Conscious awareness comprises two distinct states, autonoetic and noetic awareness. Schizophrenia impairs autonoetic, but not noetic, awareness. We investigated the strategic regulation of relevant and irrelevant contents of conscious awareness in schizophrenia using a directed forgetting paradigm. Twenty-one patients with schizophrenia and 21 normal controls were presented with words and told to learn some of them and forget others. In a subsequent test, they were asked to recognize all the words they had seen previously and give remember, know or guess (...) responses according to whether they recognized words on the basis of autonoetic awareness, noetic awareness, or guessing. Overall, patients showed the same degree of a directed forgetting effect as normal subjects. However, whereas the effect was observed both for remember and know responses in normal subjects, it was observed for know, but not for remember, responses in patients. These results indicate that patients with schizophrenia exhibit an impaired strategic regulation of contents of autonetic awareness for relevant and irrelevant information. (shrink)

We argue that moral judgment studies currently conducted utilizing virtual reality (VR) devices must confront a dilemma due to how virtual environments are designed and how those environments are experienced. We begin by first describing the contexts present in paradigmatic cases of naturalistic moral judgments. We then compare these contexts to current traditional (vignette-based) and VR-based moral judgment research. We show that, contra to paradigmatic cases, vignette-based and VR-based moral judgment research often fails to accurately model the situational features of (...) paradigmatic moral judgments. In particular, we compare and contrast six recent VR studies to support our view that only simulations high in context-realism and perspectival-fidelity can produce ‘virtually real experiences.’ After analyzing the constituents of a virtually-real experience, we go on to propose guidelines for the creation of VR studies. These guidelines serve two purposes. First, we aim to increase the ecological validity of such studies in order to advance our understanding of moral judgments. Second, we believe that such guidelines should inform how Institutional Review Boards assess VR research. We show that our guidelines are urgently needed given the current lax review standards in place. (shrink)

Chemical incarceration -- Restraints and treatment -- On the ground -- Authorization : psychiatric history and law -- Biocarceration -- Transinstitutionalization -- Dreams of escape -- In the present.

This article criticizes what it calls perspectival thought experiments, which require subjects to mentally simulate a perspective before making judgments from within it. Examples include Judith Thomson's violinist analogy, Philippa Foot's trolley problem, and Bernard Williams's Jim case. The article argues that advances in the philosophical and psychological study of empathy suggest that the simulative capacities required by perspectival thought experiments are all but impossible. These thought experiments require agents to consciously simulate necessarily unconscious features of subjectivity. To complete these (...) experiments subjects must deploy theory-theoretical frameworks to predict what they think they would do. These outputs, however, systematically mislead subjects and are highly prone to error. They are of negligible probative value, and this bodes poorly for their continued use. The article ends with two suggestions. First, many thought experiments are not problematically perspectival. Second, it should be possible to carry out “in-their-shoes” perspectival thought experiments by off-loading simulations onto virtual environments into which philosophers place subjects. (shrink)

The Gamer's Dilemma challenges us to find a distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. Without such a distinction, we are forced to conclude that either both are morally acceptable or that both should be morally illicit. This paper argues that the best way to solve the dilemma is, in one sense, to dissolve it. The Gamer's Dilemma rests on a misunderstanding in the sense that it does not distinguish between the form of a simulation and its surface content. A (...) greater appreciation of the way structural features of a simulation affect subject experience will help us see why only simulations of murder and pedophilia generating virtually real experiences are likely to be seen as wrong. I argue that a simulation’s structural elements powerfully affect how subjects experience simulated content and hence is an important, and previously neglected, variable necessary to dissolve the Gamer's Dilemma. Properly understood, virtually real simulations of murder and pedophilia are both likely to be treated by players as morally wrong. Similarly, virtually unreal murder and pedophilia will be less likely to be judged as wrong. Subject judgments are thus consistent once a simulation’s structural variables are accounted for. The Gamer's Dilemma dissolves as a dilemma once we acknowledge these structural features of simulations and how they affect experience and moral judgment. (shrink)

I argue that deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a bad approach for incarcerated psychopaths for two reasons. First, given what we know about psychopathy, empathy, and DBS, it is unlikely to function as an effective treatment for the moral problems that characterize psychopathy. Second, considerations of neurodiversity speak against seeing psychopathy as a mental illness in the first place.

In this paper, we argue that, under a specific set of circumstances, designing and employing certain kinds of virtual reality (VR) experiences can be unethical. After a general discussion of simulations and their ethical context, we begin our argu-ment by distinguishing between the experiences generated by different media (text, film, computer game simulation, and VR simulation), and argue that VR experiences offer an unprecedented degree of what we call “perspectival fidelity” that prior modes of simulation lack. Additionally, we argue that (...) when VR experiences couple this perspectival fidelity with what we call “context realism,” VR experiences have the ability to produce “virtually real experiences.” We claim that virtually real experiences generate ethical issues for VR technologies that are unique to the medium. Because subjects of these experiences treat them as if they were real, a higher degree of ethical scrutiny should be applied to any VR scenario with the potential to generate virtually real experiences. To mitigate this unique moral hazard, we propose and defend what we call “The Equivalence Principle.” This principle states that “if it would be wrong to allow subjects to have a certain experience in reality, then it would be wrong to allow subjects to have that experience in a virtually real setting.” We argue that such a principle, although limited in scope, should be part of the risk analysis conducted by any Institutional Review Boards, psychologists, empirically oriented philosophers, or game designers who are using VR technology in their work. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists often claim that moral agency is connected with the ability to feel, understand, and deploy moral emotions. In this chapter, I investigate the nature of these emotions and their connection with moral agency. First, I examine the degree to which these emotional capacities are innate and/or ‘basic’ in a philosophically important sense. I examine three senses in which an emotion might be basic: developmental, compositional, and phylogenetic. After considering the evidence for basic emotion, I conclude that emotions (...) are not basic in a philosophically important sense. Emotions, I argue, are best understood as socially constructed concepts. I then investigate whether these emotions are necessary for moral agency. In order to do this I examine the philosophical and psychological literature on psychopathy and autism (two conditions defined in terms of empathic and emotional deficits). Persons with psychopathy appear incapable of distinguishing moral from non-moral norms. Additionally, while persons with autism often struggle to develop their empathic capacities, they are capable of understanding and deploying moral emotions like guilt and shame. I conclude that, in line with the conceptual act theories of emotion, that only contagion-based empathy is necessary for the acquisition of moral concepts. (shrink)

Section 1 contains a survey of options in constructing a formal system of dialogue rules. The distinction between material and formal systems is discussed (section 1.1). It is stressed that the material systems are, in several senses, formal as well. In section 1.2 variants as to language form (choices of logical constants and logical rules) are pointed out. Section 1.3 is concerned with options as to initial positions and the permissibility of attacks on elementary statements. The problem of ending a (...) dialogue, and of infinite dialogues, is treated in section 1.4. Other options, e.g., as to the number of attacks allowed with respect to each statement, are listed in section 1.5. Section 1.6 explains the concept of a chain of arguments.From section 2 onward four types of dialectic systems are picked out for closer study: D, E, Di and Ei. After a preliminary section on dialogue sequents and winning strategies, the equivalence of derivability in intuitionistic logic and the existence of a winning strategy (for the Proponent) on the strength of Ei is shown by simple inductive proofs. (shrink)

In popular culture psychopaths are inaccurately portrayed as serial killers or homicidal maniacs. Most real-world psychopaths are neither killers nor maniacs. Psychologists currently understand psychopathy as an affective disorder that leads to repeated criminal and antisocial behavior. Counter to this prevailing view, I claim that psychopathy is not necessarily linked with criminal behavior. Successful psychopaths, an intriguing new category of psychopathic agent, support this conception of psychopathy. I then consider reactive attitude theories of moral responsibility. Within this tradition, psychopaths are (...) thought to be blameless as a result of their pronounced affective deficits. Psychopaths are considered morally blind because they lack the moral emotions that make us sensitive to moral reasons. I argue that, even if they are morally blind, psychopaths remain open to forms of blame stemming from non-moral reactive attitudes. These reactive attitudes remain appropriate because psychopaths can express hateful, disgusting, or contemptible non-moral values in their judgments. (shrink)

Contrary to concerns of some critics, we present evidence that biomedical research is not dominated by a small handful of model organisms. An exhaustive analysis of research literature suggests that the diversity of experimental organisms in biomedical research has increased substantially since 1975. There has been a longstanding worry that organism‐centric funding policies can lead to biases in experimental organism choice, and thus negatively impact the direction of research and the interpretation of results. Critics have argued that a focus on (...) model organisms has unduly constrained the diversity of experimental organisms. The availability of large electronic databases of scientific literature, combined with interest in quantitative methods among philosophers of science, presents new opportunities for data‐driven investigations into organism choice in biomedical research. The diversity of organisms used in NIH‐funded research may be considerably lower than in the broader biomedical sciences, and may be subject to greater constraints on organism choice. (shrink)

I argue that psychopathy undermines three common assumptions typically invoked in favor of moderate reasons responsive theories of moral responsibility. First, I propose a theory of psychopathic agency and claim that psychopathic agency suggests that the systems underlying receptivity to reason bifurcate into at least two sub-systems of receptivity. Next, I claim that the bifurcation of systems for receptivity suggests that reactivity is not “all of a piece” but that it too decomposes into at least two subsystems. Lastly, I argue (...) that prior attempts by Fischer and Ravizza to address these concerns contain an appeal to internalism. Since Fischer and Ravizza want their theory to remain agnostic about the nature of reasons for action, this appeal to internalism is problematic for their view. I close by suggesting that if we are to make sense of when and why psychopaths are responsible then a mechanism-based theory of responsibility must be able to explain how different systems of receptivity and reactivity come together to constitute a single mechanism that grounds responsibility ascriptions for action and they must do so without tacitly appealing to implausible forms of internalism about reasons for action. (shrink)

This paper makes two essential claims about the nature of shame and shame punishment. I argue that, if we properly understand the nature of shame, that it is sometimes justifiable to shame others in the context of a pluralistic multicultural society. I begin by assessing the accounts of shame provided by Cheshire Calhoun (2004) and Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, & Fabrice Teroni (2012). I argue that both views have problems. I defend a theory of shame and embarrassment that connects both (...) emotions to “whole-self” properties. Shame and embarrassment, I claim, are products of the same underlying emotion. I distinguish between moralized and nonmoralized shame in order to show when, and how, moral and non-moral shame may be justly deployed. Shame is appropriate, I argue, if and only if it targets malleable moral or non-moral normative imperfections of a person’s ‘whole-self.’ Shame is unjustifiable when it targets durable aspects of a person’s “whole-self.” I conclude by distinguishing shame punishments from guilt punishments and show that my account can explain why it is wrong to shame individuals on account of their race, sex, gender, or body while permitting us to sometimes levy shame and shame punishment against others, even those otherwise immune to moral reasons. (shrink)

Reactive theories of responsibility see moral accountability as grounded on the capacity for feeling reactive-attitudes. I respond to a recent argument gaining ground in this tradition that excludes psychopaths from accountability. The argument relies on what Paul Russell has called the 'subjectivity requirement'. On this view, the capacity to feel and direct reactive-attitudes at oneself is a necessary condition for responsibility. I argue that even if moral attitudes like guilt are impossible for psychopaths to deploy, that psychopaths, especially the "successful" (...) and "secondary" subtypes of psychopathy, can satisfy the subjectivity requirement with regard to shame. I appeal to evidence that embarrassment and shame are grounded on the same affective process and data that psychopathic judgments about embarrassment are neurotypical. If I am right, then psychopaths ought to be open to shame-based forms of accountability including shame punishments. I conclude by considering why psychopaths rarely self-report shame. I argue that lacking a capacity to see oneself as flawed is a different sort of failure than lacking the capacity to feel. (shrink)

In this essay, I attempt to define the 'ethnocategory' mushi in Japanese culture, through a semantic analysis of the Chinese characters bearing the radical "mushi," and fieldwork research in rural Japan. The research offers criteria for an animal's inclusion in the category, reveals the differences in people's perception of mushi according to age and gender, and elicits a structure of the category as a series of concentric circles around a semantic core. The richness and complexity of the findings provide insight (...) into Japanese attitudes towards animals and nature. (shrink)

Journal of the History of Biology provides a fifty-year long record for examining the evolution of the history of biology as a scholarly discipline. In this paper, we present a new dataset and preliminary quantitative analysis of the thematic content of JHB from the perspectives of geography, organisms, and thematic fields. The geographic diversity of authors whose work appears in JHB has increased steadily since 1968, but the geographic coverage of the content of JHB articles remains strongly lopsided toward the (...) United States, United Kingdom, and western Europe and has diversified much less dramatically over time. The taxonomic diversity of organisms discussed in JHB increased steadily between 1968 and the late 1990s but declined in later years, mirroring broader patterns of diversification previously reported in the biomedical research literature. Finally, we used a combination of topic modeling and nonlinear dimensionality reduction techniques to develop a model of multi-article fields within JHB. We found evidence for directional changes in the representation of fields on multiple scales. The diversity of JHB with regard to the representation of thematic fields has increased overall, with most of that diversification occurring in recent years. Drawing on the dataset generated in the course of this analysis, as well as web services in the emerging digital history and philosophy of science ecosystem, we have developed an interactive web platform for exploring the content of JHB, and we provide a brief overview of the platform in this article. As a whole, the data and analyses presented here provide a starting-place for further critical reflection on the evolution of the history of biology over the past half-century. (shrink)

resumo O artigo pretende revisitar a interpretação hegeliana dos Fundamentos do Direito Natural de Fichte, não propriamente seus elementos críticos, presentes na Differenzschrift e no Naturrechtaufsatz, mas antes a possibilidade de uma assimilação positiva. Em primeiro lugar, oferecemos uma interpretação da passagem entre os §3 e §4 da obra de Fichte, entre a discussão da Aufforderung e a dedução do reconhecimento jurídico, que procura articulála como interface entre educação e direito. Na segunda parte, procuramos revelar o pano de fundo “histórico-espiritual” (...) que permite considerar, no jovem Hegel, um embate entre formas inclusivas e excludentes de intersubjetividade. Na terceira parte, o objetivo é considerar a relação entre a eticidade, enquanto Einssein do universal e do singular, o direito e a educação. Finalmente, pretende-se mostrar que a assimilação positiva de Fichte por Hegel pode ser visualizada na articulação entre formas excludente e participativa de intersubjetividade no conceito de eticidade natural do System der Sittlichkeit, a qual sugere uma mediação entre amor e direito oferecida pela formação. palavras-chave direito; eticidade; reconhecimento; formação; educação. (shrink)

We study the impact of a kind of non-archimedean stratifications on tangent cones of definable sets in real closed fields. We prove that such stratifications induce stratifications of the same nature on the tangent cone of a definable set at a fixed point. As a consequence, the archimedean counterpart of a t-stratification is shown to induce Whitney stratifications on the tangent cones of a semi-algebraic set. Extensions of these results are proposed for real closed fields with further structure.

Pretende-se investigar aqui a conexáo entre intersubjetividade e normatividade a partir das filosofias do direito de Kant e Fichte. Na primeira parte, levanto a questáo da intersubjetividade jurídico-moral a partir de uma reconsideraçáo sistemática do direito em Kant. Na segunda parte, desenvolvo esta interpretaçáo dentro da própria Rechtslehre . Na terceira parte, investigo a possibilidade de uma leitura da passagem do direito privado ao público capaz de realçar os nexos intersubjetivos como pressupostos para a aplicabilidade do direito. Em seguida, considero (...) como Fichte recorre ao reconhecimento recíproco para dar sustentaçáo à aplicabilidade da racionalidade jurídico-moral kantiana. Finalmente, pretendo indicar, do ponto de vista da validade hipotética do direito, tanto as aporias do modelo fichteano quanto as potencialidades de uma ancoragem intersubjetiva da consciência jurídica. (shrink)

During the past decades, many developing countries have been severely hit by a combination of poverty and the HIV pandemic. However, there has been a debate about the relative contribution of these two factors. This study showed that poverty and orphanhood were two separate but interrelated factors contributing to poor schooling. There were no differentials shown based on double orphanhood or gender. We recommend that educational policies should put into consideration both poverty and orphanhood in order to increase schooling access (...) for children affected by HIV/AIDS and poverty. (shrink)

In this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind, a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, (...) but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy. (shrink)

Buscar-se-á no presente trabalho analisar os discursos acerca da formação do Estado em Rousseau e Locke. Os autores compartilham a teoria de uma forma de contrato social – um acordo deliberado entre seres humanos cuja condição selvagem se extingue neste momento decisório. Dessa forma, em ambos os autores, o Estado surge como um agente, ou corpo, protetor. Em contrapartida, os estudos de Pierre Clastres – etnólogo francês – referentes a grupos primitivos contemporâneos demonstram a existência de uma permanente conjuração contra (...) a possibilidade do surgimento de um poder político alienado do controle do grupo como um todo. Ou seja, uma conjuração contra o Estado. Nesse sentido, o objetivo geral desse trabalho é colidir tais ideias, assim como suas possíveis reverberações atuais. (shrink)

El autor realiza un paseo por la experiencia artística como creador y amador del arte. Recorre sus impresiones e influencias juveniles, de cómo se aprende arte del paseo por la vida, narra su pasión por formas de arte como el haikú japonés, describe el arte como “todo lo que expresa frescura vital con cierta belleza u horror iluminado por un halo estético”, y roza la Rosa del Ser esencial, entrando al tema de la Esencia, postulando que las obras de arte (...) tocan de algún modo misterioso espacios esenciales del ser humano, constituyendo un ejercicio de libertad. (shrink)

In this article, we apply the literature on the ethics of choice-architecture (nudges) to the realm of virtual reality (VR) to point out ethical problems with using VR for empathy-based nudging. Specifically, we argue that VR simulations aiming to enhance empathic understanding of others via perspective-taking will almost always be unethical to develop or deploy. We argue that VR-based empathy enhancement not only faces traditional ethical concerns about nudge (autonomy, welfare, transparency), but also a variant of the semantic variance problem (...) that arises for intersectional perspective-taking. VR empathy simulations deceive and manipulate their users about their experiences. Despite their often laudable goals, such simulations confront significant ethical challenges. In light of these goals and challenges, we conclude by proposing that VR designers shift from designing simulations aimed at producing empathic perspective-taking to designing simulations aimed at generating sympathy. These simulations, we claim, can avoid the most serious ethical issues associated with VR nudges, semantic variance, and intersectionality. (shrink)

Mais do que nunca, pensar em comunicação significa pensar em imagens. Já se repetiu exaustivamente que vivemos em uma cultura imagética, marcada pela crescente proliferação de telas e tecnologias de produção audiovisual. E se passamos de regimes analógicos para digitais, isso só fez aumentar a vitalidade da imagem e multiplicar suas potencialidades. Nesse sentido, o presente número de Logos nos oferece uma amostragem da riqueza que também podemos encontrar hoje no campo das pesquisas sobre o audiovisual. O crescimento da pós-graduação (...) em comunicação no Brasil parece apontar para um futuro promissor em termos de exploração das artes e formas de comunicação audiovisuais. Os artigos aqui reunidos dão igualmente prova da força e da amplitude desse campo, congregando temáticas tão diversas quanto a relação entre o espectador e o documentário ou a cinefilia como forma de consumo contemporâneo. Ocorre que o audiovisual não é apenas um domínio de pesquisa de crescente popularidade na academia, senão também uma das mais poderosas expressões criativas e comunicacionais do homem, capaz de despertar as paixões mais intensas. Isso porque, desde sua origem, as tecnologias audiovisuais sempre se caracterizaram como artes do espanto e do maravilhamento. Numa das lembrança mais marcantes da minha infância, ainda consigo me ver na entrada de um dos belos cinemas da Tijuca (hoje inteiramente desaparecidos, mas tema do cativante estudo histórico de Talitha Ferraz) enquanto espero minha mãe convencer o lanterninha de que tenho mesmo 10 anos de idade – o mínimo exigido para poder assistir à 2001, uma Odisséia no Espaço , obra prima de Stanley Kubrick. Saí do filme sem entender grande coisa, mas inteiramente seduzido pelas impressionantes imagens do vasto espaço sideral e pela sedutora musica de Richard Strauss. Desde esse dia, o cinema se tornou, para mim, uma espécie de religião sem deus (ou com muitos deuses). Nessa cultura das telas em que hoje habitamos, as imagens parecem ter adquirido vida própria. Elas estão em toda parte, conferindo ao mundo certo sabor de permanente fantasmagoria. Aliás, tem sido um tema constante do pensamento apocalíptico esse processo de virtualização da realidade por efeito da multiplicação das imagens eletrônicas. Mas no fundo sabemos que nunca houve para o homem uma realidade que não fosse constituída por imagens. E as fantasmagorias, boas ou ruins, são aquilo que nos oferece suporte e sustentação para um mundo que, de outro modo, provavelmente se encontraria muito mais esvaziado de sentido. Se Edgar Morin inicia seu livro Le Cinema, ou l’Homme Imaginaire com a menção a duas grandes tecnologias legadas a nós pelo século XIX – o cinema e a aviação – é também porque as imagens nos transportam a outros mundos, nos alçam em vôos da imaginação e do pensamento. Da fotografia à arte digital, do televisão ao político, os artigos que reunimos neste numero de Logos compartilham, de diferentes modos, desse sentido de maravilhamento com as imagens. Afinal, elas acrescentam ao mundo uma dimensão suplementar de sentido. Mesmo o extraordinário impacto das imagens digitais, percebido com clareza no êxito de blockbusters tecnológicos como o recente Avatar , de James Cameron, não alteraram esse dado básico de nossa experiência com o audiovisual. De certo modo, é como se estivéssemos ainda nos sentando na sala escura para nos maravilharmos com a ilusão do movimento, lado a lado com os espectadores dos primeiros filmes dos Lumière e de Méliès. Mesmo a pesquisa e a investigação critica do audiovisual não podem furtar-se inteiramente dessa sensação de espanto com as imagens. Um saber que não é temperado pela paixão não tem sentido de existir. E sem uma pincelada de olhar infantil, o que nos poderia ensinar de sempre novo nossa curiosidade com o mundo e nossas estratégias de representá-lo? (shrink)

RESUMO: Gostaria aqui de contribuir tanto à compreensão das concepções de Hegel acerca da linguagem quanto para uma apreciação da interlocução entre essas concepções e alguns desenvolvimentos na filosofia pós-hegeliana. O tema mais geral consiste em evidenciar os esforços de Hegel para estabelecer uma relação intrínseca entre experiência e linguagem. Primeiramente, tomando como ponto de partida questões diretivas da epistemologia moderna, gostaria de compreender traços da concepção hegeliana de linguagem no contexto de uma tematização intersubjetivista da validade objetiva. Em segundo (...) lugar, gostaria de refletir sobre a relação entre metafísica inferencial e cognição. Finalmente, depois de tentar respaldar a tese de que Hegel antecipa a questão de uma tensão entre o gramatical e a historicidade do léxico, mostro como a conexão entre a guinada ontológica na hermenêutica e a doutrina hegeliana da sentença especulativa conduz à experiência do inacabamento linguístico do sentido poético. ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to examine Hegel's comprehension of language and evaluate its relation to some themes in contemporary philosophy. The main purpose consists in pointing out Hegel's attempt to account for the linguistic structure of experience. To begin with, I consider Hegel's comprehension of language in an epistemological context as an effort to ground intersubjective justification of objective validity. Then I discuss the relation between cognition and inferential metaphysics. Finally, after arguing that Hegel anticipates the tension between grammar and lexical historicity, I attempt to show how the connection between the ontological turn in hermeneutics and Hegel's idea of the "speculative sentence" leads to the experience of the unfinishedness of poetic meaning. (shrink)