5 found
Eugene O. Mills [5]Eugene Orin Mills [1]
  1.  90
    Interactionism and Overdetermination.Eugene O. Mills - 1996 - American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):105-115.
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  2.  99
    Dividing Without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity.Eugene O. Mills - 1993 - Mind 102 (405):37-51.
  3.  66
    Fallibility and the Phenomenal Sorites.Eugene O. Mills - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):384-407.
  4.  76
    Interactionism and Physicality.Eugene O. Mills - 1997 - Ratio 10 (2):169-83.
    Substance‐dualist interactionism faces two sorts of challenge. One is empirical, involving the alleged incompatibility between interactionism and the supposed closure of the physical world. Although widely considered successful, this challenge gives no reason for preferring materialism to dualism. The other sort of challenge holds that interactionism is conceptually impossible. The historically influential version of the conceptual challenge is now discredited, but recent discussions by Chomsky and by Crane and Mellor suggest a new version. In brief, the argument is that anything (...)
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  5.  44
    Giving Up on the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Eugene O. Mills - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):26-32.
    David Chalmers calls the problem of explaining why physical processes give rise to conscious phenomenal experience the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. He argues convincingly that no reductive account of consciousness can solve it and offers instead a non-reductive account which takes consciousness as fundamental. This paper argues that a theory of the sort Chalmers proposes cannot hope to solve the hard problem of consciousness precisely because it takes the relation between physical processes and consciousness as fundamental rather than explicable. The (...)
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