This article shows the origin of the famous Aristotelian expression τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι in everyday language. The expression is analysable in τὸ εἶναι and τί ἦν, and this part is the core of the common language question τουτὶ τί ἦν; or τουτὶ τί ἦν τὸ πρᾶγμα; always in imperfect form. This question is often found in Aristophanes’ comedies, which represent common Attic language. The imperfect ἦν is noted as a common Attic form indicating the present already by early comentators (...) of Aristotle as Alexander of Aphrodisias, the scholia to Aristophanes, later by Budaeus, but also in the modern Greek Lexikon of D. Demetrakos. Therefore not the imperfect is the problem, by mere embarrassement it was called "philosophic." The situations in the Aristophanean comedies, in which the question occurs, show that the thing about which somebody asks, is present, in front of the speaker, that it is an individual thing and something absolutly unexspected. The questioner will ask "What on the whole is this?" He asks about the first ground of being of the thing. The term τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι quotes only the use of εἶναι in this question in common language (like many other terms are quotations as τὸ τί ἐστίν; τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα etc.) and may be paraphrased by "Think of ’to be’ as you use it in the question ’What at all is this?’ " See also my article: Sonderegger (2001). Zur Sprachform des Ausdrucks to ti en einai. Rheinisches Museum Für Philologie 144:113–122. -/- The consequences of this linguistic finding can be found in my comments on Metaphysik Z and Metaphysics Λ (English version from 2020). (shrink)

I call for the abandonment of two fundamental translation errors in the reception of Aristotelian philosophy: 'substance' does not translate 'ousia' and 'to proton kinoun' is not masculine. The claim that Aristotle had asserted a substance metaphysics and a theology must be abandoned because it is based on such errors.

The aim of this article is to free Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially book XII (Lambda), frome some metaphysical and theological presuppositions by detecting their inappropriate conceptual framwork, which one was progressive, but now holds an obsolete position. Ousia, being (not substance, a much later concept, construed to solve other problems than Aristotle's), stand for a question, not for an answer. Book Lambda develops a highly speculative argument for this queston. The famous noesis noeseos says that empirical being and knowledge is the (...) realization of a noetic structure (noesis), laid down in our most fundamental opinioons about being. (shrink)

The question of what is real seems to be the easiest to answer, because in our daily lives we are and must be naive realists. But as soon as reflection begins, we get into trouble. On the one hand we have to admit that there are several concepts of reality if we want to say that things other than physical things are also real, on the other hand we see that even that form of knowledge, which seems to be most (...) responsible for reality, natural science, cannot give the desired uniqueness in terms of what it itself wants or needs to understand to be real. Alternatively, when we see that nothing can be and nothing is real, if it is not in a world, and if we understand the world as the order of things (worldI ), then this leads us to the speculative answer that the function of worldI is to enable the reality of our empirical worldII. (shrink)

In the past Boethius was primarily considered to be the author of the Consolatio, or a theologician or logician. But as a philosopher he was the first to reflect on the concept of person, while Augustinus and others only made use of this concept. It is the purpose of this article to show that it was exactly Boethius’ situation in the late antiquity with its many differing traditions that urged and enabled him to ask himself what person essentially is. His (...) new concept of person (: naturae rationabilis individua substantia) puts person first and strengthens - problematically - the position of substance. (shrink)

Aristotle’s De Interpretatione opens with some norms designed to guide philosophical discour- se. One of these norms–of greatest importance for the discourse about being–is the distinction between the affirmation and the content of a proposition. No verb, not even the verb to be, will by itself state the existence of its content. – The oppositon to the traditional interpretation of the text in this article is primarily founded on observations of ordinary Greek speech. ”A verb uttered just by itself“ doesn’t (...) mean ”the verb without a subject noun“ as normaly assumed, but it means ”the verb without the intention to affirm what it means.“ – Some glances at Platon and Kant conclude the article. (shrink)

Aristotle is often called the father of the history of philosophy. However, if his references to earlier theses are to be taken as historical reports in our sense, then they must also be subject to historical critique – which is much to their disadvantage. However, looking through the function of his doxographies and furthter references to earlier theses shows that such a historical view is an anachronism in a way similar to the expectation of finding science in Aristotle. Rather the (...) references are made in a topical attitude. In this way the outlindes of the dominant opinions become explicit and only thereby argumentatively accessible. At the same time the unavoidable integration into tradition is consciously realised. (shrink)

The variety and ambiguity of our use of negation has often been classified according to the classes of negated terms. But if we take into account, first, the negations of possibility and necessity, and second, the negations of questions and wishes, it seems that not only negated expressions change, but the way to negate as well. If we consider that up to here every negation has only been a relative one, we may ask if it is possible to say „nothing“ (...) or „not“ in an absolute manner. This attempt is not idle, since great principles, such as that of sufficient reason , possibly make use of an absolute „not.“ How to speak of an "absolute nothing"? - Our negative speech is not exhausted by negation, since opposition, contradiction and difference contain some idea of the negative too. Certain remarks in Plato’s Sophist point to a prerogative position of difference within the whole group of negative speech mentioned above. (shrink)

Different reasons give rise to the question, what philosophy really is, and by tradition we know many answers. Plato’s answer can be found by examining his explicit statements about philosophy in his dialogues, or by analyzing his representation of Socrates – philosophy become fl esh. But an other way to fi nd an answer to the question lies in examining the things which – according to Plato – we cannot do without. There are three of them, namely the idea, logos (...) and aporia. These three taken together – the insight that we orient ourselves according to some unity in our different fi elds of life; that we cannot dismiss dialogue and debate; and questions outlive answers – paint a picture of philosophy as «unbehauptendes Denken»1 [undogmatic thought]. Such «unbehauptendes Denken» does not aim to insist on new claims against old ones, but instead seeks to analyze and to refl ect upon old views. (shrink)

More often than not Cusanus is interpreted in a theological way, under strong theological presuppositions and within the range of religion. This may be quite understandable since he was a cardinal and had important functions in the Papal States. But what are the philosophical implications if some of his texts are neither meant to assert a belief nor to search for reasons for it, but only to reflect upon the presuppositions of this belief and its different traditions? – A word-for-word (...) interpretation of the first proposition, which follows the dialogue „De non aliud“ : definitio quae se et omnia definit, ea est, quae per omnem mentem quaeritur, gives us a hint to the shift in the concept of definitio during the dialogue. Cusanus begins in quite a traditional manner and ends in a supremely abstract and speculative intuition. The not-other determines itself in a vision and by this puts every thing in its proper place; we as human beings aspire to repeat this vision in our mental life in contact with the world. In this way Cusanus does what all great philosophers do: he reflects in a given set of opinions what is the meaning of „to be“. (shrink)

Is there a possible profit from the loss of the sense of reality? -/- The loss of the sense of reality is a mental disorder that needs treatment, otherwise the person concerned will suffer harm in the short term. We cannot imagine that therefrom a profit could result. Don Quixote gives an example of a loss of reality in a slightly different sense. He is no longer committed to the banal, everyday reality, in this area he fails completely. But he (...) has another field, as it were, a higher reality, where he wins. A similar case is told to us by Plato in the story of Thales, who falls into the well while observing the stars, and is therefore laughed at by a Thracian maid. But for Plato, Thales is a positive example. The philosopher is less concerned with the reality that lies just before his feet than with what is generally true and real. Plato himself devalues what can be experienced around us in favour of the ideas. These are not perceptible, but nevertheless they are what actually exists. (shrink)

Abstract Most histories of philosophy make us believe, that there is a line of thought from the Greeks on until today. This impression should be checked by this article. At first we contrast some pros and cons of the view that philosophy in general has a history. Then we come back to the question, if Plato or / and Aristotle are really the founders of historiography in philosophy. As test-piece we take the passage in the centre of Plato's Sophistes, which (...) shows that the references to past thinkers don't have the purpose to inform us historically, but, first, to continue the current dialogue about being, second, to lead us to the aporie about being, which allows a fresh start for this question. A glance at the doxographies of Aristotle shows (we have a look at that of De Anima), that they have the same target in view, namely to reveal the fundamental opinions of being in a respective world. This way the “history of philosophy” becomes an account of succeeding worlds and the related reflection on it. – This article is an extended version of a short lecture held in Geneva, 15. sept. 2016, within the scope of the Symposium of the Schweizerische Philosophische Gesellschaft. Unfortunately it was not accepted for publication. (shrink)

What is the origin and goal of man? In this lecture to a small audience I will pursue this question by comparing passages from Platonic Philebus with those from Aristotle's Nicomachian Ethics and comparing both together with a passage from the Letter to Menoikeus. It turns out that the Aristotelian idea of eudaimonia (happiness) is not so far removed from Epicurus, since eudaimonia also includes hedone, lust.

More often than not Cusanus is interpreted in a theological manner, under strong theological presuppositions and within a religious range. This is understandable since he was a cardinal and had important functions in the Papal States. The inadequacy of this approach, however, is evident when one considers that not all of his texts are meant to assert traditional beliefs but instead to reflect upon their presuppositions. A word-for-word interpretation of the first proposition of the appendix of the dialogue De non (...) aliud reveals a shift in the concept of definitio during the dialogue. Cusanus begins in a quite traditional manner and ends in a supremely abstract and speculative intuition. The not-other determines itself in a vision, setting everything in its proper place; a vision we aspire to repeat in our mental life. In this way, Cusanus does what all great philosophers do: he reflects in a given set of traditions and beliefs upon their presuppositions. (shrink)

The present text is the revised and corrected English translation of the book published in German by the Lang Verlag, Bern 2008. Unfortunately the text still has some minor flaws (especially in the Index Locorum) but they do not concern the main thesis or the arguments. It will still be the final version, especially considering my age. It is among the most widespread and the least questioned convictions that in Metaphysics Lambda Aristotle presents a theology which has its basis in (...) a metaphysics of substance. Doubts about theological interpretation are beginning to stir in a growing number of publications, but nevertheless the majority of research literature, compendiums and histories of philosophy argues within this frame. A closer look at the facts reveals that this conviction has no basis in the text. Quite the contrary it is based on a reception with theological interests. It arised over centuries, starting from Patristic times and the Middle Ages; it was influenced by Neoplatonic texts as the Liber de Causis or the Theologia Aristotelis, texts for a long time considered as original Aristotelian books. And, if you read not translations but the Greek text, you see that the word 'god' occurs much less than in a theological book should be. In some translations we find more occurences of that word, and especially in French, Italian, English translations some words as le Bien, l'Intelligence etc. are written with capitals to inticate that it is about god. To make it even more clear, we read often the term 'First Mover' or 'Unmoved Mover' as an other name for god, but this expression is never used by Aristotle. So the reader has the impression that Aristotle speaks continuously about god. In addition, in the present book you will find arguments which clean up with the outdated concept of substance in the Aristotelian text, a concept which was developed for quite other problems than Aristotle had, namely theolgical ones. And, if there is no substance, there is no corresponding metaphysics of substance and no theology or onto-theology. If substance, metyphysics, theology play no role in Metaphysics Lambda, what else is its content and aim? That is not so difficult to say because Aristotle says it sufficiently clear in his first sentence, περὶ οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία: our inquiry is about being; its aim is to develop the Frage nach dem Sein and to state a speculative answer: being is noesis, Sein ist Gewahren. (shrink)

In almost every handbook and in almost every history of philosophy you will find the thesis that Aristotle in Metaphysics Z has developed a theory about substance – an imperfect one unfortunately. From the Middle Ages until now this has been the most widely accepted claim about this book. Because the basis for this claim is not so easy to find in the text, there is a dispute about the question what a substance really is and ”which things“ are substances. (...) But the theory itself remains. If you engage to clear the field of problems in which this book has its roots, you will see apories developed by Plato in his dialogue Sophistes, mainly the apory in the middle of the dialogue. Here the guest from Elea is led to the question ”What in the world do we have to understand by the term ’to be’?“ ”...For you evidently understood the matter long ago; we, on the contrary, before thought we understood, but now are in trouble about it.“ Aristotle repeats this question, the question about being, on a new level and with new conceptual tools. In the Topics he develops what I call the ”topical approach.“ The use of it is suppported by a new type of concepts, the quotations (e. g. to ti estin: ”Say what you mean, if you ask 'What is this?'“ The standard translation ”essence“ makes impossible to see the genuine meaning of the term.) In Metaphysics Z he puts in concrete terms what in Metaphysics Λ was just a sketch of his speculation about ”to be.“ Seeing this background, it becomes clear that Metaphysics Z never contains the expected theory, which many allege that Aristotle is defending. This is no more than the remains of the pastristic and medieval interpretation. The German translation with commentary which I submit with this book, and an extensive introduction to these questions, should contribute to the destruction of this part of metaphysics. (shrink)

Globalisation Considering the Multitude of Worlds This book deals with globalisation, its foundations, its rise and fall and the question of its future. It discusses the conditions that have led, each in its own way, to the reduction of the many worlds to one. The first foundations were laid in the time of the discoveries, the earth was recognised and measured as a unified space. Missionary work and colonisation have made the geographical unit into a unity of fundamental beliefs, values (...) and Western European languages. The brisk trade with the colonies also unified the financial and economic situation of the conquered foreign worlds, which were managed according to Western patterns. The small gain of the political independence of the states achieved in the decolonisation movement was unfortunately destroyed by the great losses already suffered in the area of the fundamental values of the original worlds, their languages, their ways of living, their faith. In the new situation it became apparent that the economic dependence on the former colonial states was increasing rather than decreasing, the way of doing politics had remained by habit that of the colonial powers. Decolonisation was not a way back to the old world. Two metaphysical assumptions of globalisation are discussed in more detail. One is the assumption of realism that the world is one. This assumption justifies missionary and colonialist action. On the other hand, there is the thesis of liberalism that the being of the beings is its economic value. Against the realistic assumption of the one world, arguments are put forward which justify and make plausible the opposite assumption of a multitude of worlds. Now that the world is de facto one thanks to globalisation, and now that it is suffering from problems that affect all people, a new kind of globalisation is needed, one that recognises and respects different worlds on the one hand, but is nevertheless capable of tackling environmental, financial and social problems together. Depending on the subject, two very different ways of reasoning are used. In the preparatory historical part, the arguments are empirical and stick to details; in the part dealing with the justification of the multiplicity of worlds, the argumentation is theoretical, not to say speculative. (shrink)

A long tradition has established the consensus, that Proclus in his Stoicheiosis theologike presents the neoplatonic theology in a systematic form. And in fact, this book with its 211 general propositions is a systematic one and the word god or gods appears on almost every page. But if you pay attention to the content, you will quickly see that not the gods are the governing theme but unity. Gods are no more than metaphors of unity and intermediaries of unity. Proclus (...) is not as dogmatic, as it many believe; he has a question: How the many things are linked with unity? Our basic human experience is that of plurality, but if "to be" means "to be a unity," we must find a way to explain the unity of our experienced pluralities. Proclus’ answers is: all that is, is a unity, but in different manners or ways. Unity has many forms, a somatic form (easy to see in everyday life, material things), a psychic form (i. e. the form of the thing in a soul), a noetic form (i. e. the same thing as an element of a system, in a world) and at last a henadic form, a presence, a being, thanks to the principle of unity. In my (first) translation into German with introduction and commentary this thesis is confirmed. So Proclus must no more be considered a fantastic theologian, an irrationalist; in fact he is a strong systematic thinker, in no way deriving plurality from unity, but searching how the effective plurality of our world is guided or governed by unity. rec: Markus Gabriel, in: Philosophische Rundschau, 51 (2004) 268–270; Peter Lautner, in: Ancient Philosophy, 26 (2006) 468–471; a totally wasting one by Christian Tornau (Jena), in Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2004.11.14, I am afraid to say based on many false understandings, not at last considering the greek text. (shrink)

One of the most famous and most important commentaries of the Neoplatonist Simplicius treats the Physics of Aristotle. Several times, having commented the text within the Aristotelian frame, Simplicius treats the same subject again but now under a Neoplatonist perspective. These texts are called corollaries and one of them is about time. Discussing other Neoplatonist views about time (esp. Pseudo-Archytas, Plotinus, Damascius, Jamblichus), he tries to clarify the nature of our physical time arising from and differentiating (diakrisis) a ”first“ unmoving (...) time. What Simplicius calls ”first time“ is the very first difference in being, identical with the fact that the soul (psyche) contains the structure of the totality of things in itself before they exist materially (vorweg-bei-anderem-Sein der Seele), which makes possible the original synthesis of becoming. Following this line, our physical time brings unity to the ever changing nature. (shrink)