamentos del gnosticismo en un conocimiento que se eleva sobre la fe, ubica rasgos análogos en el pensamiento moderno..

While I emphatically share Pihlström’s alarm about the “lunacy” of contemporary politics and the grave threat of fascistic, conservative, and authoritative movements presently wrecking democracy around the globe, I do not, however, accept Pihlström’s argument about the pragmatic method precisely as a method for reconciliation. I contend that pragmatism should not be consolidated to a method, for mediation and reconciliation are not pragmatically useful today. Moreover, I submit that instead of mediation and reconciliation, pragmatism should concern itself with experience and (...) transformation. I ultimately suggest we not depend on reifying methods that promise reconciliation; instead, embrace experience by attacking conflicts individually and look to transformation as a goal. (shrink)

The ninth treatise of Plotinus's second Ennead is devoted to a critique of the Gnostics and is titled Against Those Who Affirm the Creator of the Cosmos and the Cosmos Itself to Be Evil. In it Plotinus refutes the following propositions of the Gnostics: that the sensible world is formless and bad; that the creator of this world is evil; that the world was created and will eventually perish; that the original cause of the creation of the world was the (...) fall of one of the divine hypostases—Sophia or the World Soul; that there are more than three divine hypostases; that the individual soul of the human person chosen for salvation is the sole spark of divine fire in this world; and that direct comprehension of the supreme deity and reunification with it are accessible to such a chosen soul and to it alone. (shrink)

To what extent does the fact that a philosopher, in order to communicate, is constrained to use the same language and the same concepts as other members of his society, inhibit him from developing genuinely original modes of thought? Section I of this paper outlines arguments for the view that any attempt at radical originality, of the kinds traditionally expected of philosophy, must involve misuse of these shared concepts. Section II, however, on the basis of an examination of what it (...) is for different members of a society to use the same concepts, argues that so doing does not rule out important differences over instantiations and logical interrelations. It then attempts to show that this latitude for difference is adequate to allow for certain kinds of philosophical originality, for example, that shown in the Whiteheadian philosophy of organism. (shrink)