119 found
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  1. Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    It is tempting to think that, if a person's beliefs are coherent, they are also likely to be true. This truth conduciveness claim is the cornerstone of the popular coherence theory of knowledge and justification. Erik Olsson's new book is the most extensive and detailed study of coherence and probable truth to date. Setting new standards of precision and clarity, Olsson argues that the value of coherence has been widely overestimated. Provocative and readable, Against Coherence will make stimulating reading for (...)
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  2. Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19--41.
    It is a widely accepted doctrine in epistemology that knowledge has greater value than mere true belief. But although epistemologists regularly pay homage to this doctrine, evidence for it is shaky. Is it based on evidence that ordinary people on the street make evaluative comparisons of knowledge and true belief, and consistently rate the former ahead of the latter? Do they reveal such a preference by some sort of persistent choice behavior? Neither of these scenarios is observed. Rather, epistemologists come (...)
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  3.  51
    In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of a Priori Justification.Erik J. Olsson - 1998 - Erkenntnis 49 (2):243-249.
  4. What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):246-272.
  5.  13
    Coherence Theories of Epistemic Justification.Erik J. Olsson - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  6. Coherentism, Reliability and Bayesian Networks.Luc Bovens & Erik J. Olsson - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):685-719.
    The coherentist theory of justification provides a response to the sceptical challenge: even though the independent processes by which we gather information about the world may be of dubious quality, the internal coherence of the information provides the justification for our empirical beliefs. This central canon of the coherence theory of justification is tested within the framework of Bayesian networks, which is a theory of probabilistic reasoning in artificial intelligence. We interpret the independence of the information gathering processes (IGPs) in (...)
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  7.  34
    A Simulation Approach to Veritistic Social Epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (2):127-143.
    In a seminal book, Alvin I. Goldman outlines a theory for how to evaluate social practices with respect to their , i.e., their tendency to promote the acquisition of true beliefs (and impede the acquisition of false beliefs) in society. In the same work, Goldman raises a number of serious worries for his account. Two of them concern the possibility of determining the veritistic value of a practice in a concrete case because (1) we often don't know what beliefs are (...)
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  8. Reliabilism, Stability, and the Value of Knowledge.Erik J. Olsson - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):343 - 355.
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  9.  12
    A Simulation Approach to Veritistic Social Epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (2):127-143.
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  10.  2
    Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Erik J. Olsson - 2012 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  11.  23
    A Bayesian Simulation Model of Group Deliberation and Polarization.Erik J. Olsson - 2013 - Springer.
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  12. Norms of Assertion and Communication in Social Networks.Erik J. Olsson & Aron Vallinder - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2557-2571.
    Epistemologists can be divided into two camps: those who think that nothing short of certainty or (subjective) probability 1 can warrant assertion and those who disagree with this claim. This paper addressed this issue by inquiring into the problem of setting the probability threshold required for assertion in such a way that that the social epistemic good is maximized, where the latter is taken to be the veritistic value in the sense of Goldman (Knowledge in a social world, 1999). We (...)
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  13.  14
    The Dissemination of Fake Science : On the Ranking of Retracted Articles in Google.Emmanuel Genot & Erik J. Olsson - forthcoming - In S. Bernecker, A. K. Flowerree & T. Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News.
    Fake news can originate from an ordinary person carelessly posting what turns out to be false information orfrom the intentional actions of fake news factory workers,but broadly speaking it can also originate from scientific fraud. In the latter case, the article can be retracted upon discovery of the fraud. A case study shows, however, that such fake sciencecan be visible in Google even after the article was retracted, in fact more visible thanthe retraction notice. We hypothesize that the reason for (...)
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  14.  14
    Why Bayesian Agents Polarize.Erik J. Olsson - forthcoming - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement.
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  15.  90
    Reliability Conducive Measures of Coherence.Erik J. Olsson & Stefan Schubert - 2007 - Synthese 157 (3):297-308.
    A measure of coherence is said to be truth conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence results in a higher likelihood of truth. Recent impossibility results strongly indicate that there are no probabilistic coherence measures that are truth conducive. Indeed, this holds even if truth conduciveness is understood in a weak ceteris paribus sense. This raises the problem of how coherence could nonetheless be an epistemically important property. Our proposal is that coherence may be linked in a (...)
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  16. Book Review: Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann "Bayesian Epistemology". [REVIEW]Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Studia Logica 81 (2):289-292.
    Book Review of Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann *Bayesian Epistemology* by Erik J. Olsson.
     
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  17.  86
    Gettier and the Method of Explication: A 60 Year Old Solution to a 50 Year Old Problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):57-72.
    I challenge a cornerstone of the Gettier debate: that a proposed analysis of the concept of knowledge is inadequate unless it entails that people don’t know in Gettier cases. I do so from the perspective of Carnap’s methodology of explication. It turns out that the Gettier problem per se is not a fatal problem for any account of knowledge, thus understood. It all depends on how the account fares regarding other putative counter examples and the further Carnapian desiderata of exactness, (...)
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  18.  94
    Why Coherence is Not Truth-Conducive.Erik J. Olsson - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):236–241.
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  19. Trust and the Value of Overconfidence: A Bayesian Perspective on Social Network Communication.Aron Vallinder & Erik J. Olsson - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9):1991-2007.
    The paper presents and defends a Bayesian theory of trust in social networks. In the first part of the paper, we provide justifications for the basic assumptions behind the model, and we give reasons for thinking that the model has plausible consequences for certain kinds of communication. In the second part of the paper we investigate the phenomenon of overconfidence. Many psychological studies have found that people think they are more reliable than they actually are. Using a simulation environment that (...)
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  20.  49
    Believing More, Risking Less: On Coherence, Truth and Non-Trivial Extensions.Luc Bovens & Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):137 - 150.
    If you believe more things you thereby run a greater risk of being in error than if you believe fewer things. From the point of view of avoiding error, it is best not to believe anything at all, or to have very uncommitted beliefs. But considering the fact that we all in fact do entertain many specific beliefs, this recommendation is obviously in flagrant dissonance with our actual epistemic practice. Let us call the problem raised by this apparent conflict the (...)
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  21.  42
    A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem.Erik J. Olsson - unknown
  22. Do Computer Simulations Support the Argument From Disagreement?Aron Vallinder & Erik J. Olsson - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1437-1454.
    According to the Argument from Disagreement (AD) widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by moral facts, either because there are no such facts or because there are such facts but they fail to influence our moral opinions. In an innovative paper, Gustafsson and Peterson (Synthese, published online 16 October, 2010) study the argument by means of computer simulation of opinion dynamics, relying on the well-known model of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif (...)
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  23.  17
    The Kind of Group You Want to Belong To: Effects of Group Structure on Group Accuracy.Martin Jönsson, Ulrike Hahn & Erik J. Olsson - 2015 - Cognition 142:191-204.
    There has been much interest in group judgment and the so-called 'wisdom of crowds'. In many real world contexts, members of groups not only share a dependence on external sources of information, but they also communicate with one another, thus introducing correlations among their responses that can diminish collective accuracy. This has long been known, but it has-to date-not been examined to what extent different kinds of communication networks may give rise to systematically different effects on accuracy. We argue that (...)
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  24.  49
    On the Role of the Research Agenda in Epistemic Change.Erik J. Olsson & David Westlund - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):165 - 183.
    The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include (...)
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  25.  46
    The Impossibility of Coherence.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (3):387-412.
    There is an emerging consensus in the literature on probabilistic coherence that such coherence cannot be truth conducive unless the information sources providing the cohering information are individually credible and collectively independent. Furthermore, coherence can at best be truth conducive in a ceteris paribus sense. Bovens and Hartmann have argued that there cannot be any measure of coherence that is truth conducive even in this very weak sense. In this paper, I give an alternative impossibility proof. I provide a relatively (...)
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  26.  34
    The Bi-Directional Relationship Between Source Characteristics and Message Content.Peter J. Collins, Ulrike Hahn, Ylva von Gerber & Erik J. Olsson - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Much of what we believe we know, we know through the testimony of others. While there has been long-standing evidence that people are sensitive to the characteristics of the sources of testimony, for example in the context of persuasion, researchers have only recently begun to explore the wider implications of source reliability considerations for the nature of our beliefs. Likewise, much remains to be established concerning what factors influence source reliability. In this paper, we examine, both theoretically and empirically, the (...)
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  27.  21
    Linking as Voting : How the Condorcet Jury Theorem in Political Science is Relevant to Webometrics.George Masterton, Erik J. Olsson & Staffan Angere - unknown
  28.  42
    Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise.Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):273-288.
    Jonathan Cohen has claimed that in cases of witness agreement there is an inverse relationship between the prior probability and the posterior probability of what is being agreed: the posterior rises as the prior falls. As is demonstrated in this paper, this contention is not generally valid. In fact, in the most straightforward case exactly the opposite is true: a lower prior also means a lower posterior. This notwithstanding, there is a grain of truth to what Cohen is saying, as (...)
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  29.  1
    Explicating Ignorance and Doubt : A Possible Worlds Approach.Erik J. Olsson & Carlo Proietti - 2016 - In Rik Peels & Martijn Blaauw (eds.), The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance. Cambridge University Press.
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  30. Knowledge, Truth, and Bullshit: Reflections on Frankfurt.Erik J. Olsson - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):94-110.
  31.  59
    Providing Foundations for Coherentism.Sven Ove Hansson & Erik J. Olsson - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):243-265.
    We prove that four theses commonly associated with coherentism are incompatible with the representation of a belief state as a logically closed set of sentences. The result is applied to the conventional coherence interpretation of the AGM theory of belief revision, which appears not to be tenable. Our argument also counts against the coherentistic acceptability of a certain form of propositional holism. We argue that the problems arise as an effect of ignoring the distinction between derived and non-derived beliefs, and (...)
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  32.  93
    On the Coherence of Higher-Order Beliefs.Stefan Schubert & Erik J. Olsson - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):112-135.
    Let us by ‘first-order beliefs’ mean beliefs about the world, such as the belief that it will rain tomorrow, and by ‘second-order beliefs’ let us mean beliefs about the reliability of first-order, belief-forming processes. In formal epistemology, coherence has been studied, with much ingenuity and precision, for sets of first-order beliefs. However, to the best of our knowledge, sets including second-order beliefs have not yet received serious attention in that literature. In informal epistemology, by contrast, sets of the latter kind (...)
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  33. Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs: Reply to Jäger on Reliabilism and the Value Problem.Erik J. Olsson & Martin Jönsson - 2011 - Theoria 77 (3):214-222.
    We reply to Christoph Jäger's criticism of the conditional probability solution (CPS) to the value problem for reliabilism due to Goldman and Olsson (2009). We argue that while Jäger raises some legitimate concerns about the compatibility of CPS with externalist epistemology, his objections do not in the end reduce the plausibility of that solution.
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  34.  19
    Why Coherence is Not Truth-Conducive.Erik J. Olsson - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):236-241.
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  35.  74
    In Defense of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):93-114.
    Knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Many authors contend, however, that reliabilism is incompatible with this item of common sense. If a belief is true, adding that it was reliably produced doesn't seem to make it more valuable. The value of reliability is swamped by the value of truth. In Goldman and Olsson (2009), two independent solutions to the problem were suggested. According to the conditional probability solution, reliabilist knowledge is more valuable in virtue of being a stronger (...)
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  36.  1
    Publish Late, Publish Rarely! : Network Density and Group Performance in Scientific Communication.Staffan Angere & Erik J. Olsson - 2017 - In Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson & Michael Weisberg (eds.), Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge: Now Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Research programs regularly compete to achieve the same goal, such as the discovery of the structure of DNA or the construction of a TEA laser. The more the competing programs share information, the faster the goal is likely to be reached, to society’s benefit. But the “priority rule”-the scientific norm according to which the first program to reach the goal in question must receive all the credit for the achievement-provides a powerful disincentive for programs to share information. How, then, is (...)
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  37.  11
    Dahlman and Mackor on Coherence and Probability in Legal Evidence.Erik J. Olsson - forthcoming - Law, Probability and Risk.
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  38.  10
    A Diachronic Perspective on Peer Disagreement in Veritistic Social Epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2018 - Synthese:1-19.
    The main issue in the epistemology of peer disagreement is whether known disagreement among those who are in symmetrical epistemic positions undermines the rationality of their maintaining their respective views. Douven and Kelp have argued convincingly that this problem is best understood as being about how to respond to peer disagreement repeatedly over time, and that this diachronic issue can be best approached through computer simulation. However, Douven and Kelp’s favored simulation framework cannot naturally handle Christensen’s famous Mental Math example. (...)
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  39. The Value of Knowledge.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):874-883.
    A problem occupying much contemporary epistemology is that of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This paper provides an overview of this debate, starting with historical figures and early work. The contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology is then surveyed and some recent developments that deserve special attention are highlighted, including mounting doubts about the prospects for virtue epistemology to solve the value problem as well as renewed interest in classical and reliabilist‐externalist responses.
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  40.  8
    Formal Models of Assertion.Erik J. Olsson - 2019 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    This article provides an overview of different formal models that could be of interest to epistemologists interested in assertion. It also says something about where they fit into the general picture of assertion as a phenomenon involving both an asserter and an assertee. The author’s perspective is that of the philosopher rather than that of the logician. A semiformal level of description is employed, partly because some models are highly complex and merely introducing the basic formal machinery, let alone some (...)
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  41.  13
    Corroborating Testimony and Ignorance: A Reply to Bovens, Fitelson, Hartmann and Snyder.Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):565-572.
    In an earlier paper, I objected to certain elements of L. Jonathan Cohen's account of corroborating testimony (Olsson [2002]). In their response to my article, Bovens, Fitelson, Hartmann and Snyder ([2002]) suggest some significant improvements of the probabilistic model which I used in assessing Cohen's theses and answer some additional questions which my study raised. More problematically, they also seek to defend Cohen against my criticism. I argue, in this reply, that their attempts in this direction are unsuccessful.
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  42.  28
    Making Beliefs Coherentl. The Subtraction and Addition Strategies.Erik J. Olsson - 1998 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (2):143-163.
    The notion of epistemic coherence is interpreted as involving not only consistency but also stability. The problem how to consolidate a belief system, i.e., revise it so that it becomes coherent, is studied axiomatically as well as in terms of set-theoretical constructions. Representation theorems are given for subtractive consolidation (where coherence is obtained by deleting beliefs) and additive consolidation (where coherence is obtained by adding beliefs).
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  43.  16
    From Impact to Importance: The Current State of the Wisdom-of-Crowds Justification of Link-Based Ranking Algorithms.George Masterton & Erik J. Olsson - 2018 - Philosophy and Technology 31 (4):593-609.
    In a legendary technical report, the Google founders sketched a wisdom-of-crowds justification for PageRank arguing that the algorithm, by aggregating incoming links to webpages in a sophisticated way, tracks importance on the web. On this reading of the report, webpages that have a high impact as measured by PageRank are supposed to be important webpages in a sense of importance that is not reducible to mere impact or popularity. In this paper, we look at the state of the art regarding (...)
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  44.  26
    A Coherence Interpretation of Semi-Revision.Erik J. Olsson - 1997 - Theoria 63 (1-2):105-134.
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  45.  53
    A DDL Approach to Pluralistic Ignorance and Collective Belief.Carlo Proietti & Erik J. Olsson - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):499-515.
  46.  32
    Cohering With.Erik J. Olsson - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):273 - 291.
    I argue that the analysis most capable of systematising our intuitions about coherence as a relation is one according to which a set of beliefs, A, coheres with another set, B, if and only if the set-theoretical union of A and B is a coherent set. The second problem I consider is the role of coherence in epistemic justification. I submit that there are severe problems pertaining to the idea, defended most prominently by Keith Lehrer, that justification amounts to coherence (...)
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  47.  73
    Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem?Julien Dutant & Erik J. Olsson - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (6):1347-1365.
    This article is concerned with a statistical proposal due to James R. Beebe for how to solve the generality problem for process reliabilism. The proposal is highlighted by Alvin I. Goldman as an interesting candidate solution. However, Goldman raises the worry that the proposal may not always yield a determinate result. We address this worry by proving a dilemma: either the statistical approach does not yield a determinate result or it leads to trivialization, i.e. reliability collapses into truth (and anti-reliability (...)
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  48.  50
    Reply to Kvanvig on the Swamping Problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Social Epistemology 25 (2):173 - 182.
    According to the so?called swamping problem, reliabilist knowledge is no more valuable than mere true belief. In a paper called ?Reliabilism and the value of knowledge? (in Epistemic value, edited by A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. H. Pritchard, pp. 19?41. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Alvin I. Goldman and myself proposed, among other things, a solution based on conditional probabilities. This approach, however, is heavily criticized by Jonathan L. Kvanvig in his paper ?The swamping problem redux: Pith and gist? (...)
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  49.  40
    Coherence and the Modularity of Mind.Erik J. Olsson - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):404-11.
  50.  1
    Do We Trust Blindly on the Web?Emmanuel Genot & Erik J. Olsson - 2017 - Societé Editrice Il Mulino 1:87-106.
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