The relation between universal and particular is considered to be the Achilles’ heel of universal realism. However, modern universal realism with facts does not have the difficulties which traditional Platonic universal realism had. Its exemplification relation connecting particulars and universals in atomic facts is very different from Platonic participation. Bradley’s regress argument against the exemplification relation can be refuted in two different ways. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to avoid the assumption of an exemplification relation and thus to go without (...) the Achilles’ heel altogether. (shrink)
Parmenides advances four arguments against becoming. Two of these are sound. Plato's and Aristotle's attempt to refute them fail. They react to Parmenides' challenge by differentiating and grading being and existence. Thus they deviate from Parmenides' strict concept of existence which is the only reasonable one. What's wrong with Parmenides' train of thought is a decisive premise: that becoming is a transition from non-existence to existence. The reality of becoming can be maintained if this premise is given up. One has (...) to see that becoming is a purely temporal affair not involving existence and that existence is timeless. Time and existence are independent of each other. (shrink)
The distinctions between A-series and B-series, between synchronic and diachronic identity and between perdurance and endurance are basic in the philosophy of time; yet they are flawed. McTaggart’s claim that the B-series is static and that a series has to be changing to be really temporal arises from a misunderstanding of temporal relations and of the task of ontological analysis. The dynamic appearance of the A-series results from the incompleteness of the analysis. “Synchronic identity” is synonymous with “strict identity”, which (...) has nothing to do with simultaneity. “Diachronic Identity” is another designation for persistence of an ordinary thing through time and change. Now, strict self-identity holds independently of whether a thing has a short or a long duration. Hence, diachronic identity is synchronic identity. Lewis’ distinguishes two kinds of ontological analyses of persistence, the perdurance and the endurance analysis. This dichotomy is in several respects not exhaustive. Above all, his definition of “persist” is inadequate being based on the notion of multiple temporal localisation which is apt with interrupted but misplaced with persistent, i.e., temporally continuous objects. (shrink)
Meinong's realist theory of measurement is brought up against the presently dominating positivist and operationalist view. His criticism of 19th century positivist analysis of measurement (J. v. Kries) turns out to be pertinent to modern model-theoretic analysis (Suppes and Zinnes). Meinong's ontology of quantities as well as his view of associative and derived measurement is confronted with the operational analysis. The positivist cannot make sense of measurement error and tries to push it aside. In Meinong's view it is pivotal. This (...) view harmonises with the practice of measurement where error is used as a means of gaining knowledge. Starting from Meinong and his pupil Mally a more adequate theory of measurement could be developed. (shrink)
Diversity, more often called numerical difference, is all-embracing and ubiquitous. Any entity (existent) of whatever category is diverse from any entity else. Diversity is also ontologically primary. All determinations depend upon it. Therefore, it is mistaken to define diversity as qualitative difference. Such a defintion is circular since qualitative difference is nothing but diversity of properties. This may be called into question by someone who conceives of qualitative difference in terms of negation.
El artículo discute el papel tanto de las categorías supremas como el de las subcategorías a partir de la tradicional distinción aristotélica entre una división mínima y una división máxima del ente. Señala que para determinar las categorías son necesarias las propiedades categoriales. Se argumenta que un existente no puede poseer dos propiedades esenciales de tipo categorial, mientras que solo las subcategorías más bajas en la escala poseen propiedades categoriales simples. Se señala, además, que las categorías y las subcategorías se (...) organizan en un árbol según una cierta unidad y que, por el contrario, los conceptos no se jerarquizan necesariamente formando un árbol. También se analizan las dificultades que Porfirio y Simplicio encontraron en la división mínima y máxima de Aristóteles. Finalmente, el artículo critica el modo en que Aristóteles evita, a través de la abstracción, la referencia a las propiedades categoriales. (shrink)
Meinong's realist theory of measurement is brought up against the presently dominating positivist and operationalist view. His criticism of 19th century positivist analysis of measurement turns out to be pertinent to modern model-theoretic analysis. Meinong's ontology of quantities as well as his view of associative and derived measurement is confronted with the operational analysis. The positivist cannot make sense of measurement error and tries to push it aside. In Meinong's view it is pivotal. This view harmonises with the practice of (...) measurement where error is used as a means of gaining knowledge. Starting from Meinong and his pupil Mally a more adequate theory of measurement could be developed. (shrink)