Results for 'Epistemic duties'

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  1. Epistemic Duties and Failure to Understand One’s Evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):147-177.
    The paper defends the thesis that our epistemic duty is the duty to proportion our beliefs to the evidence we possess. An inclusive view of evidence possessed is put forward on the grounds that it makes sense of our intuitions about when it is right to say that a person ought to believe some proposition P. A second thesis is that we have no epistemic duty to adopt any particular doxastic attitudes. The apparent tension between the two theses (...)
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  2. Imperfect Epistemic Duties and the Justificational Fecundity of Evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4065-4075.
    Mark Nelson argues that we have no positive epistemic duties. His case rests on the evidential inexhaustibility of sensory and propositional evidence—what he calls their ‘infinite justificational fecundity’. It is argued here that Nelson’s reflections on the richness of sensory and propositional evidence do make it doubtful that we ever have an epistemic duty to add any particular beliefs to our belief set, but that they fail to establish that we have no positive epistemic duties (...)
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  3. Why There Are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.
    An epistemic duty would be a duty to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgment from a proposition, and it would be grounded in purely evidential or epistemic considerations. If I promise to believe it is raining, my duty to believe is not epistemic. If my evidence is so good that, in light of it alone, I ought to believe it is raining, then my duty to believe supposedly is epistemic. I offer a new argument for the claim (...)
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  4. Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias.Lindsay Rettler & Bradley Rettler - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
    In this chapter, we explore whether agents have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias. Recent research shows that implicit biases are widespread and they have a wide variety of epistemic effects on our doxastic attitudes. First, we offer some examples and features of implicit biases. Second, we clarify what it means to have an epistemic duty, and discuss the kind of epistemic duties we might have regarding implicit bias. Third, we argue that we have (...)
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  5. We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties.Mark T. Nelson - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):83-102.
    In ethics, it is commonly supposed that we have both positive duties and negative duties, things we ought to do and things we ought not to do. Given the many parallels between ethics and epistemology, we might suppose that the same is true in epistemology, and that we have both positive epistemic duties and negative epistemic duties. I argue that this is false; that is, that we have negative epistemic duties, but no (...)
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  6.  23
    Why There Are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (1):115-136.
    ABSTRACT: Epistemic duties would be duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, and they would be grounded in purely evidential considerations. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties. Though people may have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations. Rather, allegedly epistemic duties are a species of moral duty.RÉSUMÉ: Les fonctions (...)
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  7.  98
    The Epistemic Duty to Seek More Evidence.Richard J. Hall & Charles R. Johnson - 1998 - American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):129 - 139.
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  8.  82
    Why There May Be Epistemic Duties.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (1):63-89.
    Chase Wrenn argues that there are no epistemic duties. When it appears that we have an epistemic duty to believe, disbelieve or suspend judgement about some proposition P, we are really under a moral obligation to adopt the attitude towards P that our evidence favours. The argument appeals to theoretical parsimony: our conceptual scheme will be simpler without epistemic duties and we should therefore drop them. I argue that Wrenn’s strategy is flawed. There may well (...)
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  9. Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?Fred Dretske - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
    The debate between externalists and internalists in epistemology can be viewed as a disagreement about whether there are epistemic rights without corresponding duties or obligations. Taking an epistemic right to believe P as an authorization to not only accept P as true but to use P as a positive reason for accepting other propositions, the debate is about whether there are unjustified justifiers. It is about whether there are propositions that provide for others what nothing need provide (...)
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  10.  15
    Our Epistemic Duties in Scenarios of Vaccine Mistrust.M. Inés Corbalán & Giulia Terzian - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):613-640.
    ABSTRACT What, if anything, should we do when someone says they don’t believe in anthropogenic climate change? Or that they worry that a COVID-19 vaccine might be dangerous? We argue that in general, we face an epistemic duty to object to such assertions, qua instances of science denial and science sceptical discourse, respectively. Our argument builds on recent discussions in social epistemology, specifically surrounding the idea that we ought to speak up against problematic assertions so as to fulfil an (...)
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  11. The Epistemic Duties of Philosophers: An Addendum.Philippe van Basshuysen & Lucie White - 2021 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 31 (4):447-451.
    We were slightly concerned, upon having read Eric Winsberg, Jason Brennan and Chris Surprenant’s reply to our paper “Were Lockdowns Justified? A Return to the Facts and Evidence”, that they may have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of our argument, so we issue the following clarification, along with a comment on our motivations for writing such a piece, for the interested reader.
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  12.  9
    Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles.Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.) - 2020 - New York: Routledge.
    There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, (...)
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  13.  10
    Critical Reflection: An Alleged Epistemic Duty.P. Tidman - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):268-276.
  14.  63
    Critical Reflection: An Alleged Epistemic Duty.Paul Tidman - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):268–276.
  15.  18
    Epistemic Injustice in Psychiatric Practice: Epistemic Duties and the Phenomenological Approach.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (12):69-69.
    Epistemic injustice is a kind of injustice that arises when one’s capacity as an epistemic subject is wrongfully denied. In recent years it has been argued that psychiatric patients are often harmed in their capacity as knowers and suffer from various forms of epistemic injustice that they encounter in psychiatric services. Acknowledging that epistemic injustice is a multifaceted problem in psychiatry calls for an adequate response. In this paper I argue that, given that psychiatric patients deserve (...)
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  16.  64
    How Government Leaders Violated Their Epistemic Duties During the SARS-CoV-2 Crisis.Eric Winsberg, Jason Brennan & Chris W. Surprenant - 2020 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 30 (3):215-242.
    Sovereign is he who provides the exception.…The exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything. In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition.In spring 2020, in response to the COVID-19 crisis, world leaders imposed severe restrictions on citizens’ civil, political, and economic liberties. These restrictions went beyond less controversial and less demanding social distancing measures seen in past epidemics. Many states (...)
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  17. Epistemic Value, Duty, and Virtue.Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Brian C. Barnett (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community.
    This chapter introduces some central issues in Epistemology, and, like others in the open textbook series Introduction to Philosophy, is set up for rewarding college classroom use, with discussion/reflection questions matched to clearly-stated learning objectives,, a brief glossary of the introduced/bolded terms/concepts, links to further open source readings as a next step, and a readily-accessible outline of the classic between William Clifford and William James over the "ethics of belief." The chapter introduces questions of epistemic value through Plato's famous (...)
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  18. Epistemic Privilege and Victims’ Duties to Resist Their Oppression.Ashwini Vasanthakumar - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (3):465-480.
    Victims of injustice are prominent protagonists in efforts to resist injustice. I argue that they have a duty to do so. Extant accounts of victims’ duties primarily cast these duties as self-regarding duties or duties based on collective identities and commitments. I provide an account of victims’ duties to resist injustice that is grounded in the duty to assist. I argue that victims are epistemically privileged with respect to injustice and are therefore uniquely positioned to (...)
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  19.  35
    A Duty to Listen: Epistemic Obligations and Public Deliberation.Brandon Morgan-Olsen - 2013 - Social Theory and Practice 39 (2):185-212.
    It is a common line in democratic theory that citizens must only offer “public” reasons into political discourse. This is a civic obligation that is traditionally taken bypolitical liberals to fall on the citizen as speaker—as an individual who forwards political arguments. I argue here that taking proper account of the epistemic complexity involved in distinguishing public from nonpublic reasons entails robust civic obligations on listeners. Thus, those who accept this obligation for speakers must accept a corresponding civic obligation (...)
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  20.  24
    Three Duties of Epistemic Diligence.Tim Hayward - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 50 (4):536-561.
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  21. Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue.Matthias Steup (ed.) - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak.
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  22. Good Samaritans, Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives, and Epistemic Obligations.Lennart Aqvist - 1967 - Noûs 1 (4):361-379.
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  23.  2
    Epistemic Responsibility, Rights, and Duties During the Covid-19 Pandemic.Artur Karimov, Andrea Lavazza & Mirko Farina - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-17.
  24. What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.
    This paper is about an overlooked aspect—the cognitive or epistemic aspect—of the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how people act towards us and what they say of us, but also what they believe of us. That we can feel hurt by what others believe of us suggests both that beliefs can wrong and that there is something we epistemically owe to each other. This proposal, however, surprises many theorists who (...)
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  25. Epistemic Supererogation and its Implications.Trevor Hedberg - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3621-3637.
    Supererogatory acts, those which are praiseworthy but not obligatory, have become a significant topic in contemporary moral philosophy, primarily because morally supererogatory acts have proven difficult to reconcile with other important aspects of normative ethics. However, despite the similarities between ethics and epistemology, epistemic supererogation has received very little attention. In this paper, I aim to further the discussion of supererogation by arguing for the existence of epistemically supererogatory acts and considering the potential implications of their existence. First, I (...)
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  26.  76
    Epistemic Versus All Things Considered Requirements.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1861-1881.
    Epistemic obligations are constraints on belief stemming from epistemic considerations alone. Booth is one of the many philosophers who deny that there are epistemic obligations. Any obligation pertaining to belief is an all things considered obligation, according to him—a strictly generic, rather than specifically epistemic, requirement. Though Booth’s argument is valid, I will try to show that it is unsound. There are two central premises: S is justified in believing that P iff S is blameless in (...)
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  27. Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms.Will Fleisher & Dunja Šešelja - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-41.
    Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the collective action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks' (2019) account of collective moral responsibility, (...)
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  28.  28
    On 'Imperfect' Imperfect Duties and the Epistemic Demands of Integrationist Approaches to Justice.Christian Seidel - 2014 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (1):39-42.
  29. Why Epistemic Partiality is Overrated.Nomy Arpaly & Anna Brinkerhoff - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):37-51.
    Epistemic partialism is the view that friends have a doxastic duty to overestimate each other. If one holds that there are no practical reasons for belief, we will argue, one has to deny the existence of any epistemic duties, and thus reject epistemic partialism. But if it is false that one has a doxastic duty to overestimate one’s friends, why does it so often seem true? We argue that there is a robust causal relationship between friendship (...)
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  30. What Do We Epistemically Owe to Each Other? A Reply to Basu.Robert Carry Osborne - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):1005-1022.
    What, if anything, do we epistemically owe to each other? Various “traditional” views of epistemology might hold either that we don’t epistemically owe anything to each other, because “what we owe to each other” is the realm of the moral, or that what we epistemically owe to each other is just to be epistemically responsible agents. Basu (2019) has recently argued, against such views, that morality makes extra-epistemic demands upon what we should believe about one another. So, what we (...)
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  31. The Epistemic Basic Structure.Faik Kurtulmus - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (5):818-835.
    The epistemic basic structure of a society consists of those institutions that have the greatest impact on individuals’ opportunity to obtain knowledge on questions they have an interest in as citizens, individuals, and public officials. It plays a central role in the production and dissemination of knowledge and in ensuring that people have the capability to assimilate this knowledge. It includes institutions of science and education, the media, search engines, libraries, museums, think tanks, and various government agencies. This article (...)
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  32.  38
    Completing Epistemic Oughts.Scott Stapleford - 2014 - Philosophical Forum 45 (2):133-148.
    Our intuitions about what a person epistemically ought or ought not believe are sometimes quite clear. Keith DeRose and Richard Feldman have devised examples about which our intuitions are likely to conflict. DeRose argues that the conflict of intuitions arises from ambiguity in the epistemic ought. I argue that it results from incompleteness. The success of the argument depends on rejecting the narrow conception of evidential support according to which a person’s evidence supports some proposition P only if the (...)
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  33. The Duty to Believe According to the Evidence.Allen Wood - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1-3):7-24.
    'Evidentialism' is the conventional name (given mainly by its opponents) for the view that there is a moral duty to proportion one's beliefs to evidence, proof or other epistemic justifications for belief. This essay defends evidentialism against objections based on the alleged involuntariness of belief, on the claim that evidentialism assumes a doubtful epistemology, that epistemically unsupported beliefs can be beneficial, that there are significant classes of exceptions to the evidentialist principle, and other shabby evasions and alibis (as I (...)
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  34. Epistemic Dilemmas, Epistemic Quasi-Dilemmas, and Quasi-Epistemic Dilemmas.Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
    In this paper we distinguish between epistemic dilemmas, epistemic quasi-dilemmas, and quasi epistemic dilemmas. Our starting point is the commonsense position that S faces a genuine dilemma only when S must take one of two paths and both are bad. It’s the “must” that we think is key. Moral dilemmas arise because there are cases where S must perform A and S must perform B—where ‘must’ implies a moral duty—but S cannot do both. In such a situation, (...)
     
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  35. All Things Considered Duties to Believe.Anthony Robert Booth - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):509-517.
    To be a doxastic deontologist is to claim that there is such a thing as an ethics of belief (or of our doxastic attitudes in general). In other words, that we are subject to certain duties with respect to our doxastic attitudes, the non-compliance with which makes us blameworthy and that we should understand doxastic justification in terms of these duties. In this paper, I argue that these duties are our all things considered duties, and not (...)
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  36.  45
    Scalar Epistemic Consequentialism.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - forthcoming - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    The following is an advertisement for scalar epistemic consequentialism. Benefits include an epistemic consequentialism that (i) is immune from the no-positive-epistemic-duties objection and (ii) doesn’t require bullet-biting on the rightness of epistemic tradeoffs. The advertisement invites readers to think more carefully about both the definition and logical space of epistemic consequentialism.
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  37. Review of Matthias Steup (Ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue[REVIEW]Thomas D. Senor - 2002 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (3).
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  38.  56
    A Duty of Ignorance.David Matheson - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):193-205.
    Conjoined with the claim that there is a moral right to privacy, each of the major contemporary accounts of privacy implies a duty of ignorance for those against whom the right is held. In this paper I consider and respond to a compelling argument that challenges these accounts (or the claim about a right to privacy) in the light of this implication. A crucial premise of the argument is that we cannot ever be morally obligated to become ignorant of information (...)
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  39.  4
    The Right to Know: Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them.Lani Watson - 2021 - Routledge.
    We speak of the right to know with relative ease. You have the right to know the results of a medical test or to be informed about the collection and use of personal data. But what exactly is the right to know, and who should we trust to safeguard it? This book provides the first comprehensive examination of the right to know and other epistemic rights: rights to goods such as information, knowledge and truth. These rights play a prominent (...)
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  40. Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth.Timothy Perrine - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):515-529.
    Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.
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  41. The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to Do.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology (1):91-100.
    In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and combinations.
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  42. Recensioni/Reviews-Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue.M. Steup, A. Fairweather & L. Zagzebski - 2004 - Epistemologia 27 (2):346.
  43.  21
    A Duty to Explore African Ethics?Christopher Wareham - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):857-872.
    It has become increasingly common to point out that African morality is under-represented in ethical theorizing. However, it is less common to find arguments that this under-representation is unjustified. This latter claim tends to be simply assumed. In this paper I draw together arguments for this claim. In doing so, I make the case that the relative lack of attention paid to African moral ideas conflicts with epistemic and ethical values. In order to correct these shortcomings, moral theorists, broadly (...)
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  44. Epistemic Responsibility.J. Angelo Corlett - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.
    Given the hundreds of articles and books that have been written in epistemology over the span of just the past few decades, relatively little has been written specifically on epistemic responsibility. What has been written rarely considers the nature of epistemic responsibility and its possible role in epistemic justification or knowledge. Instead, such work concerns philosophical analyses and arguments about related concepts such as epistemic virtues or duties, rather than epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.2 It (...)
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  45. Is There a Duty to Speak Your Mind?Michael Hannon - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-16.
    In his recent book, Joshi (2021) argues that the open exchange of ideas is essential for the flourishing of individuals and society. He provides two arguments for this claim. First, speaking your mind is essential for the common good: we enhance our collective ability to reach the truth if we share evidence and offer different perspectives. Second, speaking your mind is good for your own sake: it is necessary to develop your rational faculties and exercise intellectual independence, both of which (...)
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  46. The Transfer of Duties: From Individuals to States and Back Again.Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2016 - In Michael Brady & Miranda Fricker (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups. Oxford University Press. pp. 150-172.
    Individuals sometimes pass their duties on to collectives, which is one way in which collectives can come to have duties. The collective discharges its duties by acting through its members, which involves distributing duties back out to individuals. Individuals put duties in and get (transformed) duties out. In this paper we consider whether (and if so, to what extent) this general account can make sense of states' duties. Do some of the duties (...)
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  47. Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. pp. 44-62.
    What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...)
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  48.  77
    Epistemic Virtue and Epistemic Responsibility.Charlotte Katzoff - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (2):105–118.
    In this paper, I propose a principle of doxastic rationality based on Bernard Williams's argument against doxastic voluntarism. This principle, I go on to show, undermines a number of notions of epistemic duty which have been put forth within the framework of virtue theory. I then suggest an alternative formulation which remains within the bounds of rationality allowed for by my principle. In the end, I suggest that the failure of the earlier formulations and the adoption of the latter (...)
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  49.  8
    Epistemic Virtue and Epistemic Responsibility.Charlotte Katzoff - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (2):105-118.
    Virtue epistemology construes intellectual virtue as a reliable ability to form true beliefs. Responsibilist versions seek to substitute for the passive, reliabilist model of the knower, that of an active subject who deliberately and purposefully exercises traits of character which tend to result in true beliefs. On these views, the disposition to exercise these epistemic virtues gives rise to notions of epistemic duty.In this paper, I propose a principle of doxastic rationality based on Bernard Williams’argument against doxastic voluntarism. (...)
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  50. A Menagerie of Duties? Normative Judgments Are Not Beliefs About Non-Natural Properties.Matthew Bedke - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):189-201.
    According to cognitive non-naturalism, normative judgments are standard beliefs that purport to be about non-natural properties. An influential plurality of normative theorists, including non-naturalist realists, error theorists and skeptics, share this view. But it is mistaken. For it predicts an epistemic profile for normative judgments that they do not have. In particular, they are not disposed to extinguish in light of accepted evidence that the any non-natural properties are absent, and they are not disposed to come into existence in (...)
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