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Eric Marcus [16]Eric Arthur Marcus [1]
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Profile: Eric Marcus (Auburn University)
  1.  40
    Aesthetic Rationality.Keren Gorodeisky & Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    We argue that the aesthetic domain falls inside the scope of rationality, but does so in its own way. To explain an action or belief by citing someone’s reason is to state a factor in virtue of whose support the action was performed or the proposition believed. But aesthetic judgment is a stance neither on whether a proposition is to be believed nor on whether an action is to be done, but rather on whether an object is to be appreciated. (...)
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  2. To Believe is to Know That You Believe.Eric Marcus - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):375-405.
    Most agree that believing a proposition normally or ideally results in believing that one believes it, at least if one considers the question of whether one believes it. I defend a much stronger thesis. It is impossible to believe without knowledge of one's belief. I argue, roughly, as follows. Believing that p entails that one is able to honestly assert that p. But anyone who is able to honestly assert that p is also able to just say – i.e., authoritatively, (...)
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  3. Why Zombies Are Inconceivable.Eric Marcus - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):477-90.
    I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they _must_ involve first-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, _cannot_. Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have unwittingly conflated imagining a creature who lacks consciousness with imagining a creature without also imagining the consciousness it may or may not (...)
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  4. Mental Causation: Unnaturalized but Not Unnatural.Eric Marcus - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):57-83.
    If a woman in the audience at a presentation raises her hand, we would take this as evidence that she intends to ask a question. In normal circumstances, we would be right to say that she raises her hand because she intends to ask a question. We also expect that there could, in principle, be a causal explanation of her hand’s rising in purely physiological terms. Ordinarily, we take the existence and compatibility of both kinds of causes for granted. But (...)
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  5. Rational Causation.Eric Marcus - 2012 - Harvard University Press.
  6. On the Parallels Between Theoretical and Practical Rationality: Reply to Setiya.Eric Marcus - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):512-525.
    Two principles are central to Rational Causation. Causalism: Believing and acting for a reason are causal phenomena in the sense that there is in both domains a causal connection between ground and grounded. Equivalence: There is a necessary connection between something's being the reason why I believe or act and my taking it to favour the belief or action. Kieran Setiya argues that Causalism is false in the theoretical case and that Equivalence is false in the practical case. I reply (...)
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  7. Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem.Eric Marcus - 2006 - Synthese 150 (1):99-129.
    In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical (...)
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  8. Summary.Eric Marcus - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):499-501.
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  9. Mental Causation in a Physical World.Eric Marcus - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50.
    Abstract: It is generally accepted that the most serious threat to the possibility of mental causation is posed by the causal self-sufficiency of physical causal processes. I argue, however, that this feature of the world, which I articulate in principle I call Completeness, in fact poses no genuine threat to mental causation. Some find Completeness threatening to mental causation because they confuse it with a stronger principle, which I call Closure. Others do not simply conflate Completeness and Closure, but (...)
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  10.  95
    Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum.Eric Marcus - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.
    There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according to which (...)
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  11.  79
    Why There Are No Token States.Eric Marcus - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:215-241.
    The thesis that mental states are physical states enjoys widespread popularity. After the abandonment of typeidentity theories, however, this thesis has typically been framed in terms of state tokens. I argue that token states are a philosopher’s fiction, and that debates about the identity of mental and physical state tokens thus rest on a mistake.
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  12.  39
    Mental Causation.Eric Marcus - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):57 - 83.
    The central problem for a realist about mental causation is to show that mental causation is compatible with the causal completeness of physical systems. This problem has seemed intractable in large part because of a widely held view that any sort of systematic overdetermination of events by their causes is unacceptable. I account for the popularity of this view, but argue that we ought to reject it. In doing so, I show how we thereby undermine the idea that mental causes (...)
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  13.  63
    Life and Action.Eric Marcus - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):749-751.
  14.  17
    On the Sortal Dependence of Event Identity.Eric Marcus - 2000 - Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):83-89.
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  15. Defending Naïve Realism About Mental Properties.Eric Marcus - manuscript
    _metaphysically transparent_: we do not arrive at a better understanding of the realm of facts that make such talk true or false when we abandon ordinary mental concepts in favor of naturalistic concepts—or, for that matter, in favor of supernaturalistic concepts, although _super_naturalism will not be my concern here. Rather, it is ordinary mental concepts themselves that provide the best framework for understanding the metaphysics of mind. In this essay, I will be concerned just with naïve realism about mental _properties_. (...)
     
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  16. Why There Are No Token States.Eric Marcus - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:215-241.
    The thesis that mental states are physical states enjoys widespread popularity. After the abandonment of typeidentity theories, however, this thesis has typically been framed in terms of state tokens. I argue that token states are a philosopher’s fiction, and that debates about the identity of mental and physical state tokens thus rest on a mistake.
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