Results for 'Epiphenomenalism'

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  1. Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will.Sven Walter - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.
    While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, (...)
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  2. Epiphenomenalism - the do's and the don 'ts'.Lawrence A. Shapiro & Elliott Sober - 2007 - In G. Wolters & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Thinking About Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern physics. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 235-264.
    When philosophers defend epiphenomenalist doctrines, they often do so by way of a priori arguments. Here we suggest an empirical approach that is modeled on August Weismann’s experimental arguments against the inheritance of acquired characters. This conception of how epiphenomenalism ought to be developed helps clarify some mistakes in two recent epiphenomenalist positions – Jaegwon Kim’s (1993) arguments against mental causation, and the arguments developed by Walsh (2000), Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew (2002), and Matthen and Ariew (2002) that natural (...)
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  3. Epiphenomenalism.William Robinson - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. Huxley (1874), who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work (...)
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  4. Type epiphenomenalism, type dualism, and the causal priority of the physical.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135.
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  5. An Idle Threat: Epiphenomenalism Exposed.Paul Raymont - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    In this doctoral dissertation I consider, and reject, the claim that recent varieties of non-reductive physicalism, particularly Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, are committed to a new kind of epiphenomenalism. Non-reductive physicalists identify each mental event with a physical event, and are thus entitled to the belief that mental events are causes, since the physical events with which they are held to be identical are causes. However, Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa and others have argued that if we follow the non-reductive (...)
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  6.  30
    Epiphenomenalism and the Epistemic Argument.Jan Rostek - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):359-377.
    The epistemic argument against epiphenomenalism aims to prove that even if epiphenomenalism is true, its adherents are not able to justify their inferential beliefs. This would mean that they cannot know that they are right which is a self-stultifying consequence. I elaborate on this problem and then present an updated version of epiphenomenalism based on property dualism. I argue that this position is capable of refuting the conclusion of the epistemic argument even in spite of accepting its (...)
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  7.  26
    Epiphenomenalism and the Evolutionary Role of Pleasure and Pain.John Wright - 2024 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (3):196-219.
    One possible challenge for epiphenomenalism arises from the theory of evolution: if the mental has no causal powers, how might it have evolved? The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to some arguments advanced by other philosophers, most particularly William Robinson and Joseph Corabi, considerations from the theory of evolution do pose a genuine difficulty for epiphenomenalism.
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  8.  30
    Replacing Epiphenomenalism: a Pluralistic Enactive Take on the Metaplasticity of Early Body Ornamentation.Duilio Garofoli & Antonis Iliopoulos - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (2):215-242.
    In the domain of evolutionary cognitive archaeology, the early body ornaments from the Middle Stone Age/Palaeolithic are generally treated as mere by-products of an evolved brain-bound cognitive architecture selected to cope with looming social problems. Such adaptive artefacts are therefore taken to have been but passive means of broadcasting a priori envisaged meanings, essentially playing a neutral role for the human mind. In contrast to this epiphenomenalist view of material culture, postphenomenology and the Material Engagement Theory have been making a (...)
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  9. Explanatory epiphenomenalism.Neil Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.
    I propose a new form of epiphenomenalism, 'explanatory epiphenomenalism', the view that the identification of A's mental properties does not provide a causal explanation of A's behaviour. I arrive at this view by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behaviour. I then formalize (...)
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  10. Epiphenomenalism.Sven Walter - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
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  11. Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties.Denis Robinson - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.
  12. Epiphenomenalism.Keith Campbell & Nicholas J. J. Smith - 1993 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epiphenomenalism is a theory concerning the relation between the mental and physical realms, regarded as radically different in nature. The theory holds that only physical states have causal power, and that mental states are completely dependent on them. The mental realm, for epiphenomenalists, is nothing more than a series of conscious states which signify the occurrence of states of the nervous system, but which play no causal role. For example, my feeling sleepy does not cause my yawning — rather, (...)
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  13.  45
    Psychological Epiphenomenalism.Darryl Mathieson - 2024 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (3-4):120-143.
    Researchers in the psychological sciences have put forward the thesis that various sources of psychological, cognitive, and neuroscientific evidence demonstrate that being conscious of our mental states does not make any difference to our behaviour. In this paper, I argue that the evidence marshalled in support of this view — which I call psychological epiphenomenalism — is subject to major objections, relies on a superficial reading of the relevant literature, and fails to engage with the more precise ways in (...)
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  14.  60
    Epiphenomenalism: Dead end or way out?Michael Pauen, Alexander Staudacher & Sven Walter - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):7-19.
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  15. Zombies, Epiphenomenalism and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland's Argument from Consciousness.Daniel Lim - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):439 - 450.
    In his so-called argument from consciousness (AC), J. P. Moreland argues that the phenomenon of consciousness furnishes us with evidence for the existence of God. In defending AC, however, Moreland makes claims that generate an undesirable tension. This tension can be posed as a dilemma based on the contingency of the correlation between mental and physical states. The correlation of mental and physical states is either contingent or necessary. If the correlation is contingent then epiphenomenalism is true. If the (...)
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  16.  81
    Epiphenomenalism as a solution to the ontological mind-body problem.Dieter Birnbacher - 1988 - Ratio 1 (1):17-32.
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  17. Evolution, epiphenomenalism, reductionism.Alvin Plantinga - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):602-619.
    A common contemporary claim is the conjunction of metaphysical naturalism—the idea, roughly, that there is no such person as God or anything at all like God—with the view that our cognitive faculties have come to be by way of the processes to which contemporary evolutionary theory direct our attention. Call this view ‘N&E’. I’ve argued elsewhere that this view is incoherent or self-defeating in that anyone who accepts it has a defeater for R, the proposition that her cognitive faculties are (...)
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  18.  73
    Could anyone justifiably believe epiphenomenalism?Richard Swinburne - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):196--216.
    Epiphenomenalism claims that all conscious events are caused immediately by brain events, and no conscious events cause brain events. In order to have a justified belief in a theory someone needs a justified belief that it or some higher-level theory predicts certain events and those events occurred. To have either of the latter beliefs we depend ultimately on the evidence of apparent experience, memory, and testimony, which is credible in the absence of defeaters; it is an undermining defeater to (...)
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  19. Epiphenomenalism Explained.Norman Bacrac - 2010 - Philosophy Now 81:10-13.
    Epiphenomenalism expressed as a form of materialism in two key axioms; distinguished from Cartesian dualism, physicalism, eliminativism; shown to be compatible with a subjective experience of free choice but not with libertarian free will - the social consequences of this view.
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  20.  87
    Generalized epiphenomenalism.William E. Seager - manuscript
    I want to show that a common and plausible interpretation of what science tells us about the fundamental structure of the world – the ‘scientific picture of the world’ or SPW for short – leads to what I’ll call ‘generalized epiphenomenalism’, which is the view that the only features of the world that possess causal efficacy are fundamental physical features. I think that generalized epiphenomenalism follows pretty straightforwardly from the SPW as I’ll present it, but it might seem (...)
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  21. Consciousness, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism.Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger - 1998 - In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
    Consciousness and evolution are complex phenomena. It is sometimes thought that if adaptation explanations for some varieties of consciousness, say, conscious visual perception, can be had, then we may be reassured that at least those kinds of consciousness are not epiphenomena. But what if other varieties of consciousness, for example, dreams, are not adaptations? We sort out the connections among evolution, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism in order to show that the consequences for the nature and causal efficacy of consciousness are (...)
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  22. Methodological epiphenomenalism.Alec Hyslop - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):61-70.
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  23.  74
    Epiphenomenalism and Occasionalism: Problems of Mental Causation, Old and New.Sarah Patterson - 2005 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (3):239-257.
  24. Epiphenomenalism and the eliminative strategy.Jason A. Beyer - 1999 - Kinesis 26 (1):18-36.
     
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  25.  46
    Epiphenomenalism and causal asymmetry.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.
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  26.  63
    Taylor's refutation of epiphenomenalism.Richard Double - 1979 - Journal of Critical Analysis 8 (1):23-28.
    In "metaphysics" richard taylor argues that epiphenomenalism is implausible because it leaves open the possibility that human behavior occurs without the presence of mental events. in my paper i examine the sort of possibility involved and conclude that the logical possibility of "mind-less behavior" which epiphenomenalism must allow is an equal possibility for all competing theories of mind. thus, epiphenomenalism is seen to be no worse off in this respect than other theories and taylor's objection fails.
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  27. The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism.Yujin Nagasawa - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (1):37 - 56.
    Frank Jackson endorses epiphenomenalism because he thinks that his knowledge argument undermines physicalism. One of the most interesting criticisms of Jackson's position is what I call the 'inconsistency objection'. The inconsistency objection says that Jackson's position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge argument. The inconsistency objection has been defended by various philosophers independently, including Michael Watkins, Fredrik Stjernberg, and Neil Campbell. Surprisingly enough, while Jackson himself admits explicitly that the inconsistency objection is 'the most powerful reply to (...)
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  28. Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism.Brie Gertler - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 62-86.
    Some physicalists (Balog 2012, Howell 2013), and most dualists, endorse the acquaintance response to the Knowledge Argument. This is the claim that Mary gains substantial new knowledge, upon leaving the room, because phenomenal knowledge requires direct acquaintance with phenomenal properties. The acquaintance response is an especially promising way to make sense of the Mary case. I argue that it casts doubt on two claims often made on behalf of physicalism, regarding parsimony and mental causation. I show that those who endorse (...)
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  29. Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness.Andrew Bailey - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):481-509.
    In its recent history, the philosophy of mind has come to resemble an entry into the genre of Hammer horror or pulpy science fiction. These days it is unusual to encounter a major philosophical work on the mind that is not populated with bats, homunculi, swamp-creatures, cruelly imprisoned genius scientists, aliens, cyborgs, other-worldly twins, self-aware Computer programs, Frankenstein-monster-like ‘Blockheads,’ or zombies. The purpose of this paper is to review the role in the philosophy of mind of one of these fantastic (...)
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  30.  76
    Exit epiphenomenalism: The demolition of a refuge.Titus Rivas & Hein van Dongen - 2001 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 57.
  31. Epiphenomenalism.Sven Walters - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  32. Epiphenomenalism.Sven Walters - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  33. Radical epiphenomenalism: B.f. Skinner's account of private events.Richard E. Creel - 1980 - Behaviorism 8 (1):31-53.
     
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  34. Epiphenomenalism and content.Mark Eli Kalderon - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (1):71-90.
  35. Epiphenomenalism and Machines: A Discussion of Van Rooijen's Critique of Popper.Davor Pećnjak - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):404-408.
  36. In defence of qualia-epiphenomenalism.Volker Gadenne - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.
    Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism.
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  37.  83
    Epiphenomenalism and the notion of cause.John Lachs - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (March):141-45.
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  38. Epiphenomenalism and Agency.David Hommen - 2018 - Mind and Matter 16 (1):17–41.
    A prominent objection against epiphenomenalism—the doctrine that mental phenomena are causally inefficacious—is that it is incompatible with the phenomenon of human agency. It is essential for our being agents, so the argument goes, that our mental states contribute to the causation of our actions. In this paper, I wish to refute that objection and argue that epiphenomenalism, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, is fully compatible with human agency.
     
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  39.  14
    Epiphenomenalism, Laws & Properties.Denis Robinson - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.
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  40. Free Will, Determinism, and Epiphenomenalism.Mark Balaguer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    This paper provides articulates a non-epiphenomenal, libertarian kind of free will—a kind of free will that’s incompatible with both determinism and epiphenomenalism—and responds to scientific arguments against the existence of this sort of freedom. In other words, the paper argues that we don’t have any good empirical scientific reason to believe that human beings don’t possess a non-epiphenomenal, libertarian sort of free will.
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  41. Emergence, epiphenomenalism and consciousness.William E. Seager - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):21-38.
    Causation can be regarded from either an explanatory/epistemic or an ontological viewpoint. From the former, emergent features enter into a host of causal relationships which form a hierarchical structure subject to scientific investigation. From the latter, the paramount issue is whether emergent features provide any novel causal powers, or whether the 'go' of the world is exhausted by the fundamental physical features which underlie emergent phenomena. I argue here that the 'Scientific Picture of the World' (SPW) strongly supports the claim (...)
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  42. Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.
  43.  19
    From epiphenomenalism to eliminativism?Krzysztof Poslajko - 2016 - In Adrian Kuźniar & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (eds.), Uncovering Facts and Values: Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy. Boston: Brill | Rodopi. pp. 192–203.
    Jaegwon Kim used the causal exclusion argument as a weapon against non-reductive physicalism in the philosophy of mind. The aim of this paper is to inquire into the consequences of this argument in order to check whether they are devastating to the initial position. The main focus will be the question of whether type epiphenomenalism, the alleged consequence of the causal exclusion argument, really leads to eliminativism about the mental. In order to cast some doubt on this claim I (...)
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  44.  9
    Evolution, Epiphenomenalism, Reductionism.Alvin Plantinga - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):602-619.
    A common contemporary claim is the conjunction of metaphysical naturalism—the idea, roughly, that there is no such person as God or anything at all like God—with the view that our cognitive faculties have come to be by way of the processes to which contemporary evolutionary theory direct our attention. Call this view ‘N&E’. I’ve argued elsewhere that this view is incoherent or self-defeating in that anyone who accepts it has a defeater for R, the proposition that her cognitive faculties are (...)
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  45. Interrogating the Epiphenomenalist Tradition.Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani - 2016 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 33 (3):481-501.
    Epiphenomenalism has had a long historical tradition. It is the view that mental properties are causally inert with respect to the physical world. In this paper, I argue that this tradition faces enormous challenges and needs better arguments to defend its position, and to demonstrate this, I interrogate the strands including computationalism, the idea of the illusion of conscious will, and causal exclusionism.
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  46. Evidence against epiphenomenalism.Ned Block - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):670-672.
  47. An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism.Jason Megill - 2013 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (2):5 - 17.
    I formulate an argument against epiphenomenalism; the argument shows that epiphenomenalism is extremely improbable. Moreover the argument suggests that qualia not only have causal powers, but have their causal powers necessarily. I address possible objections and then conclude by considering some implications the argument has for dualism.
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  48. Anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism.Rex Welshon - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.
    I argue that, on plausible assumptions, anomalous entails monism epiphenomenalism of the mental. The plausible assumptions are (1) events are particulars; (2) causal relations are extensional; (3) mental properties are epiphrastic. A principle defender of anomalous monism, Donald Davidson, acknowledges that anomalous monism is committed to (1) and (2). I argue that it is committed to (3) as well. Given (1), (2), and (3), epiphenomenalism of the mental falls out immediately. Three attempts to salvage anomalous monism from (...) of the mental are examined and rejected. I conclude with reflections on the status of non-reductive physicalism. (shrink)
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  49. Epiphenomenalism as a Solution to the Mind-Body Problem.Dieter Birnbacher - 1988 - Ratio:17.
     
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  50.  32
    Epiphenomenalism and the reduction of experience.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):680-680.
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