Results for 'Epistemic Luck'

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Bibliography: Epistemic Luck in Epistemology
  1. Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and (...)
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  2. Epistemic Luck and the Generality Problem.Kelly Becker - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.
    Epistemic luck has been the focus of much discussion recently. Perhaps the most general knowledge-precluding type is veritic luck, where a belief is true but might easily have been false. Veritic luck has two sources, and so eliminating it requires two distinct conditions for a theory of knowledge. I argue that, when one sets out those conditions properly, a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism emerges.
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  3. Epistemic Luck.Mylan Engel Jr - 2011 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-41.
    Epistemic luck is a generic notion used to describe any of a number of ways in which it can be accidental, coincidental, or fortuitous that a person has a true belief. For example, one can form a true belief as a result of a lucky guess, as when one believes through guesswork that “C” is the right answer to a multiple-choice question and one’s belief just happens to be correct. One can form a true belief via wishful thinking; (...)
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  4.  98
    Epistemic Luck and Logical Necessities: Armchair Luck Revisited.Guido Melchior - 2017 - In Smiljana Gartner Bojan Borstner (ed.), Thought Experiments between Nature and Society. A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 137-150.
    Modal knowledge accounts like sensitivity or safety face a problem when it comes to knowing propositions that are necessarily true because the modal condition is always fulfilled no matter how random the belief forming method is. Pritchard models the anti-luck condition for knowledge in terms of the modal principle safety. Thus, his anti-luck epistemology faces the same problem when it comes to logical necessities. Any belief in a proposition that is necessarily true fulfills the anti-luck condition and, (...)
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  5. Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):440-453.
    Reductive intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that (...)
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  6. Extended Cognition and Epistemic Luck.J. Adam Carter - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4201-4214.
    When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemology, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmental epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the mainstream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.
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  7.  51
    Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.
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  8. Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind.J. Adam Carter - 2017 - In Ian M. Church (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck. London: Routledge.
    Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis that cognitive processes play out inside the head. In particular, safety-based approaches (e.g., Pritchard 2005; 2007; Luper-Foy 1984; Sainsbury 1997; Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000) reveal this commitment by taking for granted a traditional internalist construal of what I call the cognitive fixedness thesis—viz., the thesis that the cognitive process that is being employed in the actual (...)
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  9.  91
    Propositional Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Risk, and Epistemic Justification.Patrick Bondy & Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3811-3820.
    If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good evidence in both cases. And yet it clearly does matter. The aim of this paper is to explain why, (...)
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  10.  16
    Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.
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  11. Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge?Mylan Engel - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):59-75.
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  12.  80
    Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck.Nilanjan Das - 2021 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 49 (2):153-202.
    This essay explores a problem for Nyāya epistemologists. It concerns the notion of pramā. Roughly speaking, a pramā is a conscious mental event of knowledge-acquisition, i.e., a conscious experience or thought in undergoing which an agent learns or comes to know something. Call any event of this sort a knowledge-event. The problem is this. On the one hand, many Naiyāyikas accept what I will call the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge, the view that a conscious experience or thought is a knowledge-event (...)
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  13. Religious Diversity and Epistemic Luck.Max Baker-Hytch - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (2):171-191.
    A familiar criticism of religious belief starts from the claim that a typical religious believer holds the particular religious beliefs she does just because she happened to be raised in a certain cultural setting rather than some other. This claim is commonly thought to have damaging epistemological consequences for religious beliefs, and one can find statements of an argument in this vicinity in the writings of John Stuart Mill and more recently Philip Kitcher, although the argument is seldom spelled out (...)
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  14.  75
    Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues.Guy Axtell - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 158--177.
    The presence of luck in our cognitive as in our moral lives shows that the quality of our intellectual character may not be entirely up to us as individuals, and that our motivation and even our ability to desire the truth, like our moral goodness, can be fragile. This paper uses epistemologists' responses to the problem of “epistemic luck” as a sounding board for this fragility; it locates the source of much of the internalist-externalist debate in epistemology (...)
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  15. Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
    A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best thought of (...)
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  16.  50
    ``Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic".Richard Foley - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2):113-124.
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  17.  19
    Epistemic Luck.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):284-289.
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  18.  56
    Epistemic Luck.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2017 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
    In almost any domain of endeavour, successes can be attained through skill, but also by dumb luck. An archer’s wildest shots occasionally hit the target. Against enormous odds, some fair lottery tickets happen to win. The same goes in the case of purely cognitive or intellectual endeavours. As inquirers, we characteristically aim to believe truly rather than falsely, and to attain such standings as knowledge and understanding. Sometimes such aims are attained with commendable competence, but of course, not always. (...)
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  19.  27
    Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge?Mylan Engel - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):59-75.
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  20. Safety, Sensitivity and “Distant” Epistemic Luck.Wolfgang Freitag - 2014 - Theoria 80 (1):44-61.
    Prominent instances of anti-luck epistemology, in particular sensitivity and safety accounts of knowledge, introduce a modal condition on the pertinent belief in terms of closeness or similarity of possible worlds. Very roughly speaking, a belief must continue to be true in close possibilities in order to qualify as knowledge. Such closeness-accounts derive much support from their (alleged) ability to eliminate standard instances of epistemic luck as they appear in prominent Gettier-type examples. The article argues that there are (...)
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  21. Epistemic Luck.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):272-281.
    Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provide an account of (...)
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  22. Safety and Epistemic Luck.Avram Hiller & Ram Neta - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.
    There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well.
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  23.  52
    Epistemic Luck, Naturalistic Epistemology and the Ecology of Knowledge or What the Frog Should Have Told Dretske.Carolyn R. Morillo - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (1):109-129.
  24. Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.
    The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call “veritic” epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type (...)
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  25.  39
    Epistemic Justification and Epistemic Luck.Job de Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.
    Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be (...)
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  26. Armchair Luck: Apriority, Intellection and Epistemic Luck[REVIEW]Nenad Miščević - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (1):48-73.
    The paper argues that there is such a thing as luck in acquisition of candidate a priori beliefs and knowledge, and that the possibility of luck in this “armchair” domain shows that definitions of believing by luck that p offered in literature are inadequate, since they mostly rely on the possibility of it being the case that not- p. When p is necessary, such a definition should be supplemented by one pointing to variation in belief, not in (...)
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  27.  86
    Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths.James Collin - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):483-504.
    Modal epistemologists parse modal conditions on knowledge in terms of metaphysical possibilities or ways the world might have been. This is problematic. Understanding modal conditions on knowledge this way has made modal epistemology, as currently worked out, unable to account for epistemic luck in the case of necessary truths, and unable to characterise widely discussed issues such as the problem of religious diversity and the perceived epistemological problem with knowledge of abstract objects. Moreover, there is reason to think (...)
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  28.  21
    Epistemic Justification and Epistemic Luck.Job Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.
    Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be (...)
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  29.  94
    Epistemic Luck.Joshue Orozco - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):11-21.
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  30. Moral and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25.
    It is maintained that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of epistemic luck, especially that version of the problem that is traditionally presented by the epistemological sceptic. (...)
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  31.  43
    On Epistemic Luck.Barbara J. Hall - 1994 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):79-84.
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  32. The Information Effect: Constructive Memory, Testimony, and Epistemic Luck.Kourken Michaelian - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2429-2456.
    The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent’s memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for (...)
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  33.  74
    Moral and Epistemic Luck.Daniel Statman - 1991 - Ratio 4 (2):146-156.
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  34. Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Theoria 73 (2):173-178.
    It is argued that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of epistemic luck, especially that version of the problem that is traditionally presented by the epistemological sceptic. (...)
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  35. Moral and Epistemic Luck.Andrew Latus - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.
    The aim of this paper is to offer a diagnosis. It focuses on the problem of moral luck, but, unlike most papers on that topic, offers no solution to the problem. Instead, what I do is discuss a number of attempts to show there is no such thing as moral luck, argue that they fail and, more importantly, that we should not be surprised they fail. I then suggest that the difficulty of the problem posed by moral (...) is paralleled by another problem about luck, namely the problem of coming up with an account of propositional knowledge that does not count certain lucky guesses as knowledge. The comparison is instructive. It brings home how hard it is to eliminate luck. As such, we should not expect a solution to either problem to be forthcoming. I also note an important disanalogy between the two problems. While we can quite easily accept that luck plays a role in knowledge, the existence of moral luck threatens to cause a good deal more trouble. (shrink)
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  36. Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (1):66–88.
    In this article I return to an argument that I presented in earlier work to the effect that virtue epistemology is at worse false and at best unmotivated. In the light of recent responses to this argument from such figures as John Greco, Guy Axtell, and Kelly Becker, I here re-state and re-evaluate this argument. In the process the original argument is refined and supplemented in key respects and some of the main charges against it are shown to be unfounded. (...)
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  37.  75
    Becker on Epistemic Luck.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):171-175.
    Kelly Becker has argued that in an externalist anti-luck epistemology, we must hold that knowledge requires the satisfaction of both a modalized tracking condition and a process reliability condition. We raise various problems for the examples that are supposed to establish this claim.
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  38.  79
    Pritchard’s Epistemic Luck[REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):284–289.
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  39. Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.
    It is argued that it is beneficial to view the debate regarding radical scepticism through the lens of epistemic value. In particular, it is claimed that we should regard radical scepticism as aiming to deprive us of an epistemic standing that is of special value to us, and that this methodological constraint on our dealings with radical scepticism potentially has important ramifications for how we assess the success of an anti-sceptical strategy.
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    Epistemic Luck[REVIEW]Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):272-281.
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  41.  78
    Conclusive Reasons and Epistemic Luck.Tamar Lando - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):378-395.
    What is it to have conclusive reasons to believe a proposition P? According to a view famously defended by Dretske, a reason R is conclusive for P just in case [R would not be the case unless P were the case]. I argue that, while knowing that P is plausibly related to having conclusive reasons to believe that P, having such reasons cannot be understood in terms of the truth of this counterfactual condition. Simple examples show that it is possible (...)
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  42.  43
    Achievements, Safety and Environmental Epistemic Luck.Benoit Gaultier - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (4):477-497.
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  43.  28
    Knowledge and Varieties of Epistemic Luck.Hamid Vahi - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):351–362.
    It is generally thought that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck as the post‐Gettier literature makes it abundantly clear. Examples are produced where although a belief is true and justified, it nevertheless falls short of being an instance of knowledge because of the intrusion of luck. Knowledge is regarded as being distinct from lucky guesses. It is, nevertheless, acknowledged by a number of epistemologists that some kind of luck is in fact an inevitable component of the (...)
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  44.  51
    Epistemic Luck. By Duncan Pritchard.Jason Baehr - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (5):728-736.
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  45.  31
    Externalism, Skepticism and Epistemic Luck.Zivan Lazovic - 2011 - Filozofija I Društvo 22 (1):89-102.
    This paper deals with the concept of epistemic luck and its place within wider philosophical debates on knowledge and skepticism. Philosophers involved in these debates share an intuition that knowledge excludes luck. Starting from Prichard?s modal definition of luck and his distinction between two varieties of epistemic luck, namely veridic and reflective, the paper explores the internalist and externalist prospects for avoiding epistemic luck and skepticism. Externalism seems to be capable of both (...)
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  46.  45
    Moral and Epistemic Luck.Andrew Latus - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.
    The aim of this paper is to offer a diagnosis. It focuses on the problem of moral luck, but, unlike most papers on that topic, offers no solution to the problem. Instead, what I do is discuss a number of attempts to show there is no such thing as moral luck, argue that they fail and, more importantly, that we should not be surprised they fail. I then suggest that the difficulty of the problem posed by moral (...) is paralleled by another problem about luck, namely the problem of coming up with an account of propositional knowledge that does not count certain lucky guesses as knowledge. The comparison is instructive. It brings home how hard it is to eliminate luck. As such, we should not expect a solution to either problem to be forthcoming. I also note an important disanalogy between the two problems. While we can quite easily accept that luck plays a role in knowledge, the existence of moral luck threatens to cause a good deal more trouble. (shrink)
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  47.  4
    Epistemic Luck by Duncan Pritchard.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):272.
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  48.  98
    Knowledge-How, Understanding-Why and Epistemic Luck: An Experimental Study.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & Joshua Shepherd - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):701-734.
    Reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how hold, contra Ryle, that knowing how to do something is just a kind of propositional knowledge. In a similar vein, traditional reductivists about understanding-why insist, in accordance with a tradition beginning with Aristotle, that the epistemic standing one attains when one understands why something is so is itself just a kind of propositional knowledge—viz., propositional knowledge of causes. A point that has been granted on both sides of these debates is that if these reductive proposals (...)
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    Knowledge and Varieties of Epistemic Luck.Hamid Vahi - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):351-362.
    It is generally thought that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck as the post‐Gettier literature makes it abundantly clear. Examples are produced where although a belief is true and justified, it nevertheless falls short of being an instance of knowledge because of the intrusion of luck. Knowledge is regarded as being distinct from lucky guesses. It is, nevertheless, acknowledged by a number of epistemologists that some kind of luck is in fact an inevitable component of the (...)
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  50.  98
    Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):35-45.
    I outline Greco’s response to the Pyrrhonian challenge to epistemic externalist theories of knowledge and offer two points of criticism. I also argue, however, that there is an account of epistemic luck available which can cast some light on the dispute that Greco is concerned with, and which could, in principle at least, be regarded as being in the spirit of the proposal that Greco sets out.
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