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Erik Carlson [47]Erika Carlson [1]
  1. Parity Demystified.Erik Carlson - 2010 - Theoria 76 (2):119-128.
    Ruth Chang has defended a concept of "parity", implying that two items may be evaluatively comparable even though neither item is better than or equally good as the other. This article takes no stand on whether there actually are cases of parity. Its aim is only to make the hitherto somewhat obscure notion of parity more precise, by defining it in terms of the standard value relations. Given certain plausible assumptions, the suggested definiens is shown to state a necessary and (...)
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  2.  38
    Organic Unities and Conditionalism About Final Value.Erik Carlson - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):175-181.
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  3. Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle.Erik Carlson - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):449-463.
    John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome’s view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu’s defence of Broome’s position fails.
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  4.  42
    More Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit.Erik Carlson - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):795-807.
    The counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit has several virtues, but it also faces serious problems. I argue that CCA is incompatible with the prudential and moral relevance of harm and benefit. Some possible ways to revise or restrict CCA, in order to avoid this conclusion, are discussed and found wanting. Finally, I try to show that appealing to the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals, or to the alleged contrastive nature of harm and benefit, does not provide a solution.
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  5. Broome's Argument Against Value Incomparability.Erik Carlson - 2004 - Utilitas 16 (2):220-224.
    John Broome has argued that alleged cases of value incomparability are really examples of vagueness in the betterness relation. The main premiss of his argument is ‘the collapsing principle’. I argue that this principle is dubious, and that Broome's argument is therefore unconvincing. Correspondence:c1 Erik.Carlson@filosofi.uu.se.
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  6. Consequentialism, Alternatives, and Actualism.Erik Carlson - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 96 (3):253-268.
  7.  75
    ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’.Erik Carlson - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):213-223.
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  8.  76
    Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics.Erik Carlson - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):283.
    A principal aim of the branch of ethics called ‘population theory’ or ‘population ethics’ is to find a plausible welfarist axiology, capable of comparing total outcomes with respect to value. This has proved an exceedingly difficult task. In this paper I shall state and discuss two ‘trilemmas’, or choices between three unappealing alternatives, which the population ethicist must face. The first trilemma is not new. It originates with Derek Parfit's well-known ‘Mere Addition Paradox’, and was first explicitly stated by Yew-Kwang (...)
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  9.  39
    Well-Being Without Being? A Reply to Feit.Erik Carlson & Jens Johansson - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):198-208.
    In a recent Utilitas article, Neil Feit argues that every person occupies a well-being level of zero at all times and possible worlds at which she fails to exist. Views like his face the problem of the subject': how can someone have a well-being level in a scenario where she lacks intrinsic properties? Feit argues that this problem can be solved by noting, among other things, that a proposition about a person can be true at a possible world in which (...)
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  10. The Oughts and Cans of Objective Consequentialism.Erik Carlson - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1):91-96.
    Frances Howard -Snyder has argued that objective consequentialism violates the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In most situations, she claims, we cannot produce the best consequences available, although objective consequentialism says that we ought to do so. Here I try to show that Howard -Snyder's argument is unsound. The claim that we typically cannot produce the best consequences available is doubtful. And even if there is a sense of ‘producing the best consequences’ in which we cannot do so, objective consequentialism (...)
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  11.  82
    Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Power Necessity.Erik Carlson - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):277-290.
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  12.  87
    The Intrinsic Value of Non-Basic States of Affairs.Erik Carlson - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 85 (1):95-107.
  13.  90
    Consequentialism, Distribution and Desert.Erik Carlson - 1997 - Utilitas 9 (3):307.
    This paper criticizes the consequentialist theory recently put forward by Fred Feldman. I argue that this theory violates two crucial requirements. Another theory, proposed by Peter Vallentyne, is similarly flawed. Feldman's basic ideas could, however, be developed into a more plausible theory. I suggest one possible way of doing this.
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  14.  61
    Cyclical Preferences and Rational Choice.Erik Carlson - 1996 - Theoria 62 (1-2):144-160.
  15. Aggregating Harms - Should We Kill to Avoid Headaches?Erik Carlson - 2000 - Theoria 66 (3):246-255.
  16.  54
    The Small-Improvement Argument Rescued.Erik Carlson - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):171-174.
    Gustafsson and Espinoza have recently argued that the ‘small-improvement argument’, against completeness as a rationality requirement for preference orderings, is defective. They claim that the two main premises of the argument conflict, and hence should not both be accepted. I show that this conflict can be avoided by modifying one of the premises.
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  17.  81
    The Presumption of Nothingness.Erik Carlson & Erik J. Olsson - 2001 - Ratio 14 (3):203–221.
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  18.  82
    Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value.Erik Carlson - 2001 - The Journal of Ethics 5 (4):335-360.
    Whether or not intrinsic value is additively measurable is often thought to depend on the truth or falsity of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities. I argue that the truth of this principle is, contrary to received opinion, compatible with additive measurement. However, there are other very plausible evaluative claims that are more difficult to combine with the additivity of intrinsic value. A plausible theory of the good should allow that there are certain kinds of states of affairs whose (...)
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  19. Counterexamples to Principle Beta: A Response to Crisp and Warfield.Erik Carlson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):730-737.
    The well-known “Consequence Argument” for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism relies on a certain rule of inference; “Principle Beta”. Thomas Crisp and Ted Warfield have recently argued that all hitherto suggested counterexamples to Beta can be easily circumvented by proponents of the Consequence Argument. I present a new counterexample which, I argue, is free from the flaws Crisp and Warfield detect in earlier examples.
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  20.  51
    In Defence of the Mind Argument.Erik Carlson - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):393-400.
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  21.  76
    Higher Values and Non-Archimedean Additivity.Erik Carlson - 2007 - Theoria 73 (1):3-27.
    Many philosophers have claimed that extensive or additive measurement is incompatible with the existence of "higher values", any amount of which is better than any amount of some other value. In this paper, it is shown that higher values can be incorporated in a non-standard model of extensive measurement, with values represented by sets of ordered pairs of real numbers, rather than by single reals. The suggested model is mathematically fairly simple, and it applies to structures including negative as well (...)
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  22.  91
    On a New Argument for Incompatibilism.Erik Carlson - 2003 - Philosophia 31 (1-2):159-164.
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  23.  25
    Intransitivity Without Zeno's Paradox.Erik Carlson - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. pp. 273--277.
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  24. Fischer on Backtracking and Newcomb's Problem.Erik Carlson - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):229–231.
  25.  18
    Is Our Existence in Need of Further Explanation?Erik Carlson & Erik J. Olsson - 1998 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):255-275.
    Several philosophers have argued that our cosmos is either purposely created by some rational being, or else just one among a vast number of actually existing cosmoi. According to John Leslie and Peter van Inwagen, the existence of a cosmos containing rational beings is analogous to drawing the winning straw among millions of straws. The best explanation in the latter case, they maintain, is that the drawing was either rigged by someone, or else many such lotteries have taken place. Arnold (...)
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  26.  54
    Torbjörn Tännsjö Hedonistic Utilitarianism, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1998, Pp. Vi + 185.Erik Carlson - 2000 - Utilitas 12 (2):248.
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  27.  42
    A Note on Moore's Organic Unities.Erik Carlson - 1997 - Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (1):55-59.
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  28.  23
    Elvio Baccarini.Josip Balabanić, Damir Barbarić, Boran Berčić, Giovanni Boniolo, Branka Brujić, Alex Byrne, Erik Carlson, Maudemarie Clark, Nadežda Čačinovič & Zvonimir Čuljak - 2008 - Prolegomena 7:1.
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  29.  22
    The Editors of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Thank the Members of the Editorial Board and the Following Scholars, Who Have Served as Referees During the Period of October 2006 Through July 2007. [REVIEW]Melissa Barry, John Bishop, Benjamin Bradley, Sarah Buss, Ben Caplan, Erik Carlson, John Carriero, Peter Carruthers, C. A. J. Coady & Marian David - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3).
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  30.  95
    Brink's and Pietroski's Obligation Execution Principle.Erik Carlson - 1995 - Analysis 55 (4):275 - 279.
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  31.  15
    Bontly on Harm and the Non-Identity Problem.Erik Carlson & Jens Johansson - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):477-481.
    The ‘non-identity problem’ raises a well-known challenge to the person-affecting view, according to which an action can be wrong only if it affects someone for the worse. In a recent article, however, Thomas D. Bontly proposes a novel way to solve the non-identity problem in person-affecting terms. Bontly's argument is based on a contrastive causal account of harm. In this response, we argue that Bontly's argument fails even assuming that the contrastive causal account is correct.
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  32. Cirkulär tid – ett varv till.Erik Carlson - 2007 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 1.
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  33. Cirkulär tid och den eviga återkomsten.Erik Carlson - 2006 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 2.
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  34.  8
    Disappointment for Others.Patrick J. Carroll, James A. Shepperd, Kate Sweeny, Erika Carlson & Joann P. Benigno - 2007 - Cognition and Emotion 21 (7):1565-1576.
  35.  2
    Existence, Beneficience, and Design.Erik Carlson & Erik J. Olsson - 2001 - In Erik Carlson & Sysiek Sliwinski (eds.), Omnium-gatherum. pp. 79-92.
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  36. Formal Methods in Ethics.Erik Carlson - 2010 - In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge.
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  37. In Defence of The.Erik Carlson - forthcoming - Mind.
     
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  38. John Broomes argument mot ojämförbara värden.Erik Carlson - 2003 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 4.
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  39. Kan vi veta vad vi tror?Erik Carlson - 1998 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 2.
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  40. Några teorier om egenvärde.Erik Carlson - 1995 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 4.
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  41. Omnium-Gatherum. Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Jan Österberg on the Occastion of His Sixtieth Birthday.Erik Carlson & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.) - 2001 - Uppsala Philosophical Studies.
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  42.  30
    Review of Brad Hooker: Ideal Code, Real World. [REVIEW]Erik Carlson - 2001 - Theoria 67 (3):268-272.
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  43.  28
    Review of Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will[REVIEW]Erik Carlson - 2002 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (1).
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  44.  23
    Review of Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will[REVIEW]Erik Carlson - 2004 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (10).
  45.  12
    Reply to Klocksiem on the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm.Erik Carlson - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):407-413.
    In a recent article in this journal, I claimed that the widely held counterfactual comparative account of harm violates two very plausible principles about harm and prudential reasons. Justin Klocksiem argues, in a reply, that CCA is in fact compatible with these principles. In this rejoinder, I shall try to show that Klocksiem’s defense of CCA fails.
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  46.  62
    Van Inwagen on Determinism and Moral Responsibility.Erik Carlson - 1998 - Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (2):219-226.
  47.  42
    Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Tandf: Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-11.
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  48. Omnium-Gatherum: Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Jan Österberg on the Occasion of His Sixtieth Birthday.Jan Österberg, Erik Carlson & Rysiek Śliwiński (eds.) - 2001 - Dept. Of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
     
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