En una conferencia sobre el Tercer Sector en Cartagena, Daniel Pecaut afirmó: “Lo que le falta a Colombia más que un “mito fundacional” es un relato nacional ”. Se refería a un relato que posibilite a los colombianos de todas las clases, razas, etnias y regiones, ubicar sus experiencias cotidianas en una mínima trama compartida de duelos y de logros.
Frege's notion of 'bedeutung' (b.) is here interpreted not as the object for which an expression stands but as its truth-Value potential. This is achieved by beginning with the b. Of sentences and defining the b. Of names as that property of them which remains constant when they are substituted in sentences without a change in truth-Value. This interpretation is shown to receive confirmation from what frege says in a recently published manuscript about the b. Of predicates; finally, It is (...) applied to frege's doctrine of oblique b. (shrink)
It is assumed a) that the statement that a human right exists means that a state which does not grant it is not legitimate, and b) that the legitimacy of power can, in modern times, be justified only by showing that it is in the equal interest of everybody. Mere democracy is insufficient to legitimate political power. Freedom for every individual must be guaranteed. So much is common ground in the controversy on human rights, but to interpret these freedom as (...) a negative freedom, as the classical conception of human rights has done, is insufficient and therefore illegitimate, because it is not in the equal interest of everybody. To add a positive concept of freedom is correct but not enough, because it still neglects those who even if they are given the facilities do not have the capacity. Since the handicapped, the old and the young cannot even enter a contract and the disposessed cannot enter a fair contract, the contractarian foundation ofhuman rights must be discarded. (shrink)
I wish to clarify two questions. The first concerns the concept of justice: what do we mean by “just”? The second concerns the question of what means we have to answer substantive questions of what is just. And here I shall restrict myself to distributive justice.
Das menschliche Verstehen bildet den Kern des Anthropologischen und ist als solches die Basis aller philosophischen Disziplinen. Der Beitrag weist auf die Bedeutung der prädikativen Sprache für das Verstehen hin und argumentiert, dass die Frage nach dem Guten als anthropologische Grundfrage zu verstehen ist. Der Rückgang aufs Anthropologische ergibt sich für den Autor, weil alle historischen Fragen nach dem Guten unzureichend sind.
In the first part of the paper Rawls, conception of a "reflective equilibrium" with our "considered moral judgements" is criticized. Moral judgements cannot form a court of appeal for the justification of moral principles, since they are themselves in need of justification. An analysis of the meaning of the sentences in which moral judgements are expressed is called for in order to establish their method of justification. In the second part of the paper the consequence which Rawls, repudiation of semantic (...) analysis has had for his conception of the "original position" is discussed. In retrogressive extension of his four-stage-sequence a zero-stage is postulated which represents the moral point of view. At this stage the reasons would have to be given for adopting the original position and for conceiving it with just those characteristics that Rawls has assumed. Only thus can the advantages and disadvantages of these characteristics be analytically assessed. (shrink)
O texto trata de três dificuldades relativas à moral, a saber: como, entre diferentes significações para a palavra “moral”, podemos entender que com ela se queira referir a uma só coisa; como entender que possamos falar de uma moral se sobre ela se podem ter tão diferentes concepções; e, finalmente, em que bases podemos perguntar como devemos ou queremos entender o que é a moral, se ela nos parece algo já dado. As respostas a essas questões estão baseadas na explicação (...) da moral como um sistema de exigências mútuas calcado na simetria de validade das justificações para cada um dos envolvidos. A partir dessa concepção de moral, o autor tenta uma reinterpretação do contratualismo. (shrink)
A conferência trata do conceito nietzschiano de vontade de poder,compreendendo-o como um ir além, ou seja, o que Tugenghat nomeia como atranscendência imanente, relacionando-o com uma certa tradição da antropologiafilosófica.This lecture deals with the Nietzschean concept of The Will to Power, assumingthat this is a “going further”, that is, that which is named by Trughendhat theimmanent transcendency, relating it to a certain tradition of the philosophicalanthropology.