One way of shedding light on the distinctions drawn between various crimes against property - all involving the deprivation of possession of a movable object - is by considering the victim's participation in the deprivation. First, it may be the case that the victim does not participate in this deprivation at all, for example, because he is not present when it occurs. Second, it may be that the victim is in a situation of necessitas simplex seu absoluta at the time (...) of the deprivation, because he is physically unable to prevent it, even though he may be present and actually observing it occur. Or, he may assist or tolerate the deprivation in an ignorantia facti , not recognizing that he is being depossessed of his own property. Third, the victim, though actually participating in the deprivation, may be either in a situation of necessitas cum adiunctione or acting under ignorance parallel to ignorantia iuris , because he is deceived as to the economic reasonableness of transferring the object to the depossessor. Leaving out the uninteresting first group of cases, the article claims that the differences drawn between the crimes committed by the depossessor depend upon why the victim's participation cannot be imputed to him. In the second group of cases, the victim's presence or his apparent participation cannot be imputed to him on the first level of imputation, because he has not willfully tolerated or participated in the depossession. In the third group of cases, the victim's participation in the depossession can be imputed to him on the first level of imputation but not on the second level, because, although the victim has willfully participated in the depossession, he has not acted voluntarily. The article first discusses the structures of imputation, which were primarily developed during the eighteenth century. It sketches the differences between two levels of imputation and between ordinary and extraordinary imputation, indicating the reasons for excluding ordinary imputation. The article then considers various types of property crimes, all involving the deprivation of possession of a movable object. The claim is made that these crimes can be distinguished on the basis of whether the victim's participation can be imputed to him on the first or second level of imputation. Contemporary German law differentiates between Diebstahl, Erpressung and Betrug thus covering most of the relevant cases in the three groups. Diebstahl generally covers the cases in groups one and two. Erpressung and Betrug cover most of the relevant cases in the third group. Yet the offense definitions of these crimes are historically accidental. Accordingly, they are neither systematically complete, nor do they cover all of the relevant cases. In addition, the article includes a discussion of the differentiation between Raub and räuberische Erpressung. (shrink)

In its reaction on the terroristic attacks of September 9th, 2001, the US-government threatened Afghanistan's Taleban with war in order to force them to extradite terrorist leader Bin Laden; the Taleban said that they would not surrender to this kind of blackmail – and so, they were removed from Kabul by means of military force. The rivalling versions of this story depend crucially on notions such as "terrorism" and "blackmail". Obviously you'll gain public support for your preferrend version of the (...) story if you are able to determine how those notions are to be used. So we had better reflect about their very meaning and about the moral implications of their proper usage. To gain a deeper understanding of our notions of "blackmail" and "terrorism" I shall propose an extreme thought experiment: Cassandra's plan. Cassandra foresees that sooner or later one of the nuclear powers might take the liberty to use atomic bombs. From fright she founds an NGO for blackmailing the statesmen who are in charge of nuclear weapons; she announces in public that all ministers and leaders of any government shall be hunted down, and executed, whose soldiers drop but one atomic bomb. (Cassandra's NGO keeps killer teams in constant training so as to increase the effect of the threat; this is being financiated from private donations). In my paper I shall raise two questions (without claiming to provide definite answers). First, would we have to say that Cassandra's NGO was a terrorist organisation? Second, would it be morally wrong if Cassandra blackmailed statesmen in the way indicated? (shrink)