Results for 'Epistemic value'

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Bibliography: Epistemic Value in Epistemology
  1. Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.
    In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: (...)
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  2.  34
    Sosa on Epistemic Value: A Kantian Obstacle.Matthew McGrath - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In recent work, Sosa proposes a comprehensive account of epistemic value based on an axiology for attempts. According to this axiology, an attempt is better if it succeeds, better still if it is apt (i.e., succeeds through competence), and best if it is fully apt, (i.e., guided to aptness by apt beliefs that it would be apt). Beliefs are understood as attempts aiming at the truth. Thus, a belief is better if true, better still if apt, and best (...)
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  3. Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value.Georgi Gardiner - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):163-181.
    Understanding enjoys a special kind of value, one not held by lesser epistemic states such as knowledge and true belief. I explain the value of understanding via a seemingly unrelated topic, the implausibility of veritism. Veritism holds that true belief is the sole ultimate epistemic good and all other epistemic goods derive their value from the epistemic value of true belief. Veritism entails that if you have a true belief that p, you (...)
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  4.  23
    The Epistemic Value of Photographs.Catharine Abell - 2010 - In Catharine Abell & Katerina Bantinaki (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford University Press.
    There is a variety of epistemic roles to which photographs are better suited than non-photographic pictures. Photographs provide more compelling evidence of the existence of the scenes they depict than non-photographic pictures. They are also better sources of information about features of those scenes that are easily overlooked. This chapter examines several different attempts to explain the distinctive epistemic value of photographs, and argues that none is adequate. It then proposes an alternative explanation of their epistemic (...)
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  5.  62
    Epistemic Value Monism and the Swamping Problem.Scott Stapleford - 2016 - Ratio 29 (3):283-297.
    Many deontologists explain the epistemic value of justification in terms of its instrumental role in promoting truth – the original source of value in the epistemic domain. The swamping problem for truth monism appears to make this position indefensible, at least for those monists who maintain the superiority of knowledge to merely true belief. I propose a new solution to the swamping problem that allows monists to maintain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over (...)
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  6.  55
    Epistemic Value.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:0-0.
    This article summarizes recent work by epistemologists on four related problems. (1) The value of knowledge. Briefly, the problem is to explain why knowledge is, or at least appears to be, more valuable than any proper subset of its parts, such as true belief. (2) The value of understanding. The task here is to explain why understanding appears to be more valuable than any epistemic status that falls short of understanding, such as having knowledge without understanding. (3) (...)
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  7.  83
    The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement.Mikael Janvid - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (4):263-274.
    The notion of entitlement plays an important role in some influential epistemologies. Often the epistemological motive for introducing the concept is to accommodate certain externalist intuitions within an internalist framework or, conversely, to incorporate internalist traits into an otherwise externalist position. In this paper two prominent philosophers will be used as examples: Tyler Burge as a representative of the first option and Fred Dretske as one of the second. However, even on the assumption that the concept of entitlement is sufficiently (...)
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  8.  53
    Engel on Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1477-1486.
    I discuss Engel’s critique of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology and his related discussion of epistemic value. While I am sympathetic to Engel’s remarks on the former, I think he makes a crucial misstep when he relates this discussion to the latter topic. The goal of this paper is to offer a better articulation of the relationship between these two epistemological issues, with the ultimate goal of lending further support to Engel’s scepticism about pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. As we (...)
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  9.  35
    Epistemic Value and Epistemic Compromise, A Reply to Moss.Amir Konigsberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):87-97.
    In this paper I present a criticism of Sarah Moss‘ recent proposal to use scoring rules as a means of reaching epistemic compromise in disagreements between epistemic peers that have encountered conflict. The problem I have with Moss‘ proposal is twofold. Firstly, it appears to involve a double counting of epistemic value. Secondly, it isn‘t clear whether the notion of epistemic value that Moss appeals to actually involves the type of value that would (...)
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  10. Epistemic Value and Achievement.Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Ratio 25 (2):216-230.
    Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not (...)
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  11.  95
    Epistemic Value Theory and Information Ethics.Don Fallis - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (1):101-117.
    Three of the major issues in information ethics – intellectual property, speech regulation, and privacy – concern the morality of restricting people’s access to certain information. Consequently, policies in these areas have a significant impact on the amount and types of knowledge that people acquire. As a result, epistemic considerations are critical to the ethics of information policy decisions (cf. Mill, 1978 [1859]). The fact that information ethics is a part of the philosophy of information highlights this important connection (...)
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  12. Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - forthcoming - In Jeffrey Dunn Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (ed.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
    William James famously tells us that there are two main goals for rational believers: believing truth and avoiding error. I argues that epistemic consequentialism—in particular its embodiment in epistemic utility theory—seems to be well positioned to explain how epistemic agents might permissibly weight these goals differently and adopt different credences as a result. After all, practical versions of consequentialism render it permissible for agents with different goals to act differently in the same situation. -/- Nevertheless, I argue (...)
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  13.  46
    Truth and Epistemic Value.Nick Treanor - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
  14. The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    According to an influential Enlightenment ideal, one shouldn't rely epistemically on other people's say-so, at least not if one is in a position to evaluate the relevant evidence for oneself. However, in much recent work in social epistemology, we are urged to dispense with this ideal, which is seen as stemming from a misguided focus on isolated individuals to the exclusion of groups and communities. In this paper, I argue that that an emphasis on the social nature of inquiry should (...)
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  15. The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism. Or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
    Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, color expressions, future contingents, and conditionals. But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemic goal. I will call the argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. After formulating the argument, I will (...)
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  16.  57
    Is Epistemic Normativity Value-Based?Charles Cote-Bouchard - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):407-430.
    What is the source of epistemic normativity? In virtue of what do epistemic norms have categorical normative authority? According to epistemic teleologism, epistemic normativity comes from value. Epistemic norms have categorical authority because conforming to them is necessarily good in some relevant sense. In this article, I argue that epistemic teleologism should be rejected. The problem, I argue, is that there is no relevant sense in which it is always good to believe in (...)
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  17. Epistemic Values and the Value of Learning.Wayne Myrvold - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):547-568.
    In addition to purely practical values, cognitive values also figure into scientific deliberations. One way of introducing cognitive values is to consider the cognitive value that accrues to the act of accepting a hypothesis. Although such values may have a role to play, such a role does not exhaust the significance of cognitive values in scientific decision-making. This paper makes a plea for consideration of epistemic value —that is, value attaching to a state of belief—and defends (...)
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  18. Recent Work on Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):85 - 110.
    Recent discussion in epistemology has seen a huge growth in interest in the topic of epistemic value. In this paper I describe the background to this new movement in epistemology and critically survey the contemporary literature on this topic.
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  19. The Epistemic Value of Understanding.Henk W. de Regt - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):585-597.
    This article analyzes the epistemic value of understanding and offers an account of the role of understanding in science. First, I discuss the objectivist view of the relation between explanation and understanding, defended by Carl Hempel and J. D. Trout. I challenge this view by arguing that pragmatic aspects of explanation are crucial for achieving the epistemic aims of science. Subsequently, I present an analysis of these pragmatic aspects in terms of ‘intelligibility’ and a contextual account of (...)
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  20. The Procedural Epistemic Value of Deliberation.Fabienne Peter - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1253-1266.
    Collective deliberation is fuelled by disagreements and its epistemic value depends, inter alia, on how the participants respond to each other in disagreements. I use this accountability thesis to argue that deliberation may be valued not just instrumentally but also for its procedural features. The instrumental epistemic value of deliberation depends on whether it leads to more or less accurate beliefs among the participants. The procedural epistemic value of deliberation hinges on the relationships of (...)
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  21. The Epistemic Value of Speculative Fiction.Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):58-77.
    Speculative fiction, such as science fiction and fantasy, has a unique epistemic value. We examine similarities and differences between speculative fiction and philosophical thought experiments in terms of how they are cognitively processed. They are similar in their reliance on mental prospection, but dissimilar in that fiction is better able to draw in readers (transportation) and elicit emotional responses. By its use of longer, emotionally poignant narratives and seemingly irrelevant details, speculative fiction allows for a better appraisal of (...)
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  22. Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
     
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  23.  13
    Epistemic Value.John Greco & Luis Pinto De Sa - 2018 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epistemic value is a kind of value possessed by knowledge, and perhaps other epistemic goods such as justification and understanding. The problem of explaining the value of knowledge is perennial in philosophy, going back at least as far as Plato’s Meno. One formulation of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is valuable. Another version of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is more valuable than mere (...)
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  24.  59
    Epistemic Value.Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge (...)
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  25. Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.
    It is argued that it is beneficial to view the debate regarding radical scepticism through the lens of epistemic value. In particular, it is claimed that we should regard radical scepticism as aiming to deprive us of an epistemic standing that is of special value to us, and that this methodological constraint on our dealings with radical scepticism potentially has important ramifications for how we assess the success of an anti-sceptical strategy.
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  26.  11
    Can Performance Epistemology Explain Higher Epistemic Value?Kurt L. Sylvan - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    Judgment and Agency contains Sosa’s latest effort to explain how higher epistemic value of the sort missing from an unwitting clairvoyant’s beliefs might be a special case of performance normativity, with its superior value following from truisms about performance value. This paper argues that the new effort rests on mistaken assumptions about performance normativity. Once these mistaken assumptions are exposed, it becomes clear that higher epistemic value cannot be a mere special case of performance (...)
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    Epistemic Value. Curiosity, Knowledge and Response-Dependence.Nenad Miščević - 2016 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):393-417.
    The paper addresses two fundamental issues in epistemic axiology. It argues primarily that curiosity, in particular its intrinsic variety, is the foundational epistemic virtue since it is the value-bestowing epistemic virtue. A response-dependentist framework is proposed, according to which a cognitive state is epistemically valuable if a normally or ideally curious or inquisitive cognizer would be motivated to reach it. Curiosity is the foundational epistemic virtue, since it bestows epistemic value. It also motivates (...)
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  28. Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology.Don Fallis - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):177-188.
    In order to guide the decisions of real people who want to bring about good epistemic outcomes for themselves and others, we need to understand our epistemic values. In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman has proposed an epistemic value theory that allows us to say whether one outcome is epistemically better than another. However, it has been suggested that Goldman's theory is not really an epistemic value theory at all because whether one (...)
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  29.  24
    Epistemic Value: The Insufficiency of Truth.Benoit Gaultier - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):303-316.
    We are naturally inclined to judge that it is better to know that p than to merely truly believe that p. How to account for this intuition? In this paper, I examine Williamson, Goldman and Olsson, and Pritchard's answers, and agree with Pritchard that it cannot be consistently claimed that knowledge is epistemically superior to mere true belief, and that truth is the only finally valuable epistemic good. Contrary to Pritchard, I argue that the latter claim is deeply mistaken. (...)
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  30. Epistemic Value. Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge (...)
     
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  31.  85
    The Epistemic Value of Intuitive Moral Judgements.Albert W. Musschenga - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):113-128.
    In this article, I discuss whether intuitive moral judgements have epistemic value. Are they mere expressions of irrational feelings that should be disregarded or should they be taken seriously? In section 2, I discuss the view of some social psychologists that moral intuitions are, like other social intuitions, under certain conditions more reliable than conscious deliberative judgements. In sections 3 and 4, I examine whether intuitive moral judgements can be said not to need inferential justification. I outline a (...)
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  32.  54
    Epistemic Value, Achievements, and Questions.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):43-57.
    A central intuition many epistemologists seem to have is that knowledge is distinctively valuable. In his paper 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value', Duncan Pritchard rejects the virtue-theoretic explanation of this intuition. This explanation says that knowledge is distinctively valuable because it is a cognitive achievement. It is maintained, in the first place, that the arguments Pritchard musters against the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive achievement are unconvincing. It is argued, in the second place, that (...)
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  33.  92
    Epistemic Value.Dennis Whitcomb - 2012 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. pp. 270-287.
    Epistemology is normative. This normativity has been widely recognized for a long time, but it has recently come into direct focus as a central topic of discussion. The result is a recent and large turn towards focusing on epistemic value. I’ll start by describing some of the history and motivations of this recent value turn. Then I’ll categorize the work within the value turn into three strands, and I’ll discuss the main writings in those strands. Finally, (...)
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  34. Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value.Pascal Engel - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
     
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  35.  63
    Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation.Don Fallis - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):39-55.
    The doctrinal paradox shows that aggregating individual judgments by taking a majority vote does not always yield a consistent set of collective judgments. Philip Pettit, Luc Bovens, and Wlodek Rabinowicz have recently argued for the epistemic superiority of an aggregation procedure that always yields a consistent set of judgments. This paper identifies several additional epistemic advantages of their consistency maintaining procedure. However, this paper also shows that there are some circumstances where the majority vote procedure is epistemically superior. (...)
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  36.  53
    The Epistemic Value of Curiosity.F. Schmitt Frederick & Lahroodi Reza - 2008 - Educational Theory 58 (2):125-148.
    In this essay, Frederick Schmitt and Reza Lahroodi explore the value of curiosity for inquiry and knowledge. They defend an appetitive account of curiosity, viewing curiosity as a motivationally original desire to know that arises from having one’s attention drawn to the object and that in turn sustains one’s attention to it. Distinguishing curiosity from wonder, the authors explore several sources of the epistemic value of curiosity. First, curiosity is tenacious: curiosity whether a proposition is true leads (...)
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  37.  49
    Why Do True Beliefs Differ in Epistemic Value?Xingming Hu - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):255-269.
    Veritism claims that only true beliefs are of basic epistemic value. Michael DePaul argues that veritism is false because it entails the implausible view that all true beliefs are of equal epistemic value. In this paper, I discuss two recent replies to DePaul's argument: one offered by Nick Treanor and the other by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Stephen Grimm. I argue that neither of the two replies is successful. I propose a new response to DePaul's argument and (...)
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    The Epistemic Value of Diversity.Emily Robertson - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):299-310.
    This article briefly considers current positions about whether the inclusion of the perspectives and interests of marginalised groups in the construction of knowledge is of epistemic value. It is then argued that applied social epistemology is the proper epistemic stance to take in evaluating this question. Theorists who have held that diversity makes an epistemic contribution are interpreted as attempting to reform social pathways to knowledge in ways that make true belief more likely. Thus, the demand (...)
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  39.  50
    How to Be an Epistemic Value Pluralist.David Matheson - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):391-405.
    ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend an epistemic value pluralism according to which true belief, justified belief, and knowledge are all fundamental epistemic values. After laying out reasons to reject epistemic value monism in its central forms, I present my pluralist alternative and show how it can adequately explain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over both true belief and justified belief, despite their fundamentality. I conclude with a sketch of how this pluralism (...)
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  40.  77
    The Epistemic Value of the Democratic Process.William Nelson - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):pp. 19-32.
    An epistemic theory of democracy, I assume, is meant to provide on answer to the question of why democracy is desirable. It does so by trying to show how the democratic process can have epistemic value. I begin by describing a couple of examples of epistemic theories in the literature and bringing out what they presuppose. I then examine a particular type of theory, worked out most thoroughly by Joshua Cohen, which seems to imply that democracy (...)
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  41.  18
    The Epistemic Value of Brain-Machine Systems for the Study of the Brain.Edoardo Datteri - unknown
    Leading researchers have claimed that bionic systems, connecting biological tissues with computer or robotic devices through brain-machine interfaces, can contribute not only to the restoration of lost sensory-motor abilities but also to neuroscientific research. This claim has been recently undermined by philosopher of neuroscience Carl Craver, who has proposed a sceptical argument on the epistemic value of bionic systems. This paper has a specific and a more general goal. The first one is to show that Craver’s argument, though (...)
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  42.  63
    The Epistemic Value of Explanation.Andrés Páez - unknown
    In this paper I defend the idea that there is a sense in which it is meaningful and useful to talk about objective understanding, and that to characterize that notion it is necessary to formulate an account of explanation that makes reference to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the participants in a cognitive enterprise. Using the framework for belief revision developed by Isaac Levi, I analyze the conditions that information must fulfill to be both potentially explanatory and epistemically (...)
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  43. Reflection, Epistemic Value and Human Flourishing.Waldomiro Silva Filho & Felipe Rocha - forthcoming - Analytica.
    In this paper, we discuss two recurring themes in Sosa’s work, reexamined in Judgment and Agency (SOSA, 2015) from a new angle, i.e. the place and importance of reflection in the cognitive economy of the epistemic agent, and epistemic value. Regarding the latter, Sosa suggests that knowing full well, which necessarily involves reflection, has value because it contributes to human flourishing. Although Sosa’s “new virtue epistemology” appears very promising in explaining different intuitions regarding epistemology and demonstrating (...)
     
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  44.  13
    An Epistemic Value Theory.Dennis Whitcomb - 2007 - Dissertation, Rutgers
    For any normative domain, we can theorize about what is good in that domain. Such theories include utilitarianism, a view about what is good morally. But there are many domains other than the moral; these include the prudential, the aesthetic, and the intellectual or epistemic. In this last domain, it is good to be knowledgeable and bad to ignore evidence, quite apart from the morality, prudence, and aesthetics of these things. This dissertation builds a theory that stands to the (...)
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  45.  7
    A Notorious Example of Failed Mindreading: Dramatic Irony and the Moral and Epistemic Value of Art.W. Scott Clifton - 2016 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 50 (3):73-90.
    The act of mindreading has been recognized to have great moral and epistemic value. Unfortunately, psychological research has shown that we are naturally inaccurate at mindreading, which should worry us quite a bit. It has also been shown that when motivated to mindread well, subjects become more accurate. In this paper I argue that some kinds of artwork—specifically, those utilizing dramatic irony—can educate us as to how valuable accurate mindreading is and motivate us to try to mindread well. (...)
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  46. Epistemic Value and Virtue Epistemology.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Southampton
    My contributions to the research on epistemic value can be divided into two parts: first, I pinpoint some causes of the problems about epistemic value which have not previously been identified; and, second, I offer novel accounts of epistemic value which offer better solutions to the problems about epistemic value. First, there are two trends in the literature on epistemic value that are rarely challenged: epistemologists tend to understand epistemic (...)
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  47.  13
    What Is Art Good For? The Socio-Epistemic Value of Art.Aleksandra Sherman & Clair Morrissey - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11.
    Scientists, humanists, and art lovers alike value art not just for its beauty, but also for its social and epistemic importance; that is, for its communicative nature, its capacity to increase one's self-knowledge and encourage personal growth, and its ability to challenge our schemas and preconceptions. However, empirical research tends to discount the importance of such social and epistemic outcomes of art engagement, instead focusing on individuals' preferences, judgments of beauty, pleasure, or other emotional appraisals as the (...)
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  48.  9
    The Epistemic Value of Emotions in Politics.Benedetta Romano - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):589-608.
    In this paper, I consider emotional reactions in response to political facts, and I investigate how they may provide relevant knowledge about those facts. I assess the value of such knowledge, both from an epistemic and a political perspective. Concerning the epistemic part, I argue that, although emotions are not in themselves sufficient to ground evaluative knowledge about political facts, they can do so within a network of further coherent epistemic attitudes about those facts. With regards (...)
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  49. The Epistemic Value of Good Sense.Abrol Fairweather - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):139-146.
  50. Some Aspects of Epistemic Value and Role of Moral Instuitions in Ethics Education.Vojko Strahovnik - 2014 - Metodicki Ogledi 21 (2):35-51.
    Moral philosophy has for quite some time practiced the use of thought experiments in argumentative strategies. Thought experiments can be understood as imagined scenarios with a certain level of complexity and novelty, which are usually designed and used to elicit our responses or moral intuitions in order to make our use of key moral concepts clearer or in order to support or reject a particular ethical theory, general moral principle, hypothesis, deeply held moral belief or presupposition. Such imagined cases also (...)
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