The chapter is divided into three separate parts. In the first part I critically discuss Adorno's interpretation of Heidegger's concern with the question of Being. Central to this interpretation is Adorno's view that Being, for Heidegger, resonates with onto‐theological or metaphysical accounts of the highest and most general being – that of Plato's ideas, or Aristotle's substance. In various steps, looking at several key claims of Heidegger, I argue that this approach is misguided. Heidegger draws a clear and philosophically justified (...) distinction between his conception of Being and the Platonic vision of essence. The second part identifies a strand of Adorno's critique that does not depend on the onto‐theological reading. This is the critique of fetishization and reification – Adorno's view that Heidegger falsely seeks to imbue his thinking and diagnosis of modernity with a veneer of the timeless and transcendental. Adorno, I suggest, justifiably introduces his dialectical procedure as a means to correct this tendency: Concepts, he claims, should be viewed and analyzed in terms of the non‐identity between themselves and the states of affairs to which they purport to refer. In clear contrast to the Heideggerian call for some kind of essential or necessary reference – words that magically yet “necessarily” pick out their object, and that thereby aspire to overcome the fateful split between word and object (or subject and object) – Adorno insists on difference, differentiation, and absence, a historically indexed self‐reflection. In the final part I propose a reading of Heidegger that takes heed of Adorno's warnings against fetishization and reification. While far from trying to efface the decisive differences between the two thinkers, I highlight moments in Heidegger that lend themselves to a dialectical interpretation. I argue that these are moments of remembrance – moments in which human practice anticipate a more reconciled relation between subject and object. (shrink)

While Henry and Levinas are often juxtaposed, little attention has been given to their shared views on pain and pleasure. Both phenomenologists converge on the argument that an adequate account of pain and pleasure requires a critical confrontation with the theory of intentionality. This raises further questions. What roles do interiority and exteriority play in pain and pleasure? Should they be conceived as different tonalities of one essence or as heterogenous phenomena? Despite their shared critique of intentionality, Henry and Levinas (...) respond differently to these questions. We argue that Henry’s account suffers from an imprisonment in immanence, leading to a homogenous account of pain and pleasure as derivatives of one essence. In our view, Levinas points toward a more fruitful phenomenological account, both in so far as he does not divorce pain and pleasure from exteriority, and also in the way his phenomenology preserves the heterogeneity of pleasure and pain. (shrink)

Draws on classical and recent philosophical studies to show how religious ideas bear on the phenomenology of the body in pain.

The dynamic developmental theory (DDT) has benefited from the insights of the commentators, particularly in terms of the implications for the proposed steepened delay gradients in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The introduction of modified memory processes as a basis for the delay gradients improved the links to aspects of ADHD. However, it remains unclear whether the hyperactive-impulsive and inattentive subtypes are separate subgroups or may be explained as different outcomes of the same genetic factors and thus explicable by the same principles. (...) The DDT suggests that altered reinforcement and extinction processes define an endophenotype in ADHD that can be related dimensionally to inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity. The relation between the suggested endophenotype, characterized by changes in basic learning mechanisms, and other endophenotypes characterized by delay aversion or response disinhibition, needs to be tested in future studies. (shrink)

Existence value refers to the value humans ascribe to the existence of something, regard­less of whether it is or will be of any particular use to them. This existence value based on preference satisfaction should be taken into account in evaluating activities that come with a risk of species extinction. There are two main objections. The first is that on the preference satisfaction interpretation, the concept lacks moral importance because satisfying people’s preferences may involve no good or well-being for them. (...) However, existence value can be based on a restricted version of the preference satisfaction theory, which is not vulnerable to the skeptical arguments about the link between preference satisfaction and well-being. The second objection is that even if preference satisfaction can be linked to well-being, understanding existence value in terms of individual preference satisfaction is incoherent, because existence value reflects disinterested preferences that involve no benefits to the individual. However, the fact that existence value may involve disinterested preferences does not threaten the coherence of the concept, but suggests that it does not fit smoothly into the “utilitarian” or “welfarist” framework it is commonly considered within. A pluralistic normative approach based on prima facie duties can be an alternative to standard utilitarian-style approaches for considering existence value in concrete cases involving a risk of species extinction, such as through deep sea mining. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the possible contributions of empirical moral philosophy to professional ethics in teacher education. We argue that it is both possible and desirable to connect knowledge of how teachers empirically do and understand professional ethics with normative theories of teachers’ professional ethics. Our argument is made in dialogue with the moral philosophy of Charles Taylor and the emerging tradition of ‘empirical ethics’ in psychiatry. We also draw on empirical data from a larger empirical project on teachers’ (...) professional ethics in Norway. Our main contribution is the development of a method for empirical professional ethics that involves three steps: articulation, disturbance and expansion. (shrink)

Some fundamental aspects of the lived body only become evident when it breaks down through illness, weakness or pain. From a phenomenological point of view, various breakdowns are worth analyzing for their own sake, and discussing them also opens up overlooked dimensions of our bodily constitution. This book brings together different approaches that shed light on the phenomenology of the lived body—its normality and abnormality, health and sickness, its activity as well as its passivity. The contributors integrate phenomenological insights with (...) discussions about bodily brokenness in philosophy, theology, medical science and literary theory. Phenomenology of the Broken Body demonstrates how the broken body sheds fresh light on the nuances of embodied experience in ordinary life and ultimately questions phenomenology’s preunderstanding of the body. (shrink)

Death is something we mourn or fear as the worst thing that could happen―whether the deaths of close ones, the deaths of strangers in reported accidents or tragedies, or our own. And yet, being dead is something that no one can experience and live to describe. This simple truth raises a host of difficult philosophical questions about the negativity surrounding our sense of death, and how and for whom exactly it is harmful. The question of whether death is bad has (...) occupied philosophers for centuries, and the debate emerging in philosophical literature is referred to as the "badness of death." Are deaths primarily negative for the survivors, or does death also affect the deceased? What are the differences between death in fetal life, just after birth, or in adolescence? In order to properly evaluate deaths in global health, we must find answers to these questions. -/- In this volume, leading philosophers, medical doctors, and economists discuss different views on how to evaluate death and its relevance for health policy. This includes theories about the harm of death and its connections to population-level bioethics. For example, one of the standard views in global health is that newborn deaths are among the worst types of death, yet stillbirths are neglected. This raises difficult questions about why birth is so significant, and several of the book's authors challenge this standard view. -/- This is the first volume to connect philosophical discussions on the harm of death with discussions on population health, adjusting the ways in which death is evaluated. Changing these evaluations has consequences for how we prioritize different health programs that affect individuals at different ages, as well as how we understand inequality in health. (shrink)

While forgiveness is widely recognised as an example of a supererogatory action, it remains to be explained precisely what makes forgiveness supererogatory, or the circumstances under which it is supererogatory to forgive. Philosophers often claim that forgiveness is supererogatory, but most of the time they do so without offering an adequate explanation for why it is supererogatory to forgive. Accordingly, the literature on forgiveness lacks a sufficiently nuanced account of the supererogatory status of forgiveness. In this paper, I seek to (...) remedy this shortcoming by offering a systematic account of forgiveness as an example of a supererogatory action. In terms of explaining the supererogatory status of forgiveness, I will argue that, to qualify as supererogatory, a forgiving action must fulfil three conditions: (i) it must be permissible; (ii) it must not be obligatory; and (iii) it must be good or praiseworthy, that is, it must have a certain moral value. Moreover, a distinction is drawn between “unconditional” and “conditional” forgiveness. I argue that conditional forgiveness (i.e. forgiveness of repentant wrongdoers) is sometimes a duty and sometimes supererogatory, whereas unconditional forgiveness (i.e. forgiveness of unrepentant wrongdoers) is typically supererogatory or beyond duty. (shrink)

With regard to any natural resource, we can ask whether we should obtain (more of) it. For instance, we may ask whether we, as a society, should seek to obtain more minerals, or more oil. Furthermo...

While there is an extensive literature on how the precautionary principle should be interpreted and when precautions should be taken, relatively little discussion exists about the fair distribution of costs of taking precautions. We address this issue by proposing a general framework for deciding how costs of precautions should be shared, which consists of a series of default principles that are triggered according to desert, rights, and ability to pay. The framework is developed with close attention to the pragmatics of (...) how distributions will affect actual behaviours. It is intended to help decision-makers think more systematically about distributional consequences of taking precautionary measures, thereby to improve decision-making. Two case studies—one about a ban on turtle fishing in Costa Rica, and one about a deep-sea mining project in Papua New Guinea—are given to show how the framework can be applied. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Teoretisk praksis -- Bd. 2. Historisk praksis.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the question of whether we have a duty to forgive those who repent and apologize for the wrong they have done. I shall argue that we have a pro tanto duty to forgive repentant wrongdoers, and I shall propose and consider the norm of forgiveness. This norm states that if a wrongdoer repents and apologizes to a victim, then the victim has a duty to forgive the wrongdoer, other things being equal. That (...) someone has a pro tanto duty to forgive a repentant wrongdoer means that he or she ought to forgive unless other considerations outweigh the norm of forgiveness. Furthermore, a distinction is made between what are termed 'general considerations' and 'case-relative considerations', and it is argued that only after all the relevant considerations have been examined can it be determined whether there is a duty to forgive, all things considered. (shrink)

Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is currently defined as a cognitive/behavioral developmental disorder where all clinical criteria are behavioral. Inattentiveness, overactivity, and impulsiveness are presently regarded as the main clinical symptoms. The dynamic developmental behavioral theory is based on the hypothesis that altered dopaminergic function plays a pivotal role by failing to modulate nondopaminergic (primarily glutamate and GABA) signal transmission appropriately. A hypofunctioning mesolimbic dopamine branch produces altered reinforcement of behavior and deficient extinction of previously reinforced behavior. This gives rise to delay (...) aversion, development of hyperactivity in novel situations, impulsiveness, deficient sustained attention, increased behavioral variability, and failure to “inhibit” responses (“disinhibition”). A hypofunctioning mesocortical dopamine branch will cause attention response deficiencies (deficient orienting responses, impaired saccadic eye movements, and poorer attention responses toward a target) and poor behavioral planning (poor executive functions). A hypofunctioning nigrostriatal dopamine branch will cause impaired modulation of motor functions and deficient nondeclarative habit learning and memory. These impairments will give rise to apparent developmental delay, clumsiness, neurological “soft signs,” and a “failure to inhibit” responses when quick reactions are required. Hypofunctioning dopamine branches represent the main individual predispositions in the present theory. The theory predicts that behavior and symptoms in ADHD result from the interplay between individual predispositions and the surroundings. The exact ADHD symptoms at a particular time in life will vary and be influenced by factors having positive or negative effects on symptom development. Altered or deficient learning and motor functions will produce special needs for optimal parenting and societal styles. Medication will to some degree normalize the underlying dopamine dysfunction and reduce the special needs of these children. The theory describes how individual predispositions interact with these conditions to produce behavioral, emotional, and cognitive effects that can turn into relatively stable behavioral patterns. Key Words: catecholamine; clumsiness; dopamine; hyperkinesis; hyperkinetic disorder; impulsivity; monoamine; neuromodulator; overactivity; pollutants; reinforcement; reward; verbally governed behavior; soft signs; variability. (shrink)

Theodor Adorno was one of the foremost radical thinkers of the Twentieth century. Critic of the Enlightenment, liberalism and modernity, he was the architect behind the famous Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and his work ranged over philosophy, social and cultural theory, art and music. In this lucid book, Espen Hammer critically considers and defends Adorno's most important contribution: his political thought and it contemporary relevance. Espen Hammer examines the background to Adorno's thought in the work of Kierkegaard, (...) Marx, Weber and Walter Benjamin and assesses Adorno's critique of Enlightenment and modernity in his famous work, Dialectic of Enlightenment. He then considers Adorno's critique of Kant and Hegel and considers Adorno's celebrated theory of negative dialectics. He defends Adorno's against Jurgen Habermas's criticism that Adorno's thought is irrational and subject-centred before considering how Adorno's theory of alterity is evident in the work of Derrida and Levinas. Adorno and the Political is an invigorating exploration of a key political thinker and is also a useful introduction to his thought as a whole. It will be of interest to those in philosophy, sociology and politics. (shrink)

It is widely recognised in moral philosophy that there is only something to forgive in cases of unexcused and unjustified wrongdoing. I will call this the standard view. According to this view, forgiveness presupposes that the person to be forgiven has done something that warrants blame and resentment. This standard view has not prompted much discussion in the literature on forgiveness. Most writers on forgiveness seem to accept that it only makes sense to speak of forgiveness in those cases where (...) someone is strictly speaking to blame for having done wrong. I think, however, that the literature on forgiveness lacks an adequately nuanced account of the relationship between forgiveness, justifications and excuses. The present paper challenges the standard view among philosophers that we can only make sense of forgiveness in the context of unexcused and unjustified wrongdoing. I will propose and consider an alternative view according to which there is something to forgive in certain types of cases involving limited responsibility, that is, where a person has a justification or an excuse for her action. More precisely, the aim of this paper is twofold: First, to argue that there is something to forgive others for in certain cases where the other person is excused or justified (i.e. interpersonal forgiveness). Secondly, to argue that there is something to forgive oneself for in certain cases where one has an excuse or a justification for one’s action (i.e. self-forgiveness). (shrink)

Stanley Cavell is a leading figure in American philosophy and one of the most exhilarating and wide-ranging intellectuals of our time. In this book Espen Hammer offers a lucid and thorough account of the development of Cavell's work, from his early writings on ordinary language philosophy and skepticism to his most recent contributions to film studies, literary theory, romanticism, ethics, and politics. The book traces the many lines of skepticism occurring in Cavell's work and shows how they amount to (...) a rich and subtle picture of human subjectivity. Hammer explores Cavell's passionate engagement with Austin and Wittgenstein's visions of language, and his uncovering of conceptions of the ordinary in Emerson and Thoreau. Central sections of the book are devoted to the tragic and the comic as these modes of existence come into play in Shakespeare and Hollywood cinematic drama. In elaborating Cavell's responses to thinkers such as Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida, the author situates Cavell's writing within the wider context of contemporary continental philosophy. Hammer clearly reveals the existential dimensions of Cavell's thought. He argues that his variant of ordinary language philosophy is a vital stimulus to self-transformation in cognitive, aesthetic, ethical, and political domains, contributing significantly to a rethinking of issues such as responsibility and autonomy, and the relationship between philosophy and literature. A critical introduction to the thought of an inordinately complex writer, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars in philosophy, literary theory, cultural theory, comparative literature, and media and cultural studies. (shrink)

While there is no shortage of philosophical and theological occupations with the problem of evil and theodicy, the phenomenological basis from which the problem arises often gets lost in abstract accounts. In delimiting the case to physical pain, this article attempts to provide a perspective on the problem of evil following the lead from one of the problem’s sources. Through a phenomenological analysis of pain, the article highlights the inner tension that belongs to the experience of pain. This contradiction can (...) be traced on various levels: pain as sensational impression, as bodily occurrence, and as posing a question of meaning. This phenomenology of pain can provide a perspective on the origin and nature of the problem of evil: both why intellectual responses must arise and why it cannot reach an adequate solution. (shrink)

The value of nature has been extensively debated in environmental ethics. There has been less discussion, however, about how one should understand the relation between this value and normativity, or reasons: if something in nature is seen as valuable, how should we understand the relation between this fact and claims about reasons to, for example, protect it or promote its existence? The “commonsense” view is that value gives rise to reasons. The buck-passing account of value, on the other hand, implies (...) that for an entity or state of affairs in nature to be valuable just is for it to have properties that provide reasons to promote or have a pro-attitude towards it. BPA has been extensively debated, but has received little attention in environmental philosophy. In this paper, it is argued that the view suggests a “reasons first” approach to environmental ethics, and that it should be preferred to competing accounts of value in the context of environmental ethics. (shrink)

In decision-making based on multiple criteria, situations may arise where agents find their options to be neither better than, worse than nor equal to each other with respect to the relevant criteria. How, if at all, can a justified choice be made between such options? Are the options incomparable? This article explores a hypothetical case that illustrates how such a situation can arise in an environmental context; more specifically, it considers the deliberations of an imagined 'ethics committee' as it struggles (...) to decide whether or not a deep-sea mining project should be allowed to proceed. I argue that the case is best understood as involving options that are comparable in the sense of being 'on a par'. Working out from a discussion of Ruth Chang's 'self-governance' theory of choice in cases of parity, I suggest that, in the environmental context, the idea of choices expressing a moral identity may lead us in the direction of a plausible solution to these particularly challenging cases. (shrink)

Ruth Tallman has recently offered a defense of the modified youngest first principle of scarce resource allocation [1]. According to Tallman, this principle calls for prioritizing adolescents and young adults between 15–40 years of age. In this article, I argue that Tallman’s defense of the modified youngest first principle is vulnerable to important objections, and that it is thus unsuitable as a basis for allocating resources. Moreover, Tallman makes claims about the badness of death for individuals at different ages, but (...) she lacks an account of the loss involved in dying to support her claims. To fill this gap in Tallman’s account, I propose a view on the badness of death that I call ‘Deprivationism’. I argue that this view explains why death is bad for those who die, and that it has some advantages over Tallman’s complete lives view in the context of scarce resource allocation. Finally, I consider some objections to the relevance of Deprivationism to resource allocation, and offer my responses. (shrink)

_Systematic public vaccination constitutes a tremendous health success, perhaps the greatest achievement of biomedicine so far. There is, however, room for improvement. Each year, 1.5 million deaths could be avoided with enhanced immunisation coverage. In recent years, many countries have introduced mandatory childhood vaccination programmes in an attempt to avoid deaths. In Norway, however, the vaccination programme has remained voluntary. Our childhood immunisation programme covers protection for twelve infectious diseases, and Norwegian children are systematically immunised from six weeks to sixteen (...) years of age. In this article, we address the question of whether our country, Norway, should make the childhood vaccination programme mandatory. This question has received considerable public attention in the media, yet surprisingly little academic discussion has followed. The aim of the article is to systematically discuss whether it is morally justified to introduce a mandatory childhood vaccination programme in Norway. Our discussion proceeds as follows: We begin by presenting relevant background information on the history of vaccines and the current Norwegian childhood vaccination programme. Next, we discuss what we consider to be the most central arguments against mandatory childhood vaccination: the argument from the standpoints of parental rights, bodily integrity, naturalness, mistrust, and immunisation coverage. After that, we examine the central arguments in favour of mandatory childhood vaccination from the standpoints of harm, herd immunity, and as a precautionary strategy. We conclude that there are convincing moral arguments in favour of adopting a policy of mandatory childhood vaccination in Norway._ _Keywords_: autonomy, harm principle, herd immunity, parental rights, precautionary approach. (shrink)

_Taking issue with sustainable governance involves careful consideration of social, economic, and environmental dimensions of sustainability, and the interplay of those dimensions in political processes and decision-making. The current issue of Etikk i Praksis contributes to this task by offering analysis of central concepts in the discourse of sustainability, as well as examinations of political and moral issues raised by pressing environmental challenges such as climate change._.

The first part of the article examines how Augustine’s notion of the everyday is mediated by his mystical ascensions, which give him the sense of height against which everydayness appears as oriented downward or fallen. These are the coordinates that make up the fundamental verticality of Augustine’s view. Heidegger’s understanding of everydayness was influenced by Augustine, particularly its inherent tendency to fall. In the article’s second part, it is argued that Heidegger explicitly avoids all references to metaphysical or religious heights. (...) For his reason, his notion of falling appears problematic as it both invokes and abandons verticality. Arguably, Heidegger’s turning from verticality to horizontality comes with a cost, as it must renounce the possibility of conceiving the radicality of the fall from a perspective from above. However, as the article’s final part shows, Heidegger and Augustine do not only provide a view of everydayness as falling, but they both share the conviction that there is more to it: Heidegger speaks of the enigmas rooted in everydayness itself, which, however, do not point above, but toward its overlooked sense of Being; Augustine invokes ordinary events as traces of wonder that point from the lowly up to the transcendence of God. (shrink)

There is no doubt that Spinoza values what he calls living under the guidance of reason, and that he somehow equates such a life with happiness. What is less clear is exactly how he conceives of such a life, and thus how he conceives of human happiness. According to Arne Naess's interpretation of Spinoza, the virtuous and free person will prefer the life of action, and happiness is best realised through living an active life “in the world”. Other scholars, however, (...) have interpreted Spinoza as suggesting that the maximally free person will prefer a life of contemplation “outside the world”. In this paper, I address Naess's relationship with this aspect of Spinoza's practical philosophy, and propose my own interpretation of Spinoza where happiness, or living under the guidance of reason, consists in a combination of activity and contemplation. (shrink)

The American philosopher Stanley Cavell is a secular Jew who by his own admission is obsessed with Christ, yet his outlook on religion in general is ambiguous. Probing the secular and the sacred in Cavell’s thought, Espen Dahl explains that Cavell, while often parting ways with Christianity, cannot dismiss it either. Focusing on Cavell's work as a whole, but especially on his recent engagement with Continental philosophy, Dahl brings out important themes in Cavell’s philosophy and his conversation with theology.

Summary Husserl’s notion of horizon plays a decisive role in his phenomenological analysis of perception. It is nevertheless striking that prominent philosophers of the “theological turn” in phenomenology, such as Levinas and Marion, attach no religious significance to the phenomenological horizon; on the contrary, they tend to regard the horizon as an obstacle to the experience of the religious. This article argues, however, that if divinity is somehow implied in the proximity of things and yet stretches out to the most (...) remote, horizontality neatly captures the divine givenness. Far from imposing restrictions on experience, the horizon opens the possibility for meaningful experience in the first place; and far from being closed in on itself, the horizon remains inherently open to revision and change. Moreover, the horizon unfolds according to a double movement of what can be called its humility and its generosity: it withdraws from the actual presence of intentional objects in order for such objects to emerge. Arguably, revelation does not cancel the non-objective givenness of the horizon, but reveals the divine horizontality by enacting its double movement: Christ is driven out of the world in order to save it. (shrink)

Over the last several decades, the continental phenomenological tradition has been marked by what has been termed “the theological turn.” Major figures such as Levinas, Henry, Marion, and Lacoste have moved beyond the restrictions of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology and have opened up phenomenology to distinctly theological themes. But such a “turn” has not been uncontested. The relation between phenomenology and theology has been at the heart of the discussion, raising the question of what constitutes philosophical description, as well as (...) of theology’s possible claim on phenomenology.Felix Ó Murchadha’s book, A Phenomenology of Christian Life: Glory and Night, situates itself within this discussion and does not hesitate to take sides. Indeed, Ó Murchadha has written a remarkable contribution to the ongoing debate, advocating the possibility of a distinctly Christian phenomenology. Far from confining himself to a commentary on key contributions to the recent debate, Murchadha’s. (shrink)

SummaryThis article has been concerned with the possibilities and limitations in two different approaches to general revelation prevalent in current philosophy of religion. Werner Jeanrond follows Rahner in his emphasis of experience in encountering revelation, but he wants to supplement Rahner's contribution with critical resources found in Paul Ricœur's hermeneutics. This suggestion, however, calls for a more thorough investigation of the relation between experience and interpretation, phenomenology and hermeneutics with regard to revelation. Ricœur's own accounts of revelation focus on readers' (...) encounters with sacred texts. As it turns out, such focus is not one among many in Ricœur's accounts of the revelation, but rather their very paradigm. When turning to Ricœur's treatment of phenomenology it becomes clear that Ricœur firmly rejects any phenomenological appeal to immediate experience; every experience must be mediated by language, speech, and subjected to interpretation. What is lost when hermeneutics assimilates phenomenology in this way, is the sensibility to the transcendence or foreignness inherent in general revelations. Such experience of foreignness is not understood as Levinas' excessivealterity, which Ricœur rightly discards, but rather a foreignness found in the middle of everyday familiarity. In order to offer an adequate philosophical response to such understanding of revelation, this article argues that the autonomy of phenomenology over against hermeneutics must be granted.ZusammenfassungDieser Artikel behandelt die Möglichkeiten und Begrenzungen zweier unterschiedlicher, in der gegenwärtigen Religionsphilosophie vorherrschender Annäherungen an allgemeine Offenbarung. Werner Jeanrond folgt Rahner in dessen Gewichtung der Erfahrung in der Begegnung mit Offenbarung, möchte aber den Beitrag Rahners kritisch mit Elementen aus der Hermeneutik Paul Ricœurs ergänzen. Sein Vorschlag verlangt jedoch nach einer vollständigeren Untersuchung der Beziehung zwischen Erfahrung und Interpretation, zwischen Phänomenologie und Hermeneutik in Bezug auf Offenbarung. Ricœurs eigene Konzepte von Offenbarung konzentrieren sich auf die Begegnungen der Leser mit heiligen Texten. Wie es sich zeigt, kommt diesem Fokus in Ricœurs Darstellungen von Offenbarung ein nicht etwa beiläufiger, sondern geradezu paradigmatischer Status zu. An Ricœurs Behandlung der Phänomenologie wird deutlich, daß Ricœur jede phänomenologische Behauptung einer unmittelbaren Erfahrung nachdrücklich abweist; alle Erfahrung ist durch Sprache, Rede und subjektive Deutung vermittelt. Eine derartige Assimilierung der Phänomenologie durch die Hermeneutik verliert allerdings die Sensibilität der Transzendenz oder Fremdheit gegenüber, die der allgemeinen Offenbarung zueigen ist. Die erfahrene Fremdheit ist dabei nicht als Levinas'sche exzessive Alterität zu verstehen, die Ricœur zu Recht verwirft, sondern eher als Fremdheit, die in der Mitte der Alltagsvertrautheit erfahrbar ist. Für eine adäquate philosophische Untermauerung dieses Verständnisses von allgemeiner Offenbarung als Erfahrung des Fremden im Vertrauten ist es dann allerdings zwingend, die Autonomie der Phänomenologie gegenüber der Hermeneutik zu gewährleisten. (shrink)

This article argues that Cavell's key concept of acknowledgement is of great theological significance. Acknowledgement is meant as a particular interpretation of knowledge, which emphasises the personal responsiveness and responsibility to the human other and to the world. As Cavell himself indicates, acknowledgement also overlaps with faith. However, what such acknowledgement of God amounts to, is not yet satisfactorily understood in the growing literature on Cavell. This article argues that Cavell's treatment of confessions (Augustine, Wittgenstein) and acceptance of promise (Luther) (...) provides important clues to a more elaborate understanding of acknowledgement in general, and of acknowledging God in particular. (shrink)

Despite the divide between American formalism and theoreticians of minimalism, Barnett Newman’s art received great acclaim from both schools of thought. Attempting to unearth the philosophical preconditions of this strange constellation, this article argues that the closeness between minimalism and formalism is due to their mutual reliance upon phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy. However, their proximity also conveys their distance, since they imply different interpretations and applications of the philosophical schools in question. Such theoretical differences shed light on Newman’s paintings: (...) both minimalism and formalism are right in their accounts – yet not exclusively so. What arguably makes up the distinctive fascination of Newman’s paintings is their incessant oscillation between empty physicality and powerful meaning. (shrink)

This account of evil takes the Book of Job as its guide. The Book of Job considers physical pain, social bereavement, the origin of evil, theodicy, justice, divine violence, and reward. Such problems are explored by consulting ancient and modern accounts from the fields of theology and philosophy, broadly conceived. Some of the literature on evil - especially the philosophical literature - is inclined toward the abstract treatment of such problems. Bringing along the suffering Job will serve as a reminder (...) of the concrete, lived experience in which the problem of evil has its roots. (shrink)

What is the best way to approach our environmental problems? Or what kind of environmental ethics or philosophy is best suited to address and possibly solve some of the most serious environmental problems of our time? These questions have been discussed several times over the last decades and various alternative answers have been proposed for how to deal with contemporary environmental problems. One influential approach in the early 1970s was deep ecology, launched by Arne Naess in his article «The Shallow (...) and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary». Deep ecology or the deep ecological movement was for a long time a dominant theme in environmental philosophy and it has given rise to numerous articles, books and conferences. Deep ecology flourished in the 1970-80s, but its standing today is severely diminished. Why has deep ecology lost its standing as a leading environmental philosophy and movement? In this paper, I discuss some of the reasons why I think deep ecology has such a limited appeal today. I will argue that the flaw of deep ecology lies in its adherence to ontology rather than ethics. Supporters of deep ecology, such as Naess himself, have tended to attach great importance to our experience of reality as a source of environmental attitudes. But I believe that this focus on environmental ontology has been a recipe for disaster rather than a success for deep ecology and its supporters. I suggest that a proper environmental position should be based on critical thinking and moral principles rather than on ontological assumptions about human experiences of the world. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss some central ethical aspects of self-forgiveness. A first comparison is made between interpersonal forgiveness and self-forgiveness. It would seem that self-forgiveness follows much of the same structure as interpersonal forgiveness, although with some exceptions. One noticeable difference is that with self-forgiveness, the forgiver and forgiven is one and the same person. The main ethical question discussed is when self-forgiveness is morally permissible. I argue that self-forgiveness is only morally permissible when the wrongdoer acknowledges wrongdoing and (...) display genuine repentance. He must also, insofar as possible, ask the victim for forgiveness before contemplating self-forgiveness. (shrink)

It is a useful exercise to reflect, sometimes, on the way philosophy is carried out, and on how we think philosophy should be carried out in the future. We need to accept that academia is undergoing some important changes, which means that academic philosophy is also changing. The aim of this article is to discuss what gives philosophy its legitimacy in Norway. I will argue that the justification for having philosophy in Norway, in one way or the other, must be (...) that it has societal value. In this respect, I believe that teaching and public outreach are philosophy's most important areas of focus. Even though I mainly concentrate on academic philosophy in Norway, much of what I say is relevant for understanding the legitimacy of academic philosophy in other countries. (shrink)