Results for 'Epistemic obligations'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Epistemic Obligations.Richard Feldman - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:235-256.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  2.  4
    Epistemic Obligations: Truth, Individualism, and the Limits of Belief.Bruce Reichenbach - 2012 - Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.
    The book's key questions concern whether we have a right to believe whatever we choose and whether we have significant control over our beliefs. After exploring four case studies in which the question of a right to believe arises and querying what epistemic obligations are, we consider how epistemic obligations might be grounded, whether in prudence, morality, or human virtues. Some argue that epistemic excellence is less concerned with our obligations to believe the truth (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3.  45
    Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism.Hilary Kornblith - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 231--248.
  4.  30
    Epistemic Obligation and Rationality Constraints.Charlotte Katzoff - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):455-470.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5.  69
    Epistemic Obligations and Doxastic Voluntarism.Phil Goggans - 1991 - Analysis 51 (2):102 - 105.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6.  10
    Epistemic Obligation and Rationality Constraints.Charlotte Katzoff - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):455-470.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  66
    Knowledge and Epistemic Obligation.Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:211-233.
  8.  78
    Stanford’s Unconceived Alternatives From the Perspective of Epistemic Obligations.Matthew S. Sample - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):856-866.
    Kyle Stanford’s reformulation of the problem of underdetermination has the potential to highlight the epistemic obligations of scientists. Stanford, however, presents the phenomenon of unconceived alternatives as a problem for realists, despite critics’ insistence that we have contextual explanations for scientists’ failure to conceive of their successors’ theories. I propose that responsibilist epistemology and the concept of “role oughts,” as discussed by Lorraine Code and Richard Feldman, can pacify Stanford’s critics and reveal broader relevance of the “new induction.” (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9. Good Samaritans, Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives, and Epistemic Obligations.Lennart Aqvist - 1967 - Noûs 1 (4):361-379.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  10.  99
    The Powers That Bind : Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Obligation.Neil Levy & Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson (ed.), The Ethics of Belief. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 12-33.
    In this chapter, we argue for three theses: (1) we lack the power to form beliefs at will (i.e., directly); at very least, we lack the power to form at will beliefs of the kind that proponents of doxastic voluntarism have in mind; but (2) we possess a propensity to form beliefs for non-epistemic reasons; and (3) these propensities—once we come to know we have them—entail that we have obligations similar to those we would have were doxastic voluntarism (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  11.  44
    CriticaI Thinking and Epistemic Obligations.Donald Hatcher - 1995 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 14 (3):28-40.
  12.  75
    Deontic Tense Logic With Historical Necessity, Frame Constants, and a Solution to the Epistemic Obligation Paradox.Lennart Åqvist - 2014 - Theoria 80 (4):319-349.
    In an earlier paper by the author, Åqvist , I presented an approach to the logic of historical necessity, or inevitability, in the sense of a “two-dimensional” combination of tense and modal logic for worlds, or histories, with the same time order, known as T × W logic. Distinctive features of that approach were, apart from its two-dimensionality, its being based on discrete and finite time, and its use of so-called systematic frame constants in order to enable us to indicate (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13.  19
    How We Fail to Know: Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations.Anne Schwenkenbecher - forthcoming - Political Studies:online first.
    Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of ignorance. Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing, but little attention has been paid to group-based ignorance as the reason for some of our collective failings. I distinguish between different types of first-order and higher order group-based ignorance and examine how these can variously lead to problematic inaction. I will make two suggestions regarding our epistemic obligations vis-a-vis collective (in)action problems: (1) that our (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. The Obligation to Diversify One's Sources: Against Epistemic Partisanship in the Consumption of News Media.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - In Carl Fox & Joe Saunders (eds.), Media Ethics: Free Speech and the Requirements of Democracy. London: Routledge. pp. 240-264.
    In this paper, I defend the view that it is wrong for us to consume only, or overwhelmingly, media that broadly aligns with our own political viewpoints: that is, it is wrong to be politically “partisan” in our decisions about what media to consume. We are obligated to consume media that aligns with political viewpoints other than our own – to “diversify our sources”. This is so even if our own views are, as a matter of fact, substantively correct.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. Epistemic Humility and Medical Practice: Translating Epistemic Categories Into Ethical Obligations.A. Schwab - 2012 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (1):28-48.
    Physicians and other medical practitioners make untold numbers of judgments about patient care on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. These judgments fall along a number of spectrums, from the mundane to the tragic, from the obvious to the challenging. Under the rubric of evidence-based medicine, these judgments will be informed by the robust conclusions of medical research. In the ideal circumstance, medical research makes the best decision obvious to the trained professional. Even when practice approximates this ideal, it does (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  16. Moral Obligation and Epistemic Risk.Zoe Johnson-King & Boris Babic - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. In Defense of the Epistemic Imperative.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (4):435-446.
    Sample (2015) argues that scientists ought not to believe that their theories are true because they cannot fulfill the epistemic obligation to take the diachronic perspective on their theories. I reply that Sample’s argument imposes an inordinately heavy epistemic obligation on scientists, and that it spells doom not only for scientific theories but also for observational beliefs and philosophical ideas that Samples endorses. I also delineate what I take to be a reasonable epistemic obligation for scientists. In (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  18. Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.
    Epistemic instrumentalists seek to understand the normativity of epistemic norms on the model practical instrumental norms governing the relation between aims and means. Non-instrumentalists often object that this commits instrumentalists to implausible epistemic assessments. I argue that this objection presupposes an implausibly strong interpretation of epistemic norms. Once we realize that epistemic norms should be understood in terms of permissibility rather than obligation, and that evidence only occasionally provide normative reasons for belief, an instrumentalist account (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  19. What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.
    This paper is about an overlooked aspect—the cognitive or epistemic aspect—of the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how people act towards us and what they say of us, but also what they believe of us. That we can feel hurt by what others believe of us suggests both that beliefs can wrong and that there is something we epistemically owe to each other. This proposal, however, surprises many theorists who (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  20.  67
    Epistemic Versus All Things Considered Requirements.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1861-1881.
    Epistemic obligations are constraints on belief stemming from epistemic considerations alone. Booth is one of the many philosophers who deny that there are epistemic obligations. Any obligation pertaining to belief is an all things considered obligation, according to him—a strictly generic, rather than specifically epistemic, requirement. Though Booth’s argument is valid, I will try to show that it is unsound. There are two central premises: S is justified in believing that P iff S is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  21. An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.
    Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  22. Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
    A rational person doesn’t believe just anything. There are limits on what it is rational to believe. How wide are these limits? That’s the main question that interests me here. But a secondary question immediately arises: What factors impose these limits? A first stab is to say that one’s evidence determines what it is epistemically permissible for one to believe. Many will claim that there are further, non-evidentiary factors relevant to the epistemic rationality of belief. I will be ignoring (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   222 citations  
  23.  91
    Imperfect Epistemic Duties and the Justificational Fecundity of Evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4065-4075.
    Mark Nelson argues that we have no positive epistemic duties. His case rests on the evidential inexhaustibility of sensory and propositional evidence—what he calls their ‘infinite justificational fecundity’. It is argued here that Nelson’s reflections on the richness of sensory and propositional evidence do make it doubtful that we ever have an epistemic duty to add any particular beliefs to our belief set, but that they fail to establish that we have no positive epistemic duties whatsoever. A (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  24. Accessibility, Implicit Bias, and Epistemic Justification.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1529-1547.
    It has recently been argued that beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a challenge for accessibilism, since implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they seem to be relevant to epistemic justification. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that while we may typically lack conscious access to the source of implicit attitudes and their impact on our beliefs and behaviour, we do have access to their content. In this paper, I discuss the notion of accessibility required for this (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25.  63
    Epistemic Consequentialism.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epistemic Consequentialism Consequentialism is the view that, in some sense, rightness is to be understood in terms conducive to goodness. Much of the philosophical discussion concerning consequentialism has focused on moral rightness or obligation or normativity. But there is plausibly also epistemic rightness, epistemic obligation, and epistemic normativity. Epistemic rightness is often denoted with talk … Continue reading Consequentialism Epistemic →.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  26. Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?Fred Dretske - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
    The debate between externalists and internalists in epistemology can be viewed as a disagreement about whether there are epistemic rights without corresponding duties or obligations. Taking an epistemic right to believe P as an authorization to not only accept P as true but to use P as a positive reason for accepting other propositions, the debate is about whether there are unjustified justifiers. It is about whether there are propositions that provide for others what nothing need provide (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  27.  29
    The Obligation to Know: Information and the Burdens of Citizenship.Steve Vanderheiden - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):297-311.
    Contemporary persons are daily confronted with enormous quantities of information, some of which reveal causal connections between their actions and harm that is visited upon distant others. Given their limited cognitive and information processing capacities, persons cannot reasonably be expected to respond to every cry for help or call to action, but neither can they defensibly refuse to hear and reflect upon any of them. Persons have a limited obligation to know, I argue, which requires that they inform themselves and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  28. Can the Lottery Paradox Be Solved by Identifying Epistemic Justification with Epistemic Permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.
    Thomas Kroedel argues that the lottery paradox can be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility rather than epistemic obligation. According to his permissibility solution, we are permitted to believe of each lottery ticket that it will lose, but since permissions do not agglomerate, it does not follow that we are permitted to have all of these beliefs together, and therefore it also does not follow that we are permitted to believe that all tickets will lose. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. Responsible Belief and Epistemic Justification.Rik Peels - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2895-2915.
    For decades, philosophers have displayed an interest in what it is to have an epistemically justified belief. Recently, we also find among philosophers a renewed interest in the so-called ethics of belief: what is it to believe responsibly and when is one’s belief blameworthy? This paper explores how epistemically justified belief and responsible belief are related to each other. On the so-called ‘deontological conception of epistemic justification’, they are identical: to believe epistemically responsibly is to believe epistemically justifiedly. I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  30.  80
    Obligation and Aspect.Benj Hellie - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (4):398-449.
    ‘Fred must open the door’ concerns Fred’s obligations. This obligative meaning is turned off by adding aspect: ‘Fred must have opened/be opening/have been opening the door’ are one and all epistemic. Why? In a nutshell: obligative ’must’ operates on procedural contents of imperative sentences, epistemic ‘must’ on propositional contents of declarative sentences; and adding aspect converts procedural into propositional content.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31. Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (4):747-768.
    The following claims are independently plausible but jointly inconsistent: (1) epistemic deontologism is correct (i.e., there are some beliefs we ought to have, and some beliefs we ought not to have); (2) we have no voluntary control over our beliefs; (3) S’s lack of control over whether she φs implies that S has no obligation to φ or to not φ (i.e., ought-implies-can). The point of this paper is to argue that there are active and passive aspects of belief, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32.  43
    Epistemic Normativity in Kant's “Second Analogy”.James Hutton - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):593-609.
    In the “Second Analogy,” Kant argues that, unless mental contents involve the concept of causation, they cannot represent an objective temporal sequence. According to Kant, deploying the concept of causation renders a certain temporal ordering of representations necessary, thus enabling objective representational purport. One exegetical question that remains controversial is this: how, and in what sense, does deploying the concept of cause render a certain ordering of representations necessary? I argue that this necessitation is a matter of epistemic normativity: (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33.  2
    A Moral Obligation to Proper Experimentation: Research Ethics as Epistemic Filter in the Aftermath of World War II.Noortje Jacobs - 2020 - Isis 111 (4):759-780.
  34. Shared Epistemic Responsibility.Boyd Millar - forthcoming - Episteme:1-14.
    It is widely acknowledged that individual moral obligations and responsibility entail shared moral obligations and responsibility. However, whether individual epistemic obligations and responsibility entail shared epistemic obligations and responsibility is rarely discussed. Instead, most discussions of doxastic responsibility focus on individuals considered in isolation. In contrast to this standard approach, I maintain that focusing exclusively on individuals in isolation leads to a profoundly incomplete picture of what we're epistemically obligated to do and when we (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  66
    Imperative Change and Obligation to Do.Berislav Žarnić - 2003 - In Krister Segerberg & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Law, Morality: Thirteen Essays in Practical Philosophy in Honour of Lennart Åqvist. Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University. pp. 79-95.
    The ambition of the paper is to provide a solution to the problem posed by Von Wright (1999): how is it possible that the two actions, one of producing P and the other of preventing P can have different deontic status, the former being obligatory and the latter being forbidden. The solution for the problem is sought for by an investigation into connections between imperative and deontic logic. First, it is asked whether a solution could be found in Lemmon's (1965) (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  36.  75
    Why There May Be Epistemic Duties.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (1):63-89.
    Chase Wrenn argues that there are no epistemic duties. When it appears that we have an epistemic duty to believe, disbelieve or suspend judgement about some proposition P, we are really under a moral obligation to adopt the attitude towards P that our evidence favours. The argument appeals to theoretical parsimony: our conceptual scheme will be simpler without epistemic duties and we should therefore drop them. I argue that Wrenn’s strategy is flawed. There may well be things (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  37.  31
    Epistemic Neglect.Shannon Brick - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (5):490-500.
    In most testimonial transactions between adults, the hearer’s obligation is to accord the speaker a level of credibility that matches the evidence that what she is saying is true. When the speaker...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38.  35
    On Epistemic and Moral Certainty: A Wittgensteinian Approach.Michael Kober - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (3):365 – 381.
    Epistemic and moral certainities like ' This is a hand' or 'Killing people is evil' will be interpreted as constitutive rules of language games, such that they are unjustifiable, undeniable and serving as obliging standards of truth, goodness and rationality for members of a community engaging in the respective practices.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  39.  93
    Prima Facie Obligation.Nicholas Asher & Daniel Bonevac - 1996 - Studia Logica 57 (1):19-45.
    This paper presents a nonmonotonic deontic logic based on commonsense entailment. It establishes criteria a successful account of obligation should satisfy, and develops a theory that satisfies them. The theory includes two conditional notions of prima facie obligation. One is constitutive; the other is epistemic, and follows nonmonotonically from the constitutive notion. The paper defines unconditional notions of prima facie obligation in terms of the conditional notions.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  40.  47
    Prospects for A Levinasian Epistemic Infinitism.J. Aaron Simmons & Scott F. Aikin - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (3):437-460.
    Abstract Epistemic infinitism is certainly not a majority view in contemporary epistemology. While there are some examples of infinitism in the history of philosophy, more work needs to be done mining this history in order to provide a richer understanding of how infinitism might be formulated internal to different philosophical frameworks. Accordingly, we argue that the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas can be read as operating according to an ?impure? model of epistemic infinitism. The infinite obligation inaugurated by the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41.  43
    Inability and Obligation in Intellectual Evaluation.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2020 - Episteme 17 (4):475-497.
    If moral responsibilities prescribe how agents ought to behave, are there also intellectual responsibilities prescribing what agents ought to believe? Many theorists have argued that there cannot be intellectual responsibilities because they would require the ability to control whether one believes, whereas it is impossible to control whether one believes. This argument appeals to an “ought implies can” principle for intellectual responsibilities. The present paper tests for the presence of intellectual responsibilities in social cognition. Four experiments show that intellectual responsibilities (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Dretske on Epistemic Entitlement.Michael Williams - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):607-612.
    According to Fred Dretske, the debate between externalists and internalists in epistemology is about “Whether there are epistemic rights without corresponding duties or obligations. Externalists believe and internalists deny that there are such unjustified justifiers. Dretske’s first fundamental thesis is: externalists are right. Unjustified justifiers can be thought of as “given,” not because they are certain or indubitable, but because they are “free of justificational encumbrances.” Even knowledge—the supreme entitlement—requires no justification.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  43.  79
    Epistemic Justice and the Principle of Total Evidence.Sherrilyn Roush - manuscript
    Epistemic injustice is injustice to a person qua knower. In one form of this phenomenon a speaker’s testimony is denied credence in a way that wrongs them. I argue that the received definition of this testimonial injustice relies too heavily on epistemic criteria that cannot explain why the moral concept of injustice should be invoked. I give an account of the nature of the wrong of epistemic injustice that has it depend not on the accuracy of judgments (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy.Christopher Hookway - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):78-96.
    Ethics studies the evaluation of actions, agents and their mental states and characters from a distinctive viewpoint or employing a distinctive vocabulary. And epistemology examines the evaluation of actions (inquiries and assertions), agents (believers and inquirers), and their states (belief and attitudes) from a different viewpoint. Given this common concern with evaluation, we should surely expect there to be considerable similarities between the issues examined and the ideas employed in the two areas. However, when we examine most textbooks in ethics (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  45.  15
    Reconceiving the Therapeutic Obligation.D. Merli & J. A. Smith - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (1):55-74.
    The “therapeutic obligation” is a physician’s duty to provide his patients with what he believes is the best available treatment. We begin by discussing some prominent formulations of the obligation before raising two related considerations against those formulations. First, they do not make sense of cases where doctors are permitted to provide suboptimal care. Second, they give incorrect results in cases where doctors are choosing treatments in challenging epistemic environments. We then propose and defend an account of the therapeutic (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. Epistemic Dilemmas, Epistemic Quasi-Dilemmas, and Quasi-Epistemic Dilemmas.Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
    In this paper we distinguish between epistemic dilemmas, epistemic quasi-dilemmas, and quasi epistemic dilemmas. Our starting point is the commonsense position that S faces a genuine dilemma only when S must take one of two paths and both are bad. It’s the “must” that we think is key. Moral dilemmas arise because there are cases where S must perform A and S must perform B—where ‘must’ implies a moral duty—but S cannot do both. In such a situation, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  18
    Epistemic Deontologism and the Voluntarist Strategy Against Doxastic Involuntarism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2011 - Ithaque 8:1-16.
    According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification, a belief is justified when it is our obligation or duty as rational creatures to believe it. However, this view faces an important objection according to which we cannot have such epistemic obligations since our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. One possible strategy against this argument is to show that we do have voluntary control over some of our beliefs, and that we therefore have epistemic (...). This is what I call the voluntarist strategy. I examine it and argue that it is not promising. I show how the voluntarist attempts of Carl Ginet and Brian Weatherson fail, and conclude that it would be more fruitful for deontologists to look for a different strategy. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Epistemic Dilemmas: New Angles, New Arguments.Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
    It seems plausible that there can be “no win” moral situations in which no matter what one does one fails some moral obligation. Is there an epistemic analog to moral dilemmas? Are there epistemically dilemmatic situations—situations in which we are doomed to violate an epistemic requirement? If there are, when exactly do they arise and what can we learn from them? A team of top epistemologists address these and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  80
    Doxastic Decisions, Epistemic Justification, and The Logic of Agency.Heinrich Wansing - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):201-227.
    A prominent issue in mainstream epistemology is the controversy about doxastic obligations and doxastic voluntarism. In the present paper it is argued that this discussion can benefit from forging links with formal epistemology, namely the combined modal logic of belief, agency, and obligation. A stit-theory-based semantics for deontic doxastic logic is suggested, and it is claimed that this is helpful and illuminating in dealing with the mentioned intricate and important problems from mainstream epistemology. Moreover, it is argued that this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  50. Consequentialism Epistemic.Jeffrey Dunn - 2015
    Epistemic Consequentialism Consequentialism is the view that, in some sense, rightness is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to goodness. Much of the philosophical discussion concerning consequentialism has focused on moral rightness or obligation or normativity. But there is plausibly also epistemic rightness, epistemic obligation, and epistemic normativity. Epistemic rightness is often denoted with … Continue reading Consequentialism Epistemic →.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 1000