Results for 'Epistemic Luck'

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Bibliography: Epistemic Luck in Epistemology
  1. Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and (...)
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  2. Epistemic Luck.Mylan Engel Jr - 2011 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-41.
    Epistemic luck is a generic notion used to describe any of a number of ways in which it can be accidental, coincidental, or fortuitous that a person has a true belief. For example, one can form a true belief as a result of a lucky guess, as when one believes through guesswork that “C” is the right answer to a multiple-choice question and one’s belief just happens to be correct. One can form a true belief via wishful thinking; (...)
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  3. Epistemic Luck and the Generality Problem.Kelly Becker - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.
    Epistemic luck has been the focus of much discussion recently. Perhaps the most general knowledge-precluding type is veritic luck, where a belief is true but might easily have been false. Veritic luck has two sources, and so eliminating it requires two distinct conditions for a theory of knowledge. I argue that, when one sets out those conditions properly, a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism emerges.
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  4. Epistemic Luck and Logical Necessities: Armchair Luck Revisited.Guido Melchior - 2017 - In Smiljana Gartner Bojan Borstner (ed.), Thought Experiments between Nature and Society. A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 137-150.
    Modal knowledge accounts like sensitivity or safety face a problem when it comes to knowing propositions that are necessarily true because the modal condition is always fulfilled no matter how random the belief forming method is. Pritchard models the anti-luck condition for knowledge in terms of the modal principle safety. Thus, his anti-luck epistemology faces the same problem when it comes to logical necessities. Any belief in a proposition that is necessarily true fulfills the anti-luck condition and, (...)
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  5.  57
    Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.
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  6. Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):440-453.
    Reductive intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that (...)
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  7.  23
    Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.
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  8. Epistemic Luck.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):272-281.
    Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provide an account of (...)
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  9. Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind.J. Adam Carter - 2017 - In Ian M. Church (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck. London: Routledge.
    Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis that cognitive processes play out inside the head. In particular, safety-based approaches (e.g., Pritchard 2005; 2007; Luper-Foy 1984; Sainsbury 1997; Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000) reveal this commitment by taking for granted a traditional internalist construal of what I call the cognitive fixedness thesis—viz., the thesis that the cognitive process that is being employed in the actual (...)
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  10. Propositional Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Risk, and Epistemic Justification.Patrick Bondy & Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3811-3820.
    If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good evidence in both cases. And yet it clearly does matter. The aim of this paper is to explain why, (...)
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  11.  82
    Epistemic Luck and Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):1-6.
    This is an editorial introduction to a special issue of Acta Analytica on epistemic luck.
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  12. Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge?Mylan Engel - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):59-75.
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  13.  59
    Epistemic Luck.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2017 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
    In almost any domain of endeavour, successes can be attained through skill, but also by dumb luck. An archer’s wildest shots occasionally hit the target. Against enormous odds, some fair lottery tickets happen to win. The same goes in the case of purely cognitive or intellectual endeavours. As inquirers, we characteristically aim to believe truly rather than falsely, and to attain such standings as knowledge and understanding. Sometimes such aims are attained with commendable competence, but of course, not always. (...)
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  14. Extended Cognition and Epistemic Luck.J. Adam Carter - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4201-4214.
    When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemology, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmental epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the mainstream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.
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  15.  76
    Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues.Guy Axtell - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 158--177.
    The presence of luck in our cognitive as in our moral lives shows that the quality of our intellectual character may not be entirely up to us as individuals, and that our motivation and even our ability to desire the truth, like our moral goodness, can be fragile. This paper uses epistemologists' responses to the problem of “epistemic luck” as a sounding board for this fragility; it locates the source of much of the internalist-externalist debate in epistemology (...)
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  16. Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
    A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best thought of (...)
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  17.  51
    ``Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic".Richard Foley - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2):113-124.
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  18. Safety, Sensitivity and “Distant” Epistemic Luck.Wolfgang Freitag - 2014 - Theoria 80 (1):44-61.
    Prominent instances of anti-luck epistemology, in particular sensitivity and safety accounts of knowledge, introduce a modal condition on the pertinent belief in terms of closeness or similarity of possible worlds. Very roughly speaking, a belief must continue to be true in close possibilities in order to qualify as knowledge. Such closeness-accounts derive much support from their (alleged) ability to eliminate standard instances of epistemic luck as they appear in prominent Gettier-type examples. The article argues that there are (...)
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  19. Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck.Nilanjan Das - 2021 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 49 (2):153-202.
    This essay explores a problem for Nyāya epistemologists. It concerns the notion of pramā. Roughly speaking, a pramā is a conscious mental event of knowledge-acquisition, i.e., a conscious experience or thought in undergoing which an agent learns or comes to know something. Call any event of this sort a knowledge-event. The problem is this. On the one hand, many Naiyāyikas accept what I will call the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge, the view that a conscious experience or thought is a knowledge-event (...)
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  20.  30
    Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge?Mylan Engel - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):59-75.
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  21.  20
    Epistemic Luck.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):284-289.
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  22. Epistemic Luck.Mylan Engel Jr - 2010 - In Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 336-340.
     
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  23.  9
    Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. pp. 318-319.
    Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis that cognitive processes play out inside the head. In particular, safety-based approaches reveal this commitment by taking for granted a traditional internalist construal of what I call the cognitive fixedness thesis—viz., the thesis that the cognitive process that is being employed in the actual world is always ‘held fixed’ when we go out to nearby possible (...)
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  24. Safety and Epistemic Luck.Avram Hiller & Ram Neta - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.
    There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well.
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  25.  55
    Epistemic Luck, Naturalistic Epistemology and the Ecology of Knowledge or What the Frog Should Have Told Dretske.Carolyn R. Morillo - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (1):109-129.
  26. Religious Diversity and Epistemic Luck.Max Baker-Hytch - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (2):171-191.
    A familiar criticism of religious belief starts from the claim that a typical religious believer holds the particular religious beliefs she does just because she happened to be raised in a certain cultural setting rather than some other. This claim is commonly thought to have damaging epistemological consequences for religious beliefs, and one can find statements of an argument in this vicinity in the writings of John Stuart Mill and more recently Philip Kitcher, although the argument is seldom spelled out (...)
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  27. Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.
    The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call “veritic” epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type (...)
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  28.  38
    Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck.Changsheng Lai - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Does ‘remembering that p’ entail ‘knowing that p’? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory (hereafter, ETM) answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often ‘vaguely remember’ a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on prominent theories of misremembering in philosophy of psychology (e.g. fuzzy-trace theory (...)
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  29. Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths.James Collin - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):483-504.
    Modal epistemologists parse modal conditions on knowledge in terms of metaphysical possibilities or ways the world might have been. This is problematic. Understanding modal conditions on knowledge this way has made modal epistemology, as currently worked out, unable to account for epistemic luck in the case of necessary truths, and unable to characterise widely discussed issues such as the problem of religious diversity and the perceived epistemological problem with knowledge of abstract objects. Moreover, there is reason to think (...)
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  30.  44
    Epistemic Justification and Epistemic Luck.Job de Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.
    Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be (...)
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  31.  90
    Epistemic Luck in Stoicism.Pavle Stojanović - 2022 - Ancient Philosophy 42 (1):273-289.
    The Stoics thought that knowledge depends on a special kind of appearances which they called ‘apprehensive’, which are by definition true. Interestingly, Sextus Empiricus reports in M 7.247 that they held that there are appearances that are true but that are not apprehensive because they are true merely by chance and thus cannot constitute knowledge. I believe that this suggests that the Stoics were aware of what is in modern literature known as the problem of epistemic luck. Unfortunately, (...)
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  32. Moral and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25.
    It is maintained that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of epistemic luck, especially that version of the problem that is traditionally presented by the epistemological sceptic. (...)
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  33.  24
    Epistemic Justification and Epistemic Luck.Job Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.
    Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be (...)
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  34.  95
    Epistemic Luck.Joshue Orozco - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):11-21.
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  35.  23
    Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk.Jesús Navarro - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but (...)
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  36.  16
    Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge.Mylan Engel - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):33-56.
    In this article, I develop and defend a version of reliabilism – internal reasons reliabilism – that resolves the paradox of epistemic luck, solves the Gettier problem by ruling out veritic luck, is immune to the generality problem, resolves the internalism/externalism controversy, and preserves epistemic closure.
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  37. The Information Effect: Constructive Memory, Testimony, and Epistemic Luck.Kourken Michaelian - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2429-2456.
    The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent’s memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for (...)
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  38.  24
    The Third Type of Epistemic Luck.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Studies in Dialectics of Nature 7 (37):14-20.
    The core thesis of anti-luck epistemology is the incompatibility thesis, that is, knowledge is incompatible with veritic epistemic luck. Traditionally, anti-luck epistemologists hold that there are two distinct types of veritic epistemic luck, viz, intervening luck and environmental luck. The former occurs when something luckily intervenes between the subject’s belief and the target fact, which renders the subject’s belief luckily true. The latter can be found in cases where the subject’s belief is (...)
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  39.  2
    Epistemic Luck[REVIEW]Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):272-281.
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  40.  12
    Collective Epistemic Luck.Moisés Barba & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):99-119.
    A platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because (...)
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    Epistemic Luck by Duncan Pritchard.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):272.
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  42.  43
    On Epistemic Luck.Barbara J. Hall - 1994 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):79-84.
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  43. Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic.Richard Foley - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2).
     
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  44.  78
    Becker on Epistemic Luck.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):171-175.
    Kelly Becker has argued that in an externalist anti-luck epistemology, we must hold that knowledge requires the satisfaction of both a modalized tracking condition and a process reliability condition. We raise various problems for the examples that are supposed to establish this claim.
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  45.  79
    Moral and Epistemic Luck.Daniel Statman - 1991 - Ratio 4 (2):146-156.
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  46. Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Theoria 73 (2):173-178.
    It is argued that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of epistemic luck, especially that version of the problem that is traditionally presented by the epistemological sceptic. (...)
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  47.  60
    Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):121-134.
    This paper critically explores Timothy Williamson’s view of evidence, and it does so in light of the problem of epistemic luck. Williamson’s view of evidence is, of course, a crucially important aspect of his novel and influential “knowledge-first” epistemological project. Notoriously, one crucial thesis of this project is that one’s evidence is equivalent to what one knows. This has come to be known as the E = K thesis. This paper specifically addresses Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology and the E (...)
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  48. Moral and Epistemic Luck.Andrew Latus - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.
    The aim of this paper is to offer a diagnosis. It focuses on the problem of moral luck, but, unlike most papers on that topic, offers no solution to the problem. Instead, what I do is discuss a number of attempts to show there is no such thing as moral luck, argue that they fail and, more importantly, that we should not be surprised they fail. I then suggest that the difficulty of the problem posed by moral (...) is paralleled by another problem about luck, namely the problem of coming up with an account of propositional knowledge that does not count certain lucky guesses as knowledge. The comparison is instructive. It brings home how hard it is to eliminate luck. As such, we should not expect a solution to either problem to be forthcoming. I also note an important disanalogy between the two problems. While we can quite easily accept that luck plays a role in knowledge, the existence of moral luck threatens to cause a good deal more trouble. (shrink)
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  49.  9
    Information, Epistemic Luck and Generality.Abel Wajnerman Paz - 2017 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 26:326-354.
    Resumen El objetivo de este trabajo es determinar la relevancia de la teoría informacional del conocimiento para el problema de la suerte epistémica. Argumento que el clásico enfoque de Dretske es equivalente a la condición de seguridad de Pritchard. Sin embargo, considero que esta manera de eludir la suerte epistémica exige lidiar con el llamado "problema de la generalidad". Argumento que una respuesta a este problema requiere una noción de seguridad diferente y propongo un enfoque informacional equivalente a esta versión (...)
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    Pritchard’s Epistemic Luck[REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):284–289.
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