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Eric Funkhouser [21]Eric Matthew Funkhouser [1]
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Profile: Eric Funkhouser (University of Arkansas, Fayetteville)
  1. The Determinable-Determinate Relation.Eric Funkhouser - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):548–569.
    The properties colored and red stand in a special relation. Namely, red is a determinate of colored, and colored is determinable relative to red. Many other properties are similarly related. The determination relation is an interesting topic of logical investigation in its own right, and the prominent philosophical inquiries into this relation have, accordingly, operated at a high level of abstraction.1 It is time to return to these investigations, not just as a logical amusement, but for the payoffs such investigation (...)
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  2. Do the Self-Deceived Get What They Want?Eric Funkhouser - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.
    Two of the most basic questions regarding self-deception remain unsettled: What do self-deceivers want? What do self-deceivers get? I argue that self-deceivers are motivated by a desire to believe. However, in significant contrast with Alfred Mele’s account of self-deception, I argue that self-deceivers do not satisfy this desire. Instead, the end-state of self-deception is a false higher-order belief. This shows all self-deception to be a failure of self-knowledge.
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  3. Three Varieties of Causal Overdetermination.Eric Funkhouser - 2002 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):335-351.
    Causal overdetermination worries arise in a number of domains, but most notably in the philosophy of mind. ln discussions of such worries, alleged examples of causal overdetermination are uniformly viewed as primajzcie problematic. While all alleged cases of overdetermination might be problematic, I aim to show that they are so for different reasons. Examples of causal overdetermination neatly divide into three varieties, corresponding to the connections between the mechanisms and the properties of the causes. Future debates over overdetermination, and mental (...)
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  4. Imagination and Other Scripts.Eric Funkhouser & Shannon Spaulding - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):291-314.
    One version of the Humean Theory of Motivation holds that all actions can be causally explained by reference to a belief–desire pair. Some have argued that pretense presents counter-examples to this principle, as pretense is instead causally explained by a belief-like imagining and a desire-like imagining. We argue against this claim by denying imagination the power of motivation. Still, we allow imagination a role in guiding action as a script . We generalize the script concept to show how things besides (...)
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  5.  54
    Robust, Unconscious Self-Deception: Strategic and Flexible.Eric Funkhouser & David Barrett - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):1-15.
    In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and psychological claims that the unconscious is rigid, ballistic, and of (...)
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  6.  72
    Self-Deception and the Limits of Folk Psychology.Eric Funkhouser - 2009 - Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):1-13.
    This article considers the product of self-deception. Many assume, or argue, that the product of self-deception is a belief. I argue against this being a general truth by outlining some of the ways in which the self-deceived can be deeply conflicted, such that there is no fact of the matter concerning what they believe. These situations are not adequately addressed by many accounts of self-deception. Further, I argue that this task requires going beyond our folk psychological classifications.
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  7. Multiple Realizability.Eric Funkhouser - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):303–315.
    b>: This article explains the concept of multiple realizability and its role in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I consider what is required for the multiple realizability of psychological kinds, the relevance of multiple realizability to the reducibility and autonomy of psychology, as well as further refinements of the concept that would prove helpful.
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  8.  35
    The Logical Structure of Kinds.Eric Funkhouser - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Eric Funkhouser uncovers a logical structure that is common to many, if not all, classificatory systems or taxonomies. Every conceptual scheme--including the sciences, mathematics, and ethics--classifies things into kinds. Given their ubiquity across theoretical contexts, we would benefit from understanding the nature of such kinds. Significantly, most conceptual schemes posit kinds that vary in their degree of specificity. Species-genus taxonomies provide us with familiar examples, with the species classification being more specific than the genus classification. This book instead focuses on (...)
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  9. A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability.Eric Funkhouser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):467-494.
    While the concept of multiple realizability is widely used, it is seldom rigorously characterized. This paper defends a liberal conception of multiple realizability as sameness of type through _any_ differences in the (lower-level) conditions that give rise to instances of that type. This kind of “sameness through difference” is contrasted with another type of asymmetric dependency relation between properties, multiple _specification_. This liberal conception is then defended from objections, and it is augmented by a concept of relativized multiple realizability. The (...)
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  10. On Privileging God's Moral Goodness.Eric Funkhouser - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (4):409-422.
    Prima facie, there is an incompatibility between God’s alleged omnipotence and impeccability. I argue that this incompat- ibility is more than prima facie. Attempts to avoid this appearance of incompatibility by allowing that there are commonplace states of affairs that an omnipotent being cannot bring about are unsuc- cessful. Instead, we should accept that God is not omnipotent. This is acceptable since it is a mistake to hold that omnipotence is a perfection. God’s moral perfection should be privileged over God’s (...)
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  11.  8
    Beliefs as Signals: A New Function for Belief.Eric Funkhouser - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-23.
    Beliefs serve at least two broad functions. First, they help us navigate the world. Second, they serve as signals to manipulate others. Philosophers and psychologists have focused on the first function while largely overlooking the second. This article advances a conception of signals and makes a prima facie case for a social signaling function for at least some beliefs. Truth and rational support are often irrelevant to the signaling function. If some beliefs evolved for a signaling function, then we should (...)
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  12. Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination.Eric Funkhouser - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369.
    In traditional Frankfurt cases some conditions that make an outcome unavoidable fail to bring about that outcome. These are cases of causal preemption. I defend this interpretation of traditional Frankfurt cases, and its application to free will, against a dilemma raised by various libertarians. But I go on to argue that Frankfurt cases involving gen- uine causal overdetermination are even more effective at achieving the compatibilist’s purposes. Such cases avoid the “flicker of freedom” debate and better display the central disagreement (...)
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  13.  11
    Is Self-Deception an Effective Non-Cooperative Strategy?Eric Funkhouser - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (2):221-242.
    Robert Trivers has proposed perhaps the only serious adaptationist account of self-deception—that the primary function of self-deception is to better deceive others. But this account covers only a subset of cases and needs further refinement. A better evolutionary account of self-deception and cognitive biases more generally will more rigorously recognize the various ways in which false beliefs affect both the self and others. This article offers formulas for determining the optimal doxastic orientation, giving special consideration to conflicted self-deception as an (...)
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  14.  3
    Reply to Doody.Eric Funkhouser & David Barrett - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-5.
    In an earlier paper, we appealed to various empirical studies to make the case that the unconscious mind is capable of robust self-deception. Paul Doody has challenged our interpretations of that empirical evidence. In this reply we defend our interpretations, arguing that the unconscious is engaged in strategic and flexible goal pursuit.
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  15. Willing Belief and the Norm of Truth.Eric Funkhouser - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (2):179-95.
    Bernard Williams has argued that, because belief aims at getting the truth right, it is a conceptual truth that we cannot directly will to believe. Manyothers have adopted Williams claim that believers necessarily respect truth-conducive reasons and evidence. By presenting increasingly stronger cases, I argue that, on the contrary, believers can quite consciously disregard the demand for truth-conducive reasons and evidence. The irrationality of those who would directly will to believe is not any greater than that displayed by some actual (...)
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  16.  42
    Practical Self-­Deception.Eric Funkhouser - unknown
    Philosophical accounts of self-­‐deception almost invariably treat it as a phenomenon concerning belief. But this article argues that, in the very same sense that we can be self-­‐deceived about belief, we can be self-­‐deceived about matters that concern our practical identities — e.g., our desires, emotions, values, and lifestyles. Given that our practical identities are at least as important as our status as believers, philosophical accounts of self-­‐deception should accommodate such practical self-­‐deception.
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  17.  20
    Review of Anna-Sofia Maurin, If Tropes[REVIEW]Eric Funkhouser - 2004 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (2).
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  18.  7
    Comments on David Palmer's.Eric Funkhouser - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (2):91-93.
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  19.  1
    Willing Belief and the Norm of Truth.Eric Funkhouser - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (2):179-195.
    Bernard Williams has argued that, because belief aims at getting the truth right, it is a conceptual truth that we cannot directly will to believe. Many others have adopted Williams' claim that believers necessarily respect truth-conducive reasons and evidence. By presenting increasingly stronger cases, I argue that, on the contrary, believers can quite consciously disregard the demand for truth-conducive reasons and evidence. The irrationality of those who would directly will to believe is not any greater than that displayed by some (...)
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  20.  1
    Comments on David Palmer's "Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Determinism: Begging the Question in the Frankfurt Cases".Eric Funkhouser - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (2):91-93.
  21.  8
    Comments on David Palmer's "Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Determinism".Eric Funkhouser - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (2):91-93.
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